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Abstract 
This thesis addresses a practical problem. The problem concerns the evaluation of 'identification 
parades', or 'lineups', which are frequently used by police to secure evidence of identification. It is 
well recogni~ed that this evidence is frequently unreliable, and has led on occasion to tragic 
miscarriages.· of justice. A review of South African law is conducted and reported in the thesis, and 
shows that the legal treatment of identification parades centres on the requirement that parades should 
be composed of people of similar appearance to the suspect. I argue that it is not possible, in practice, 
to assess whether this requirement has been met and that this is a significant failing. Psychological 
work on identification parades includes the development of measures of parade fairness, and the 
investigation of alternate lineup structures. Measures of parade fairness suggested in the literature are 
indirectly derived, though; and I argue that they fail to address the question of physical similarity. In 
addition, I develop ways of reasoning inferentially (statistically) with measures of parade fairness, 
and suggest a new measure of parade fairness. 
The absence of a direct measure of similarity constitutes the rationale for the empirical component of 
the thesis. I propose a measure of facial similarity, in which the similarity of two faces is defined as 
the Euclidean distance between them in a principal component space, or representational basis. (The 
space is determined by treating a set of digitzed faces as numerical vectors, and by submitting these to 
principal component analysis). A similar definition is provided for 'facial distinctiveness', namely as 
the distance of a face from the origin or centroid of the space. 
The validity of the proposed similarity measure is investigated in several ways, in a total of seven 
studies, involving approximately 700 subjects. 350 frontal face images and 280 profile face images 
were collected for use as experimental materials, and as the source for the component space 
underlying the similarity measure. The weight of the evidence, particularly from a set of similarity 
rating tasks, suggests that the measure corresponds reasonably well to perceptions of facial similarity. 
Results from a mock witness experiment showed that it is also strongly, and monotonically related to 
standard measures of lineup fairness. Evidence from several investigations of the distinctiveness 
measure, on the other hand, showed that it does not appear to be related to perceptions of facial 
distinctiveness. An additional empirical investigation examined the relation between target-foil 
similarity and identification performance. Performance was greater for lineups of low similarity, both 
when the perpetrator was present, and when the perpetrator was absent. The consequences of this for 
the understanding of lineup construction and evaluation are discussed. 
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~ lnfroducfion '&'o 
This thesis addresses a practical problem. The problem concerns the evaluation of an identification 
technique commonly used by police, which is known as the 'identification parade', or 'lineup': 
The quality of evidence secured from an identification parade is dependent on both the structure of 
the parade, and the way in which it is regulated. Legal systems in most countries have evolved 
fairly effective conditions for the regulation of parades, but have paid little attention to the question 
of parade structure, particularly with respect to how parade structure should be evaluated. The 
central requirement of parade structure, at least in English and South African law, is that it consist 
of an adequate number of foils who bear a sufficient physical resemblance to the suspect. The 
courts provide ineffective criteria for judging 'sufficient physical resemblance', and this hampers 
the task of parade construction, and the task of parade evaluation. Since the identification parade is 
considered a key test of eyewitness identification, it is clear that the inability to assess the 
requirement of physical similarity is a significant problem. The central project of this thesis is the . 
development and validation of a measure of one element of physical similarity. In particular, I will 
propose a measure of facial similarity, which appears also to be a promising measure of parade 
fairness. This thesis is consequently a treatise in 'applied psychology', but not narrowly so. There 
are important issues, in particular, that attend the notion of 'applied psychology', and a 
consideration of these will take us well outside the project of the similarity measure. 
Psychology has long suffered an internal division over its site of practice. Experimental psychology 
has, by and large, opted for the artificial laboratory, in wilful emulation of natural sciences like 
Chemistry. At the same time, other traditions of psychology have chosen locations outside the 
confines of the laboratory, in the world of 'practical problems'. The present piece of work adopts 
the approach of the latter type of 'tradition, but will endeavour also to examine its foundations. 
There is no attempt to exalt this approach over others, but the inherent jealousy of intellectual 
traditions should, of course, be recognised. 
One of the 'real problems' that Psychology has addressed on several occasions this century, but 
especially in recent times, is that of legal identification evidence. Humans who witness events are 
The tenns 'identification parade' and 'lineup' will be used interchangeably in this thesis. 
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Chapter 1 l~frodudion 
frequently called by courts and police services to deliver their testimony. This testimony frequently 
takes the form of an identification of a person allegedly involved in the witnessed event, and is used 
as evidence against the identified person. It is well known that eyewitness identifications are 
frequently mistaken, and have on occasions led to tragic miscarriages of justice. Several of the 
more recent tragedies in the USA are vividly documented by Loftus & Ketcham (1991).2 Some 
legal commentators suggest that mistaken identifications are the single greatest cause of legal 
injustice,3_ and courts have instituted several safeguards against them. The safeguard perhaps held in 
highest regard is a technique known as the 'identification parade'. A person suspected of a crime is 
made to stand alongside a number of other people, of similar height, build, and physical appearance. 
The witness is asked to point out the perpetrator of the crime from the array of assembled people. 
An identification from a 'regularly conducted' parade is given great weight, particularly in the 
criminal justice system of South Africa, which is the legal frame of reference for this study. 
Identification parades, however, are not a guarantee of the veracity of witness identifications. 
Indeed, a series of mistaken parade identifications in the celebrated case of Adolf Beck probably 
brought about the institution of the English Court of Criminal Appeal (Shepherd, Ellis & Davies, 
1982). Legal systems all over the world are mindful that identification parades do not provide the 
guarantee supposed of them: There have been no fewer than three commissions of enquiry into 
identification evidence in England, alone, this century (Devlin, 1976). 
Psychologists have applied themselves to the problem of identification parades in recent times, and 
their contributions include the development of measures of parade fairness, and the invention of 
alternate parade structures. This is a kind of 'applied psychology', an empirical search for solutions 
to the problems that identification parades pose. But the notion of an 'applied psychology' is not as 
uncomplicated as it may first appear. Indeed, I will argue in Chapter 2 that the notion of an 'applied 
psychology' is typically misunderstood. It is most commonly taken to be 'the application of known 
methods to real problems', but very little of what goes by the name of applied psychology is ever 
applied. Most applied psychology is at best 'applicable psychology', and the label 'applied' is used 
merely by dint of the topic of investigation. In short, there is a sort of nominalist error: because a 
name exists, an entity is presumed to correspond to it. In this way, 'Applied Psychology' has come 
South Africa has surely had a number of tragedies induced by mistaken identifications, but there is no systematic 
documentation to support this presumption. A number of near-tragedies are documented, though. In one of the famous 
'crowd-murder' - or 'collective action' - cases of the mid 1980's, known as Duduza, one of the accused was identified 
by several witnesses, and was saved only by video footage which showed that the perpetrator was left-handed, whereas 
the accused was right-handed. (Tyson, personal communication). A newspaper report, which is reproduced on page 
59, also leads one to believe that misidentifications are not uncommon in South Africa. 
This is discussed at some length in Chapter 3. 
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to be treated as a subdiscipline of psychology, few questions are asked about the nature of 
'application', and few researchers show how their studies can be used in respect of the very 
problems that serve as justification for the research in the first place. 
In some respects, the psychological literature on identification parades is heedful of these problems. 
Thus, Gary, Wells has written on several occasions about the applied nature of research on 
identification evidence (Wells, 1978; Wells, 1986), and has outlined strategies that lead or could 
lead to application of research. His contributions in this respect will be considered closely in 
Chapter 2. I draw several conclusions in Chapter 2, but the important conclusion t~en forward 
from that chapter is that 'practical problems' require careful analysis, and should not be approached 
peremptorily. In particular, they require careful analysis in the terms of the context or discipline in 
which the problem is located. Jn the present case, this implies that the problems of identification 
evidence and identification parades should be understood in terms of the referent (i.e. South 
African) criminal justice system. 
Accordingly, Chapter 3 presents a review of South African law on identification evidence. Material 
from statutes, case law, and internal police documents will be considered. I will try to draw a 
coherent picture of South African legal practice in respect of identification parades, but there are 
several contradictions and complications. In brief, South African law has long recognised the 
treacherous nature of identification evidence, and has devised a system of rules and safeguards 
against it. The identification parade is probably considered the strongest of these safeguards, but 
I 
the special dangers that attend this technique are also well recognised. Many requirements and 
strictures regulate the conduct of the parade in South Africa, but I will argue that these are 
subsidiary in an important sense to the central requirement that the parade consist of the suspect, 
and a number of innocent people who are sufficiently similar in appearance to the suspect. 
Guidelines for evaluating this requirement have been handed down by the courts, but are extremely 
vague. I will argue that this 'central requirement' cannot be met in practice, either at the level of 
police regulation of identification parades, or at the level of judicial evaluation. 
South Africa is certainly not the only country faced with problems stemming from identification 
parades. Psychologists in several countries have suggested useful measurement techniques, and 
have investigated modifications aimed at improving the lineup as an identification procedure. This 
work is considered at some length in Chapter 4. Although the problem of identification evidence 
appears to invite 'thoroughly practical' research, the review presented in Chapter 4 will show that 
there is also some theoretical work of consequence. Two competing Bayesian approaches are 
outlined: in the formulation due to Navon (l 990a, l 990b ), identification parades are postulated to 
provide information about the physical resemblance of perpetrator and suspect, whereas the 
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alternate fonnulation due to Wells and colleagues (Wells & Lindsay, 1980; Wells & Luus, 1990a) is 
said to provide infonnation about the reliability of the parade identification.4 
I also consider the recent attempt by Wells, Seelau, Rydell & Luus (1994) to fonnulate the 
rudiments of a theory of identification parades. Wells et al. suggest two propositions, and a 
corollary. ;ine propositions are i) that identification parades are recognition tests, which seek to 
uncover infonnation not present at recall, and ii) that the identification process is governed in part 
by extrarriemorial judgement and heuristic processes. The corollary is that a lineup task can be 
likened to a social psychology experiment: factors that confound such an experiment can also 
confound the lineup task. 
The'theoretical work on identification parades is useful, but I argue that a central theoretical tangle 
remains unresolved. In particular, the nature of the task embodied in the identification parade is not 
clear: is the task a reliability test, or does it collect independent evidence of identity? I address this 
uncertainty at several places in the thesis; see especially Chapters 3, 4, and 6. 
The groundbreaking studies of Doob & Kirshenbaum (1973), Wells,. Leippe & Ostrom (1979), 
Malpass (1981), and Malpass & Devine (1983) are among the most useful of all psychological work 
on identification parades. These studies propose methods for measuring the 'fairness' of 
identification parades, and rely on a method of soliciting 'mock' eyewitness identifications, known 
as the mock witness task. This task requires 'witnesses' to guess the identity of the perpetrator, 
even though they have not previously seen the perpetrator, and have only a brief verbal description 
of him. If 'mock witnesses' are able to guess the identity of the suspect at a level of success greater 
than would be expected under an equiprobability model, the lineup is said to be biased against the . 
suspect. In addition, the distribution of identifications across lineup foils sustains several other 
measures of lineup fairness. These concern the effective 'size' of the lineup, ~hich may be defined 
as the number of foils who are effective choice alternatives: if fewer than the total number of foils 
attract mock witness identifications, the lineup's effective size is smalier than its nominal size. 
The mock witness task assumes a probability model for interpretation, but this is not made explicit 
in the psycho-legal literature, nor is any advice given regarding the statistical evaluation of mock 
identifications. This is a significant failing, and I attempt to remedy it in Chapter 6. I argue that a 
binomial probability model can be used to model the mock witness task, and suggest ways in which 
inferential statistics can be used to assist in the interpretation of indices of lineup bias and lineup 
This description of the Bayesian approach taken by Wells and colleagues is due to Navon (1990a), and is arguable. 
The dispute between the two approaches is detailed in Chapter 4. 
/ 
Chapter 1 lntrodudion 
size. Certain additional techniques suggested by Malpass & Devine (1983, 1984) for the selection 
and evaluation of parade foils, which are based in part on the mock witness method, are considered, 
and suggestions are made regarding the application of inferential statistical thinking to these 
techniques. In Chapter 6, I also explore statistical methods for assistance in the interpretation of 
other lineup indices, including the Bayesian measures of 'diagnosticity', and 'infonnation gain' 
devised by ~ells & Lindsay (1980). 
Lineup fairness indicators based on the mock witness task are indirect measures. They show a 
lineup to be biased against the suspect, if she is chosen at levels greater than chance expectation, or 
they show the lineup to have low effective size, if certain foils are chosen at levels which deviate 
from chance expectation. They do not show which aspect of the parade has led to a lack of 
'fairness', but this is presumabiy the absence of a sufficient number of foils who resemble the 
description give to mock witn<!sses, and by implication, a similar absence of foils who resemble the 
suspect. 
I argue in the conclusion of Chapter 4 that a direct measure of suspect-foil similarity would be a 
useful addition. Although a whole-body measure of similarity would be a more complete solution, 
facial similarity is probably the most important element of physical resemblance/ and the major 
empirical goal of the thesis is to develop a direct way of measuring this. 
The search for a measure of facial similarity takes us to Chapter 5, and the face recognition 
literature. The size of this literature demands a focused approach; my approach in that chapter is 
therefore a shameless raid of the literature for a suitable conceptualization of facial similarity. I will 
consider several possibilities, and argue for an adaptation of a particular approach to facial 
representation: this approach represents faces as eigenspaces of normalized intensity maps in the 
picture plane, and it allows - I suggest - a method of deriving a similarity space for populations of 
facial images. The route to this position is not uncomplicated, or brief; it takes us through much 
recent theoretical and empirical work, and there are several profitable stops. 
The influential theoretical models of face recognition advanced by Bruce and colleagues (Bruce & 
Young, 1986; Burton & Bruce, 1990) are considered, but the models do not explicitly address 
perceptions of facial similarity. Nevertheless, the intimation of a visual-front end to the models is 
taken forward, as is the notion of a 'canonical representational code'. Specific treatment of facial 
similarity can be found in a handful of studies, and the most useful of these for my purposes appear 
This is probably the rationale for the common modem police practice of using lineups constituted by head-and-
shoulder photographs of the suspect and foils. The widespread use of these 'photo-parades' is justification enough, in 
my opinion, for the res.triction adopted here. 
\ 
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to be those reported by Valentine and colleagues (Valentine 1991a, 199lb; Valentine & Endo, 
1992; Valentine and Ferrara, 1991). Valentine suggests a theory of the perceptual representation of 
faces in a multi-dimensional space, and such a space easily allows the derivation of facial similarity 
and facial distinctiveness measures as spatial distances, or dot products. Unfortunately, Valentine's 
model is only formulated at a conceptual level, and he leaves the dimensions that constitute the 
multidimens~onal space unspecified. Later sections of the chapter take me in search of these 
'dimensions', and I conclude that the most promising solution here is the representational schema 
developed by Sirovich & Kirby (1987), O'Toole & colleagues (e.g. O'Toole & Thompson, 1993), 
and earlier, by Kohonen (1984). This scheme is the 'engine' for the facial similarity measure used 
in the empirical component of the thesis, and is described in some detail. It proposes treating 
digitized face images as numerical vectors, and finding a basis for the space constituted by these 
vectors, through principal° component analysis. 
This solution to the problem of finding a representational basis strikes me as particularly elegant: it 
allows one to represent all the faces in a particular set (and even faces outside this set) in a common 
space, that is, as weighted combinations of the basis vectors, or principal components. It also 
sustains the key proposition of the thesis, which is that the similarity of two faces is a function of 
the multidimensional distance separating them in 'face space'. The closer the faces are to each 
other, the higher their similarity. The representational basis also allows the definition of a related 
measure, namely facial distinctiveness. Facial distinctiveness is treated in Valentine's theory as the 
distance from the origin, or centroid, of the space, and this is easily operationalized in terms of the 
principal component basis. In sum, the PC (principal component) schema supports a similarity and 
distinctiveness metric in an effortless and natural manner, and is accordingly adopted for 
investigation in the empirical work of the thesis. 
There are several aims in the empirical work, which is reported in Chapters 7 and 8. The central 
aim is to investigate the validity of the PC-based similarity metric. Even as a principal component 
space provides an elegant solution to the problem of finding a representatonal basis to sustain the 
similarity metric, this representational basis is thoroughly arbitrary: basis vectors are chosen by 
principal component algorithms on the basis of statistical criteria, 6 and they need not correspond in 
any way to human perceptions and judgements of facial similarity. The proposed measure clearly 
requires empirical investigation. A number of such investigations were conducted, and are reported 
in the relevant chapters. 
6 
They are chosen to satisfy two central statistical, or mathematical, constraints: namely that the set of basis vectors is 
orthonormal, and basis vectors are in addition chosen so that they (sequentially) resolve maximum variance. 
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Seven studies were conducted in total. The studies involved approximately 700 subjects, and pre-
study collections of facial images involved another 350 subjects. 
Studies 1 and 2 are reported in Chapter 7. These studies were exploratory investigations of the 
similarity and distinctiveness measures. Study I piloted the principal component analysis of 
images, and .a similarity ranking task. Study 2 extended the pilot work reported as Study I, and 
examined the correspondence between the similarity measure and subject rankings of facial 
similarity. It also investigated the correspondence between the similarity measure and a 'face 
pairings' task. Both procedures produced results which indicated some correspondence between 
perceptions of similarity and the PC-based measure, but these were of a mixed nature in the case of 
the ranking task. Several other 'validity checks'. were built into the design of Study 2. A cluster 
analysis of images on principal component coefficients produced clusters .which appeared to group 
'like' faces, and separate 'unlike' faces. A discriminant analysis of pre-defined sex, race, and age 
groups, using principal component coefficients as classificatory variables, proved capable of 
discriminating these groups with a high degree of accuracy. In addition, several other 
methodological issues raised by the image analysis technique were investigated in this study, and 
are reported. Investigations of the PC-based distinctiveness measure, on the other hand, produced 
results which unifonnly disconfinned a correspondence between the measure and subject 
perceptions of distinctiveness. 
Studies 3 and 4 are reported in Chapter 8. Inspection of the method and results of Study 2 
suggested that there were several methodological uncertainties in that study, and corrections for 
these were built into the design of Study 3. In the first place, a relatively small, homogenous set of 
face images was used in the earlier study. Study 3 corrected this by collecting a relatively large and 
heterogeneous set of face images. Corrections were also effected to the similarity ranking task of 
Study 2, particularly in an attempt to structure subject judgements. Large inter-subject variation in 
ratings of similarity were observed in Study 2, and instructions were devised in an attempt to 
counteract this variation. Results from 11 distinct rating sequences showed a strong correspondence 
between subject ratings and the similarity measure. Facial distinctiveness was investigated again in 
Study 3, but manipulations involving the PC-based operationalization proved difficult to interpret, 
and a lack of correspondence between this measure and subject ratings was observed again, 
corroborating results from Study 2. 
Study 4 used the rating task of Study 3, and again examined the correspondence of subject ratings 
of similarity and the PC-based distance measure. In addition, Study 4 introduced an important 
manipulation. Subjects were shown frontal photographs of subjects, or profile photographs, or both 
frontal and profile photographs, and asked to complete the similarity rating task. This manipulation 
CD 
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made it possible to assess :i) whether PC-based measures of similarity derived from frontal views of 
faces correspond to PC-based measures derived from profile views of the same faces; ii) whether 
subject ratings of profile views correspond to subject ratings of frontal views; and iii) whether the 
PC-based measure of similarity correlates with subject ratings of similarity, in both frontal and 
profile, and combined frontal and profile, views. 
Results in the case of i) showed that the PC-based similarity measure derived from frontal images 
correlated reasonably highly with the PC-based measure derived from profile images. Much 
research in the face recognition literature has implicitly assumed that frontal images are sufficient 
representations of faces (see the discussion in Chapter 5 on this issue), thus confounding 'face 
recognition' and 'picture recognition', and it is important to show that the PC-based measure of 
facial similarity generalises beycnd just one viewing perspective. 
Results in the case of ii) showed that subject ratings of profile views corresponded reasonably well 
to ratings of frontal views, but correlations here were uniformly lower than correlations observed 
between frontal PC similarity scores and profile PC similarity scores. I suggest that the correlations 
between the sets of PC scores are therefore sufficiently high. 
Results in the case of iii) showed again that facial similarity scores derived from a principal 
component analysis correlate highly, on average, with subject ratings of similarity. This was not 
uniformly the case in Study 4, however: a manipulation involving PC-based distinctiveness 
complicated the pattern of results. 
· In all rating tasks employed in Studies 1-4, subject judgements of similarity exhibited substantial 
inter-rater variation. There are many possible reasons for this; I argue in Chapter 7 that the most 
unfortunate explanation, in terms of the consequences for the central empirical project, is one which 
posits that subject perceptions of facial similarity are inherently unstable, that individual ratings of 
the same face will fluctuate over occasions. Accordingly, in Study 5 I investigated the stability of 
subject similarity ratings over time, using a standard test-retest design. Subjects completed a 
similarity rating task of the kind used in studies 3 and 4, and after a period of three weeks 
completed a second similarity rating task, which contained the same target, and approximately half 
of the faces used in the original array. Correlations assessing test-retest reliability were acceptably 
high, even under conditio~s which were not promotive of this. 
The ambition underlying the central empirical project of the thesis is to find a direct measure of 
facial similarity which will serve at the same time as a measure of lineup fairness. Although 
Studies 1-5 appear to show, in sum, that the proposed measure corresponds to human ratings of 
I 
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facial similarity, none of these studies provides any infonnation about the usefulness of the measure 
in relation to identification parades. 
Study 6 accordingly moved the focus of the empirical work to the question of parade fairness. 
Eighteen lineups of varying target-foil similarity and varying target distinctiveness were created as 
materials for a mock witness experiment. Subjects in this experiment were provided with 
descriptions of three suspects, and were able, in general, to identify the suspects with comparative 
ease. The identification rate was, however, affected by both manipulations. In particular, the 
identification rate (measured as a proportion) appeared to vary in a negative linear relation to the 
PC-based similarity score i.e. as facial similarity increased, the prop.ortion of subjects correctly 
guessing the identity of the suspect decreased. The relation of the identification rate to 
distinctiveness was not clear, once again showing that the PC based distinctiveness measure does 
not seem to be of much use - at least in its present fonn. Correlations between the measure of facial 
similarity and indices of lineup fairness commonly used in the literature (i.e. 'functional size', 
'effective size', and the measure 'E', which is proposed in Chapter 6) were all strong, and in the 
expected direction. 
In Study 7, the final empirical study reported in the thesis, I investigated the relation between facial 
similarity and identification perfonnance, in a simulated identification scenario. This relation has 
rarely been examined in the literature: it is a central element in legal and psychological thinking 
about identification parades, and some empirical evidence about its nature may be useful. A 
randomised factorial experiment was devised, incorporating manipulatiQns of facial similarity 
( operationalised in tenns of the PC-based measure), perpetrator presence, and lineup structure (i.e. 
simultaneous vs. sequential). Subjects were asked to examine biographical infonnation, and 
photographs, of three fictitious students at their university, and after a period of half an hour were 
tested with photo-lineups, which were constructed to embody the manipulations described above. 
Results showed several things. In the first place, the superiority of sequential lineups over 
simultaneous lineups - well established in the literature - was confirmed, and in the expected 
manner. That is, sequential lineups led to fewer mistaken identification decisions when the 
perpetrator was absent, but to no fewer correct identifications when the perpetrator was present. 
Identification accuracy was strongly affected by target-foil similarity, but in an unanticipated 
fashion: lineups which had the lowest degree of target-foil similarity produced the highest degree of 
correct identification decisions, both in situations where the perpetrator was present, and in 
situations where the perpetrator was absent. 
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The relation between similarity and identification accuracy is not inexplicable, taken on its own: in 
Chapter 4, I discuss the proposition by Wells and colleagues (Wells, Rydell & Seelau, 1993; Wells, 
Seelau, Rydell & Luus, 1994) that lineups should be constructed to have 'propitious heterogeneity', 
i.e. target-foil similarity should not be too high. There is a useful reductio ad absurdum here, which 
is to imagine a lineup constituted by a suspect and nine of his clones: such a lineup will yield a 
highly inaccurate identification rate, and this implies some optimal suspect-foil similarity function.
7 
However, when the results of Study 7 are combined with the results of Study 6, there appears to be 
an interpretative difficulty of some magnitude. Study 6 shows that an increasing degree of facial 
similarity leads to fairer lineups (as detennined in mock witness tasks), but Study 7 shows that 
greater similarity leads to fewer correct identification decisions. This implies, counter-intuitively, 
that fairer lineups lead to poorer identification accuracy. 
I will return to this problem in the final chapter of the thesis, to wit Chapter 9. The rest of the thesis 
sets the stage for this return. 
7 Wells and colleagues, however, do not think that it is useful to pursue the notion of an 'optimal similarity function'. 
See the discussion in Chapter 4. 
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Introduction 
This thesis examines ways of measuring the fairness of police identification parades, and is therefore 
an exercise in applied psychology. Methodological and measurement issues are also of some 
importance, but are subsidiary in most respects to the central concern with identification parades, and 
the testimony of eyewitnesses. 
I will argue in this chapter that research on eyewitness testimony depends for its justification on the 
prospect of application. The research derives from a concern with a practical problem, namely the 
consequences that honest, but mistaken identifications have for the fair discharge of justice. Pre-trial 
identifications are characteristically secured with the assistance of identification parades, since it is 
widely believed that they make such identifications more reliable. Documented cases of mistaken 
identification have shown that they do not eliminate the problem (Loftus, 1979; Loftus & Ketcham, 
1991), and it is perhaps not even clear that they significantly alleviate it. Psychologists have 
addressed research in the last twenty years to ways in which these 'recognition tests' can be 
improved. 
This interest in eyewitness identifications stems from a more widespread, and recent, concern with 
applying psychology to 'everyday' problems. The rush to do 'applied psychology' is often 
accompanied by an unfortunate neglect of the conceptual issues that underlie the notion of applied 
research. I will consider these in some detail here, and take a few observations in this respect as 
rough guides for later chapters. I begin by considering reasons for the contemporary enthusiasm for 
applying psychological research outside of laboratory settings. 
'Crises' and the drive to application 
As long as most psychologists can remember, psychology has been in a state of crisis.1 Each 
generation re-asserts the existence of the crisis - usually as if the crisis had just been discovered - and 
1 
Stehr ( 1992) argues that the pronouncement of 'crisis' recurs in almost all of the social sciences, from the early part of the 
twentieth century onwards. Generally, these crises devolve on the (cyclical) assertion that social science knowledge of 
the period has failed to make practitioners competent to understand or solve contemporary social problems. 
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re-defines its nature, with an eye to justifying its own solution to this intractable state. There is 
remarkable agreement about the existence of the crisis, especially since psychologists disagree about 
so many other things! 
One statement of the crisis, which we associate with Tajfel, Israel, Gergen and others, from the late 
. . 
1960's, objects to the narrow conceptualization of both method and theory that mainstream social 
psychology eXhibits. Laboratory experiments drive the discipline, and these are conducted as if in a 
vacuum, hence the title of Tajfel's (1972) paper 'experiments in a vacuum.' This cannot be good for 
the discipline; the arguments are well known enough to pass them over here. Of course, more radical 
statements of the crisis can be found, of almost any description. Seve's Marxist statement of the crisis 
is an example (Seve, 1976), as is the work by the 'Loughborough group.' The title of Ian Parker's 
recent book ( 1989) is indication enough of the prevalence of the view that the discipline is 
permanently besieged: The crisis in modem social psychology and how to end it. 
I do not want to labour progress here with an examination of the many formulations of the alleged 
crisis. I will look at one in detail. This is the view that psychology fails to concern itself with real 
problems, indeed with everyday life. There are many variants of this view; I would like to present the 
position adopted by the American cognitive psychologist Ulric Neisser, because his statement of 
crisis has led directly - and indirectly - to a flourish of research that seeks to concern itself with 
everyday life. 
The genesis of applied cognitive psychology - Neisser' s polemic 
Almost two decades ago, Ulric Neisser (1976), a leading cognitive psychologist, and author of a 
seminal text that spearheaded the 'cognitive revolution' (Neisser, 1967), seriously questioned the 
scientific validity of cognitive research. He claimed that cognitive psychology lacked 'ecological 
validity', that it failed to acquire relevance outside of the laboratories in which it was constructed. 
Where psychoanalysis and behaviourism insured themselves, during their periods as hegemonic 
discipline, by making themselves applicable, cognitive psychology had failed to secure itself in this 
~ay. Neisser recommended a radical change in cognitive psychology's orientation if it wanted to 
-endure as a psychological discipline - he predicted a rapid demise if it failed to apply itself outside of 
its laboratories. 
Every age has its own conceptions - men are free or determined, rational or irrational: they can 
discover the truth or they are doomed to illusion. In the long run, psychology must treat these 
issues or be found wanting. A seminal psychological theory can change the beliefs of a whole 
society as psychoanalysis, for example, has surely done. This can only happen, however, if 
the theory has something to say about what people do in real, culturally significant situations. 
What it says must not be trivial, and it must make some kind of sense to the participants in 
those situations themselves. If a theory lacks these qualities - if it does not have what is 
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nowadays called ecological validity - it will be abandoned sooner or later. (Neisser, I 976, p 
2). 
Several years later, Neisser (1983) pursued this argument with an edited collection of memory 
research papers that addressed problems in ways that were clearly more applicable to conditions 
outside of the laboratory. He chose the papers as examples of what directions cognitive psychology 
should follow: if it wanted to do 'ecologically valid' research, and commenced the collection of papers 
with a restatement of his 1976 argument, this time with the psychological study of memory 
particularly in mind. 
I think that memory in general does not exist. It is a concept left over from a medieval 
psychology that partitioned the mind into independent faculties thought and will and emotion 
and many others with memory among them. Let's give it up and begin to ask our questions in 
different ways - our questions need not be uninformed by theory or by a vision of human 
nature but perhaps they can be more closely driven by the characteristics of ordinary human 
experience (Neisser, I 983, p 12). 
The task is thus to make the study of memory applicable to 'ordinary' lives. That knowledge 
generated by cognitive psychology might be used for practical gain is a theme that recurs in Memory 
Observed.9 One section of the collection, for instance, is devoted to cognitive psychological research 
on eyewitness testimony, and Neisser himself contributes one of the papers to this section of the 
book. Here the point is stressed that research can very usefully be redirected for obvious and 
important practical gain. 
Neisser dismisses the 'laboratory' approach to the study of memory on the grounds that in the 
hundred years of its existence it has accumulated very little knowledge about the experiences we 
ordinarily think of as involving memory processes. Its findings are restricted not only in terms of 
generalizability - scenarios typically used to study memory in laboratories rarely resemble those 
outside the laboratory - but their theoretical representation is usually also restrictively experimental. 
(Thus, 'memory interference' means performing in a particular way on a list learning task). 
Laboratory research on memory has failed to accumulate the kind of findings that constitute a 
coherent and useful body of knowledge. What knowledge it has accumulated, anyway, presents little 
advance on what is immediately obvious - indeed, on what is immediately obvious to pre-schoolers. 10 
The strongest and most notorious assertion by Neisser, however, was the sheer irrelevance of memory 
research: 
9 
Neisser was not the only cognitive psychologist at that time who pursued this line of critical inquiry, but his arguments 
appear to have had the greatest influence. Alan Baddeley, at the M.R.C. unit in Cambridge, made a similar argument, 
somewhat more whimsically, as is apparent from the title of his I 988 article (Baddeley, I 988). 
10 
This is not mere sarcasm on Neisser's part. Several studies have shown convincingly that children of pre-school age 
know the important experimental findings in traditional psychological laboratory research. (Kreutzer, Leonard and 
Flavell, 1975). 
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If X is an interesting or socially significant aspect of memory, then psychologists have hardly 
ever studied X (1978, p 4). 
The solution lies in changing the content of memory investigations. Neisser urges in several places 
that memory research address 'practical problems': 
... some of the best minds in psychology have worked and are presently working in the area of 
me~ory. Why then have they not turned their attention to practical problems and natural 
settings? (1983, p 6) 
The message is clear in Memory Observed: cognitive psychology lacks ecological validity and one of 
the ways of doing 'ecologically valid' cognitive research is to do research that can be used outside of 
the laboratories in which !tis produced. It is to do what is commonly called 'applied psychology.' 11 
Neisser's argument has been very influential, perhaps especially in the area of immediate concern to 
this thesis, eyewitness te~timony research. Neisser specifically singled eyewitness research out for 
praise in his 1978 paper: he considered it an area of cognitive psychology that concerned itself with a 
real problem. It is also an historically interesting tradition of research as far as applied psychology is 
concerned, since the earliest applied psychologists took it as one of the obvious areas for an applied 
psychological science. Hugo Miinsterberg, often called the father of applied psychology, wrote a 
book and several papers on the subject in the first decade of the twentieth century (Miinsterberg, 
1908). Stem ( 1910), Whipple (1912) and many others, in continental Europe, in England, and the 
U.S.A., did likewise. 
This early research petered out in the second and third decades of the century, and there was very 
little recently published work at the time of Neisser's statement of the crisis. After Neisser's 
message, the area boomed. Between 1979 and 1986, at least seven books on the subject were 
published (see, for examples, Loftus, 1979; Yarmey 1979; Wells & Loftus, 1984; Lloyd-Bostock and 
Clifford, 1983), and by 1994 this number had risen to close to twenty five. Over 1000 journal articles 
appeared between the years 1977 and 1995.'2 There are presumably many reasons for this explosion 
of research, but I think Neisser's message to 'go forth into the world' resonated loudly down the 
corridors of academic psychology, and many research psychologists rallied to the call. 
However, Neisser's polemic has not gone unanswered. It is worth digressing briefly to consider a 
recent counter by the Yale psychologists, Banaji & Crowder (1989)~ The value of this exercise 
derives from the fact that the chief interest of the research presented in this thesis is the 'real-world' 
II Of course, Neisser's argument is much lengthier and more sophisticated than the brief synopsis presented here. I have 
adumbrated and simplified it in order to emphasise the concerns with ecological validity and application. 
12 
A more detailed argument is technically required here: I offer these quantitative estimates on the basis of personal 
knowledge of the literature, and admit the possibility that they may be slightly inaccurate. 
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witness problem of identification parades, and there are important conceptual questions hidden in the 
notion of applying psychology to such problems. 
The Response to Neisser: Banaji & Crowder (1989) 
There are two n,iajor propositions in the argument made by Banaji & Crowder (1989). In the first 
instance, they assert that the move out of the laboratory to the locus of naturally occurring memory 
phenomena is misplaced. All sciences study phenomena in laboratories, and then attempt to apply 
acquired knowledge to phenomena in their naturally occurring state. The notion that a scientific 
enterprise can make its results more ecologically valid by studying phenomena in their natural form is 
without sound precedent: it is like imagining an astronomy conducted with the naked eye (Banaji & 
Crowder, p 1185). Since so many uther scientific disciplines manage to bridge the interpretative gap 
between the laboratory and the natural world, there is no a priori reason why memory research should 
not be able to do so. 
In the second place, there is no reason why a mere concern with" everyday phenomena' should render 
a piece of research ecologically valid. In this respect, Banaji and Crowder list many studies that 
include samples or tasks because of their interest value, or their 'eccentricity', and for no other 
scientifically respectable reason. The point is that these studies survive on an illusion of ecological 
validity. They aim at a high ecological validity of method, but succumb to low generalizability of 
results. The multiplicity of uncontrolled factors in naturalistic observation prohibits generalizability 
to other situations; tests in the real world do not permit generalizability since variability in real world 
situations is immense. 
It is better, argue Banaji & Crowder in conclusion, to have results that are generalizable, even if the 
ecological limitations on this generalizability are unclear. Results that are not at all generalizable, 
despite a superficial veneer of ecological realism, are of no use at all. 
Replies to Banaji & Crowder 
The 1989 article by Banaji & Crowder appeared in the mouthpiece of the American Psychological 
Association, American Psychologist, and generated heated responses. 13 These were assembled in a 
13 The arguments made by Banaji & Crowder are not new, and neither are the responses. A similar dispute, with similar 
arguments for and against, appeared in the American Psychologist in the early I 980's: see, for example, Berkowitz & 
Donnerstein's (1982) 'answers to criticisms of laboratory experiments'. The cyclical occurrence of such disputes is in 
line with the remark I made earlier about the cycles of 'calls to crisis' which dominate social scientific literature and 
research. 
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discussion forum in the 1991 volume of the same journal, and it is worth repeating some of the key 
points. 
It is not clear that the analogy with the physical sciences drawn by Banaji and Crowder supports their 
contention: although chemistry may be a particularly successful laboratory science, there are many 
other sciences (to wit, Zoology) for which field research is invaluable, and for whom its absence 
' would speq severe retardation (Neisser, 1991). Furthermore, there are many memory phenomena 
which are clearly inscrutable by laboratory investigation: Bahrick's (Bahrick, Bahrick & Wittlinger, 
1975; Bahrick, 1984) 50 year follow up studies for memory of material learned at school is a case in 
point. 
Furthermore, it is a mistake to characterize the difference between laboratory research and the 
research of the so-called 'eve1yday memory school' as. one of method (Klatzky, 1991).. Both 
traditions of enquiry share a belief in many common methodological canons, but are effective in 
different situations. 14 It is just a mistake to ignore the fact that laboratory guided memory research has 
very little to say about ordinary memory phenomena (Morton, 1991), and appeals to 'guaranteed' 
methods of attaining generalizability are sorely tested by the patent lack of success in over 100 years 
of laboratory research. 
I am reluctant to argue here for a settlement of the dispute: it is a long-lived and remorseless tyrant of 
a problem, and has probably marked out its permanent place in the psychological gallery. What I 
wish to assert instead is that there are problems other than those raised by Banaji & Crowder with the 
endeavour to take memory research out of the laboratory. A number of very thorny issues lie below 
the surface prospect of 'solving practical problems' with research. These need to be considered 
closely if we are to take seriously the suggestion that 'application' is a way of securing 'ecological 
validity' for a piece of research. 
As the research to be examined in this thesis takes much of its impetus from the prospect of applying 
its findings to legal matters, I will deal with the issues that 'application' raises at some length. 
The notion of an 'applied psychology' 
'Applied psychology' is one of the oldest formally recognized and institutionalized branches of 
psychology, at least in name. As early as 1908 a chair in Applied Psychology existed in an American 
institution (the Carnegie Institute of Technology), and by 1917 the American Psychological 
14 
Davies ( 1992) has more recently argued in favour of methodological pluralism, particularly with respect to research on 
witnesses. 
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Association had established the Journal of Applied Psychology. Thus, by the early decades of this 
century, applied psychology was considered to be a firmly established subdiscipline: institutes existed 
for applied psychological research, chairs of applied psychology existed in several universities, and a 
burgeoning technology (mental testing) was associated with applied psychology}5 
For the purposes of the discussion here, some idea of what 'applying psychology' means, at least in 
conventional terms, is needed, and so I will introduce a number of conceptualizations from prominent 
'applied psychologists'. 
Dudycha (1963) likens the applied psychologist to an engineer: in the same way that the engineer 
applies theoretical physics, the applied psychologist applies the findings of psychological science. 
This allows the rather mundane reading of Applied Psychology as 'psychology in use': 
. . . the application of psychology to the various areas and aspects of individual and social 
life. p 4) 
Notice how Dudycha displaces the onus of the justification: applied psychology is sound insofar as 
psychological science is sound. 
This link between application and the extension of the scientific method is made even clearer by 
Anastasi (1964). The applied psychologist's contribution stems from 'his research approach to the 
problems of human behaviour': he takes the scientific method common to all sciences into applied 
contexts. Insofar as applied and basic research differ, the essential differences concern: 
1. How the problem is chosen. Basic research chooses problems to help in the construction of 
theories, applied research chooses problems to help in administrative decisions. 
2. The specificity and generality of results. Basic research is more generalizable; in applied 
research generalization is of limited validity (as applied research is less concerned with 
theoretical and causal relations). (p 5). 
The problem, for Anastasi, is to distinguish 'applied' from 'pure' without sacrificing the legitimizing 
claim on the 'scientific method'. 
Both conceptualizations considered thus far attempt to distinguish applied science from pure science 
formally: the difference between the two endeavours resides finally in the locale of practice, and 
whatever other differences there are may be specified from knowledge of this fact. In much the same 
vein is the following conceptualization (van der Vlist, 1982), which appears in an influential 
European series of monographs. 
15 d The historical account presented here is taken from a reading of the accounts given by Anastasi (1964) and Du ycha 
(1963). As an historical presentation it is quite obviously inadequate, but it does make the point fairly clearly that 
Applied Psychology has long been considered a respectable subdiscipline of psychology. 
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According to van der Vlist, applied and pure research differ in the way they treat their respective 
independent and dependent variables. Where pure research concerns itself principally with the 
relationships between indepepdent and dependent variables, applied research is seen to be concerned 
exclusively with a particular dependent or independent variable. Pure science serves to increase our 
knowledge about a theoretically interesting relationship; applied science serves as the basis for 
decision making with respect to a concrete dependent or independent variable. 
The relationship of this view to the views espoused by Anastasi & Dudycha is fairy transparent and 
the observations I made earlier apply equally here. I single out van der Vlist's treatment because it 
makes the pointed claim that 'applied research' is so named because of its application: later I will 
suggest that the 'naming' of applied research is a much more arbitrary matter than this. 
Applied research is the extension uf pure research into 'ecologically real' locations. This is the line 
of argument pursued in all of the accounts I have considered thus far, but subtler formulations are 
naturally possible. So, for example, Warr (1978) denies the applied/pure dichotomy, and instead 
asserts that it exists as a dimension, stretching from the completely pure investigation to the 
completely applied project. Where, on this dimension, a particular psychological enterprise falls, 
depends on (i) the population studied, (ii) the research setting, and (iii) the intended outcome of the 
work. The problems to be studied are taken directly from real life situations, although they may be 
studied on the spot or in laboratories. 
whereas 
the applied nature of an investigation derives from the fact that its proximal origin is in a general 
sense external to the discipline (p 11) · 
Pure psychological research aims to deal with an issue raised by the results, theories or ideas of 
psychologists themselves, being part of a short cycle feedback system feeding directly upon its 
own outputs (p 11 ). 
I have considered a number of attempts to identify the intellectual pursuit that constitutes 'applied 
psychology'. I want to show in the next section of the chapter that these accounts take us no further 
in our attempt to understand the nature of applied research, and I will suggest there that the notion of 
an applied psychology is consequently better treated as a meta-theoretical problem than as a category 
of research. 
Problematizing conceptions of applied psychology 
In a provocative and incisive paper, Jonathan Potter ( 1982) argues that most discussions of applied 
science can be subsumed under a more general ideological practice which attempts to present 
'science' as socially useful, as the origin of many of the things that improve our lives. The notion of 
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'applied science' serves this broader function by contributing to it an 'ideology of application' (1982, 
p 24): the intimate relation held in scientific cultures to exist between science and technology. The 
first two conceptualizations of applied psychology that I discussed - those espoused by Anastasi and 
Dudycha - are exemplary instances of this: applied psychology is the transportation of the scientific 
method to locations proximal to the discipline. 
This conceptualization does not stem from the psychological literature in particular. Indeed, it is a 
prevalent way' of thinking about research in most scientific disciplines, and is known in the 
philosophy of science as the 'two stage model' of scientific activity (see Danziger, 1990, who traces 
the rise of its popularity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). This is the familiar 
distinction between 'basic' and 'applied' science. The task of basic science is the painstaking 
construction of universal theory, and applied science sees to it that this universal theory is applied 
outside the laboratory. The conceptualization specifically indicates a direction of information flow, 
namely from basic to applied. 
But just how close is the relationship between science and technology? The suggestion of an intimate 
relation between science and technology - as inscribed in the ideology of application - is, to say the 
least, problematic: at any rate, the relationship is not of the direct form suggested. An increasing 
body of research in the sociology of science and philosophy of technology suggests that technology is 
not simply applied science (in the sense given to the term in the ideology of application). For 
example, research on the USA weapons industry shows that 91 % of innovations in the technology 
originated from inside the technology itself, and only 9% from scientific research (Potter, 1982). 
Similarly, studies using citation analysis find that 
Science seems to accumulate mainly on the basis of past science, and technology primarily on the 
basis of past technology. (Mulkay, quoted in Potter, 1982, p. 23) 
This is not to say that technology and science bear no relationship to each other: the sense in which 
technology and science do relate is best taken as a case of enablement, but this enablement is in a 
direction contrary to that hypothesized by the ideology of application. Ihde (1979), for instance, 
argues that the history of technology shows that technology of a particular form is a prerequisite for 
science of a particular form.1 6 Thus, watermills (among other technological innovations) existed 
before, and were prerequisites for Newtonian mechanics. That knowledge "flows" from the pure pole 
of the pure - applied dimension to the applied pole is an untenable thesis. There is a case to be made 
for connections between basic and applied science in particular instances, but there is certainly 
nothing of the suggested dependency. 
16 
For a similar argument in respect of mental testing and its relation to theories of intelligence, see Danziger (1990). 
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The claim serves clear ideological interests: connotations about the social utility of 'science' slip into 
the way we think about our lives. It is probably to maintain the implications attendant upon the idea 
of a flow of knowledge from 'pure' to 'applied', that prevailing conceptions of 'applied psychology' 
identify the origin of the research problem as the feature that distinguishes pure from applied 
research. 
The matter does not end here. Potter makes an important distinction between applied psychology and 
applicable psychology. The point is that most of what we call applied psychology is really only 
applicable psychology: findings made under the name of applied psychology are generally not applied 
- the label is assumed only because of a superfluous concern with issues or problems in society. In 
most 'applied research', all that happens is that researchers pluck problems from the outside world 
and justify their work in academic terms. The research is called 'applied research' only because it 
(ostensibly) addresses a social problem. 
This discussion of the problems in the orthodox conceptualizations of applied psychology has drawn 
attention to the ideological notion of the pure-applied split and the pertinent distinction between 
applied and applicable psychology. There is a further point I wish to make about these 
conceptualizations, which is the way in which the 'applied' in 'applied psychology' is treated. 
The 'applied' in applied psychology, is read, in all the accounts I have presented here, as the name of 
a subdiscipline of Psychology. To put it clearly: the question of an applied psychology is treated in 
"' terms of what makes applied psychology a discipline, not in terms of why applied psychology is an 
applied endeavour. Instead of focusing on how psychology is applied, elaborate attempts have been 
made to show how applied differs from pure. This is a type of nominalist error: because a name 
exists,.an entity is assumed to correspond to it. In this way psychologists have taken for granted the 
'applied' nature of applied psychology, and have failed to ask important questions about if 
psychology is applied, and how it is applied. Thus what is really only applicable psychology at best 
has come to constitute what goes by the name of applied psychological research. 
So we can see that the notion of an 'applied psychology' is a very problematic one indeed. Neisser' s 
recommendation that memory research apply itself to practical prnblems then, is certainly not the 
guarantor of a new scientific respectability that he suggested it might be. 
This does not mean that applying psychological research, or doing applied psychological research, is 
impossible. Examples of situations where research findings have been applied, and situations where 
they have been extremely useful, are not difficult to find. Thus, the recent legal revision of rules 
covering child witnesses in the U.K. used a review of the psychological literature as· a preface 
(Davies, 1992). Similarly, the collective of researchers informally known as 'the Aberdeen group' 
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has produced an artificial facial composite production system that is currently in use in several U .K. 
police forces (Ellis, J. W. Shepherd, J. Shepherd, Flin & Davies, 1989). 
It does mean, however, that we need to think clearly about the nature of the research that we engage in 
when we study 'problems' of the sort recommended by Neisser. The choice of problem often serves 
as justification for the research, and it is consequently very important to have a clear understanding of 
the nature of the problem in its original context, as well as some idea about the concrete application 
of the ensuing research. Eyewitness researchers have frequently failed to consider these specific 
issues, but there are several exceptions. In the next section, I will examine a few of these in the hope 
that they may inform the approach to be adopted in this dissertation. 
Types of 'eyewitness variable' 
Much eyewitness research is conducted with little attention to the generalizability of findings across 
situations (Read & Bruce, 1984). There are many ways in which one can become an eyewitness to an 
event, and it is not clear that different witness-creating events have enough in common to justify 
treating them with any degree of equivalence (Bekerian, 1993 ). 
It is accordingly important to differentiate witness scenarios according to the variables of interest, and 
to deal with them separately. A simple and very useful distinction in this regard was made by Wells 
(1978). Wells argued for a crude dichotomization of variables at play in the identification process. 
Estimator variables are attributes of the witness or the event which cannot be controlled. The 
physical lighting of the crime scenario, the length of time the witness observed the perpetrator, and 
the gender of the witness, are examples. These variables may all affect the accuracy of the testimony, 
but since they cannot be controlled, one can only estimate the effect that the variables have on the 
accuracy of the witness's report. Such an estimation is of course an extremely imprecise matter, and 
those who opt to study them need be mindful of this. System variables are attributes of the legal 
system - and perhaps of the event, or witness - which affect the accuracy of the identification, and 
which can be controlled and modulated. The type and composition of an identification parade, and 
the style of interrogation used by a police officer are examples of such attributes. The idea is that we 
can improve the quality of witness testimony by identifying and researching system variables. Table 
2.1 presents a simplified classification of aspects of the identification process according to the 
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Table 2.1 Estimator and system variable classification of eyewitness identification factors 
The underlying implication is that the application of research should be facilitated by studying system 
variables. This is important to Wdls, who asserts 
... in undertaking an applied project it is incumbent on a researcher to demonstrate the applied utility of an 
eyewitness study. (Wells, 1978, p 1555). 
The distinction between estimator and system variables is astute, and is often used in review 
discussions of eyewitness research. It is taken up by Deffenbacher (1991 ), for instance, and by 
Shepherd, Ellis & Davies ( 1982), who use it to justify the classification presented above as Table 2.1. 
It is an astute distinction because it achieves classification of.a myriad number of variables, while 
emphasising the point that eyewitness research depends for its justification on the prospect of 
application. The object is not to develop a comprehensive theory of the eyewitness; indeed such a 
project cannot hope to succeed. 
Nevertheless, studying variables that facilitate application is only a step in the right direction. The 
gap between research knowledge and application of that knowledge is daunting, even if the research 
is tailored for the prospect of application. In the next section we consider specific methods of . 
application aimed at bridging the gap. 
Models for applying eyewitness research 
Eyewitness research has entered the legal system in several forms, and with varying success. Again, 
Gary Wells has made a pertinent distinction (Wells, 1986), this time in order to distinguish the ways 
in which eyewitness researchers can hope to secure application of research knowledge. 
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Expert testimony 
The first and perhaps most controversial route of application is by expert testimony in court trials. 
The idea here is that expert testimony can help 'triers of fact' 17 identify relevant variables and 
understand their influence on eyewitness testimony. Presumably, too much or too little credibility is 
ascribed to eyewitness testimony in court trials, and ·expert testimony helps to correct this. Experts 
could testify with respect to estimator variables, in which case the testimony is aimed at providing a 
sort of 'social framework' for the triers of fact, or the expert could testify about system variables, and 
this may include giving an opinion or measure of the fairness ofidentification procedures used in the 
particular case. is 
Expert testimony is not new to the courts, and there are articulated criteria governing the admittance 
of such testimony. However, Monahan & Walker ( 1988) argue that these criteria are neither coherent 
nor consistently applied, 19 and the experience of several researchers in the field is that the admittance 
of expert testimony on eyewitness issues is a hit and miss affair (Loftus & Ketcham, 1991 ). 
There are also other, fundamental problems with expert testimony on eyewitness research. These 
have been the basis for heated debate over the last 10 years (Mccloskey & Egeth, 1983; Loftus, 
1983a, 1983b; Egeth, 1993), and will be mentioned briefly here. 
Expert testimony seems to reduce the tendency of jurors to believe eyewitnesses (Wells, 1986). 
However, if jurors are not prone to 'overbelieve' witnesses in the first place, this testimony may be 
inappropriate. Furthermore, even if it appropriately reduces such 'overbelief", it is not clear whether 
such testimony makes jurors more accurate at distinguishing correct and incorrect witnesses: a 
simple, blanket correction of the 'overbelief" may not make jurors any more accurate, but may 
merely make them indiscriminately skeptical (McCloskey & Egeth, 1983). It is also not clear that 
estimator variable research will tell jurors anything they do not know: McCloskey & Egeth (1983) 
17 In the U.S.A., this function is usually served by a jury. In South Africa, there are no jury trials, and the presiding judicial 
officer(s) are the triers of fact. A distinction is still made, nevertheless, between matters of fact, and matters of law. 
is There are ways of having testimony admitted to trials other than the traditional viva voce route. The so-called 'Brandeis 
brier, or Amicus brief, is a method suggested by Melton (1987), as a model for entering psychological knowledge into 
legal trials. The idea is that a professional body (such as the APA) acts as a 'friend of the court', submitting written 
argumentation based on scientific knowledge. 
19 Monahan and Walker make a case for a new model of treating social science research in courts, which they call the 'social 
framework' approach. The distinction between legislative and adjudicative fact, currently used in deciding on the 
relevance and admissibility of social science research, is jettisoned in favour of 'social authority', the central concept in 
the new paradigm: i.e. social science research should be treated as a source of authority rather than of fact. Social science 
research should be used just as precedent works in the common law: that is, it is binding on lower courts, the coherence of 
the argument is the criterion for evaluating it, acceptance and application by other courts is a recommendation for use, etc. 
Judges could do the research themselves, and psychologists could present evidence by deposition and not necessarily viva 
voce. The justification offered has various elements, but is based in particular on the claim of an overarching similarity of 
social science research and law: both are general, and produce principles, but there is also much deliberation required for 
particular cases. Monahan and Walker point out that several courts in the USA have started using social science findings 
as social .framework evidence: i.e. the use of general conclusions from social science research in determining factual 
issues in a specific case. 
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suggest that much estimator variable research simply reinforces widely held beliefs about eyewitness 
performance.2° Finally, how are jurors to use the information delivered in the testimony? Each juror 
will need to internalize the testimony, match the facts of the case against known research, and then 
estimate the effect that various aspects of the case are likely to have had on the accuracy of the 
witnesses. In all likelihood, though, it will do little more than make them consider the eyewitness 
identification somewhat more carefully. 
Other criticisms of expert testimony on eyewitnesses worth mentioning here include i) questions 
about the quality of estimator variable research, and ii) positions which dispute the need for the 
research in the first place. Thus, McCloskey & Egeth (1983) argue that research on many estimator 
variables is contradictory and inconclusive, and that what is known about such factors is usually 
restricted to first and second order effects - almost nothing is known about higher order interactions. 
Konecni and Ebbesen ( 1986), on the other hand, argue that eyewitness identifications are admitted as 
evidence in such a small percentage of criminal cases that the problem is not worth bothering about. 
These criticisms are themselves not inviolate, and several detailed a priori and empirical studies have 
attempted to demonstrate their flaws. Thus, Goldstein, Chance & Schneller ( 1989) surveyed judicial 
districts in the U.S. and estimated that eyewitness identifications are admitted in about 77 000 trials 
per year; Kassin, Ellsworth & Smith ( 1989) surveyed eyewitness experts and found a s~bstantial level 
of agreement on most research findings; and Elizabeth Loftus has replied on several occasions to 
many of the other criticisms (Loftus, 1983a, 1983b, Loftus & Ketcham, 1991). 
This is not the place to attempt an arbitration of the dispute. What I wish to take to the next section of 
the chapter is the question of the use to which jurors are expected to put expert testimony. No-one 
has contested that this requires a very difficult act of estimation on the part of the witness, and it may 
have a major constraining effect on the efficacy of eyewitness research. 
System variable research 
The second category Wells (1986) considers, in his classification of ways to apply eyewitness 
research, is a set of three strategies aimed at securing application for system variable research. 
2° For example, that the opportunity and length of observation are important detenninants of accuracy (Deffenbacher, 
1991 ); that lengthier passages of time between observation and identification lead to more mistakes (Wells, 1993 ), and so 
on. 
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Publish effectively 
Since the ordinary business of researchers is to publish their findings, a useful strategy may be to 
publish in journals and books that are likely to be read by those who control the system variables 
under investigation. Melton ( 1987), for example, provides compelling evidence that most extra-
precedent material cited in legal cases is originally published in law journals. There is very little use 
of non-legal material. The model of application here is a slow process of diffusion of psychological 
knowledge into legal practice. However, as both Wells and Melton concede, editors of law journals 
are not usually receptive to experimental research, and it is not clear what proportion of the 'legally 
enabled' read these journals. There is no guarantee of application by this route. 
Incorporate knowledge of system variables in police training 
The second strategy identified by Wells is the incorporation of knowledge into training at police 
training centres. Since police officials are frequently at the first site of work involving eyewitness 
identifications, this could be a particularly potent method of application. Unfortunately, it may be an 
impracticable strategy. Police services do not presently place much importance in training officers in 
identification procedures, and indeed usually offer no training in lineup administration. This. is 
assumed in many services in the U.S.A. to be self-evident (Wells, 1986), and much the same appears 
to be true in South Africa.21 
Change formal procedures and rules of conduct 
The third strategy suggested by Wells is to aim at changing fonnal procedures and rules of conduct. 
There are several possibilities here. Statutory regulation of identification procedures could be enacted 
at the level of law, and research knowledge could infonn such a process. Judicial commissions have 
considered the problem of identification evidence in several countries this century,22 and although 
psychological research findings have often been considered, they have had little force. In the most 
recent English commission, chaired by Lord Devlin, the committee expressed the opinion that 
psychological research was not presently of much assistance, but nevertheless, that 
... the possibility should be explored of undertaking research directed to establishing ways in 
which the insights of psychology could be brought to bear on the conduct of identification 
parades. (Devlin, 1976, cited in Shepherd et al., 1982, p. xi.) 
21 
This was communicated to me and to a legal colleague (Shereen Yolks), in a telephonic interview we conducted with 
South African police officers in Cape Town in 199 l. 
22 
In England, no fewer than three judicial commisions have investigated the problem, and made recommendations (Devlin, 
1976). In Canada, at least one commission has been briefed with a similar task, and has submitted a report (Brooks, 
1983). . 
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Alternatively, psychologists could aim at securing strong procedural recommendations from legal 
bodies. Research on identification procedures would form part of the basis for these 
recommendations. 
Again, Wells is not optimistic about the prospects of successful application. Statutory regulations or 
procedural recommendations are unlikely to be promulgated, since police practice is traditionally 
treated in Ang,o-Western traditions as largely independent. Whatever checks are necessary will 
emerge in the evolution of the common law through judicial precedent. In South Africa, for example, 
several judges have stressed that the conduct of identification parades is a matter of police practice, 
and the power to conduct identification parades is enacted at statutory level (see Chapter 3 of this 
thesis). 
Problems with the system variable approach to application 
Although each of the strategies for applying system variable research has some promise, closer 
inspection shows that there are obstacles in the way of each. Wells (1986) is pessimistic about the 
prospect of application by these routes, and suggests that a better overall strategy may be to provide 
expert testimony on system variable research in particular legal trials. I will examine his argument in 
favour of this claim in the next section of the chapter, but wish for the moment to dwell briefly on the 
discredited strategies 
With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that Wells' pessimism may have been misplaced. There is 
evidence now to suggest successful application of some of the major system variable research. Two 
examples will suffice. One of the most robust and interesting findings in research on identification 
parades is the plain superiority of the sequential identification parade over the traditional 
simultaneous identification parade (see Chapter 4 for technical details). This form of identification 
parade was apparently developed by Rod Lindsay, in collaboration with Gary Wells (Lindsay & 
Wells, 1985), and leads to fewer false identifications, with no significant decrement in the number of 
accurate identifications. North American police forces have taken note of the research and it is now 
estimated that some 15% of identification parades are of the sequential form (Malpass, personal 
. I 
communication). Clearly, successful application has occurred here, and it appears that effective 
publication of the results has been one of the proximal determinants of the application.23 A second 
example of successful application is the development of a computerized facial composite system by 
the 'Aberdeen group'. Prior research pointed to the inadequacy of the traditional police methods for 
23 
It is difficult, of course, to provide firm evidence for this proposition, and should perhaps be considered a tentative 
hypothesis about the determinants of the application. 
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producing facial composites (i.e. the commercially produced systems Identikit, PhotoFit, and sketches 
by police artists). In one study, for example, it was shown that police officers charged with 
composite production were not able to produce a convincing composite of a well known face, even 
with a photograph of the person in front of them (Ellis, 1984). The 'Aberdeen group' has in the 
interim period produced a computerised system that produces composites of palpably higher quality, 
and which also appears to lead to better accuracy rates in experimental settings than the traditional 
techniques. This system is now in use in several British police services, and police are given special 
training in composite production. Psychological research on identification issues has clearly achieved 
successful application here, and this has occurred at the level of change in police training. 
Nevertheless, there is much system variable research that has not met with application - perhaps most 
has not met with application - and it may serve us better to understand the reasons for failure to 
achieve application, than to derive faith from specific instances of successful application. This is a 
larger project than I am able to undertake in this dissertation, and I will settle instead for the few 
rough pointers in the right direction, outlined in the final section of the chapter. 
Expert testimony on system variables 
Wells (1986) concluded at the time of writing that neither of the two broad approaches to application 
of witness research had much success (expert testimony on estimator variables, the three strategies 
aimed at application of system variable research). He argued that it might be more effective to 
combine the approaches. In particular, he suggested that testimony on system variable research could 
be very effective, but doubted that the same could be true of testimony on estimator variable research. 
' This is because testimony of the latter sort could only be descriptive of broader issues of eyewitness 
reliability, whereas testimony of the former sort effectively makes proscriptions on police practice. 
Testimony on system variable problems is likely to have a chain effect - if an identification is 
procedurally discredited by testimony, prosecutors will lean on the police to change their practice, 
and this will result in modifications still further down the hierarchy. Prosecutors are after 
convictions, and there is thus a built-in incentive to change. In the case of testimony on estimator 
variables, however, there is nothing either prosecutors or police can do about the reliability of their 
witnesses, despite any incentives that might be present. 
This is a compelling argument, but it ignores several of the problems outlined earlier in respect of 
expert testimony of any kind. There is no compulsion on courts of law to admit expert testimony,24 
24 
Although it is worth noting that expert testimony has been admitted in particular instances on the grounds that to exclude 
it would have the consequence of excluding evidence of known probative value (Loftus & Ketcham, 1991 ). 
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and several psychologists have argued that the popular legal distinction between adjudicative and 
legal fact further hinders the admission of such testimony (Monahan & Walker, 1988). 
It suffices for our purpose in this chapter to leave the question as noted, but unresolved: the debate 
about expert testimony on eyewitness research rages on in the literature (Egeth, 1993), and it is 
perhaps a bit grandiose to entertain solving it here. 
Determinants of application" 
I wish to re-iterate here that it is not acceptable to discard the notion of an 'applied psychology', even 
though the way in which it is ordinarily conceptualized is unsatisfactory. In the absence of a solution 
to this problem, I will make a few observations that serve as a guide to the way in which I approach 
the particular problem atthe centre of the dissertation. 
The observations concern what determines whether research gets applied or not. One useful 
exploration is to systematically examine examples of research that do get applied and to compare 
them to research that fails to get applied. One such attempt exists in the applied behavioural science 
literature (Stolz, 1981 ), which I wish to consider briefly. 
Stolz (1981), after a scrutiny of innovations from applied behavioural research, isolated the following 
determining variables in the successful dissemination and application of research. 
25 
1. Research data showed that the innovation was effective. 
2. The technology met the continuing mission of the adopting agency. 
3. The potential adopter had a pressing management problem. 
4. The availability of the dissemination to the potential adopter was timely. 
5. Potential adopters were able to view ongoing model and programs. 
6. The adoption was proposed by policy makers, rather than by the researchers who developed 
the technology. 
7. The intervention was tailored to local conditions. 
8. Those who wouid have to implement the program were involved in the preliminary research 
and in asking for the adoption. (Stolz 1981, p 498-99). 
I approach 'application' in this section - and perhaps throughout the chapter • from a somewhat narrow perspective, 
namely as putting knowledge to immediate use. There is a wider perspective one can take here, which is to argue that 
social science research intersects and creates discourses that operate at a social level, which is surely a form of 
'application' of knowledge. This is the sense in which Freud's psychosexual theory has surely changed the entire 
under5tanding of childhood development for several generations of people. 
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There are several other attempts to identify the determinants of application, from a number of diverse 
disciplinary areas, and these generally support Stolz's conclusions. Stroh (1991) identifies the 
following five characteristics as being strongly associated with project adoption in the light-
construction industry: 
Perceived economic advantage; compatibility; complexity; trialability; observability 
Similarly, Luukkonen & Stahle ( 1990) review the impact of evaluations conducted in four Nordic 
countries, and suggest that the following characteristics lead to high impact: 
1. The evaluation must answer a need for information, and it must be carried out in a 
methodologically credible fashion. 
2. The results must be communicated effectively to those in decision-making positions. 
3. The recommendations must help supporters of pertinent positions. 
4. Pertinent questions must have powerful .supporters. 
There seem to be a few lessons here: what is required for the execution of successful applied research 
is its insertion into an appropriate infrastructure. 'Application' requires a certain jurisdiction: new 
laws are promulgated by legal government, a change in the policy of a company toward its employees 
derives from executive decision, and so on. Applications are made by policy makers. 
Consequently, applied research must be seen as inherently inter-disciplinary, and the nature of the 
applied research should reflect the concerns of the discipline or public area that it enters:26 in the 
present case, the problem of the identification parade must be understood legally before effective 
applied research can be conducted. Framing the research solely in terms of the entering research 
discipline jeopardizes it from the outset. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that research on identification parades stems from a recent 'drive to 
application'. However, there are important issues underlying the notion of 'application', and these are 
frequently unexplored or misunderstood in the eyewitness literature. An adequate treatment of these 
issues is beyond the scope of the present work, but I have made certain observations that will guide 
later chapters. 
26 There is an obvious danger here, namely that the research discipline is completely subjected to the concerns and desires of 
the disciplinary area it is entering, that it becomes a lackey to authority. It may in addition be very difficult to persuade 
the alien discipline of this danger. These are problems that must be addressed on a case-to-case basis. 
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In particular, psychological research· on eyewitness identifications cannot be justified on the mere 
premise that it addresses an important practical problem. It must be shown that the research can 
contribute to the solution of the problem, or the alleviation of the problem. This presumes a sound 
analysis of the problem, and since it is a legal problem, we must investigate the legal nature of the 
problem.27 This is the task for the next chapter. 
27 Of course, the legal problem may be intractable, or there may simply be very little consensus on the nature of the 
problem. The extent of the investigation will probably be a matter of degree, as it can hardly expect to be a legal tract in 
its own right. 
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Introduction 
The identification parade is widely regarded as an important safeguard to an accused who is 
implicated by identification evidence. I aim to show in this chapter that less protection is accorded to 
an accused by a 'regularly conducted' identification parade than is commonly supposed. This claim 
is substantiated by a comprehensive review of South African law on identification parades, and by a 
brief examination of police practice in South Africa.21 A particular weakness that I identify concerns 
the physical resemblance of parade foils: the 'sufficient physical similarity' of foils is set out as a 
necessary condition for fair parade construction, but, in practice, courts are unable to assess whether 
this condition has been met. I will use this observation as partial justification for empirical work 
reported in later chapters. 
The review of South African identification law presented here is rather lengthy, but this is in accord 
with the conclusions reached in the previous chapter. I argued there that applied research on 
identification problems needs to be thoroughly and carefully informed of the legal character of such 
problems. 
Evidence of identification is by its very nature unreliable, and legal history is replete with examples 
of convictions which were based on the testimony of honest witnesses who were nevertheless 
mistaken.29 Indeed, the English court of criminal appeal owes its existence in large part to the 
mistaken identifications in the notorious and tragic case of Adolf Beck.30 
21 
Since this chapter attempts a legal analysis, it adheres to a style typical in legal publishing. Footnoting and referencing, 
in particular, differ from conventional formats in the psychological literature. 
29 
As early as 1932 Borchard compiled a volume containing several dozen cases of injustice caused by such evidence (E.M. 
Borchard, Convicting the innocent: errors of criminal justice. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1932). Wills, in 
Principles of circumstantial evidence, 7th ed., at 193 also lists a number of cases. South African courts have certainly 
been alert to injustices that result from mistaken identifications: in R. v. Masemang, 1950 (2) (SA) 488 (A), van den 
Heever, J.A at 493, remarks that they " ... fill one with apprehension". 
30 Lorebum, Earl. 'Cases of mistaken identity.' SAU 1917 152; Devlin, Lord Patrick. Foreword to 'Identification 
evidence', J.W. Shepherd, H.D. Ellis, G.M. Davies. Aberdeen University Press, 1982. The creation of this court, of 
course, did not eliminate the miscarriages of justice that issue from mistaken identifications. In England, there have been 
three Royal commissions of inquiry this century into miscarriages of justice that issued from identification evidence, two 
of which postdated the creation of the appeal court. See Devlin, footnote 34 of this chapter, for details. 
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In the South African Law Journal, several articles have acknowledged the inherent dangers of 
identification evidence. The 'Justice of the peace' writes, in 1926:31 
... mistaken identity is the most likely and common cause of miscarriages of justice, and such 
miscarriages not only shock the public conscience but give rise to doubt and uneasiness as to 
the administration of justice. (At 287). 
Similarly, the 11th report of the English Criminal Law Revision committee says: 
We regard mistaken identification as by far the greatest cause of actual or possible wrong 
convictions. 32 
There are several reasons for the unreliability of evidence of identification. The witness engages in a 
task which is complex and error prone, even in favourable circumstances: he33 must accurately see and 
hear a transitory sequence of events, and at some much later stage correctly recall what he witnessed. 
In addition, the circumstances under which the observation occurs are usually not favourable: the 
witness probably catches only a fleeting glimpse of the criminal, the illumination of the physical site 
is poor, and there is a long delay between the event and the occasion on which the witness is required 
to testify. These conditions militate against accurate testimony, but more threatening even is the fact 
that the nature of the testimony severely hampers attempts at cross examination. Lord Devlin puts 
this point lucidly: 
[Identification evidence] ... is exceptionally difficult to assess. It is impervious to the usual 
tests. The two ways of testing a witness are by the nature of his story - is it probable and 
coherent? - and by his demeanour - does he appear to be honest and reliable? ..... [In] 
identification evidence there is no story; the issue rests on a single piece of observation. The 
state of the light, the point of observation, and the distance from the object are useful if they 
can show that the witness must be using his imagination. But otherwise, where there is a 
.credible and confident assertion, they are of little use in evaluating it. Demeanour in general is 
quite useless. . .. If a man thinks he is a good memoriser and is not that fact will not show 
itself in his demeanour ... (At 76). l 4.J5 
The courts recognise the danger posed by a bald statement of identification, 36 and approach 
identification evidence with caution. Numerous judicial caveats have been sounded, recommending 
that identification evidence be thoroughly tested intra curially before conviction. 
JI 
'Identification'. South African Law Journal 1926, 287. (No author is given). 
32 
Cited in Devlin, 1976, at 76. See footnote 34 of this chapter. 
33 
In this, and later chapters, pronouns that typically indicate gender (e.g. he, she) are used interchangeably, and often . 
without the intention of referring to a particular gender. 
34 
'Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the Departmental Committee on the Evidence of 
Identification in Criminal Cases'. Chairman: RtHon. Lord Devlin. London; Her Majesty's Stationery Office; 1976. 
" . The accused faces an additional danger: the trier of fact might be tempted to conclude that the witness is correct simply 
because he has withstood cross examination. See Kola v. R. 49 ( l) P.H. l 00. 
36 R. v. Shekelele and another 1953 (1) (SA) 636 (T), S. v. Mehlape 1963 (2) (SA) 29 (A). and many other cases express the 
need for caution. Indeed, Didcott, J. in S. v. Ngcobo 1986 (l) (SA) 905 (N}, at 906 says: 
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The defining feature of cases involving identification evidence is the act of identification, which will 
invariably occur when the witness is asked whether the perpetrator of the crime is present in court.37 
This will be the identification that the court relies on to convict, but will be preceded by previous acts 
of identification, which will be made as a matter of course during the police investigation. The most 
obvious and rudimentary method of pre-tri,al identification is the staged confrontation: the accused is 
displayed to th~ witness, who is asked to positively identify the suspect.31 This is a very suggestive 
procedure,39 and is regarded universally40 as providing evidence of little value in establishing the true 
identity of the perpetrator. The patent dangers emanating from one-on-one confrontations provoked 
judicial criticism, and in response the identification parade evolved, and today is perhaps the most 
widely favoured test of identification evidence. Williams and Hammelman41 assert that this is 
certainly the case in the United Kingdom: 
They [identification parades] have come to be widely considered a valuable and reliable way 
of providing evidence of identity where this may become an issue before the court. (At 481 ). 
The identification parade has acquired the status of 'most preferred safeguard' against the danger(s) 
of identification evidence, not only in South Africa, but in most countries. There certainly are other 
safeguards, notably those set out in the landmark case of R v. Shekelele,42 and I will discuss these, but 
our focus is on the identification parade. 
The history of identification parades 
The identification parade appears to have become a regular part of police practice as late as the latter 
part of the nineteenth century. Lord Devlin traces its origins to a Police Order issued by the 
Metropolitan police in 1860, following upon "some remarks made by an assistant Judge of the 
Middlesex session".43 Isolated parades may, of course, have been held earlier. The test that the 
identification parade embodies has an intuitive appeal, and earlier societies may well have used a 
37 
38 
The danger of mistaken identification is one to which all judicial officers arc or should certainly be alive. Enough has 
been said about it over the years, and in various parts of the world to see to that 
In R. v. Mputing, 1960 (1) (SA) 785 (T), Boshoff, J. makes the point that such an identification has little value since the 
compromising position that the accused is in suggests his identity as the perpetrator to the witness. Hoffman and Zefertt, 
in their book South African Law of Evidence, 1989, Durban: Butterworths, at 615, suggest that the witness would indeed 
look foolish if he pointed anywhere other than the dock. It is surprising, and should send a chilling warning of the 
perfidious nature of identification evidence that this, nevertheless, frequently occurs. 
Cases do arise where the police are, through force of circumstance, obliged to embark on acts of identification which are 
less than ideal. See S. v. Ngcobo 1986 (1) (SA) 905 (N) for an example. 
39 
R. v. Mputing, 1960 (I) (SA) 785 (T). 
<40 
See Shepherd et al., footnote 30 of this chapter. 
41 
G. Williams and H.A. Hammelman, 'Identification parades', in Criminal Law Review, 1963, 479-482, 545-555. 
42 
1953 (1) (SA) 636 (T). 
43 
Devlin, Ibid. At 112. 
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similar device. However, it appears to have flourished in legal systems using the English system of 
prosecution - Lord Devlin points out that it is largely absent in countries that use other systems.44 
It is not clear when the parade became a regular feature of South African police work. The earliest 
South African cases I have been able to find that specifically mention the practice, and which lay 
down 'rules' for its conduct, are R v Olia and R. v. Mkize.'5 The first two editions of the well known 
South African criminal procedure textbook, by Gardiner and Lansdown46 make no inention of the 
practice. In the third edition of 1936 the identification parade is mentioned explicitly for the first 
time." However, the practice is referred to in two early articles in the South African Law Journal." 
The presentation of identification evidence in court 
Identification evidence can take several forms. It is worth tracing the way that such evidence is 
presented in court, since this will help to clarify the specific fonn of identification evidence 
represented by the result of an identification parade. 
Evidence of identification can be direct or circumstantial in nature. I am concerned in this thesis only 
with direct kinds. Such forms of identification evidence are presented in court by the prosecution. 
The witness is asked to point out the person who committed the deed that the case has bearing on. 
This will be the suspect, in the dock. This identification has little value on its own, and serves simply 
as a reminder that the witness will testify that the accused is the same person she observed commit the 
deed. Dock identifications have been relied on as primary evidence of identification, but consistent 
judicial criticism49 has effectively made this a rare occurrence. 
During the course of the trial, the prosecution will lead evidence that the witness has identified the 
suspect as the perpetrator of the crime in question. This identification may have occurred in a number 
of ways, but will most likely have been secured at an identification parade, since such identifications 
are generally held to be most acceptable. Other procedures that have produced eyewitness 
identifications, which have been admitted in South African courts, include 'showups' or 
44 
Devlin, op. cit p 3. 
45 
R. v. Olia 1935 (SA) 213 (T); Mld::e v. R. 1932 (1) (PH) Hl7 (N). 
46 
F.G. Gardiner and C.W.H. Lansdown, South African Criminal Law and Procedure. Cape Town: Juta. 
47 . 
Of course, there are earlier English cases that address the practice, and these have been followed from time to time in 
41 
49 
South African law. See R.v. Chapman 1911 7 Cr. App. Rep. 53, R. v. Palmer 10 Cr. App. Rep. 77, R. v. Williams 1912 8 
Cr App. Rep. 84. 
Lorebum, supra, in 1914; and 'Justice of the peace', supra, in 1926. 
In the English case of R. v. Chapman 1911 7 Cr. f Rep. 53, it was held that the confrontation of witness and accused, in 
order to secure an identification, is neither fair nor justified. Dock identifications, which are a form of such 
confrontation, therefore have very little value. Indeed, in R. v. Palmer I 0 Cr. App. Rep. 77 such a form of identification 
was held to be sufficient ground for setting aside a conviction. 
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'confrontations', 'voice identification parades', 'photographic identification parades', and 'dog scent 
parades'. so It is perhaps useful to characterise these procedures as involving an independent test of the 
witness's ability to identify the suspect. This characteristic distinguishes such identification evidence 
from a notable and frequent alternative fonn of identification evidence, where the suspect is well 
known to the witness, and where such a test of identification ability would at best be superfluous. I 
concern myself.in this chapter with the fonner class of evidence. 
Rules 
There are many regulations and guidelines in South African law governing the conduct and evaluation 
of evidence secured from identification parades. I hope to show that these depend ultimately on the 
requirement that parade members bear a satisfactory degree of physical resemblance to each other. 
Statutes 
Section 37(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977 gives police officials the authority to 
conduct identification procedures. The act states: 
"Any police official may 
a) ... 
b) make [a person arrested upon any charge, or any such person released on bail or on warning 
under section 72], available or cause such person to be made available for identification in 
such condition, position or apparel as the police official may detennine ... " 
The effect of s. 37(l){b) is that police officials are given the power to conduct identification parades. 
Arrested persons may be placed on parade (either those still in custody, or those out on bail), but there 
is no power to compel non-suspects to act as parade 'foils'. Nor do judicial officers have the power to 
order that a police official conduct an identification parade: in S. v. Bums" it was held that if a parade 
has not been conducted the judicial officer's competence is limited to drawing inferences from the 
failure to have done so. 
It is worth noting that the type of identification procedure is not specified by the act (i.e. an 
identification procedure other than an identification parade could be used), nor are any requirements 
specified for the satisfactory conduct of the identification procedure. The conduct of the 
50 
But note that identifications secured at 'dog scent' parades are not considered direct evidence of identification. I include 
them here because of the similarity that they bear to other fonns of identification parade. 
51 
S. v. Burns and another 1988 (3) (SA) 366 (C). 
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identification parade (or other identification procedure) is therefore at the discretion of the police 
official. 
A question that naturally arises is whether an accused person is obliged to participate in an 
identification parade. The Act appears to empower police officials to conduct the parade, if 
necessary, against the will of the accused. In this respect English law is different, since accused 
people are abfo to refuse to participate,52 but at the expense of forcing the prosecution to resort to 
another form of identification. 
· A person placed on an identification parade has the right to counsel. This is assumed in S. v. Jija and 
others,53 and is also the practice in England and the United States of America. 
General rules 
In order to understand the rules and guidelines that courts have set down in respect of identification 
parades, it is necessary to consider more broadly the way in which identification evidence is 
approached. This is because identification parades are usually treated as a test of identification, and 
the testing of identification evidence is prescribed under a number of so-called 'cautionary rules' .54 
The cautionary rule with respect to single witnesses 
The earliest (and in many cases, logically prior) cautionary rule is that set out in the case of R v. 
Mokoena. 55 Evidence given by a single witness should be treated with extreme caution. It was held 
that although it is possible to convict solely on the basis of the testimony given by a single witness, 
that witness must be honest and creditable, and the testimony must be satisfactory in every material 
respect. Many cases have followed and elaborated this judgement. Thus, in Woji v. Santam56 it was . 
held that this cautionary rule is also applicable in civil cases, bearing in mind the difference in the 





See Phipson on Evidence, 12th. ed. 1976, London: Sweet & Maxwell, at §1254. An interesting example of how such a 
refusal was achieved is given in C. Williams, Identification parades, Criminal Law Review, 1955. He reports that in the 
case, R. v. Lamb, heard at the Bristol Assizes in 1946 (which is unreported), the defendant muttered "Go on, I'm your 
man, why waste time". The police officer conducting the parade dissolved the parade and merely asked the witness 
whether he recognised the prisoner. This identification was upheld at the trial, but the author of the article contends that 
it was a dangerous route for a court to follow, even in the circumstances of that case. 
S. v. Jija and others 1991 (2) (SA) 52 (E). 
Although it is not clear that they can be called 'rules'. See G.L. Peiris, 'Corroboration of the evidence of complainants' 
ActaJuridica, 1981, 139. 
R. v. Mokoena 1932 ( 1) (PH) H5 I. The case is unfortunately not reported in much detail. 
56 
Woji v. Santam 1980 (2) (SA) 971 (SECLD). 
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caution is suggested when the single witness is also the complainant - in R v. Segoales
1 
it was said 
that the court must be satisfied that the story belonging to that person whom the onus rested on to 
discharge must be true and the other false - and when the defence is attempted by an uneducated 
defendants' Examples of what the courts have held to be testimony that is not satisfactory in every 
material respect include i) when the opportunity for observation is not good/9 and ii) when the 
evidence is vague, or the witness has a motive to give false testimony.60 
It is mistaken, 'however, to think that cautionary rules like that fonnulated in Mokoena change the 
nature of the onus. In R v. J. 61 it was noted that the cautionary rule should not be taken to replace the 
usual test of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is only a guide, which may be useful to decide 
whether the onus has been discharged. In S. v. Meh/ape62 the court held that if, at the end of a 
criminal trial, there is any reasonable possibility of mistaken identity, the state has not proved its case 
beyond reasonable doubt. Where identity of the offender is the sole issue, the approach to be adopted 
in weighing up evidence should depend on the circumstances of the case. For example, in S. v. 
Khumalo,63 it was held that where the accused's story or alibi is not clearly or necessarily false, even 
if not accepted, in a case of identification this must be seen as hindering the discharge of the onus. 
The cautionary rule with respect to identification evidence 
The cautionary rule in Mokoena is specifically concerned with the testimony of single witnesses. It is 
relevant to the question of identification evidence insofar as a single witness produces such evidence. 
A second cautionary rule with particular application to identification evidence was fonnulated by 
Dowling, J. in the much cited case R v Shekele.64 It is worth repeating a substantial portion of the 
judgement in that case. 
Questions of identification are always difficult. That is why such extreme care is always 
exercised in the holding of identification parades - to prevent the slightest hint reaching the 
witness of the identity of the suspect. An acquaintance with the history of criminal trials 
reveals that gross injustices are not infrequently done through honest but mistaken 
identifications. People often resemble each other. Strangers are sometimes mistaken for old 
acquaintances. In all cases that turn on identification the greatest care should be taken to test 
the evidence. Witnesses should be asked by what features, marks, or indications they identify 
51 
R. v. Segoa/e (SA) 641 (T). 
SK 
Filipi v. R. 1960 (2) (PH) H206 (FSC). 
, 
59 
R. v. Mokoena 1932 (1) (PH) H51. 
60 
R. v. Ditshego 1932 OPD 164. 
61 
R. v. J. 1966 (l) (SA) 88 (A). 
62 S. v. Meh/ape 1963 (2) (SA) 29 (A). 
63 
Khumalo v. S. 1964 ( l )(PH) H80 (N). 
64 
R. v. Sheke/e/e and another 1953 (1) (SA) 636 (T). Although judgement was delivered in this case in 1947, it was not 
reported until 1953. In the period between 1947 and 1953 it was frequently referred to, in its unpublished form. 
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the person whom they claim to recognise. Questions relating to his height, build, complexion, 
what clothing he was wearing and so on should be put. A bald statement that the accused is 
the person who committed the crime is not enough. Such a statement, unexplored, untested 
and uninvestigated, leaves the door wide open for the possibility of mistake. Where the 
accused is an ignorant native who is unrepresented by counsel or attorney and who is therefore 
unable himself to probe the evidence of identification and where the prosecutor has not done 
so, the <;ourt should undertake this task, as otherwise grave injustice may be done. (At 638). 
The central ele?Ient of the cautionary approach recommended in Shekelele is that identification 
evidence by an 'eyewitness should not be accepted unless it has been tested. This approach has been 
adopted with approval in numerous cases.65 It is true that courts had acknowledged the need for 
caution in several earlier cases - in Kole v. R,66 Kotze, J. suggested that this was obvious to every 
judicial officer, and in R v. Pietersen67 a conviction was set aside because evidence of identification 
had not been tested by the court a quo - but the specific requirement set out in Shekelele that 
identifications be tested by directing questions to the witness has been very influential. 
The kinds of questions that are put to the witness will depend on the circumstances of the case. 
Where the witness and the accused are well acquainted, for example, matters of clothing, facial 
characteristics, and identifying bodily marks are of less importance. The degree of previous 
acquaintanceship, and the opportunity for observation, will need to be tested.68 It is probably 
impossible to specify beforehand all the factors that must be investigated by putting questions to an 
identifying witness,69 since each case will have different circumstances . 
.The greatest care should be taken to test identification evidence, and a witness may be tested in cross 
examination by requiring him to describe again the appearance of the person(s) he purports to 
identify. Where the advocate representing an accused was effectively restrained from doing so on the 
grounds that the court was satisfied as to the credibility of the witness, on appeal it was held that 
identification evidence must be both credible and reliable,7° and that the line of cross examination 
should have been permitted. The court must be satisfied that an identifying witness is honest,11 but 
the fact that a witness is bonafide and honest is not enough.12•73 The requirement in Shekelele that 
65 
See, among others, R. v. Matsha 1958 (2) (PH) H254 (E), Pe/wan v. S. 1963 (2) (PH) H237 (T), R. v. Alluverino 1963 (4) 
(SA) 727 (SR), Poopedi en ander v. S. 1966 (2) (PH) H407 (T), S. v. Grosch 1984 (I) (PH) H53 (SW A). 
66 
Kote v. R.. 190.6 (SA) 189 (E). 
67 R. v. Pietersen 1941 (2) (PH) H252 (C). 
68 
R. v. Dladla and others 1962 (I) (SA) 307 (A). 
69 
S. v. Mehlape 1963 (2) (SA) 29 (A). 
70 
S. v. Pretorius 1991 (2) (SACR) 601 (A). A similar position was adopted, earlier, in R. v. Nomtwana and others 1961 (4) 
(SA) 174 (E). 
71 R. v. Sebeso and others 1943 (SA) 196 (A), R. v. Hlatywayo 1953 (I) (PH) H74 (T). 
72 S. v. Mehlape 1963 (2) (SA) 29 (A). The point is made very clearly by Clifford Sully: "Far fewer have been condemned 
on perjured evidence than on false evidence given in good faith." (Cited in 'Identification', SAL.I, 1926, at 289). 
/' 
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evidence of identification be tested has been taken by some courts to have strict force. In R v. 
Medupe, 14 a failure of the court a quo to apply the test led the immediate court of appeal to overturn 
the conviction. Similar decisions were made in R v. Motsagie,75 R v. A/luverino,16 and S. v. 
Mazibuku.n In addition, evidence of identification should be rigorously tested - in S. v. Fritz,11 the trial 
judge expressed satisfaction that the identification evidence had been thoroughly tested, but the 
Appellate Divis~on disagreed, saying that the identification had not been thoroughly enough explored, 
and it accordingly set aside the conviction. 
Several courts have expressed reservations about the test set out in Shekelele. In R v. Mputing,19 
Boshoff, J. pointed out that a witness may well recognise a perpetrator accurately, despite not being 
able to offer any distinguishing circumstances or characteristics. Identification is often a sub-
conscious process. This was also said, more emphatically, by van den Reever, J.A. in R v. Kumalo80 -
a description might bear little relation to the perpetrator, and yet the witness may correctly identify 
the perpetrator. More recently it has been held that the inability of a witness to describe a person 
identified by that witness is not necessarily fatal to the question of whether the identification is 
proper.11 These statements do not purport to disagree with the prescription that identification evidence 
should be tested, they merely point to the vagaries of such evidence. 
In Mputing, it was also pointed out that the value of reported characteristics or identifying features is 
related to how common they are in the population: the less common, the more value such evidence 
will have.12 ·In Mavuso and another v. The King,13 for example, the court held that the accused's voice 
had a very distinctive ring and tone, and made for reliable identification. In R v. T.,'4 the description 




Certainty is not a guarantee of accuracy. Indeed, it may on occasion suggest the opposite, as in the cases of S. v. Ntsane 
1966 (2) (PH) H408 (N), and R. v. Weimers and others 1960 (3) (SA) 508 (A), where the witnesses became more and 
more certain during their testimony, for no discernible reason. 
R. v. Medupe 1957 (1) (PH) H64 (GWLD). 
75 
1959 (1) (PH) H42 (GWPO). 
76 
1963 (4) (SA) 727 (SR). 
77 
S. v. Mazibuku 1966 (2) (PH) H326 (0). 
71 
S. v. Fritz 1980 (l)(PH) Hl7 (A). 
19 
R. v. Mputing. 1960 (I) (SA) 785 (T). 
80 R. v. Kumalo 1948 (2) (PH) H200 (A). 
81 Sv. Pretorius 1991 (2) (SACR) 601 (A). 
12 But, in Filipi v. R. 1960 (2) (PH) H206 (FSC), the Court noted that there is a danger attached to distinctive physical 
appearance - that very distinctiveness alone may induce the court to rely on the witness's identification. 
83 
Mavuso and another v. The King 1969 (2) (PH) H 168 (Swaziland High Court). 
14 R. v. T. 1958 (2) (SA) 676 (A). 
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Perhaps the most important qualification to the cautionary rule set out in Shekelele is made in the 
cases R v. matywayo85 and S. v. Poopedi en ander.86 Evidence of identification will often be tested in 
court, and it must be borne in mind that the accused may well be right in front of the accused at the 
time that this evidence is tested. While it is true that the features whereby a witness recognises 
someone should be tested, this will have little value if the witness is in the dock and visible to the 
witness. The witness's description will have more weight if it is committed before seeing the 
defendant.17 I~ R v. y:n Bresler, J. went further, and said that in cases where questions of 
identification .·are in issue, details of identification should be investigated at the very earliest 
opportunity. Otherwise, an accused person might find himself suddenly confronted at the trial with 
an unexpected mass of important details in regard to the identification. If sufficient details are not 
furnished to the police, the police should seek greater particularity from the deponents. 
However, to test identification evidence with this very important qualification in mind will often 
imply that evidence of earlier consistent descriptions must be led. A further witness may need to be 
called to testify to an eyewitness's original description, as happened in the cases of R v. Mack, S. v .. 
Seanego and R v. Rassool.89 This may run foul of the strictures against hearsay evidence, and 
evidence of previous consistent testimony. 90 The English case R v. Christie91 for example, ruled such 
evidence inadmissible. In R v. M 92 it was held that consistency of description as a test of 
identification must conform to the rule that a witness cannot be corroborated on the basis of other 
consistent testimony. Wigmore93 presents a comprehensive discussion of the issue, and reserves 








That some modem courts are on record for rejecting such evidence is a telling illustration of 
the power of a technical rule of thumb to paralyze the judicial nerves of natural reasoning (at 
. §1130). 
R. v. Hlatywayo 1953 (l) (PH) H74 (T). 
Poopedi en ander v. S. 1966 (2)(PH) H407 (T). 
In the Devlin report previously referred to, Lord Devlin made the recommendation that only the initial description of the . 
perpetrator given by the witness to the police should be admitted as evidence. 
R. v. Y. and another 1959 (2) (SA) 116 (W). 
R. v. Mack 1969 (4) (SA) 53 {R), S. v. Seanego 1978 (2) (PH) H121 (A), R. v. Rassool 1932 (SA) 112 (NPD). 
The argument could be made that all forms of pre-trial identification are subject to these strictures, including 
identifications secured at identification parades. Indeed, in Rassoo/, the court considered this, and held that 
identifications out of court are admissible as evidence of the identity of the accused as the perpetrator. 
R. v. Christie 1914 A.C. 545 (H.L.). 
92 
R. v. M 1959 (1) (SA) 434 (A). 
93 
Wigmore, J.H. Wigmore on Evidence. 6th ed. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1940. 
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The South African cases that consider this point appear to have decided in favour of allowing such 
evidence in identification cases.94 In R v. Mack it was held that although a witness is not nonnally 
entitled to reveal the details of a report made by himself which was not made in the presence of the 
accused, there may be circumstances in which the report would be relevant and therefore admissible. 
Such evidence could be led, for example, if the circumstances were such that the identification at the 
parade was challenged. In S. v. Seanego9' it was decided that the report of an identifying witness to a 
third party may be admissible if it addresses the veracity of the identification, and in R v. Ve/ekaze96 
that evidence of a previous identification is admissible, even if the witness himself does not testify 
directly to this (but is not admissible when the witness denies the previous identification, as happened 
in that case). The point was put more generally in R v. G.,97 where it was said that the Court was 
entitled to hear evidence of the manner and circumstances in which identifications took place, as the 
story of this may be important information. In that case, the witness, who was also the complainant, 
took down the first three letters of a motor vehicle registration number, in which vehicle she had 
allegedly been raped, and she reported the number to her employer, who confinned this. While on 
patrol with a police officer some time afterwards, she pointed the car out, where it stood in a camping 
ground. This car belonged to the appellant. Still later, the witness saw the perpetrator with another 
man in a second car, and she took down this number, and reported the matter again to her employer. 
The police established that the second car belonged to the appellant's brother-in-law. Finally, the 
witness identified the appellant at an identification parade. The court ruled that the details of this 
'story' were important in evaluating the evidence of identification. 
The cautionary approach taken to identification evidence is not exclusively concerned with the kind 
of test recommended in Sheke/ele. It has been said on more than one occasion that the Court should 
consider corroborative evidence in identification trials very carefully, especially when it is led in 
favour of the accused. Thus, in Jubela Necobo v. R,91 it was said if identity is in issue, the fact that a 
motive cannot be found is of the greatest importance. Similarly, an alibi defence merits careful 
consideration, and there is no onus on the accused to prove the alibi, it is for the state to show that it is 
false.99 If the accused's testimony is shown in some respects to be false, and the accused a liar in this 
94 But note that Hoffman and Zefertt (South African law of Evidence, Durban: Butterworths, 1989) are less certain about 
the status of this evidence in South African courts. Schmidt, in Bewysreg, 2nd ed., Durban: Butterworths, 1980, at 368, 
suggests that evidence of previous consistent testimony is admissible, but only insofar as it details the earlier 
identification. Where such evidence of identification goes further and details the deeds committed by the alleged 
perpetrator, the further details are not admissible, except where this is unavoidable. 
9' 1978 (2)(PH) Hl21 (A). 
96 R. v. Velekaze 1947 (l) (SA) 162 (WLD). 
91 R. v. G. 1956 (2) (PH) H266 (A). 
91 
Jubela Necobo v. R. 1926 (l)(PH) HIS (A). 
99 Mokoena v. R. 1958 (l)(PH) H99 (A). 
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respect, it will not be enough to secure the conviction. There may well be good reasons for the false 
testimony: in R v. Motsagie, 100 it appeared that the accused lied about his whereabouts on a particular 
night in order to hide the fact that he had broken a curfew, and the untruth was thus not taken into 
consideration against him. 
English law has long battled with the question of corroboration in cases that tum on identity. There 
have been three· Royal commissions of enquiry into identification evidence this century, and in the 
last of these the principal recommendation was to make convictions in identification cases dependent 
on corroborative evidence. 101 A similar recommendation was made by a barrister in R v. Williams. 102 
In both instances, the recommendation was not adopted, although a less exacting version of the 
principle was adopted in R v. Turnbull. 103 
The cautionary procedure when witness and accused are acquainted 
In Shekelele, the witness and the perpetrator were strangers, and the test set out in that case in respect 
of characteristic or identifying features should not be applied to situations where the accused and the 
witness are well acquainted. It is not useful to probe evidence of identification for special identifying 
features when the accused is known to the witness, since the witness may resort to recollection of 
prior knowledge in answering such questions. 104 It has been held that where the identifying witness 
knows the identified person well and is honest, her assertion of identity, in good circumstances for 
observation, is entitled to great weight. 105 In such circumstances even a bald identification may be 
acceptable. 106 This does not mean, however, that the need to test evidence of identification falls 
100 R. v. Motsagie 1959 (1) (PH) H42 (GWPD). 
101 
Devlin, at 150. The exact wording is important, though: 
We recommend that the trial judge should be required by statute 
a. to direct the jury that it is not safe to convict upon eye-wibless evidence unless the circumstances of the identification are exceptional or the eye-wibless 
evidence is supported by substantial evidence of another sort; and 
b. to indicate to the jury the circwnstances, if any, which they might regard as exceptional and the evidence, if any, which they might regard as supporting 
the identification; and 
c. ifhe is unable to indicate either such circumstances or such evidence, to dim:t the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. (§8.4, at 150) 
102 R. v. Williams [1956] Crim. L. R. 833. 
103 R. v. Turnbull [1976] Crim. L. R 567 (C.A.). In this judgement, it was recommended that judges should draw the 
attention of juries to the quality and nature of identification evidence in a trial. Where the identification is of 'poor 
-quality', for example, where the witness caught only a 'fleeting glimpse' of the perpetrator, there will be insufficient basis 
for a prosectution. 
104 
Teka v. R. 1960 (l)(PH) 171 (C). 
105 
Mtetwa v. R. 1954 (2) (PH) HI 99 (A). 
106 R. v. H/atywayo, 1953 (1) (PH) H74 (T). James, Jin R. v. Dladla and others 1962 (1) (SA) 307 (A), pointed out that 
acquaintance with the accused must increase the probability that an accurate identification has been made. In S. v. 
Gantsho en ander 1978 (l) (PH) H68 (A) a corollary to this was said to be probably true: namely that it must reduce the 
likelihood of a mistaken identification. 
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away, 101 but that the test should take a different form. In particular, the degree of acquaintanceship 
must be tested - how often has the witness seen the accused?, when did the witness last see the 
accused?, has the witness ever seen the accused close-up?, has the witness ever spoken to the 
accused?101 Matters of clothing, facial characteristics, and identifying bodily marks are of less 
importance in such cases. What is important is the degree of previous knowledge, and the opportunity 
for observation, with regard to the circumstances in which it was made.109 In R v. Dladla it was held 
that even if the,'witness makes a mistake concerning the name of the accused, if the witness knows the 
perpetrator by sight, this may be enough. Some courts have taken the requirement that claims of 
acquaintanceship should be tested to be a strong one: In S. v. Mehlape, 110 the failure to test 
acquaintanceship was one of two grounds on which a conviction in a lower court was overturned. 
Of course, it is not only in cases where witness and accused are acquainted that the opportunities for 
observation should be very carefully tested. This should also be done where witness and accused are 
not acquainted. The manner in which the opportunities for observation are tested will depend, as 
always, on the particular circumstances of the cases. Thus, in S. v. Nhlabali, 111 the witness saw the 
perpetrator, briefly, by the light of an acetylene blowtorch and the reflected light of two battery 
torches aimed at a safe, and this was judged inadequate opportunity. In R v. T. 112, the opportunity for 
observation that a rape victim had in a dark park, at a fair distance from the nearest light, was held to 
be adequate by the trial court, but the appeal court ruled that the opportunity was affected by the fact 
that victim and perpetrator were complete strangers, and this probably hindered the opportunities to 
too great an extent to allow accurate observation. 
The cautionary rules in respect of identification evidence should of course not be adopted to the 
detriment of common sense: the probative value of an identification depends on the circumstances of 
the case, and each case must be judged on its merits. 113 In Van Rensburg v S., 114 it was ruled that 
although the trial court had not followed the prescribed tests, the witness had observed the perpetrator 
when he took his mask off, and since she said she recognised the perpetrator as someone whom she 
knew, she was unlikely to be mistaken, given that the opportunities for observation were good. 
107 The fact of acquaintance does not in itself show that the witness is not mistaken. Sibiya and others v. R. 1956 (1) (PH) 
H136 (A). 
101 S. v. Mehlape 1963 (2) (SA) 29 (A). 
109 R. v. Dladla and others 1962 (1) (SA) 307 (A). 
110 1963 (2) (SA) 29 (A). 
111 S. v. Nhlabali 1967 (2) (PH) H304 (A). 
112 1958 (2) (SA) 676 (A). 
113 R. v. Masemang 1950 (2) (SA) 488 (A). 
114 Van Rensburg v. S. 1968 (2)(PH) H329 (A). 
Identification Parades in S.A; Law 
Somewhat more questionably, in the case of S. v. Nango, 115 where the opportunities for observation 
were constrained, and a policeman testified to the identity of a man who attempted murder on a 
second policeman with an axe, the Court held that the witness had special powers of observation 
(spesiale observasievermoens) - by virtue of his training and membership of a special police unit -
and that this made the identification more likely to be accurate. 116 
Many cases have stressed the need to consider evidence of identification in sight of the totality of the 
facts and the circumstances of the case, and I have provided examples of this type of approach above. 
What is perhaps not very clear is how this affects the inherent weighting to be given identification 
evidence. In Mputing, Boshoff, J. contended that an identification must be reliable enough to stand 
on its own (seljstandig), but in other cases it appears that fairly weak identification evidence has been 
accepted when the circumstances are such as to suggest the guilt of the defendant. This is especially 
true of cases involving identification parade evidence, and I will consider the implications in this 
regard at some length later in the chapter. 
Identification parades are an important form of test under the cautionary approach recommended in 
the several landmark identification cases. This is explicitly acknowledged in Shekele and S. v. 
Gordon, 111 and indeed, as we will see in the next section, they are widely considered indispensable to 
the pre-trial identification process. 
Identification parade rules 
I have not been able to trace the 'originary moment' of the identification parade in South African 
police or legal practice (if, indeed, such a moment exists), and the absence of discussion of the 
practice in the South African law reports before 1932 is noticeable. It appearance probably owes 
much to police practice in England, and to the early cases of the English court of criminal appeal. 
One of the earliest of these cases, R v. Chapman, 118 spoke strongly against the practice of 
'confrontations'. It was said that confrontations of witness and accused - in order to secure 
identifications - ·are neither fair nor justified. Dock identifications, in particular, have very little 
m S. v. Nango 1990 (2) (SACR) 450 (A). 
116 
An earlier case, though, held that the fact that a police officer of proved integrity and reliability as a witness makes an 
identification does not render it more reliable. It is irrelevant to the question of whether the officer is mistaken in his 
identification. Madiba v. R. 1947 (2) (PH) H272 (N). 
117 
Gordon v. S. 1970 ( 1 )(PH) H68 (A). 
Lii 
R. v. Chapman 1911 7 Cr. App. Rep. 53. 
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value. 119 The usual and proper way to conduct identifications is to place the suspected man with a 
sufficient number of others, and to have the identifying person pick out a man without assistance. 120 It 
is wrong to point out the suspected person and ask "Is that the man"? At the time of this case, 
decisions made by the English appeal court were binding on South African courts, and Chapman's 
case is frequently cited in the law reports, albeit not immediate to its reporting. 
The prescription for pre-trial identification in Chapman is echoed in South African cases that bear on 
the matter. Thus, in Mputing, it was said that where there is uncertainty regarding the identity of the 
person who committed the misdeed, an identification parade should be held. Similarly, in Kola v. 
R., 121 Schreiner, J.A. held that it was of the greatest importance that identification parades should be 
held, except where they are useless (e.g. where the witness knows the defendant well). He further 
stated that it is unsatisfactory to rely on an identification of a witness not acquainted with the accused 
without it being tested by a parade. 
A stronger case could hardly be made for the practice of identification parades than that made in Kola 
and Mputing. Courts have certainly relied on the purported reliability that a parade identification 
imparts - in S. v. B.,' 22 for instance, where a woman was raped by two men, her identification of these 
at a parade was the only evidence in front of the court, and they were convicted on this basis. 
Nevertheless, many judges and legal scholars have been fully mindful of the dangers that attend 
parades - in Kola itself, Schreiner issued the following lucid warning: 
But an identification parade, though it ought to be a most important aid to the administration of 
justice, may become a grave source of danger if it creates an impression which is false as to 
the capacity of the witness to identify the accused without the aid of his compromising 
position in the dock. Unsatisfactory as it may be to rely upon the evidence of identification 
given by a witness not well acquainted with the accused, if that witness has not been tested by 
means of a parade, it is worse to rely upon a witness whose evidence carries with it the hall-
mark of such a test if in fact the hall-mark is spurious. (At 169). 
How does a court decide whether this 'hall-mark' has been cast truly, or is counterfeit? In the cases, 
this question has been approached in tenns of the notion of 'regularity': an identification at a 
regularly conducted parade can be accorded great weight, but irregularities render such identifications 
of little weight. 123 This very important notion, however, has not been carefully defined in judicial 
119 
van den Heever, J.A., in R. v. Kumalo 1948 (2) (PH) H200 (A), was even more forthright He called such evidence 
"worthless", and said that it was "calculated to endanger the liberty of innocent persons" (At 331). In R. v. Madubedube 
1958 (1) (SA) 276 (0) it was pointed out that it does not only endanger iMocent suspects, but also lets the guilty go free. 
120 Similarly, in R. v. Williams 1912 8 Cr App. Rep. 84, it was held that for the purposes of identification, the suspected 
person should not be presented alone. 
121 
Kola v. R.. 1949 (1) (PH) HIOO (A). Many other cases have acknowledged the important role of identification parades as 
a form of pre-trial identification. See Mtetwa v. R 1954 (2) (PH) HI 99 (A); R. v. Madubedube 1958 ( 1) (SA) 276 (0). 
122 S. v. B. and another 1980 (2) (SA) 946 (A). 
123 R. v. Masemang, 1950 (2) (SA) 488 (A). 
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discussion in South Africa, and is approached most frequently by identifying specific 'irregularities'. 
If a parade suffers from no discernible irregularities, it is considered to be regularly conducted. Some 
courts have offered more general heuristic advice: in R. v. Olia, for example, it was said that an 
identification parade should be conducted in such a manner that there can be no doubt whatsoever as 
to the genuineness of the identification.124 Nevertheless, most of the case law concentrates on specific 
sources of irregularity, and I will consider these in some detail. 
In Kola it was held that the onus is on the state to exclude all possibilities that an irregularity might 
have occurred in a parade. This position has been adopted and applied, with approval, in many 
cases.125 In Kola itself, the Crown was not able to show that the identifying witness could not have 
seen into the parade room while the identification parade was being formed, and could therefore not 
eliminate the possibility that the ir.ientity of the suspect was made known (however inadvertently) to 
the witness. In S. v. de Bruin, 126 it was not clear whether the accused was the only person on the 
parade with a dark suit, and since the State did not lead evidence to show that this was not the case, it 
did not exclude the possibility that an irregularity had occurred. · 
The word 'irregularity' is perhaps not very well chosen, since it invites comparison with the way the 
term is used in Acts like no. 31 of 1917 (section 3 70). In R. v. Sebeso121 as much was argued by 
counsel for the defendant: specifically, it was said that certain irregularities which occurred at an 
identification parade prejudiced the trial per se, and should have been considered irregularities in 
terms of the aforementioned Act. This contention was dismissed by the Court, and it was held that 
irregularities at identification parades are not irregularities at the trial, but merely factors bearing on 
the value of the identification evidence adduced there. This ruling was affirmed in R. v. W. 121 The 
notion of an 'irregularity' in the conduct of an identification parade is perhaps best exemplified by the 
well known remarks of van den Reever, J.A. in Masemang, at 493: 
But where such identification rests upon the testimony of a single witness and the accused was 
identified at a parade which was admittedly conducted in a manner which did not guarantee 
the standard of fairness observed in the recognised procedure, but was calculated to prejudice 
the accused, such evidence standing alone can have little weight. 
124 
It is not clear that this is very helpful. Later in the thesis I will argue that it may be more accurate to think of 
identification parades as always leaving some doubt as to the accuracy of the identification. 
m See S. v. Burgess 1978 (l )(PH) HIO (N}, and S. v. Mlati 1984 (4}(SA) 629 (A). 
126 S. v. de Bruin 1967 (2) (PH) H325 (A). 
127 R v. Sebeso and others 1943 (SA) 196 {A). 
121 R v. W. 1947 (2) (SA) 708 (A}. In R v. Y. and another 1959 (2) (SA) 116 (W}, it was said that even as a failure to 
observe the regulations in an identification parade is not an irregularity at the trial, such a failure will not be overlooked. 
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An irregularity at a parade is an aspect of the conduct or structure of the parade that prejudices the 
accused (and a regularly conducted parade is, conversely, one that does not in any way prejudice the 
accused). In Mlati, Botha, J. made this clear: 
Die uitdrukking "calculated to prejudice the accused" sinspeel natuurlik nie op 'n doelbewuste 
beplanning van die polisiebeamptes om die beskuldigde te benadeel nie; dit verwys na die 
bestaan van feite wat, objektief beoordeel, tot gevolg het dat die beskuldigde blootgestel is aan 
benadeling, hoe ook al daardie feite tot stand gekom het. (At 635) 
(Translation. The expression "calculated to prejudice the accused" naturally does not refer to 
a premeditated intention on the part of the police officials to compromise the accused; it refers 
to the existence of facts which, objectively considered, have the effect of compromising the 
accused, however those facts came into being). 
I will return a little later in the chapter to the question of the effect that parade irregularities have on 
the way identification evidence is evaluated. 
Irregularities in the constitution of the parade 
The principle that appeared to lead English courts to reject identifications secured at 'showups', or 
confrontations, was that these procedures are extremely suggestive. In Chapman's case,129 it was 
contended that the correct procedure is to place the accused among a sufficient number of other 
people, and have the witness attempt an identification. The exact number which is sufficient was not 
considered by that court, but in South Africa several legal scholars have said that it is eight,130 
although no justification is given for this particular number. The parade members chosen to serve as 
parade 'foils' should be similar in physical appearance to the accused: in R v. Sebeso, 131 similarity of 
colour, build and clothing was considered adequate, and in R v. Weldon,' 32 it was said that utmost 
care must be taken in arranging identification parades to see to it that clothes of the parade members 
will not suggest to a witness that the suspect must be sought amongst those parade members who are 
differently dressed. 133 Irregularities in terms of this last requirement have frequently led to the need 
for higher courts to overturn decisions. In Masemang, the accused was dressed in a jersey which had 
a distinctive dark maroon colour, whereas the other parade members had on jerseys a shade lighter. 
This was considered an irregularity. Similarly, in Mlati, the defendant was the only parade member 
who wore a black leather jacket at the identification parade, and he was immediately identified by the 
129 1911 7 Cr. App. Rep. 53. 
130 Hoffman and Zefertt, at 616; V .G. Hiemstra. Strafprosesreg, Durban: Butterworths, 1967, at 73, say that a total of eight 
people (including the suspect), is required. This has been a requirement under English law for some time (see G. 
Williams and H.A. Harnmelman, Identification parades, in Criminal Law Review, 1963, at 479), and may well be the 
source of these claims. 
131 R. v. Sebeso and others 1943 (SA) 196 (A). 
132 R. v. Weldon 1947 (l)(PH) H39 (A). 
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complainant, who had earlier reported that one of her assailants was wearing such a jacket at the time 
of the offence. In this case it was held that although the relevant section in the Criminal Procedure 
Act of 1977 gave a police official the power to place a suspect on an identification parade in any 
apparel the official might determine, the official should attempt to ensure that an identification at a 
parade would have probative value, and this might well entail ensuring that the manner in which the 
accused is ~ressed is not unduly suggestive. The State argued that in the instant case the accused had 
been asked before the parade if he was satisfied with the parade, and he had replied in the affirmative, 
but Botha, J. concluded that there was no onus on the accused to ensure that the identification parade 
was regularly conducted, but indeed that the onus rested on the State. In S. v. Sibanda, 134 it was said 
very clearly that a police official must use his discretion appropriately when considering the apparel 
to place identification parade members in - distinctive clothing may 'assist' the identification to the 
detriment of the accused. 
A parade should be constituted by people of similar physical appearance, but this requirement cannot 
be absolute, and will usually be met in degree. Thus, in R v. Tusi & another, m the defendant had a . 
beard of fairly short length, and it appeared that the beards of other parade members varied somewhat 
from this. This disparity was not, however, considered sufficient to warrant any concern over the 
reliability of the identification. 
In some cases it will be very difficult indeed to construct a parade which consists of people 
reasonably similar to each other: in Weldon, Scheiner, J.A. asserted that this is probably the case 
when the defendant is a woman. Perhaps the most extreme example of this problem is to be found in 
the case of S. v. Seanego, 136 where the defendant had a green mark on his head. In this case, the trial 
judge found it understandable that the police had not attempted to construct an identification parade. 
In practice, the police find it very difficult to find people of suitable physical appearance who are 
willing to serve as parade foils, 137 and this task is still more difficult where the accused has a peculiar 
identifying feature. 131 In several discussions I had with police officers in the SAPS (South African 
Police Service) charged with arranging identification parades, it transpired that a common strategy for 
133 
See also Mo/ife v. R.. 1955 (l) (PH) H62 (T). 
134 
S. v. Sibanda and others 1969 (2) (SA) 345 (T). 
135 R. v. Tusi and another 1957 (4) (SA) 553 (N). 
136 
S. v. Seanego 1978 (2) (PH) Hl21 (A). 
137 
"It is all very well for the new police orders to say that the accused "will be placed among a number of persons, as far as 
possible of similar age, height, general appearance and class of life as himself or herself', but the practical difficulties in 
the way of doing so must be immense, while anything like a real failure to carry out the order almost entirely destroys the 
efficacy of the parade". (Justice of the peace, 'Identification', SAL.I, 1926, at 288). 
131 
One approach to this problem is to place a covering on the feature, and to put a similar covering in the same place on each 
of the foils. This happened in Mo/ife v. R. l 955 ( l) (PH) H62 (T), where the accused had a bandage around his head. 
The practice is apparently commonplace in the U.S.A. See also the case of the one eyed girl who allegedly robbed a 
sailor, SAL.I, 1926 at 288. 
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obtaining foils is to recruit policemen not involved in the case at hand, and government employees 
from neighbouring buildings. It is worth noting that this practice is strongly discouraged in England, 
and has largely fallen away there. The reasons appear to be139 i) police officers serving as foils may 
know who the suspect is, and convey this unwittingly to the witness; ii) in country districts most 
witnesses would know all the resident police officers, and they would therefore be useless foils; iii) 
police officers.often have a distinct bearing and manner, and this will mark them as different from the 
suspect. 
Nevertheless, that the parade should consist of people of reasonable physical similarity is an 
important requirement. In this respect, the evaluative criteria set by the courts are only partially 
helpful. Colour, build and clothing may be important attributes on which to determine similarity, but 
they are not sufficient, nor are they adequate. Facial similarity is perhaps a far more important 
attribute for parade members to have. '40 Little has been said about this attribute, although it could be 
argued that the requirement of physical similarity ipso facto includes facial similarity. Nevertheless; 
a trial court is in a disadvantaged position when it comes to evaluating facial similarity, since it will 
frequently have no useful record of the cons~itution of the parade. Nowadays police often make a 
photographic record of the parade, and may submit such record to the Court, but they have not always 
done this, and there is no compulsion on them to do so. Even if a photographic record of the parade is 
available for inspection, it is not clear that it takes the matter much further, for how is one to evaluate 
facial similarity? This, of course, is the theme for the empirical work reported in later chapters. 
Parades with multiple ~ccused members 
The practice of identification parades, as commonly understood, involves the insertion of an accused 
into a line of other, innocent people. This is frequently not the case in practice; it is perhaps as 
common to encounter parades with multiple accused members as it is to encounter single suspect 
parades. There is some evidence to suggest that the former type of parade is inherently inferior to the 
latter, which I will detail in a later chapter. It is notable that it is not a requirement in South African 
law that a parade should contain only one suspect. However, where a number of persons are under 
suspicion and an identification parade is held, the parade should not consist only of the suspected 
persons, even if this means that more than one parade must be held.
141 
This is not a strong 
requirement - in the very case in which it was formulated (Wildman en andere v. S.), it was held that a 
139 See Williams and Hammelman. footnote 41 of this chapter. 
140 I will substantiate this claim in greater detail when I discuss psychological research on identification parades, namely in 
the following chapter. 
'" Wildman en andere v. S. 1968 (2) (PH) H356 (A). 
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parade which consists only 9f suspects could yield an identification that is not totally valueless, 
although it will be greatly reduced. 
Irregularities in the procedure of the parade 
The Courts h~ve frequently made recommendations regarding the procedural aspects of identification 
parades. The concern is with how the parade is conducted, and the purpose of the recommendations is 
to avoid sitUations in which there is suggestion as to the identity of the accused, or even the 
possibility that there is such suggestion. 
Thus, in R. v. Mkize, 142 it was held that identification parades should be arranged so that suspects and 
witnesses do not come into contact with each other before the parade. In that case a conviction was 
set aside because the accused people and the witnesses had arrived independently at a police camp 
and had been in a position to come into contact without police supervision. Witnesses should also not 
be in a position where they can see into the parade room while the parade is being fomied, and they 
should also not see any of the parade members before the parade is conducted. 143 
A similar restriction is applicable to groups of witnesses. When witnesses are assembled preparatory 
to an identification parade, police officials ought to prevent them as far as possible from engaging in 
conversation which concerns the identity of the person sought. A member of the service, where 
possible, should be present to see that such an instruction is not infringed. 144 
There should be no opportunity at all that allows the suggestion of the identity of the suspect to the 
witness(es), no matter that this might only happen inadvertently. Courts have gone so far as to say 
that the witness must not know that the police have a definite suspect in mind, and that therefore, the 
police official conducting the parade should not know the identity of the suspect in the parade.'4' 
In R. v. Nara Sammy, several of these rules were affirmed. The presiding judge rejected an 
identification made at a parade on the grounds that i) witnesses were herded into a common room 
before the identification and discussed the appearance of the perpetrator; ii) the officer conducting the 
parade had seen the parade being assembled and therefore knew who the suspect was and could have 
communicated it to witnesses, even if this was an unlikely event; and iii) the presiding officer failed 
142 
Mkize v. R. 1932 ( 1) (PH) Hl 7 (N). This was the earliest reference I could find to the tenn 'identification parade' in a 
report of a South African case. 
143 
Kola v. R. 1949 (1) (PH) HlOO (A). 
144 
R. v. Weldon 1947 (l)(PH) H39 (A). 
14
' R. v. Nara Sammy 1956 (4) (SA) 629 (T), also R. v. Y. and another 1959 (2) (SA) 116 (W). In R. v. Masemang, 1950 (2) 
(SA) 488 (A), a police officer accompanied the witness on the way to the parade, and from their reported conversation he 
appeared to intimate that he knc:w the identity of the suspect. This was considered inappropriate and irregular. 
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to warn of the possible absence of the offender, and therefore probably implied that he was present. 
For the latter reason, the judicial officer recommended that the instruction "if such person is present 
on the parade" should be incorporated into police instructions to witnesses at identification parades. 
This has been taken in some cases to be a strict requirement. Thus, in the Transkei case reported at 
appeal as S. v. Mpopo,' 46 the witness was asked by a police sergeant "to point out the person whom 
she suspected ~o have killed the deceased". The sergeant's error received a sharp comment from the 
trial Judge, Mtinnik, C.J.: 
I think you must go right back to Sterkspruit and let them teach you how to run an 
identification parade again. You have just messed up another murder case. How could you go 
and ask a witness who does she suspect of murdering somebody? (At 428) 
However, in other cases the absence of such a warning has not been treated with the same gravity. In 
S. v. Hay, 147 where such an instruction was not issued, it was held that the omission of the instruction 
'indien hy op die parade aanwesig is' (tr. If he is present in the parade) need not necessarily 
compromise the accused. 
The disclosure of a parade identification in court 
The Courts have also made several observations and recommendations regarding the reporting of 
parade identifications at the trial. In the first place, it has been stated that only the witness who made 
the identification should be permitted to testify to this fact in court. In Molife v. R., 
141 
the crown led 
evidence that the accused had been identified at two of three identification parades, but failed to call 
the identifying witness in respect of the first identification. The court dismissed this evidence. 
If an identification parade was held, and a person who could well have identified the perpetrator did 
not identify the accused at a parade, it is the duty of the prosecutor to bring this evidence to the 
attention of the court, especially when identification is the only or main issue.
149 
Indeed, the failure of 
witnesses who could be expected to identify the perpetrator must be evidence in favour of the accused 
- it must imply some doubt as to the evidence that the accused is the perpetrator.
150 
In Nksatlala v. R., 
Schreiner, J.A. held that the test to be applied when giving weight to this failure is whether the failure 
to identify raises a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court. 
146 S. v. Mpopo 1978 (2) (SA) 424 (A). 
147 Hay v. S. 1970 ( 1) (PH) H98 (A). A similar position was taken in R. v. Y. and another 1959 (2) (SA) 116 (W). 
141 Molife v. R. 1955 (1) (PH) H62 (T). 
149 Molife v. R., supra. 
150 S. v. Molakang 1979 (2) (PH) H154 (0). 
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The way in which the identification is made at the parade appears also to be of some importance. 
Thus, in R.. v. Hlatywayo, 151 Steyn, J. said that an unhesitating identification at an identification parade 
increases the believability of the identification, while a hesitating identification suggests the converse. 
This assertion, however, is not entirely consistent with the many observations made regarding witness 
demeanour in identification cases. Thus, in Meh/ape, Williamson, J.A. noted 
The often patent honesty, sincerity and conviction of an identifying witness remains, however, 
a snare to the judicial officer who does not constantly remind himself of the necessity of 
dissipating any danger of error in such evidence. (At 32). 
Earlier, in Masemang, van den Heever, J.A. issued a similar warning: 
The positive assurance with which a witness will sometimes swear to the identity of an 
accused person is in itself no guarantee of the correctness of that identification. (At 493). 
In police practice, there appears to be a requirement that the witness physically touch the person she 
wishes to identify at the parade. I can find no discussion of this in South African cases, but police 
officials are of the opinion that such a ruling has come from the courts. It is a particularly unpopular 
requirement among rape complainants, for obvious reasons. In England, it has long been a 
requirement that the witness touch the identified person, m except where the witness is very nervous. 
The details of how an identification was made at an identification parade may thus be taken into 
account at the trial, but an issue that has arisen in this regard is the status of the police record of such 
a parade. (Later in the chapter I will discuss the mechanism by which police keep records of 
identification parade, namely by requiring police officials to complete form SAP 329). Is such a 
record privileged, and if so, which type of privilege is it protected under? 
The Courts are divided on this issue. In S. v. Mpetha, 153 Williamson, J. ruled that identification parade 
documents are privileged, but in S. v. Jija and others 154 the Appellate Division formed a different 
opinion. There it was held that a police record of an identification parade is not a privileged 
document, either in the sense of legal professional privilege, or in the sense of witness statement 
privilege: it is difficult to see how privilege could attach to a document completed in the presence of 
the accused and their legal representatives, who are entitled to question the correctness of the 
information set out in the document. Such a document is a contemporaneous note of the res gestae of 
the parade. Alternatively, the court held, if there is such privilege, judicial discretion should be 
151 
R. v. Hlatywayo 1953 (1) (PH) H74 (T). 
152 The Home office has issued recommendations and guidelines on the conduct of identification parades from time to time, 
and in the earliest of these that I have been able to trace (the 1925-1926 guidelines, reproduced in Shepherd et al. [see 
footnote 30], at 123), the touching requirement is included at the reported insistence of the Secretary of State. 
153 S. v. Mpetha and others 1982 (2) (SA) 253 (C}. 
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exercised in cases where the document becomes relevant and it should then be made available to the 
defence. 
There is also divided opinion in the cases concerning the effect of previous acquaintance on the 
probative value of identifications made at parades. In Kola, at 169, Schreiner, J.A. said that 
"identification parades ... would be useless ... where the identifying witness knows the suspect apart 
from the occasion of the crime." This proposition appears straightforward, and a rationale' for it may 
be found in the cases which consider the question of acquaintanceship more generally. There is little 
point in testing the identification of a witness who is acquainted with the accused, since the witness 
may rely on previous knowledge of the accused.,, - that is to say, on knowledge that does not stem 
from her observations at the time of the event. The test will . be easily passed, and this will go 
nowhere toward the real goal of ~uch a test, which is to determine whether the witness is correct in 
her assertion that the accused was the perpetrator she saw at the event. 
However, in the case of S. v. Rademeyer,156 a different decision was arrived at by Muller, J.A. In this 
case, two witnesses identified the accused at an identification parade as the man they had seen 
commit a murder. It appeared that they knew the accused by sight, although both claimed that their 
knowledge of him was slight. The advocate for the accused argued that their previous knowledge of 
the accused negated the value of the identifications made at the parade. Muller, J.A. had a different 
view: 
Ek kan glad nie sien hoe hierdie voorafkennis die bewysgewig van hulle uitkenning op die 
parade negeer of enigsins affekteer nie, en dit veral waar die verhoorhof bevind het dat hulle 
eerlike en betroubare getuies was. (At 303). 
(Translation: I simply cannot see how this prior knowledge negates, or even affects the 
evidentiary weight of their identifications at the parade, especially since the court a quo found 
that they were honest and reliable witnesses). 
Other forms of parade 
What I have called the 'identification parade' in this chapter is really only one form of the parade, 
namely that in the visual modality, and might more appropriately be called the 'visual identification 
parade'. Just as a claim of identity might rest on the visual observation of particular identifying 
characteristics, so it may also rest on aural observation, or observation of voice characteristics. It is 
also a mistake to think that an identification parade need occur corporeally, that is to say as a task in 
154 
1991(2)(SA)52 (E). 
155 Tekav. R. 1960(l)(PH) 171 (C). 
U6 S. v. Rademeyer er; ander 1980 (2) (PH) H 191 (A). 
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which a witness inspects an array of live people: often, an array of photographs will be presented to 
the witness, and the pre-trial identification will occur solely from the photographs. In this section of 
the chapter I examine these alternative forms of identification parade. 
Voice parades 
Identification on the basis of voice is not a common form of identification evidence led in our courts, 
but it occurs from time to time, and the courts have considered the merits of this type of evidence. An 
early English appeal case, R. v. Keating, 157 held that it is possible that a sufficient identification can be 
made on the basis of a person's voice alone, and accordingly admitted such evidence. In the earliest 
reported South African cases to consider this type of identification evidence, there was some doubt 
about the admissibility of identifo.:ations secured at voice identification parades. In R. v. Gericke, 158 
the advocate for the accused argued that the relevant section in the Criminal Procedure Act of 1917 
did not make provision for making someone participate in a voice parade, since a person's voice 
could not be said to be a distinguishing feature or mark. Alternatively, the advocate argued, making 
the accused participate in a voice parade runs foul of the common law, which prohibits forcing people 
into self-incriminating actions (i.e. the tenet nemo tenetur se ipsum prodere has application). 159 These 
arguments were overruled: the court declared that there was no difference in principle between a 
visual identification parade and a voice identification parade. In a later case, S. v. M 1963,160 it was 
specifically ruled that evidence of voice identification is admissible as a voice cannot fail to be 
viewed as a characteristic or distinguishing mark. In addition, the argument regarding self-
incrimination was rejected, since this particular stricture has application to forced confessions, and 
the intention behind the stricture is to guard against evidence made unreliable by the way it is 
adduced. Identification parades are not confessions, and are therefore not protected under the tenet. 
Several cases have made specific recommendations regarding the conduct of voice identification 
parades. Thus, in Gericke, it was said that i) there should be more than four voices in the parade; ii) 
some of the parade members' voices should be known to the witness - not merely one but more than 
one; iii) the witness should not be taken to the suspect last, since there is no-one else to identify at 
"
1 R. v. Keating 1909 2 Cr. App. Rep. 61. 
151 R. v. Gericke 1941 (3) 211 (C). In this particular case, the voice parade was conducted by putting five people including 
the accused in different cells, and having the ear-witness listen to a police officer speak to each in turn, without seeing 
any of them. 
159 Of course, this argument can also be used against visual identification parades. This has occurred in both English and 
American courts (see Williams and Hammelman, footnote 41 of this chapter), but it is not accepted there. See Nathan R. 
Sobel 'Eyewitness identification: Legal and practical problems', New York: Clark Boardman, 1991, at 8-1, for a 
comprehensive discussion of this issue in U.S. law. 
160 S. v. M 1963 (3) (SA) 183 (T). 
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that point. No justification is offered in support of recommendation i), nor is any offered for the 
peculiar recommendation in ii). 161 
In R. v. Chitate, 162 Quenet, J.P. applied the reasoning from Shekelele and other identification cases to 
the whole issue of voice identification. The same care must be taken with aural parades as is taken 
with visual identification parades, since the danger of mistaken identification is also present. 
Questions must be put as to what features of the voice (e.g. timbre, loudness) are recognised. The 
opportunities for correct aural observation should also be tested (e.g. the loudness of the perpetrator's 
voice, the number of people speaking at that time). The voice test must occur as early as possible,'
63 
and certainly before the witness has had an opportunity to hear the accused speak. 'Voice foils' who 
participate in the parade must be chosen to resemble the suspect's voice. The whole purpose of such 
tests is to discover whether a witness's conclusion is reliable, and such reliability will remain untested 
if the test itself was improperly conducted. In S. v. M 1972164 some of these recommendations were 
confinned, and several added. In particular, it was said that witnesses must not know who the 
accused is, and they should be separated from each other to counteract suggestion from one to 
another. 
However, in some cases the notion of a voice parade has been severely questioned. In the Swaziland 
High court, in Mavuso and others v. The King, 165 the presiding judge considered voice identification 
parades to be of dubious value, since the suspect could disguise his voice, or he could choose to say 
little, or nothing. In S. v. M 1963, where a voice identification parade was not held, but appeared 
applicable, the judge questioned the possibility of satisfactorily conducting a voice identification 
parade, noting that he had grave doubts "whether any voice identification parade would not culminate 
in pure frustration." (At 183). 
Photograph parades 
In several countries, it is now common for police to use photograph identification parades, or 
'photospreads' as they are known in the U.S.A. This practice is not yet common in South Africa, 
although evidence of identification from photographs has been admitted. 
161 Indeed, the latter recommendation would enable the witness to disregard one or more of the voices in the parade, and the 
size of the parade would then possibly be smaller than that recommended! 
162 R. v. Chitate 1966 (2 ) (SA) 690 (RA). 
163 Not as in that case, where the test occurred after the accused had testified in court for some time. 
164 S. v. M. 1972 (4) (SA) 361 (T). 
165 Mavuso and another v. The King 1969 (2) (PH) H 168 (Swazi). 
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Again, an early precedent can be found in the English appeal court cases. In R. v. Allen Ferguson!(Jl, it 
was held that photographs of suspected persons, whose arrest is under consideration, may be shown 
by the police for purposes of recognition.. However, persons recognising suspects should not 
afterwards be asked to identify them at the trial. If they are, all the facts of the recognition should be 
disclosed. In R. v. Melany 161 a similar ruling was made, but it was added that identification by 
photograph should be conducted where corporeal identification is not possible, and that this 
identificatio~ 'should not precede a corporeal identification. 161 
These authorities were cited in the Southern Rhodesian case of R. v. Jackson, 169 where a woman was 
arrested on the basis of an identification from a single photograph, and tried for cheque fraud. 110 Here 
it was ruled that a series of photographs should be used if police are to use photographs for purposes 
of identification. If a corporeal icentification parade is held after the photograph parade, the value of 
an identification made there is greatly lessened, but this effect is less severe if a series of photographs 
is used for the parade, with a photograph of the accused among them. 
In a recent case, S. v. Shandu, 111 Mr. Justice Didcott spoke against the value of photograph parades. 
He held that the conditions under which they are conducted can scarcely duplicate the conditions of a 
corporeal identification parade. Resemblance of parade members is not guaranteed in a photospread, 
and there are no settled procedures and regulations governing the technique to protect the accused 
from influence and suggestion. Where such a parade is held, the reliability of an identification rests 
to a large extent on the number of photographs exhibited, and the fairness with which they are 
presented. It is not clear however, that the difficulties the learned judge identifies are either unique to 
photograph parades, or insurmountable. All identification parades appear to suffer under the 
requirement of physical resemblance, and indeed, the problem may be greater for corporeal 
identification parades. In photograph parades, it is possible to collect beforehand a large number of 
photographs from which to select suitable foils, and parades could be 'standardized' for fairness using 
empirical techniques. In addition, the safeguards against suggestion currently in effect with respect to 
166 R. v. Allen Ferguson 1924 18 Cr App. Rep. 145. 
167 R. v. Melany 1924 18 Cr App. Rep. 2. 
161 
However, the recent Home office guidelines of 1978 in respect of the conduct of identification parades have amended 
these recommendations somewhat. Here it is suggested that i) any photograph of a suspected person that is shown to a 
witness be embedded in an array of at least 12 photographs (including that of the suspected person); ii) the photographs in 
the array should be of a similar type, and the people who have been photographed should be as similar to each other as 
possible; iii) the witness should be explicitly infonned that the photograph of the perpetrator might not be in the array; 
and iv) a witness who has made a finn identification by photograph should always be asked to attend an identification 
parade unless it is unnecessary or impracticable for some other reason. (Home Office Circular No. 109 of 1978, 
reproduced in Shepherd et al. [see footnote 30] at 128). 
169 
R. v. Jackson 1955 (4) (SA) 85 (SR). 
110 The accused was also placed on an identification parade, though, where she was identified by a witness who had made an 
identification from a photograph shown her by the police. 
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corporal identification parades could very easily be enacted for photographic parades. A real 
difficulty with photograph parades appears to be the difference in quality of identifying information 
that the witness is given. For instance, a corporeal parade provides more information of a three 
dimensional nature than provided in photographs. Nevertheless, I will later consider empirical 
evidence which suggests that the difference in this regard is not great. 
It is worth digressing at this point to make the observation that witnesses frequently come into contact 
with photographs of accused people independently of identification tasks, and these photographs may 
'contaminate' the memory of the perpetrator. This criticism applies with equal force to instances 
where witnesses are shown photographs of suspects during the course of police investigations, and to 
instances where the press publishes photographs of the suspect before the trial commences (and on 
occasion, before identification parades have been held). In such instances, a witness may come to 
believe that the police have arrested the perpetrator, and mistake her original memory of the 
perpetrator for that she has gleaned from the photograph. Glanville Williams warned the legal 
community some time ago of the terrible potential for injustice that the uncontrolled police use of 
photographs creates.m In England, the Home Office has heeded his advice (albeit somewhat 
belatedly), and has issued detailed instructions for the use of these in cases of criminal 
identification.168 
Dog scent parades 
The final type of identification parade I wish to consider here173 is one that is both rather unusual, and 
that has attracted considerable attention in the South African Law Joumal. 114 I mean the type of 
identification parade in which the 'witness' is a dog, and the parade is commonly known as a 'dog 
scent parade'. 
I will discuss this form of parade briefly, since the evidence contained in an identification from such a 
parade is not direct evidence in the way that evidence delivered by an eye- or ear- witness is direct 
evidence. The dog that makes the identification did not observe the event in question, but attempts to 
correlate a scent presumed to belong to the perpetrator with a member of an array of people 
171 S. v. Shandu 1990 (I) (SACR) 80 (N). 
m See footnote 30. 
173 I do not consider 'item' parades (as conducted in R. v. W. 1947 (2) (SA) 708 (A), where a suit and a bicycle were placed 
among similar suits and bicycles for identification), since Courts have not ruled specifically on these parades, except to 
admit them as evidence. 
174 See L. H. Hoffmann "Those Dogs Again" 1974 SA law Journal vol 91 237. 
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assembled for 'scenting'. The recent case of S. v. Shabalala,m taken on appeal to the Appellate 
Division carefully considers this form of evidence. 
In that case, a man awoke one night to find an intruder attacking his wife. He attempted to defend his 
wife from the intruder, who fled from the scene of the crime, leaving sand shoes behind him in the 
flight. These shoes were later given to a specially trained bloodhound, one 'Tilly', who sniffed the 
sandshoes, and then sniffed each member of an assembled array of people. Tilly stopped at the 
appellant, barked, and touched him with her paw. This was led as evidence of identification in the 
court a quo, where it was admitted as having evidential value, although not much weight was attached 
to it. The Appellate Division, however, ruled that such evidence is inadmissible, confirming a 
judgement made much earlier, in R v. Trupedo!16 The court did say, though, that it does not follow 
that Trupedo is the final pronouneement on the matter in all circumstances. The principal reason for 
the exclusion of such evidence is the untrustworthiness of the evidence, and where this element is 
sufficiently reduced the actions of the dog would become relevant and therefore admissible. Mere 
proof that the dog comes from special stock and that it has been specially trained in tracking will not 
suffice. Additional evidence explaining "the faculty by which (these) dogs ... are ... able to follow the 
scent of one human being, rejecting the scent of all others" (At 734), is required. in 
Police practice in South Africa 
It has been noted on more than one occasion by the courts that the conduct of identification parades is 
a matter largely in the hands of the police, and that this therefore gives them a wide discretion.'11 For 
this reason, it is important to examine the in-house procedures the South African Police Service 
follows in respect of identification parades. 
Police officials appear to receive no (or very little) formal training in the conduct of identification 
parades, either during their basic training in police college, or during later specialized training. An 
officer who is frequently charged with organising parades at Caledon Square, Cape Town, 179 told me 
that the very first experience he had with an identification parade was as an organizing official. Two 
policemen in the identikit unit at Caledon Square reported similar experiences, and asserted in 
17
' S. v. Shabala/a 1986 (4) SA 734 (A). 
176 
R. v. Trupedo 1920 AD 58. 
177 A recent article summarizes the scientific evidence at hand, and comes to the conclusion that there is inadequate scientific 
support for trusting canine behaviour in scent identification parades. A conviction based on such evidence, the author 
argues, is based more on superstition than reason. A.E. Taslitz. 'Does the cold nose know? The unscientific myth of the 
dog scent lineup'. Hastings Law Journal 1990, vol. 15, 42. 
171 
S. v. Sibanda and others 1969 (2 ) (SA) 345 (T). 
179 This was communicated in a telephonic interview (see footnote 21 ). 
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addition that police officials are often left to their own devices when constructing parades. 110 There is 
no 'pool' of foils, for example, that can be drawn on for such a purpose, and police frequently request 
civil servants working in neighbouring buildings to serve as foils. The following 1989 newspaper 
report corroborates these claims: 
Magistrate says police tried to mislead him
181 
by Mziwakhe Hlangani 
A Port Elizabeth magistrate expressed outrage and disgust yesterday at irregularities allegedly committed by policemen 
during an identification parade. The magistrate, Mr. A W Meiring, said he had found out that policemen had tried to mislead 
him by covering peep holes through which suspects could be viewed during an identification parade with fingerprint ink. Mr. 
Meiring said he had never thought a police officer would go out of his way to falsely and deliberately implicate a suspect so 
that he was sentenced to jail for a long term. The magistrate said he had always trusted policemen and had sentenced 
thousands to jail because he had relied on police evidence .... The court had established that there had been irregularities in an 
identification parade and that a junior officer who was inexperienced had been placed in charge of the parade, said Mr. 
Meiring. There had been holes in walls though which suspects could be seen at a New Brighton identification parade. 
Conversation could be clearly heard between walls separating complainants, police and accused .... Mr. Meiring ordered the 
inspection in loco on Wednesday moMing. He also ordered that nobody should leave the courtroom before he was ready to 
leave for the inspection. "But somebody apparently sent a message through for the openings to be covered, because when I 
got there, I found wet fingerprint ink spread over the openings", Mr. Meiring said .... The magistrate also said it was clear -
from the evidence of Constable KA Stemele who was in charge of the parade - that he did not know the identification parade 
procedures. He said that the incorrectness with which the parade was conducted was illustrated by the fact that none of the 
policemen had been able to explain why they had four people on the parade when the complainant had to identify three 
suspects. 
This lack of training may be due to a belief on the part of police management that police officers do 
not require training, that the purpose and nature of identification parades is self-evident. It may, on 
the other hand, be due to a belief that parades can be adequately conducted and regulated by a printed 
set of procedures. Indeed, a standard police fonn governs the administration of identification parades, 
and police officials are obliged to complete the fonn whenever they conduct a parade. 
The fonn in question (SAP 329) is reproduced as Appendix A. Since the fonn appears to be the chief 
mechanism guiding in-house police practice, it is worth examining in some detail. 
There are 34 sections. Sections 1-4 require details concerning the police member in charge of the 
parade, the police station it is conducted at, the charge(s) against the suspect, and the details of the 
investigating officer who has issued the instruction that the parade be conducted. Sections 5-9 record 
details of the suspect(s) to be placed on parade, confinn that suspects were infonned of their 
entitlement to legal representation, and record who the representatives were, if appointed. Sections 
10-11 record the names of the photographer and interpreter, if present. Sections 13-16 record the 
names of police members who guarded and escorted witnesses, before, during, or after the parade. 
Section 17 requires the police member in charge to indicate how many people were on the parade, and 
to certify "that they were " ... of about the same height, build, age and appearance and were dressed 
more or less similar to the suspect(s)." Sections 18-19 record that suspects were infonned of the 
110 This information was elicited in 1987, when I consulted police about an entirely different research matter. 
111 Eastern Province Herald, April 28, 1989, pp 1-2. 
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charges against them, of the purpose of the parade, and that they were entitled to make any reasonable 
request(s) in respect of the parade. These sections also record what their requests were, and what 
steps were taken as a result of the request(s). Sections 20-21 record that suspects were asked if they 
were satisfied with the parade, their answers to this question, and the names of legal representatives, 
if present. Section 22 records the name, age and address of all parade members, and section 23 
records whether a photograph was taken of the parade. Sections 24 - 25 record i) the procedure of the 
parade, including the positions taken up by parade members, from left to right, ii) the name and 
language of the first witness, ii) that the witness was asked to point out the suspect(s), if on the 
parade, by touching his/her/their shoulder(s), iii) the time taken by the witness to point out a person(s) 
on the parade, the result of this identification, and the reaction of the witness during the pointing out 
of person(s). Sections 26 and 27 record that suspects are given the opportunity to change their 
positions before the next witness is introduced, whether they avail themselves of this, and what the 
new positions of parade members are. Sections 28-31 record details regarding identifications made 
by additional witnesses, following the same format as Sections 24-27. The final three sections, 32-34 
record additional remarks, and a certification of just report from the conducting officer. 
The form is lengthy, and detailed. Many of the guidelines that have come from the courts, as 
summarised at some length in this chapter, are embodied in the form. It is notable, though, that these 
guidelines are rarely developed beyond the original wording. In the case of the requirement of 
physical similarity, no details regarding the physical characteristics of parade members are recorded, 
and if a photograph is not taken at the time of the parade, the court has no way of assessing whether 
the requirement has been met, short of issuing summons to the people who served as foils. Some of 
the guidelines are also not implemented in the form: in particular, the requirement that the officer 
conducting the parade should not know the identity of the suspect is not enforced. 
Police practice appears to depend very heavily, and perhaps unwisely, on SAP 329. I should stress, 
however, that this conclusion derives from a handful of interviews, and a more comprehensive 
investigation may show police practice in a more positive light. 
Evaluation of South African law on identification parades 
In the preceding sections of this chapter I attempted a comprehensive overview of South African law 
on identification parades, and to a lesser extent, of police practice in respect of such parades. It is 
time now tc;> provide an evaluation of this law, and to identify points of concern. The problems are in 
most cases not particular to South African law. In the following chapter, where I discuss 
psychological research on identification parades, it will be clear that several of the problems are 
inherent to the task. 
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The status of identification parade 'rules' 
The power of police officials to conduct identification parade is enacted at tbe level of statute. The 
courts have frequently noted that the practical administration of parades is accordingly at the 
discretion of the police service. Nevertheless, courts have made many remarks about the conduct of 
parades, and, as discussed at some length in earlier parts of this chapter, have also formulated rules by 
which to evaluate their 'regularity'. But of what force are these rules? Are they 'rules' at all? This is 
an important question, and I will consider two troubling aspects of the formulation and 
implementation of parade rules in the case law. In the first place, the rules are applied inconsistently 
across cases, and secondly, they are applied as a matter of degree, so that it is possible on occasion 
that most of the rules are broken, but the evidence is still admitted. A few examples from preceding 
sections will be provided as substantiation. 
Courts are inconsistent about the effect that prior acquaintanceship has on the probative value of an 
identification at a parade. The Appellate Division held on one occasion that prior acquaintanceship 
renders the value of such an identification questionable, and on another that it does not affect the 
value of the identification at all (see page 53). Similarly, courts have held that identifications made 
by policemen are not more likely to be accurate than those made by lay people (see footnote 116), but 
that they are when made by policemen who belong to certain units, since they have 'special powers of 
observation' (see page 44). Of course, inconsistencies are to be expected in any body of discourse 
that evolves through the practice of precedent; more troubling is the way in which parade rules are 
used along an implicit gradient of application. The requirements of conduct set out in some rules can 
be compromised, and even flagrantly broken, and there may yet be little effect on the evidentiary 
value of the identification. Thus, it is possible that a parade may consist of only suspects (see page 
49), even though an axiomatic rule is " ... to place the suspected man with a sufficient number of 
others, and to have the identifying person pick out a man without assistance" (see page 45). In one 
case, it was decided that the qualification 'if the person you saw commit the crime is present' should 
be added to the standard police lineup instructions (see page 51 ), but in another case the absence of 
such an instruction was not accorded any significance (see page 51). 
One might be forgiven for concluding that the entire approach of the courts to the rules set by 
precedent is of this 'sliding nature'. This approach has its genesis in the legal doctrine of case-wise 
interpretation: each case must be considered on its merits (page 43), and the facts of the case must be 
considered in their totality and in sight of all the circumstances (page 44). While it is clear that blind 
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adherence to technical rules may " ... paralyze the judicial nerves of natural reasoning'', 112 this doctrine 
makes the 'rules' set down for identification parades indeterminate. They are not rules at all, and the 
protection they afford falsely 'accused people is questionable. 
The super-ordinate rule which cannot be evaluated 
Much of the case law has concentrated on protecting accused people from procedural irregularities. 
There are also important protections that have to do with how identification parades are constituted, 
and one of the most important of these is the stipulation that parade members should bear a sufficient 
degree of physical resemblance to each other. The conceptual basis of this rule is not set out clearly 
in the cases, and I will attempt in the next section of the chapter to explicate the legal basis for the 
claim. For the moment, though, the question I wish to address is how courts or police officials 
evaluate compliance with this rule. 
It is clear that police officials labour under the task of finding foils similar to the suspect (see page 
48). Courts appear to evaluate this rule in a somewhat ad hoc fashion. Thus, similarity of the foils is 
judged in particular cases by matches of colour, build (height and weight), clothing, and facial hair, 
but nothing is said about matches in respect of facial similarity (see page 49), nor is an acceptable 
degree of similarity defined. This is perhaps a near-intractable task, and the courts can therefore 
hardly be expected to perform it well. Nevertheless, the consequence is that physical similarity is a 
type of potentially 'confounding' or 'third' variable, whose effects on the fairness and efficacy of the 
parade are concealed. It throws into question the entire basis and purpose of the identification parade 
as an evidentiary tool. 
What are identification parades for? 
Despite the fact that the identification parade has been in use now for over 100 years, its explicit 
purpose has rarely been carefully examined by courts. Some commentators assert that a lineup 
primarily provides protection against the suggestiveness inherent in other methods of identification 
such as a direct face-to-face confrontation between the witness and suspect (Devlin, 1976)}13 But 
what will the witness's positive identification show in such a situation? Will it show that the witness 
is reliable, and that the details of his/her testimony can therefore be taken seriously? Or will it 
112 
Wigmore, see page 40 of this chapter. 
113 
It is worth noting here the recent research by Gonzalez, Ellsworth, and Pembroke (1993), which points out that no-one 
has ever provided empirical substantiation of this claim. Indeed, in several experiments conducted by Gonzalez et al. 
showups had a lower degree of respon:;e bias than lineups. 
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provide direct evidence against the suspect, in the sense that it increases the probability that the 
suspect is guilty? In short, should identifications secured at parades be treated as independent 
evidence of identity, or should they be treated as tests of assertions of identity? 
Both of these aims are built into the structure of the lineup. The witness is asked, if able, to indicate 
the perpetrator from a number of 'foils', who are known to be innocent of the deed in question. If the 
witness identifies one of the foils, his/her evidence regarding the identity of the perpetrator is 
considered less reliable than it would otherwise. The identification parade clearly serves on the one 
hand as a check on witness reliability. Yet, a positive identification is also taken as evidence against 
the suspect: indeed, the courts are at great pains to ensure that the identification at a parade constitutes 
an independent piece of evidence. 114 This would not be the case if the identification parade served 
merely as a reliability check. Ccnsistency of identification would serve as a measure of reliability in 
its own right. Instead, the courts prefer to consider identifications as independent evidence regarding 
the suspect's guilt. 
The implications of the two aims are quite different. If the intention is to test the reiiability of a claim 
of identity, then the identification of a suspect at the parade is of marginal value, since it merely 
serves to corroborate the claim. If the intention is to secure independent evidence of identification, 
then the parade identification is of great significance. In the next chapter, where I survey the 
psychological literature on identification parades, I will show how this issue has been addressed from 
a somewhat different perspective. 
This chapter has shown that there are many complications in the treatment given to identification 
parades in South African law. What I would like to take forward to later chapters as a central 
argument, is that both courts and police officials are presently unable to assess whether a most 
important requirement has been met, namely that an identification parade consist of people who are 
sufficiently alike. 
114 See the remarks made by Boshoff, J. in Mputing (discussed on page 44 of this chapter). 
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Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I reviewed the legal safeguards against the vagaries of eyewitness evidence, 
particularly with respect to the practice of identification parades. There I made the point that courts 
are well aware of the dangers that attend identifications made by eyewitnesses, and I outlined the 
rules that have evolved in South African courts in response to these dangers. One of the conclusions I 
drew from that discussion was that one of these 'rules', namely the required physical similarity of 
suspect and foils, is very difficult to evaluate, and may operate as the legal equivalent of a 
confounding variable. In .the present chapter, I review a body of psychological research on 
identification parades, and conclude - in part - that variations in physical similarity may indeed affect 
witness performance in identification parades, but that these effects are not well understood. I also 
review measures of parade fairness reported in the psycho-legal literature, and consider some of the 
research aimed at optimizing parade procedure and structure. 
There is a long history of psychological interest in legal problems surrounding evidence of 
identification. As early as the beginning of the 20th century European psychologists were 
demonstrating the notable imperfections of human witnesses to their students, and were publishing 
regularly in continental and American journals (see for examples Whipple, 1912; Stem, 1910). 
However, most of the research on eyewitness issues has accumulated in the last twenty years, and 
since little of the early research is directly relevant to the question of identification parades, I will 
focus instead on the more recent psychological literature. 
The literature will be discussed under three headings. In the first, I consider research on measures of 
parade fairness. In the second, I outline psychological conceptualizations of the nature of the 
identification task, and discuss the relation of these to practical recommendations on foil selection. In 
the third section, I consider research on structural features of parades. 
Research on measures of fairness 
The notion of a 'biased identification parade' is so well known in most countries that it is almost part 
of contemporary folklore. Apart from providing the less concerned with a good belly laugh, the 
biased parade is a genuine outrage to jurists and observers of the law alike, since it leads to grave 
injustice. A notorious example of such a parade is cited in Elliso~ & Buckhout, (1981). Minneapolis 
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police arrested a black man as the prime suspect in a case they were investigating, and placed him in a 
parade otherwise constituted only by white men. Similar cases have occurred in South Africa; in the 
previous chapter I referred to the case of Pe/wan, where a parade was composed of three Indian men 
and three white men, the suspects being three Indian men. In Pe/wan and the case referred to above, 
the parade was clearly (perhaps self-evidently) biased - and easily identifiable as such - but more 
usually the bi~s will be difficult to identify and to describe. In addition, such identification and 
description will always depend on inherently subjective observations; this is especially the case for 
infractions of the requirement of physical similarity. 
Several psychological studies have addressed the problem of measuring parade fairness, and several 
of these have suggested interesting measures of fairness. These are worth reviewing in some detail. 
In Chapter 6 I address these measures again, and attempt to develop ways of reasoning inferentially 
about them. 
The method of the mock witness 
The contemporary psychological interest in measures of lineup fairness stems in large part from an 
article published by Doob & Kirshenbaum ( 1973), in which they reported the results of an unusual 
experiment. The experiment tested a police lineup used in a Canadian case, R v Shatford, for fairness. 
The case turned on an identification made by a single eyewitness. The authors questioned that the 
eyewitness in the case was able to make an identification at a parade, given the fact that the only 
physical description that she was able to provide to the police was that the perpetrator was 'attractive'. 
Doob & K.irshenbaum suspected that the witness was basing her identification on, at best, 'partial 
memory' 11' of the suspect), or at worst, on her own description to the police. In the first stage of the 
study, 20 subjects who were 'blind' to the identity of the suspect were asked to rate the members of 
the parade for attractiveness. The suspect received a substantially higher mean attractiveness rating 
than any of the other foils, suggesting that the suspect was distinctive, and could well be selected by a 
witness who remembered only that the perpetrator was attractive. In the second stage of the study, 
Doob & Kirshenbaum showed a photograph of the identification parade to 23 'mock witnesses' 
(witnesses who had not been present at the original crime), along with the 'description' of the suspect 
given to police by the witness. They reasoned that subjects who had not been present at the crime 
should not be able to identify the suspect with a probability exceeding that expected on the basis of 
random selection (I/number of lineup members = 1112 = 0.083). 64% of the witnesses correctly 
m A term coined by Doob & Kirshenbaum. 
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identified the suspect. Doob & Kirshenbaum reported that the probability of this occurring is less 
than 0.001, and concluded that the lineup was biased. 
Doob & Kirshenbaum suggested that this method - which has come to be known as the method of the 
mock witness - could be used in general to assess the fairness of identification parades. The method 
posits that the lineup is fair when the proportion of witnesses choosing the suspect does not exceed 
that expected 'on the basis of mere random choice. 
Functional and Nominal size 
The intention of Doob & Kirshenbaum's study was to provide a measure of lineup fairness. 
Information regarding lineup fairness is provided to some extent by the proportion of accurate mock 
witness choices, but it is certainly not complete. An important additional feature of a lineup appears 
to be the number of plausible foils that it contains. If some members of the lineup are implausible, 
then the expected proportion of accurate mock witness identifications should perhaps be calculated as 
1/k', where k' is the number of plausible foils. A clear example of this reasoning is given in the South 
African case of S. v. Pe/wan. In this case, the court dismissed evidence of identification from a lineup 
whose membership consisted of three Indian suspects and three white foils, where the crime had been 
committed by three Indian men. The court reasoned that the witness had pointed out the only three 
people on the parade that he could have pointed out: that is, the parade consisted in effect of only 
three members. 
Wells, Leippe & Ostrom (1979) coined the term 'functional size' to deal with this type of situation, 
viz. that where the 'nominal' size of the lineup and the number of plausible foils clearly diverge. They 
suggested a measure of'functional size', which has the intent of providing an index of the number of 
plausible lineup members, and is therefore also a measure of lineup fairness. The measure relies on 
the mock witness task introduced by Doob & Kirshenbaum, but avoids certain problems encountered 
by Doob & Kirshenbaum's procedure for evaluating fairness when 'null' and 'perfect' foils are present 
in the lineup. 
Doob & Kirshenbaum's measure of fairness is insensitive to null and perfect foils. If a lineup, 
consisting of 9 foils and the suspect, is fair, the suspect will be identified with probability = 1110. 
However, if 5 valueless foils are added to the identification parade (valueless in the sense that they 
are so unlike the original description that they have an irrelevant probability of selection), this 
probability will be 1/15, suggesting that the additional foils have decreased the likelihood that the 
suspect is identified. This is not the case, by definition, and casts some doubt on the value of the 
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assumption of equiprobability. An argument with a similar conclusion can be made for the case of 
'perfect' foils (foils chosen at rates exactly equivalent to chance expectation). 
Wells et al. (1979) suggest an alternate measure, which avoids comparing the proportion of accurate 
identifications116 to the expected proportion under an assumption of equiprobability. The measure is 
defined as DIN (where D is the number of mock witnesses who choose the defendant, and N is the 
total number of mock witnesses), and represents the proportion of mock witnesses who identify the 
suspect. It is insensitive to the problem of null and perfect foils since it depends only on the 
frequency with which the defendant is identified, and not on the size of the lineup. Wells et al. (1979) 
suggest that the measure has a useful interpretation when transformed to its reciprocal (N/D), which is 
the number of functional members of a lineup, hence the term 'functional size'. It is this index that 
they suggest as a measure of lineup fairness. A lineup is fair when the 'functional size' and the 
'nominal size' are identical. In the hypothetical lineups d and e of Table 4.1, which represent lineups 
with clearly divergent numbers of plausible foils, functional size is 2 and 6 respectively, and this 
difference corresponds quite well to the apparent difference in fairness of the lineups (i.e. from visual 
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Table 4.1 Functional size in a number of hypothetical lineups. 
It is doubtful that the statistic suggested by Wells et al. ( 1979) really provides an index of lineup size. 
Malpass ( 1981) argues this quite convincingly, so there is no need to repeat his observations here, 
except that the measure depends only on the proportion of accurate mock witness identifications, and 
takes no account of the distribution of identifications across the foils. It is possible for the functional 
186 
Several distinctions need to be made in respect of the accuracy of witness identifications at parades, although these 
depend at some level on whether the witnesses are 'mock witnesses', or 'simulated witnesses', or real witnesses. In 
parades where the suspect is the perpetrator, a correct identification is the identification of the suspect. All other choices 
are incorrect. In parades where the suspect is innocent, the correct witness response is to indicate that the perpetrator is 
not present. Two other responses are possible, but they should be distinguished, at least conceptually. If the witness 
chooses one of the foils, this is an error, and it will be obvious in all three kinds of parade that this is the case. However, 
where the witness chooses the innocent suspect, it will not be clear in 'real parades' that the choice is mistaken. It has 
become conventional in parade research to separate these types of errors. Where the distinction is important, I will adhere 
to the convention. 
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size of a lineup to be identical to its nominal size and for the distribution of identifications to exhibit a 
clearly different picture about the number of plausible foils. Lineup f of Table 4.1 is one example 
(the functional size of the lineup is 6, suggesting 6 plausible lineup members, but visual inspection 
suggests that this is an over-estimate),187 and it is easy to imagine many others. 
Effective Size and Defendant Bias 
Malpass (1981; Malpass & Devine, 1983), has provided a thorough analysis of the contributions made 
by Doob & Kirshenbaum (1973) and Wells et al. (1979) to the measurement of lineup fairness. In his 
analysis he argues for a distinction between lineup size and lineup bias. Lineup size refers to the 
number of plausible members that the lineup contains, and it contributes directly to the fairness of the 
lineup by decreasing the probability that the defendant is identified by a witness who wilfully chooses 
at random. Lineup bias, on the other hand, is the extent to which mock witnesses choose the 
defendant at rates greater (or smaller) than chance expectation. Because both these components 
contribute to the fairness of a lineup, a measure of each is required. Malpass (1981) suggests a 
measure of each. 
The first measure to be considered is what Malpass calls 'effective size', which is intended to measure 
what Wells et al. thought functional size would measure. 
It is clear that an identification parade should have a sufficient number of members to provide some 
conventionally agreed level of protection against the threat of a witness choosing randomly. Thus, if 
a parade consists of only two members it provides little protection, since the probability of being 
identified on the basis of random identification is 0.5. On the other hand, a parade consisting of ten 
members would reduce this probability to 0.1. It is not clear what identification probability should be 
regarded as safe: this will depend on how the courts weigh the danger of convicting the innocent (a 
Type I error, in statistical terms) against the danger of setting free the guilty (a Type 2 error). 
However, most legal systems suggest that parades should have between six and ten members, and so 
seem prepared to convict between I 0 and 17% of all innocent suspects. 111 
Malpass suggests that it would be a mistake to think that an identification parade of some nominal 
size automatically provides adequate protection against the threats posed by a small parade. This is 
117 
This particular distribution of lineup identifications is not as unlikely as it may seem. There are several reported instances 
of mock witness trials where foils have drawn more identifications than the suspect (cf. Buckhout, Rabinowitz, Alfonso, 
Kanellis & Anderson, 1988). 
111 
Note, though, that this statement has disguised in it the assumption that innocent and guilty suspects are equi-probable, 
whereas it is presumably the case that guilty suspects are much more likely to be members of identification parades. 
Also, the truth of the statement depends on the further assumption that witnesses choose randomly, which is unlikely. 
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because one or more of the lineup members may be implausible, and a witness who has no 
information at all about the true identity of the perpetrator will be able to disregard the implausible 
foils andrai1d()mly .choo~~ the suspect with a probability greater than I/nominal size. The probability 
of being randomly selected from a lineup depends not only on the size of the lineup, but also on the 
quality of the foils (specifically, the number of plausible foils). 
In order to evaluate a lineup, Malpass argues, the critical thing to know is how many plausible foils it 
contains. Although Wells et al.'s (1979) measure of functional size attempts to estimate this quantity, 
it has several faults. Malpass suggests an alternative to functional size, namely 'effective size', which 
is the number of effective choice alternatives presented to mock witnesses. In a more precise 
notation, 
Effective size = ka - t I Oj - eal 
i=I 2ea 
where oi = the (observed) number of mock witnesses who choose lineup member i; e3 = the 
adjusted nominal chance expectation (N•[llka]); ka =the adjusted nominal number of alternatives 
in the lineup (original number - number of null foils).
189 
The intent of the measure is to reduce the size of the lineup from a (corrected) nominal starting value 
by the degree to which members are, in sum, chosen below the level of chance expectation. As is 
clear from the formula, the absolute value of the difference between observed and expected values is 
taken, and the sum is divided by 2, in order that the calculation reflect the sum of differences where oi 
- ei < 0. (Malpass reasons that the important departures are those below chance expectation, since 
lineup members who fail to draw identifications are poor foils). 
The assumption underlying the notion of effective size is an appealing one. One or more of the foils 
in a lineup may present an inadequate test of a witness who has little more than only very general 
knowledge of the appearance of the offender, and we shouldn't take the ability of a witness to reject 
such foils very seriously. The calculation of effective size acts on the assumption by reducing the 
nominal size of the lineup as a function of the departure of identifications of individual foils from that 
expected by an equiprobability model. For many distributions of identifications the measure does 
seem to give an indication of the number of foils that could reasonably be considered present. 
Lineups g, h, and i in Table 4.2 are clear examples. 
119 
The notation used here differs slightly from that given by Malpass (1981 ), to ensure consistency with later theoretical 
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Lineup Member 
1 2 3 4* 5 6 
0 25 5 25 3 2 2.83 3.00 
10 10 9 10 II 10 5.90 5.90 
I 0 12 12 0 11 3.17 3.17 
7 7 7 24 8 7 4.60 4.60 
12 6 9 13 14 6 5.10 5.10 
6 19 3 20 8 10 4.45 4.45 
E
1 
= effective size calculated with adjustment for null foils. Eb = effective size 
calculated without adjustment for null foils. • =suspect 
Table 4.2 Effective size in a number of hypothetical lineups. 
However, the measure also produces estimates that seem intuitively at odds with visual inspection of 
particular lineup distributions (lineups j, k and I are cases in point). In Chapter 6, when I return to 
measures of lineup fairness, I will provide further arguments in this regard. 
Defendant bias 
Malpass (1981) points out that effective size does not provide a measure of bias towards the suspect, 
but an estimate of the number of plausible foils present in a lineup. Thus, it is possible for a suspect 
to participate in an unbiased lineup of very small effective size. Imagine that only three members 
(including the suspect) of a ten member parade are plausible choices. If the suspect is chosen by 
mock witnesses with a probability of 1/3, there is no bias toward the suspect, despite the large number 
of redundant foils. Vje should not reject this lineup because of the differential probability of 
successfully choosing the suspect, but rather because of the increased risk that the suspect will be 
chosen at random from the lineup with three effective members (i.e. at a rate of oj per identification). 
Bias towards (or against) the suspect is another matter. Malpass advises that, in principle, we follow 
Doob & Kirshenbaum's method, which was described earlier. Here bias is equated with the departure 
of the proportion of suspect identifications from that expected under an assumption of 
equiprobability. He suggests that the 'size' of the lineup is better estimated by the calculation of 
'effective size', which I discussed at some length immediately above. Thus, defendant bias will be 
measured by departures of the suspect identification probability from I/[ effective size of lineup]. The 
idea here is that the likelihood of being selected randomly by a witness is less a function of the mere 
size of the lineup than a function of the number of plausible foils present in the lineup. 
How should the measures of parade fairness be used? 
Each of the measures discussed above can be used in a practical sense to evaluate parade fairness. 
The method in each case is that of the 'mock witness': research subjects are given a description of the 
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suspect, 190 and they are required to select the parade member who best fits this description. The 
measures are then calculated on the basis of the mock identifications. 
The measures are intriguing, and indeed, useful contributions to the considerable problem of 
evaluating the quality of identification parade evidence. They have been applied to several real cases, 
where they have been used to argue for the biased, or fair, nature of identification procedures used 
there (Doob & Kirshenbaum, 1973; Bi.Jckhout, et al., 1988; Brigham & Pfeifer, 1994). In addition, 
some valida~ion research conducted by Brigham & Brandt ( 1992) shows a substantial degree of 
correspondence between judgements of fairness made by law enforcement officials, and estimates of 
functional and effective size. 
The contributions bring a bit of hard-headed empirical thinking to a problem that is usually dismissed 
as intractable, and not amenable to investigation. However, there are three reservations about the 
measures that I would like to articulate at this point. 
In the first instance, they may be of limited legal utility, particularly in the (South African) legal 
system used as a reference point in this thesis. The mock witness task is impractical. While it is 
certainly possible for the defence - or a self-critical police force - to monitor identification parades 
using some combination of the measures described above, it would be expensive to do this on a 
regular basis. All of the measures require that a sizeable experiment be conducted, in which 
identifications are collected from mock witnesses: this entails the recruitment of a substantial number 
of civilians each time an identification parade is held. 191 The original parade members would also have 
to be retained for.the 'mock' parade. Both of these requirements make for large expenses, and it is 
unlikely that the police will be able to sustain the required mock witness recruitment for very long. 
Furthermore, most identification parade cases appearing before the courts in South Africa are 
defended pro deo, so it is unlikely that the defence will be willing to incur the expenses associated 
with these methods. 
In the second place, the methods all proceed indirectly, and therefore fail to directly address the 
features of the parade that determine its fairness, or bias. If a high proportion of mock witnesses are 
able to correctly identify the suspect, we do not know what it is about the parade that enables them to 
do so. It may be that suspect-foil similarity is low, or it might be that the suspect has a particular, 
distinctive feature, or it may even be a procedural irregularity. Part of the problem is the lack of 
190 Typically, the original description provided by the witness. If this is not available, then a description can be generated by 
the experimenter (eg. the experimenter obtains a description from a subject who is allowed to sec the suspect under 
similar circumstances to those of the original event). 
191 It is not possible to exactly estimate the required number of subjects per parade, since this will vary according to both the 
size and the fairness of the lineup. However, a six member parade would probably require approximately sixty subjects. 
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conceptual clarity about wh~t an identification parade is supposed to achieve. I will return to this 
problem later in the chapter, ~hen I discuss specific strategies for selecting foils. 
Finally, a substantial problem with the measures is that they are used without any attention to their 
statistical properties. This is a significant failing, since the mock witness task has its basis in a 
probability .model: the number of correct mock witness identifications is compared to that expected 
under an assumption of equiprobabilistic choice. This comparison must explicitly take heed of 
random variation in choice, or it is bound to capitalize on chance. Similar arguments can be made for 
the measures of functional and effective size. One of the central tasks that I hope to accomplish in 
this thesis is the development and application of inferential statistical reasoning to these measures. 
This work is reported in Chapter 6. 
Theories of identification parades 
In Chapter 3, I pointed out that although the lineup has been used for at least 100 years, its explicit 
purpose has rarely been carefully examined by courts. This is also a failing which has characterized 
identification parade research, at least until recently. There are now at least two or three serious 
attempts to make clear the· conceptual basis of the identification parade, and these have important 
implications for the selection of parade foils, and for the evaluation of identifications secured at 
parades. I deal with some of this theoretical work now. 
' . 
The notions of 'diagnosticity' and informativeness: a Bayesian analysis 
There are at least two purposes that an identification parade can serve. It can constitute a reliability 
check, in the sense that it tests whether a witness is able to identify a suspect arrested by the police. 
Such an arrest may or may not have been based on a verbal or 'visual description', 192 but this is not 
material to the purpose of the parade, which is conducted merely to corroborate or disconfirm the 
hypothesis of identity. Alternatively, the parade may have the purpose of securing an independent 
piece of evidence against the suspect, in the sense that it increases the perceived likelihood that the 
suspect is the perpetrator (see Chapter 3 for a related discussion). 
Wells and colleagues (Lindsay & Wells, 1980; Wells & Lindsay, 1980; Wells & Turtle, 1986) have 
provided a Bayesian analysis of parade identifications, although they do not make the explicit 
192 I mean the kind of description inherent in an 'identikit' portrait, or some similar assisted reconstruction of the witness' 
visual memory of the perpetrator. 
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distinction referred to above. I will attempt a little later to make clear how this distinction impacts on 
their analysis. 
There are two key notions in their Bayesian analysis of parades. The first is the well known 
'likelihood ratio', which has a fundamental place in Bayesian statistics. Lindsay & Wells (1980) refer 
to this ratio as the 'diagnosticity' of a lineup: how 'diagnostic' the lineup is of the suspect' s guilt (or 
innocence). ,in terms closer to Bayesian principles, the ratio expresses how much more likely the data 
are to have occurred given the truth of one hypothesis (that the suspect is the criminal) relative to the 
other (that the suspect is innocent): 
P(ids~ =c) 
P(ids ~ ;e c) 
where ids = identification; s = suspect; c = criminal; I is the conditional operator . 
An example should make the meaning of the ratio clear. Table 4.3 presents the distribution of 
witness193 choices in two sets of identification parades: in one of the parades in each set the suspect is 
guilty (parades l & n), in the other the suspect is innocent (parades m & o). 
Lineup Member 
1 2 3 4* 5 6 NIP 
5 3 6 31 8 3 4 
m 8 5 6 5 2 7 27 
n 5 3 6 31 8 3 4 
0 6 5 6 25 8 3 7 
NIP = not present. •=Target 
Set {I, m}: diagnosticity = [31/60)/[S/60) = 6.20 . 
Set {n, o}: diagnosticity = [31/60)/[25/60] = 1.24 
Table 4.3 Diagnosticity in a series of hypothetical parades. 
In the first set of parades, the suspect is 6.2 times more likely to be chosen when she is the criminal 
than when she is innocent. The identification parade is said to be diagnostic of the suspect's guilt. In 
the second set of parades, the suspect is only 1.24 times more likely to be chosen when guilty than 
when innocent, and the parade is thus not very diagnostic of the suspect's guilt. 
The absolute size of the diagnosticity ratio is thus the measure of the parade's value, taken 
independently of all other things that have a bearing on the case. 
193 Note that real witnesses, and not mock witnesses, arc the witnesses of interest here. 
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The theoretical position assumed in the fonnulation of the ratio is clearly aligned to the second of the 
purposes I distinguished earlier: a parade provides independent evidence of the guilt or innocence of 
the suspect. Navan (1990a, 1990b), however, has argued that the diagnosticity ratio is a measure of 
reliability, and does not provide independent evidence of identity. I will consider his objections in the 
next section of the chapter. 
The second key notion in . the Bayesian analysis proferred by Wells and colleagues is that of 
'infonnativeness', or 'infonnation gain'. A positive (or negative) identification presumably leads to 
some alteration of the probability that the suspect is the criminal from the point of view of the 
investigating officer, and the amount of this change is the nett infonnational value of the 
identification. Infonnation gain is the difference between the prior probability that the suspect is the 
criminal, and the posterior probability of the same (dependent only on the intervening identification 
or non-identification of the suspect). It is stated fonnally as 
Information gain jp(s=c) - p(s=cjids)I 
or,' Information gain jp(S*c) - p(S*clnids)I 
where s = suspect, c = criminal, I = sign for conditional occurrence of an event,. ids is the event that an 
identification is made, and nids is the event that an identification is not made 
p(ids ~ =c)p(s =c) 
p(s ~c lids) 
' p(ids ~ =c)p(s =c) + p(ids ~ '¢ c)p(s ,,,_ c) 
and s, c, ids are defined as before. 
The absolute value of the difference between the probabilities is taken, since it is the size of the gain 
that is important, and not the direction. The value of the identification depends on the size of the 
prior probability (although this is only clear from a close examination of the Bayesian ratio): a 
positive identification might lead to a big increase in the likelihood of the suspect's guilt if it is low to 
begin with, but will generally have a smaller impact the higher the prior likelihood of guilt. 
Whereas the diagnosticity ratio concerns the independent amount of evidence provided by an 
identification at a parade! infonnation gain expresses the effect that an identification (or non-
identification) has on the total amount of infonnation that existed before the identification. 
The notions of diagnosticity and infonnation gain attempt to conceptualize the identification task 
embedded in identification parades in tenns of a type of statistical information theory. There is some 
question about the interpretation of the measures, though. David Navan ( 1990a, l 990b) has recently 
argued that there are several problems with these notions, and has suggested a different way of 
looking at parades in terms of Bayesian theory. 
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Parade identifications and ecological likelihoods: Navon's objections 
In order to understand Navon's objections to the Bayesian fonnulation provided by Wells and 
colleagues, it is important to grasp a methodological feature of much identification parade research. 
Police identification parades are of at least two types: parades where the perpetrator is present, and 
parades wher~ the perpetrator is absent. In both types of parade, the police have placed a suspect in 
the parade, but they invariably do not know whether the suspect is guilty. In order to reproduce this 
aspect of police practice, two identification parades are frequently used in psychological research, one 
containing the 'guilty' suspect, and one containing an 'innocent' suspect. The difficulty with this 
procedure lies in the justification of the choice of innocent suspect for the second parade. This is 
often achieved by choosing a confederate who bears some physical resemblance to the perpetrator, 
and 'deeming' this foil to be the innocent suspect. 
'Fixing the resemblance', in this way, argues Navon, begs the question of the infonnational value of 
the lineup. Diagnosticity (which is the ratio of correct identifications in perpetrator-present lineups to 
incorrect identifications (of the innocent suspect) in perpetrator absent lineups) can be made high by 
choosing a suspect (and foils) that is highly dissimilar to the perpetrator, and very low by choosing a 
suspect that is highly similar. Navon contends that similarity is a very important aspect of the 
identification: it embodies the most useful evidence provided by the identification. The measure 
developed by Wells and colleagues is only a measure of the reliability of a witness identification - it 
expresses a ratio of correct identifications to incorrect identifications. The point is that concentrating 
on the transduction process itself will inevitably mask the nett evidential value of the infonnation, 
since this depends on ecological likelihoods, and not on the process of transduction. The correct 
question to focus on is how likely the random match is of the perpetrator and any innocent person 
whose features happen to match those of the perpetrator. The critical infonnation is not how likely a 
false alann is, but how difficult it is to find a foil that will be falsely identified. By analogy, the value 
of a forensic blood type match depends on how unlikely such a match is, not on how reliable 
laboratory techniques are for detennining the match. 
The fonnulation of diagnosticity given by Wells and colleagues (see page 73) is thus conditional on 
the resemblance between the suspect and the target, but this conditionality is not taken into account in 
the fonnulation. Navon accordingly suggests another likelihood ratio, 
p(Rst )Roi S = Tand N = n) 
p(Rst )Ro I S *- Tand N = n) ' 
where Rst = the resemblance between subject and target; 
Ro = the lowest degree of resemblance that can be 
inferred from the parade, s = suspect, t = target. 
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Navon makes a few suggestions about obtaining parameters for determining how likely a match is 
given that the suspect is innocent. In particular, he suggests that the critical practical index is how 
difficult it is to get a foil who is not rejected by the witness: the target/perpetrator is then at least as 
close in resemblance to the suspect as he is to the foil who is not rejected. The next step is to find a 
probability value by retrieving the base rate for the critical foil, namely by comparing him to 
empirical distributions of face types (although such distributions do not exist), or by counting the 
number of foil candidates se;:rrched until a match is made. 
Wells & Luus (1990a) replied to some of Navon's objections, and the replies were countered in a 
second article by Navon (1990b). The details of the exchange are not important here. What is 
important is that both parties acknowledge the importance both of ecological likelihoods and of the 
physical resemblance between the foils and the perpetrator of the crime. 
Neither of the Bayesian approaches discussed in this section offer a sufficient conceptualization of the 
task embodied in the identification parade. In several recent articles, Wells and colleagues (Wells, 
1993; Wells, Seelau, Rydell, & Luus, 1994) have attempted a more complete analysis. 
Identification parades as recognition tests 
Wells et al. (1994) outline .a theory of identification parades constituted by two propositions and a 
corollary. The theory has important consequences for the selection of parade foils; these will be 
discussed later in the chapter. 
Proposition 1: The purpose of a lineup is to uncover information in an eyewitness's 
recognition memory that was not available in recall. 
The identification parade closely resembles a memory recognition test: the witness is presented with 
an array of choices, and is required to make the correct judgement. Where the perpetrator is present, 
the correct judgement is to point him out, and where the perpetrator is absent, the correct judgement is 
to indicate that none of the choices is suitable. A critical difference, though, is that the person who 
administers the recognition test usually knows the correct answer. In the identification parade, police 
hope that the witness will lead them there. 
Parades are conducted because verbal descriptions of the perpetrator given by witnesses do not 
contain information that allows us to decide whether the suspect is the culprit or not. This may be 
due to the poverty of the description, or to its inaccuracy. Several studies have shown that witnesses 
may provide substantively inaccurate descriptions, but are nevertheless able to identify the perpetrator 
in a parade (Pigott & Brigham, 1985; Wells, 1985). 
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Wells et al. directly assert that the function of a parade is to adduce evidence of identification, i.e. to 
increase or decrease the probability that the suspect is the criminal. The verbal recall given by a 
witness to the police is a different matter from the test of recognition that the lineup essentially is: the 
lineup must look for evidence that takes the matter further than the witness's original description, it 
must provide information about identity in addition to this report. 
Proposition 2: The identification process is governed not only by simple memorial 
factors but also by extramemorial judgement and heuristic processes. 
One such heuristic is the so-called 'relative judgement strategy' (Wells, 1984), discussed later in the 
chapter. A witness may construe her task to be the identification of the person who looks most like 
the perpetrator, rather than an absolute judgement of identity. This is an efficient strategy when the 
suspect is present in the parade, but is extremely dangerous when he is not! 
Wells et al. provide a slightly broader conceptualization of proposition two by attaching a corollary to 
it. 
Corollary to proposition 2: A lineup task can be likened to a social psychology 
experiment: Factors that can confound the psychological 
experiment can confound the lineup task. 
This analogy was discussed at some length by Wells & Luus (1990), Wells (1993), and Doob (1980, 
cited in Wells, 1984). There are obvious parallels between the need for 'blind' and 'double blind' 
procedures in both cases, the need to take random sampling variation into account, and so on. I will 
not detail the analogy any further here, except to note that the explicit comparison with social 
psychology is too specific - experimental methodology in general is probably a more suitable 
analogue. 
On the basis of the two propositions and the corollary, Wells et al. make a number of 
recommendations for the conduct of identification parades. 194 These are summarised below as Table 
4.4. 
194 But see Wells (1988) for a similar set of recommendation without the theoretical basis. 
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Recommendation Justification 
195 
l Verbal descriptions should be taken from all To determine whether a parade has taken the issue of 
eyewitnesses. identity further than the witness's original 
description 
2 For every suspect there should be five Arbitrary floor on probability of correct random 
distractors in the parade. witness choice (in analogy to a type I error rate). 
3 Distractors should be chosen to match the The parade attempts to gain more information than 
witness's description of the suspect. present in the original description. 
4 Separate lineups should be used for each Independence of identifications (faults in parade 
eyewitness in multiple-witness crimes structure will be replicated if unchanged). 
5 The positioning of the suspect should be In analogy to counterbalancing procedures. 
different for each lineup in which he appears 
6 Different distractors should perhaps be used In analogy to counterbalancing procedures. 
where a suspect appears in more than one 
parade 
7 Lineup administrator should not know who the In analogy to double-blind procedures. 
suspect is, nor who the distractors are. 
8 Eyewitness to be given the •;fpresent' To make the response criterion stricter. 
instruction. 
9 The witness should be asked in two stages; viz. To make the response criterion stricter. 
i) can you identify the perpetrator?; ii) who is 
it? 
Table derived from Wells, Seelau, Rydell & Luus (1994). 
Table 4.4 Recommendations made by Wells et al. for the conduct of identification parades 
The theory and recommendations set out immediately above assumes that the identification parade is 
intended to provide independent evidence of identity, and sets out ways to optimize the reliability of 
parade procedure. It fails to consider the alternate conceptualization of the parade as a test of witness 
reliability. I have previously referred to the distinction between the conceptualization of the 
identification parade as a test of reliability, and as a method of acquiring independent evidence of 
identity. This distinction is important, because it has different implications for the evaluation of 
parade identifications. 
Navon (1992) has recently made a similar distinction, and he notes some of the implications that each 
conceptualization has for parade practice and evaluation. The distinction he draws is between the 
following purposes of a parade: i) to provide an identification of the offender; or ii) to provide 
information about the resemblance between suspect and perpetrator beyond that provided by the fit 
with the original description. The first of the purposes is akin to a test of reliability, since it aims at 
proof of identity - an identification confirms that police have 'the right man'. Navon refers to this as 
the 'high match approach' (p. 584). The second of the purposes is intended to gather information 
195 Some of the justifications in this table do not appear in the article by Wells et al., but nevertheless flow naturally from the 
propositions and corollary. 
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from the eyewitness, and does not intend to secure an identification. This is the so-called 
'minimalistic approach'. 
The two purposes have very different implications for the selection of parade distractors. In this 
respect, Navon shares the idea with Luus & Wells (1991, Wells et al. 1993) that distractors should be 
chosen to resemble the original description of the offender, and not the suspect. Since this view is 
very different from much existing police practice and psychological research, I will introduce it after 
discussion of earlier work on the selection of distractors for parades. 
Research on distractor selection and evaluation 
. . . 
In Chapter 3, I outlined a central legal requirement for the construction of identification parades, 
namely that the suspect be placed alongside other people of approximately the same height, weight 
and physical appearance. This requirement is long established in both English and South African Jaw. 
It is a difficult criterion to evaluate, and some research by Malpass and colleagues (Malpass, 1981; 
Malpass and Devine, 1983) has attempted to apply the principles used in measures of lineup fairness 
to the problem. 
Malpass & Devine (1983) suggest a method for evaluating the suitability of individual foils, which is 
closely related in principle to the measure of effective size. The critical datum for evaluating the 
suitability of an individual foil, Malpass & Devine suggest, is the extent to which the foil is chosen 
below chance expectation in a mock witness task. Thus, if foil l is chosen from a ten member lineup 
with some low probability, this would suggest that the foil does not adequately represent the 
description given to the police by the eyewitness. (The question of the extent of departure from 
chance expectation is a thorny one. Malpass & Devine suggest leaving the decision to the fact 
finders). 
An alternative approach to measuring parade fairness would then be to set a minimum size criterion, 
and to determine whether the parade meets the minimum size (the estimate of size would be 
determined by including only plausible foils - and the suspect - in the total). This approach would 
apparently be intuitively appealing to lawyers and judges (Malpass and Devine, 1983). I argue in 
Chapter 6 that decisions about whether an individual foil meets some minimum identification 
criterion should be made in terms of a suitable probability model. 
The point to note here is that although this method of evaluating individual foils does not presuppose 
a particular strategy for choosing foils, psychological research using the method has followed the 
legal model of matching the foils to the suspect. Wells, Navon and colleagues are adamant that this 
approach is not only inoptimal, but courts grave danger. In order to present the argument clearly, I 
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discuss the traditional method of foil selection, and its suggested replacement, under separate 
headings. It is not necessary to distinguish the approaches taken by Wells and Navon, since they 
overlap. 
The match to suspect strategy 
This is the method advised by the courts. A number of foils are selected to serve as members of the 
parade, on the basis of their physical similarity to the suspect. A number of protections appear to be 
intended (Luus & Wells, 1991): in the first place, the probability of a correct, random choice is 
reduced; secondly foils allow the identification of known error, which reveals that the witness's 
memory is faulty; and thirdly, properly chosen foils assure that eyewitnesses cannot use deductive 
reasoning to determine which member of the lineup is suspected by the police, i.e. it reduces 
suggestion. 
There are several problems with this approach. The most pressing is that there is no clear optimal 
'point of physical resemblance' which can be used as a selection heuristic. On the one hand, a low 
degree of physical similarity will allow the witness to identify an innocent suspect on superficial 
features the suspect shares with the offender. 196 On the other hand, too great a degree of physical 
similarity will render an identification impossible, even if the witness has an accurate memory of the 
offender. Wells and Luus (1991) offer a reductio ad absurdum here, namely the situation where the 
parade consists of a suspect and five of her clones. 
The match to suspect strategy is intended to protect against situations where the suspect happens to 
resemble the offender more than the foils do. It is not clear that it provides this protection. It might 
be possible to find foils that bear considerable resemblance to the suspect, but it will be impossible to 
guarantee that the foils share all the features that an innocent suspect shares with the offender. Since 
the police are (partially) likely to arrest the suspect on the basis of some resemblance to the original 
description, and since it is not possible (or desirable) to completely match the foils to the suspect, the 
suspect is likely to resemble the offender more than any of the foils. An innocent suspect is therefore 
not completely protected against a superficial resemblance with the offender, although the dangers 
attendant upon such resemblance will be somewhat reduced. 
196 
See the cases of Pe/wan and Masemang, which were discussed in Chapter 3. 
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The match to description strategy 
A better approach to distractor selection, argue Wells, Luus, Navon, and colleagues, is to match them 
to the description of the offender originally given by the witness. This is in line with the notion that 
one of the primary functions of an identification parade is to adduce evidence of identity over and 
above what the witness is able to recall, i.e. the parade serves as a test of recognition memory. 
The major advantage of the match to description strategy is that it apparently solves the problem of 
suspect - foil similarity. It protects against superficial resemblance of suspect and offender by 
ensuring that the foils share all the features of the offender that the witness recalls. It specifies the 
physical features to be shared by all lineup members. On the other hand, it also avoids the problem of 
excessive suspect - foil similarity: since the original description cannot be a complete depiction of the 
offender, foils and suspects wlll differ on the many features not specified in the description. It 
specifies the physical features not to be shared by parade members. In short, the match to description 
strategy ensures that there is adequate 'feature heterogeneity' (Gibson, 1969), or 'propitious 
heterogeneity' (Wells, 1993). 
The guarantee of 'propitious heterogeneity' is postulated as the greatest advantage of the match to 
description strategy. In particular, Luus & Wells suggest that where parades formed under either 
strategy will reduce false identifications of innocent suspects, the match to description strategy will 
increase accurate identifications of guilty suspects. A recent paper by Wells, Rydell & Seelau ( 1993) 
reports a set of experiments that appears to bear this contention out, but it is worth waiting for 
replications before making much of the comparison. 
Several objections can, in turn, be lodged against the match to description strategy. These, and the 
answers Luus & Wells (1991) provide, are worth detailing here, since one of the central aims of the 
thesis is to develop a measure of facial similarity for use in assessing the fairness of identification 
parades, and the application of the measure will adopt a 'match-to-suspect' strategy. 
The first problem with the strategy concerns situations where the police arrest the suspect on grounds 
other than the initial witness description, and conduct a parade in which the suspect is very dissimilar 
to the description. In this type of situation, the match to description strategy is likely to result in a 
parade where the suspect is distinctive, and the foils fairly similar - both to each other and to the 
description. Luus & Wells suggest that the two selection strategies be used in conjunction here: i.e. 
that foils are chosen to share features with both the suspect and the original description. 
The second problem concerns situations where the original description is idiosyncratic (e.g. where it 
mentions a tattoo). Luus & Wells suggest the use of artwork or a concealing patch, or alternatively, 
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not conducting a lineup, since the description is sufficiently selective to suggest that the suspect and 
perpetrator are one and the same person. 
The third problem concerns cases where there are multiple witnesses and each provides a different 
description. Here Luus & Wells suggest using separate lineups, although it is not clear how this can 
be satisfactorily achieved when there is only one suspect! 
Finally, there is the problem where some feature of the suspect which the witness did not recall of the 
perpetrator. is very distinctive, and may lead of its own to the identification of the suspect. Luus & 
Wells point out that each foil is likely to have some distinctive feature anyway, and this will counter 
the suspect's distinctive feature. 
The match to description strategy coheres in a satisfying way with the theoretical conceptualization of 
the parade as a recognition test. However, it requires auxiliary strategies, and it is not clear that its 
advantages over the match to suspect approach are substantial. There is empirical evidence from a 
study by Wells et al. (1994), which suggests that the match-to-description strategy results in more 
accurate identification decisions, but this unreplicated study is the only evidence of this kind to date. 
Research on structural aspects of identification parades 
Psychologists have often pointed out the similarity of the identification parade to a rudimentary 
scientific experiment: the police have an hypothesis about the identity of the perpetrator, and they 
follow a procedure which tests this hypothesis. The procedure itself - i.e. the parade - has some of the 
characteristics of experimental control in so far as it attempts to rule out several sources of confound 
(Wells & Luus, 1990; Wells, 1993; Wells et al. 1994). Nevertheless, it is perfectly legitimate to 
question whether the control is rigorous enough, and indeed, whether present procedures are 
structurally optimal. The analogy of lineup and experiment is so arresting that psychologists have 
directed much of their effort here. 
There is much to discuss; I will present a somewhat simplified account, progressing from research of 
less consequence, to some that has profound implications for the conduct of identification parades. I 
begin by showing that some of the protections already built into identification parade procedure are 
well placed, and that the absence of these protections (and therefore the failure to ensure that they are 
in place) would certainly lead to a higher rate of mistaken identification decisions. In particular, 
instructions to witnesses indicating the possible absence of the criminal are important, and the courts 
are also quite correct in approaching voice identifications with a considerable degree of skepticism. I 
also discuss empirical results from studies that examine alternative types of identification parade, and 
which show that present structures are inoptimal and could be gainfully modified. 
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Parade Instructions 
In a famous set of studies, Orne (1962), and Rosenthal (1966) argued (and showed) that human 
subjects are motivated to determine experimental hypotheses, and often do so by attending to very 
subtle cues inherent in the nature and structure of the experimental situation. Humans are not the 
inert objects postulated by certain traditions of scientific enquiry, but are indeed, highly reactive. 
Buckhout (1'974), and Wells & Luus (1990) have argued that identification parades must suffer from 
the same problem. Witnesses understand why they have been brought to the parade, and they may 
well assume that it is their responsibility to point someone out. They may construe their task to be 
something like 'find the parade member whom the police suspect', rather than 'is the person who 
committed the crime present?' Subtle cues from police officers, or biased instructions - neither of 
which need be conscious attempts by the police to subvert the fairness of the test - among other 
things, may affect the witness's choice. 
Of course, these threats are well known and carefully protected against in most legal systems. South 
Africa's record in this regard is, in particular, good. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that 
empirical studies have explored the extent of this threat, and thus, several staged-crime experiments 
have shown that instructions that presuppose the presence of the criminal in the parade ("Point out the 
person who committed the offence") lead to much higher error rates than instructions that don't 
("Note that the criminal may not be present. If the criminal is present, point him out") (Malpass & 
Devine, 198la; Cutler, Penrod & Martens, 1987a; Cutler & Penrod, 1988). The implication is that the 
instructions given to witnesses ought to be tempered quite carefully with a warning indicating the 
perpetrator's possible absence, 197 which is an approach favoured by South African courts. Paley & 
Geiselman (1989) compared a set of clearly biased instructions with those usually given by the LAPD 
(Los Angeles Police Department), and with a further set of 'more balanced' instructions, and found an 
increase in mistaken identifications for the biased instructions, but no such increase with either of the 
other instructions. 
There are several other threats to the fair conduct of an identification parade that inhere in the social 
nature of the task. Malpass & Devine (1984) cast the performance of a witness at an identification 
parade in terms of subjective expected utility: the witness's decision to identify someone will depend 
on more than just the quality of his memory, but indeed on a number of considerations extraneous to 
the act of witnessing the event. Ainsworth & King ( 1988), for example, interviewed a number of 
witnesses who had recently attended identification parades, and reported an extremely high degree of 
197 However, one study suggests that this effect is dependent on whether subjects are 'debriefed' prior to the identification or 
not. Subjects who have not been debriefed fail to show the observed effect, and seem in general to take the task much 
more seriously than undebriefed subjects (Ktshnken & Maass, 1988). 
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fear of reprisals. This fear is no doubt exaggerated by the requirement in both the English and South 
African legal systems that witnesses touch the person they wish to identify. 
Malpass and Devine argue that the events eyewitnesses provide testimony of are often viewed under 
inoptimal conditions, and that witnesses typically face some degree of ambiguity when deciding 
whether to make an identification. Witnesses must take some risks whatever they decide. Subjective 
expected utility theory postulates that a decision to identify will be the result of a process that weights 
each available alternative (i.e. to choose, or not to choose) according to the perceived value of the 
outcome;. it is quite possible therefore that a witness with a faultless memory of the perpetrator may 
refuse an identification, or that a witness who remembers nothing of the perpetrator's identity may 
attempt an identification. 
There is little of practical value for the police or the courts in this observation, since it is recognized 
in several ways by these bodies: however, it is worth reminding ourselves that the quality of the 
witness's memory is not the court's only concern in evaluating eyewitness identification evidence. 
Intervening mugshots 
In Chapter 3 I noted the concern which the courts and legal commentators have expressed regarding 
the practice of showing witnesses photographic 'mugshots'. The concern is that mugshots intervening 
between the witnessed event and an identification parade may 'contaminate' a witness's memory and 
lead the witness to mistake her memory of the mugshot for her memory of the perpetrator of the 
crime. 
Several studies have explored this possibility, but the results are unclear regarding the potential for 
'contamination'. Studies by Loftus & Greene (1980), Jenkins & Davies (1985), and Brigham & 
Cairns (1989) suggest that such contamination is likely to occur, but studies by Gorenstein & 
Ellsworth (1980) and Lindsay, Nosworthy, Martin & Martynuck (1994) do not support this 
conclusion. 
Gorenstein & Ellsworth argue that any observed effects are likely to occur by one of two routes. In 
the first, a witness will incorrectly identify a suspect because his face has become familiar as a result 
of the mugshot interpolation, but the witness cannot place the situation in which he first observed the 
face. In the second, a witness will feel committed to a choice made during the mugshot interpolation, 
and will therefore choose the suspect again at the identification parade. 
Of the studies which have tested the effect of interpolated mugshots, that by Lindsay et al. is probably 
closest to actual police practice: a large set of photographs was used, and effects were tested for 
several confederate suspects. That they failed to find any substantive adverse effect is noteworthy. 
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Lindsay et al. also outline a novel way of using mugshot albums, which has direct bearing on some 
contentions discussed earlier in the chapter. Instead of attempting to secure a positive identification 
from a mugshot album, Lindsay et al. suggest that witnesses be asked to identify all the mugshots 
they cannot certainly exclude. This will provide police with evidence concerning the physical 
identity of the perpetrator, but not with an identification. Such evidence should not be admitted in 
trials, but used by police to further investigate the case at hand. In several tests of this strategy, 
Lindsay et:· 8.l. claim to have shown that the accuracy rate is greatly increased: the confederate 
perpetrator is almost always included in the set of mugshots that witnesses are unable to reject, and 
this set is also usually manageably small. 
This is a very interesting recommendation, and it has a direct parallel with the minimalistic approach 
to identification parades favoured by Navan, as discussed above. It seems to suggest that the 
similarity of mugshots (parade foils) is crucial, but that this similarity works in a different way to that 
imagined by the courts. In particular, similarity of mugshots (parade foils) hinders the accurate 
identification of the perpetrator. This must be a matter of degree, though, since extreme dissimilarity 
of parade members self evidently prejudices the suspect. I suggest that we may need to revisit the 
notion of an 'optimal similarity function' rejected by Luus & Wells (1991), and I will directly 
investigate this possibility in a later chapter. 
Size of the lineup 
Most legal systems make explicit recommendations regarding the minimum number of persons 
required to constitute an identification parade. In England and South Africa, this number is 
frequently said to be eight (see Chapter 3). No explicit justification is given for this number, but it 
presumably protects the suspect against random or haphazard identifications. 
Psychological research has in several instances explored the effect of different parade sizes on 
measures of witness accuracy. Thus, Nosworthy & Lindsay (1990) systematically varied the size of a 
parade by adding either poor foils or good foils, i.e. nominal size was increased, but effective size 
held constant, or both nominal and effective sizes were increased. They found that neither 
manipulation affected either i) accurate identifications of the perpetrator, or ii) mistaken 
identifications of innocent suspects. They concluded that a parade consisting of the suspect and only 
three foils may be adequate, in the sense that it does not affect the ability of the witness to identify the 
perpetrator when he is present, or the ability to reject the parade when the perpetrator is not present. 
This line of argument was taken even further by Gonzalez, Ellsworth & Pembroke (1993), who 
showed in a set of experiments that 'showups' i.e. a parade consisting of only the suspect, did not 
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exhibit an increase in mistaken identifications relative to properly formed parades, nor did they affect 
the rate of accurate identifications. If anything, performance of witnesses at showups was 
characterized by fewer mistaken identifications! They explain this anomalous finding in terms of an 
'absolute judgement strategy', a notion more fully elaborated by Wells (1984), and discussed later in 
the chapter. 
Wagenaar.;& Veefkind (1992), on the other hand, also conducted a study in which many-person 
parades 'Y6re compared· to one-person parades, and they found a substantially increased rate of false 
alarms in the latter case. They warn against the practice of showups, declaring it unsafe. 
The studies by Nosworthy & Lindsay, and Gonzalez et al. report interesting results, but they appear to 
overlook the preventive function of identification parades. Parades with very few members cannot 
protect against witnesses who make random or haphazard identifications, even if such witnesses are 
extremely rare. Parades of considerable size may not maximize the rate of accurate identifications 
relative to smaller paraqes, but they better prevent the dangers created by the kind of witness who 
feels that he must make an identification, even if such a witness is more likely to attempt an 
identification when confronted with a parade than a showup. In the former case, mistakes can be 
diagnosed (i.e. when the witness identifies an innocent foil), but in the latter case, an identification 
cannot be diagnosed, and may have severe consequences for the innocent suspect. 
Modes of presentation 
The identification parade is usually a test of visual memory, but most legal systems also recognize 
that cues to identity may reside in the voice, in mannerisms, and in gait. Explicit recognition is given 
along these lines in South African law, in, among others, the cases of R v. Gericke, S. v. M, and R v. 
Chitate. (See Chapter 3). 
The case of voice identification has attracted the most attention in the psychological literature, and 
comprehensive summaries can be found in Bull and Clifford (1984), and Yarmey (1994). The most 
pertinent finding here has been that voice identifications are prone to yield alarmingly high false 
alarm rates: voices are especially easy to confuse. It is difficult to place anything resembling a precise 
estimate on how probable a false alarm is in a voice parade, since the experimental conditions 
employed in different experiments differ greatly, as do the false alarm rates themselves. This is a 
necessary difficulty: in order to determine which structural factors are critical to the rates of accurate 
and false identification in identification parades, conditions are purposefully manipulated in distinct 
ways. However, an experiment by Melara, De Wit-Rickards and O'Brien (1989) provides a direct 
comparison of voice identification parades and visual identification parades, which is illustrative of 
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the point: visual parades had an associated false alarm rate of 0.44 ('hit rate' = 0.29), while voice 
parades had an associated rate of 0.85 ('hit rate' = 0.6). (Both parades were preceded by the same 
staged crime, making the error rates comparable). Similar differences between visual and voice 
parades are reported by McAllister, Dale & Keay (1993). McAllister et al. also report that subject 
jurors are not intuitively aware of the differences in accuracy between eye- and ear- witnesses, and 
are not easily persuaded of this, either. 
Identification parades typically used in Western countries restrict the presentation of the parade to one 
mode, usually the visual. This arrangement is usually out of keeping with the nature of the witnessed 
event: a witnessed event will provide many cues to identity over and above those afforded by the 
static view re-created in a visual identification parade.191 In the second place, cues from a single 
(sensory) domain may be degraded with respect to the original context (e.g. physical disguise), and it 
will be easier to identify the perpetrator with the assistance of cues from other domains. If we accept 
the truth of these propositions, and modify parade structure, what benefits will multi-mode parades 
have for witness ability? 
Two recent sets of experiments, reported by Melara et al. (1989), have explored the benefits that 
accrue to parades from modifications to the structure of the task that enable the joint presentation of 
cues from different domains (e.g. voice, gait, clothing). These modified parades make for fairly 
substantial reductions in the false alarm rate. Melara et al., for example, showed that lineups which 
allowed witnesses to view and hear parade members reduced false alarm rates from 64% to 38%, and 
from 54% to 36%, in two separate conditions.'99 
The idea of allowing witnesses access to cues that are not solely visual in nature is already in practice 
in Sweden. The parade is formed in a room in which parade members are allowed to sit down, to 
smoke, to communicate, and to behave in general as they ordinarily would over an extended period of 
time. The parade is viewed by the witness from behind a one-way mirror, and members of the parade 
are not aware of when the witness is brought in to view the parade (Shepherd et al., 1982). 
Thus far I have considered the question of different sensory modes, but it is also important to note 
that parades presently differ within single sensory modes. What I mean is the practice of eliciting 
identifications from photographic parades as an alternative to corporeal lineups. In some parts of the 
191 Some associationist theories hold that memories arc encoded in a network of associations, and the more associations 
available to a witness, the greater the likelihood that the attempt to remember will be successful. See, for example, 
Anderson & Bower ( 1973 ). There is also evidence to suggest that cross-modality information is particularly powerfully 
encoded. Constraining the domain of information must therefore impede the ability to remember. 
199 Note however that this reduction in false alarm rates in dual mode lineups was not present when the target was absent 
from the lineup. 
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United States, for example, photographic parades are favoured over corporeal parades (Goodman, 
personal communication). 
Intuitively, corporeal parades would seem to have an advantage: the d,etail to be obtained from an in 
vivo inspection of the suspect must surely far exceed that present in a photograph. However, the 
consensus results from several studies indicate that this is not the case: that there is either very little 
difference b~tween the capacity of photographic and corporeal parades to elicit identifications, or that 
there is no difference at all. 
Thus, Shepherd, Ellis and Davies (1982) staged a crime in front of 242 subjects, and compared their 
identification accuracy rates in four different parade modes: live, video, black and white photographic 
stills, and colour stills. No significant differences were observed between accuracy rates obtained 
from these different parades: indP,ed, the results slightly favoured the video parade. Similar results are 
reported by Dent (1977), among others.200 
Cutler, Berman, Penrod & Fisher (1994) have recently broadened the conceptualization of 
identification methods, subsuming the many methods of securing identifications under the term 
'identification test media'. They report an extensive quantitative review of the literature on 
'identification test media', and draw the conclusion that there is no notable difference in the literature 
between live, video, or photo- lineups. There is also no evidence to suggest that media which 
embellish cues201 aid identification accuracy or reduce false alarms. 
Multiple suspect lineups 
The characteristic identification parade, we imagine, consists of a single suspect and a number of 
innocent distractors. In practice this is not the case, as many trial lawyers will tell you: more often 
than not a lineup contains multiple suspects. In one Cape Division case, for instance, an advocate 
represented three of fifteen accused, all of whom appeared in a 43-man parade.202 
It is evident that a parade containing several suspects has attendant threats to its validity, perhaps of a 
different form to those associated with a single suspect parade. Wells and Turtle have investigated 
these threats, and compared the value of the information yielded by multiple suspect parades to that 
200 But for a dissenting opinion see Egan, Pittner, & Goldstein. ( 1977). 
201 Several studies have explicitly manipulated the nature of cues present in identification test media. In some cases cues 
have been embellished - Cutler & Penrod (1988) allowed witnesses to view the gait of video parade members - and in 
others, cues have been degraded. Cue degradation has typically been effected by disguising the suspect, e.g. Cutler, 
Penrod & Martens (1987). 
202 The practice of using multiple suspect lineups is not uniquely South African. In fact, Wells reports that in his visits to 
several dozen police precincts in the United States in the l980's he found this to be more often the case than not (Wells & 
Turtle, 1986). 
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yielded by single suspect models, within the Bayesian statistical framework set out earlier in the 
chapter. 
At the heart of it, the difference between the two parade models involves a trade-off between the 
increased likelihood of achieving an accurate identification in the multiple suspect parade, given the 
presence of a greater number of suspects,203 and the increased likelihood of a false identification in the 
same parade. In the case of a single suspect parade, any identification of a parade member other than 
the suspect is known to be false, whereas in a multiple suspect parade the witness can make a number 
of undetectable mistaken identifications. Specifically, Wells and Turtle have shown that only when 
the population of potential suspects is very small, is the multiple suspect model to be preferred, 
otherwise it poses a greatly increased risk of mistaken identification. In practical terms, such a 
situation is unlikely - i.e. the situation where the police could, for example, say "One of five people 
did it" - and a consideration of the risks would seem more pertinent in the evaluation of the multiple 
suspect parade. 
There is another risk associated with the multiple suspect model, often explicitly overlooked by courts 
in South Africa, and elsewhere. One of the underlying features of an identification parade is the 
protection it gives suspects against random, or haphazard, identifications. This protection is built into 
the foil-suspect ratio considered acceptable by courts, which in South Africa is often stated as eight to 
one. If additional suspects are added to the parade without preserving this ratio, it follows that the 
likelihood that a suspect wil1 be identified by random guessing wil1 be increased. Yet, courts do not 
insist on preserving this ratio: in England, a 1969 circular to the Home office, and in South Africa the 
law - on the ground, at 1east204 - says that it is not necessary to preserve this ratio. There is little to 
suggest that identification parades invite haphazard identifications, but the possibility of this 
occurring occasionally must be strong, and the protection provided by the suspect-foil ratio is 
therefore important. 
The principal reason for the use of the multiple suspect lineup by police is probably the efficiency of 
such a parade. As I noted earlier, the construction of a parade is an exacting and onerous task; so 
much more if several parades must be constructed for one investigation. Nevertheless, I suggest that 
the benefits of this type of parade are few in relation to the costs, and everyone would probably be 
better off without it. 
203 
I restrict myself - as do Wells and Turtle - to the case of one perpetrator and multiple suspects. The case of multiple 
perpetrators and multiple suspects is essentially similar, if somewhat more complicated. 
204 
This has been pointed out to me by several members of the Cape Bar. 
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The value of non-identifications 
In Chapter 3, I noted the approach of South African courts to the evidential value of non-
identifications. Specifically, courts have stated that the failure of witnesses who could be expected to 
identify the perpetrator must be evidence in favour of the accused - it must imply some doubt as to the 
evidence that the accused is the perpetrator. 
Wells & Lindsay (1980) have investigated the value of non-identifications in terms of their Bayesian 
formulation of the 'informativeness' of parade identifications, and they come to the same conclusion. 
However, they go further, and specify the nature of the relationship between identifications and non-
identifications: identifications are more informative than non-identifications when they are rarer, and 
vice versa. 
Although courts have noted the significance of non-identifications, it is not certain that they will 
always accord such failures the appropriate weighting. Wells & Lindsay note the well known 
tendency of human subjects to overlook disconfirming instances, the similar and widespread inability 
to accurately interpret base rates, and several other findings from the decision making literature that 
would lead one to doubt that cognisance at the level of case law is sufficient. 
McAllister & Bregman (1986, 1989) and Leippe ( 1985) have specifically investigated the role that 
information about non-identifications plays in jury2°' decision making in simulated crime scenarios. 
The results from these experiments are unfortunately inconclusive, but do not seem to suggest a 
tendency of jurors to under-utilise non-identifications from eyewitnesses. 
Similarity 
At the centre of the legal conceptualization of the identification parade is the notion of physical 
similarity, and the assertion. that a parade should be formed so that the foils and suspect sufficiently 
resemble each other. In this section of the review I discuss psychological research that has directly 
addressed the issue of similarity. I intend this as preparation for a lengthier section in Chapter 5, 
where I will attempt to set out a particular approach to the measurement of facial similarity. 
One of the clearest demonstrations of the importance of physical similarity is to be found in a study 
reported by Malpass & Devine (1983). The study uses the mock-witness method detailed earlier in 
the chapter. 
20
' Juries were abolished in South Africa more than 25 years ago. The interpretation of jury research to South African legal 
practice is therefore quite complicated, but I will nevertheless refer to such research at several places in the thesis. 
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Full length photographs of college age white adult males were rated by twenty judges on six 
dimensions, each dimension consisting of three levels. Subjects were asked to choose the descriptors 
which best characterized the photographed person. Table 4.5 presents the dimensions and levels 
judges were required to use. 
Dimension Level 1 Levell Levell 
Hair colour blonde brown black 
Hair length short medium long 
Hair style straight wavy curly 
Height short medium tall 
Build thin medium husky 
Eye colour light dark -
From Malpass and Devine, 1983: p 89. 
Table 4.S Dimensions and levels used by judges in Malpass & Devine's (1983) study 
Each photograph (parade member) was given a total score, per subject, by weighting each level by the 
ordinal number associated with it within the levels (i.e. level I descriptors were weighted as 1, level 2 
descriptors as 2, etc.), and by summing the descriptor weights. An average was taken for each 
photograph, across subjects. In this way, each photograph was assigned a score ranging from 6 to 18. 
The perpetrator in this experiment matched the six level 2 descriptors, and difference scores were 
calculated between descriptor total scores and the perpetrator total of twelve. These difference scores 
were used as suspect-foil similarity measures. 
Four identification parades were then constructed so as to possess varying degrees of physical 
resemblance, and mock witnesses were asked to identify the suspect (on the basis of a description of 
the suspect, only). The results of the experiment are reported in Table 4.6, below: 
Suspect No.of Foil 
Parade - foil mock Suspect 2 3 4 5 
discrep. witnesses 
A 8.45 67 0.12 0.37 0.36 0.06 0.05 0.05 
B 10.06 66 0.20 0.57 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.02 
c 16.98 68 0.80 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 
D 23.78 39 0.85 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.00 
Expected proportion= 0.167. From Malpass & Devine, 1983, p 93. 
Table 4.6 Distribution of(proportionate) mock witness choices as a function of suspect-foil similarity. 
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Visual scrutiny of the results of this experiment shows that physical similarity is strongly related to 
the frequency with which suspects are chosen. Fairness depends on the degree of suspect-foil 
similarity - indeed, the correlation between suspect-foil dissimilarity and suspect identification 
probability is perfect206 - and even small variations in similarity appear to affect the distribution of 
choices. 
Notice especially one feature of the distribution of mock witness choices, which is that lineups A and 
B contain foils who are identified more frequently than the suspect himself. This anomalous result 
may have something to do with the nature of the 'mock witness' task - since mock witnesses have not 
seen the perpetrator of the event, but instead are required to guess the identity of the perpetrator from 
a verbal description, it may be that the foils in question are more typical of the description than the 
suspect.207 The anomalous result in Malpass & Devine's study is not unique. At least two other 
studies report identification parades in which foils are chosen more frequently than the suspect (Wells 
and Lindsay, 1980; Buckhout, Rabinowitz, Alfonso, Kanellis and Anderson, 1988208). These studies 
underscore the crucial importance of physical resemblance in identification parades. In particular, 
they suggest that physical resemblance shouldn't be considered simply in terms of the relative 
similarity of parade members, but also in terms of the distinctiveness of parade members in relation to 
a population norm. 
Other studies have found results analogous to those reported by Malpass and Devine. Lindsay & 
Wells (1980) report a staged crime experiment in which they explored the relationship of lineup 
similarity to Bayesian measures209 of the information value of identifications obtained from lineups. 
The perpetrator of the 'crime' staged for the experiment was a Caucasian in his 20's. He had light 
brown hair and a moustache. A 'high foil similarity' lineup was constructed by filling it with foils 
who were "about twenty years old with brown to blonde hair and moustaches" (p 307); and a 'low foil 
similarity' lineup was constructed by filling it with foils who were "in their late 20s with full black 
beards and black hair" (p 307). In addition, this second lineup consisted of two Orientals and three 
Caucasians (apart from the suspect). The success of the similarity manipulation was checked by using 
a mock witness task - subjects were required to guess the identity of the suspect from a very brief and 
206 
Note that this correlation is inflated by the fact that the suspect-foil similarity measure is an averaged value. 
207 
Imagine that a suspect is described as tall and swarthy. This characterization will fit many people, and it will be more 
accurate for some than it is for others. The claim I make here is that it is possible that a description may well be true of 
the suspect, but a better characterization of one or more of the foils. 
201 
The anomaly is particularly interesting in Buckhout et al.'s study, since the identification parade that produced the 
anomalous result was one conducted by police and submitted as evidence to a New York court, and not a parade 
conducted as part of a psychological experiment. 
209 
In particular, measures of 'diagnosticity' and 'information gain'. These are discussed earlier in this chapter (see page 72 
onwards). 
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general description of the perpetrator. Subjects were able to identify the suspect with comparative 
ease in the low similarity lineup, but not in the high similarity lineup. 
More recently, Wagenaar & Veefkind (1992) investigated the effect of similarity on identification 
performance in both 'target present' and 'target absent' parades. Here, as in most instances of parade 
research where similarity is incorporated in the design, suspect - foil similarity was assessed by 
independent judges on a Likert-type scale. Wagenaar & Veefkind report that similarity systematically 
decreased recognition accuracy: in target present parades, increased similarity led to greater choosing 
of foils, and in target absent parades, it led to greater false alarm rates. However, the authors do not 
present complete results for the experiment, and it is not possible to tell whether increased similarity 
led to fewer correct identifications of the target in target present lineups. 
The studies by Lindsay & Wells (1980), Malpass & Devine (1983), and Wagenaar & Veefkind (1992) 
are not the only studies that have manipulated the physical similarity of foils and suspects. Indeed, 
similarity is often used as an independent variable in identification parade research, but usually in 
combination with other variable&. Few studies have directly addressed the relationship of foil -
suspect similarity to recognition accuracy. In addition, almost no studies have examined the impact of 
'facial distinctiveness' on identification performance, even though a large number of studies in the 
related area of face recognition and perception have shown that measures of distinctiveness are 
strongly related to recognition ability. I will return to this point later in the thesis, when I review the 
face recognition literature in search of methods of measuring similarity. 
The point to be made in summary is that the psychological literature provides us with clear evidence 
of the influence of physical similarity on the fairness of the parade: it is critical, and the imprecise 
way in which it is made a requirement for the conduct of identification parades bodes poorly for legal 
practice. 
Blank parades 
One of the most enduring of all the findings in research into identification parades is the relatively 
low observed rate of accurate identifications and the accompanying relatively high observed rate of 
false alarms. Thus, in a meta-analysis of some 50 studies using identification parades, Shapiro & 
Penrod (1986) report a cumulated average accuracy rate of 0.52. Cumulated false alarm rates are not 
reported by Penrod etc., but in published studies they are rarely below 0.25. This implies that 
witnesses are rarely more than four times as likely to identify a guilty suspect as an innocent one, and 
usually only twice as likely to do so. 
Chapter 4 Psychological approaches to Identification Parades 
This latter statistic presents identification parades in a rather bleak light. What is responsible for the 
poor perfonnance of witnesses? Psychologists have attempted to explain the high false alann rate in 
tenns of a 'relative judgement· strategy' (Wells, 1984), and several structural manipulations that 
substantially attenuate the false alann rate support this notion. 
Wells (1984) coined the tenn 'relative judgement strategy',210 specifically suggesting that the structure 
of a police iqentification parade invites a relative judgement on the part of witnesses. The witness 
knows in the first place that the police would not conduct a parade if the police did not have a suspect 
firmly in mind, and thus interprets the task as requiring him to identify the parade member that the 
police suspect. Worse still, the identification task in its present fonn explicitly involves comparing 
the members of the parade. This will lead to a decision that is based not on the virtual 
correspondence of the witness's memory of the suspect and the parade members, but on the relative 
correspondence of the witness's memory and the parade members. The task will in short be 
interpreted as 'finding the parade member who, among those present, looks most like the perpetrator 
of the crime', which is not the task it is intended to be. 
Wells argues that this is almost certainly' a simplified portrayal of a witness's choosing behaviour at 
an identification parade - witness's choice strategies are likely to vary along a dimension 
characterized at the extremes by relative and absolute judgements - but he insists that it also identifies 
a very real problem. 
One solution to the problem of relative judgements of physical similarity is to precede an 
identification parade with a 'blank parade', in which all the parade members are known to be innocent. 
Witnesses who choose someone from this lineup are clearly mistaken, and to be dismissed as too 
unreliable to complete the main identification task.211 Wells successfully employed a blank parade in 
a staged crime experiment,212 and discovered that subjects who chose a member of the blank parade 
were almost twice as likely to make an incorrect identification from the subsequent lineup, and 
likewise were only about half as likely to make a correct identification from the subsequent lineup. 
Wells argues that the results of this experiment show that identifications from lineups are adversely 
affected by relative judgement strategies. Wells points out that blank parades are not feasible in 
210 Wells coined the phrase, but the idea is not originally his. Glanville Williams, the famous English legal authority, 
expressed a similar concern in a 1963 paper: 
The witness may ... be inclined to pick out someone, and that someone will be the one member of the parade who comes 
closest to his own recollection of the criminal. (p 487). 
Woocher (1977) also made several remarks which have much the same meaning as that intended by Williams. 
211 This particular solution is also favoured by Glanville Williams (Williams and Hammelmann, 1955, p 487). 
212 Note that Wells exposed all subjects to the second lineup, whether or not they made accurate identifications in the first 
lineup. 
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practice. Witnesses would quickly learn that an identification parade consists of two parts, one 
involving the real suspect, and the other not, thus rendering the blank parade ineffectual. Also, if 
police find one parade difficult to construct - as they certainly do - then constructing two parades 
would be doubly difficult. The solution must lie elsewhere, in some other manipulation that 
counteracts the relative judgement strategy. 
It is interesting to note, in passing, that Lindsay & Wells (1980) suggest that the protection afforded to 
suspects by increased similarity of foils is due to the counteraction of the relative judgement strategy. 
The physical features of the criminal represent the source of the original memorial representation, and 
will draw witness choices at a fairly high rate. When the parade is properly constructed, an innocent 
suspect will not resemble the perpetrator more than the foils, so the relative judgement strategy will 
not lead to identification of the suspect. It follows that when the innocent suspect and foils are 
dissimilar, and the suspect resembles the perpetrator (which is probable), the relative judgement 
strategy will lead to identification of the suspect.213 
Sequential parades 
A second, and highly successful structural manipulation, introduced by Lindsay and Wells (1985), is 
the so-called 'sequential parade'. This alteration to the lineup task attempts to counter the relative 
judgement tendency by removing its structural basis. Instead of presenting the witness with an array 
of parade members (i.e. exposing the witness to the suspect and a number of foils simultaneously), the 
parade members are ushered into a room individually and sequentially, and the witness is required to 
identify the perpetrator from the members of this sequence. 
The results of five studies, comprising a total of about 15 experimental comparisons, show that the 
sequential parade is highly effective in combating the high false alarm rates found in so-called . 
'simultaneous parades'. It should be noted that accurate identification rates are not substantially 
affected by this manipulation, while false alarm rates are greatly reduced. A typical false alarm rate 
from a sequential parade will be below 0.10, as opposed to typical rates of more than 0:25 in 
simultaneous parades. 
It is instructive to look at the results of a number of these studies (summarized in Table 4.7, below), 
specifically as a way of comparing the traditional, simultaneous police parade with the sequential 
parade. 
213 Later arguments by Wells and colleagues, discussed earlier in the chapter, suggest that the critical similarity relation is 
between foil and description of the perpetrator, and not between foil and suspect. The notion of a relative judgement 
strategy is unaffected in other ways by this revision . 
. @ 
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Study Identification Sequential · Simultaneous 
identification parade identification parade 
pp PA pp PA 
Lindsay and Accurate 0.50 0.65 0.58 0.42 
Wells, 1985 Mistaken 0.02 0.35 0.12 0.58 
Lindsay, Lea & Accurate 0.47 0.77 0.57 0.43 
Fulford, 1991 Mistaken 0.07 0.17 0.20 0.37 
Lindsay, Lea, a Accurate 0.93 0.70 
Nosworthy Mistaken 0.03 0.20 
et al. 1991 b Accurate 0.80 0.53 
; Mistaken O.o3 0.20 
c Accurate 0.67 0.23 
Mistaken 0.07 0.40 
d Accurate 0.87 0.60 
Mistaken 0.03 0.13 
Cutler & Penrod, 
1988 a Accurate 0.8 0.76 
Mistaken 0.19 0.39 
b Accurate 0.41 0.47 
Mistaken 0.21 0.43 
Sporer, 1993 Accurate 0.39 0.61 0.44 0.28 
Mistaken 0.61 0.39 0.56 0.72 
PP= perpetrator present; PA = perpetrator absent. Lindsay, Lea, Nosworthy et al. do not report data for accurate 
identifications in PP lineups,
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and Cutler & Penrod do not report results for PP and PA lineups separately. 
Table. 4.7 Mistaken and accurate identification rates in simultaneous and sequential identification parades. 
The table shows two things very clearly. In the first place, the rate of accurate identifications is 
similar in both sequential and simultaneous parades21s when the perpetrator is present in the lineup, 
but not when the perpetrator is absent from the lineup, in which case sequential parades have a 
considerable advantage. Thus, sequential parades are (almost) as likely to secure an identification 
when the perpetrator is present, and more likely to result in a correct rejection of the parade when the 
perpetrator is absent. More importantly, the rate of mistaken identifications differs dramatically 
across the types of parade structure: sequential parades lead to a greatly reduced rate of false 
identification when the perpetrator is absent. These results are quite exciting: they clearly indicate 
the superiority of the sequential parade. In addition, they are robust, and have been replicated in 
several studies. One of the most interesting replications is the study by Lindsay, Lea, Nosworthy et 
al., reported in Table 4. 7: these researchers showed that sequential parades are much less dramatically 
affected by sources of bias, such as suspect-foil dissimilarity and suggestive instructions, than 
simultaneous parades. All the evidence points to the superiority of sequential parades; it is perhaps 
germane that police forces in South Africa adopt them on an experimental basis. They will involve 
little additional work in relation to that already required by the present parade structure and 
procedure. 
m They found that the rate of accurate identification did not differ across simultaneous and sequential parades. 
m Most of the research has shown that this conclusion can be accepted in individual studies with a great deal of statistical 
confidence. However, cumulated across studies it seems that the rate of accurate identifications is slightly higher in 
simultaneous parades. This is not surpising, and does not indicate an inherently greater ability of simultaneous parades to 
procure accurate identifications: guessing rates are higher in simultaneous parades, and the small difference in accuracy 
rates is probably due to inflation by guessing. 
Chapter 4 Psychological approaches to Identification Parades 
In this chapter, I attempted an overview of published psychological research on identification parades. 
This was perhaps a rather ambitious attempt, consequent on the perceived task of evaluating the 
contribution of psychology to a substantive legal problem. I will accordingly settle in this conclusion 
for observations relevant to one or two themes to be developed in later chapters of the thesis. 
I have noted many interesting lines of psychological inquiry into the identification parade and its 
problems. The earliest of the lines of enquiry concerns the measurement of parade fairness with the 
, 
mock witne.ss task. The measures developed in this respect are promising, and show the potential of 
the empirical .method to illuminate areas that have proved relatively inaccessible to the law. 
However, I have argued that the measures lack a firm basis in statisti~al theory, despite their 
elaboration in terms of uncertainty. In a later chapter, I will attempt to develop suitable statistical 
methods for each of the several measures considered in this chapter. 
Psychological research on identification parades depends in large part for its justification on the 
prospect of application: this was the theme of Chapter 2. In this respect, it must be noted there is little 
evidence of direct interaction between research and law enforcement agencies at the level of research 
planning and execution. Such interaction, I argued earlier, is often one of the signs of a successful 
applied discipline. There are certainly some clear instances of contact and interaction between 
research and police practice - the adoption of the sequential identification parade in many U.S.A. 
precincts, for example - but there is little to suggest that the fate of identification parade research will 
be any different to other forms of applied psychology. 
The most important observation that I wish to take forward from this chapter concerns physical 
similarity. In the first place, the notion that foils and suspects resemble each other is central to the 
legal conceptualization of parades. In the second place, it has rarely been addressed directly in 
psychological research. When it has, the measures employed to derive estimates of similarity are 
quite crude, but the results nevertheless suggest that similarity is crucial to the outcome of 
identification parades. Since few psychological studies have taken similarity into account, it may in 
addition be the case that much of the research is confounded by its unconstrained variation. One aim 
of the empirical work reported in later chapters is the development of a direct measure of facial 
similarity. A second, minor aim is to examine the robustness of some of the central parade research 
findings with respect to facial similarity. 
.,q/ face Representations and Theories 
off ace Recognition ~ 
In this chapter my aim is to raid the face perception and recognition literature for a suitable 
conceptualization of facial similarity. This follows naturally from the conclusions drawn in the 
two preceding chapters.216 I will consider several possibilities, and argue for an adaptation of a 
particular approach to facial representation: this approach represents faces as eigenspaces of 
normalized intensity maps in the picture plane, and it allows - I suggest - a method of deriving 
a similarity space for populations of facial images. The route to this position is not 
I 
uncomplicated, or brief; it takes us through much recent theoretical and empirical work, and 
there are several profitable stops to be made. 
Theoretical aspects of face recognition 
Until the early l 980's there was little formal theoretical work in the area of face recognition 
(Bruce, 1994). In the interim period, there has been a considerable amount of theory 
development and testing, and I will examine several of the more complete theoretical accounts 
in the next section of the chapter. There are a number of theoretical and meta-theoretical 
issues, though, that are relevant across specific models of face recognition, and which are of 
some importance to the empirical goals of this thesis. I will address these here, showing - I 
hope - that perceived facial similarity is best understood in a web of relations to more general 
problems in the face perception and recognition literature. 
Configural vs. F eatural processing 
A long-standing issue in much face perception research is whether cognitive processing of 
faces is con.figural or featural in nature. Are faces perceived as combinations of separable 
features?, or are faces perceived as configurations, in which features are inherently 
216 
In these chapters, I showed that legal requirements for conducting a parade assume that the similarity of parade 
members can be controlled, and I reviewed empirical evidence that suggests that variations in similarity can 
strongly affect parade outcomes. Although 'physical similarity' certainly encompasses more than just facial 
similarity, I consider only similarity of faces. I will provide some justification for this exclusion in the present 
chapter. , 
-·-···---------------------------------------------
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inextricable? This problem is not unique to the face perception area, indeed it is one of the 
fundamental perceptual questions. The notion that faces are processed as configurations is 
reminiscent of certain Gestalt propositions.· 
Although the literature does not support a unanimous conclusion, the weight of the evidence appears 
to favour the configurational view, or a medial position. Rhodes, Brennan & Carey ( 1987) note that 
the featural and configural positions are probably confounded, since a featural change automatically 
implies a configurational change. Thus, replacing Margaret Thatcher's nose with Edwina Currie's 
(on an identikit portrait) will not only yield a different single feature, but also a different 
configuration. 
Feature saliency 
The argument for the featural view of face processing derives from studies which address the saliency 
of different facial features in perception and recognition. There are several ingenious methods of 
exploring saliency, and much of the work is summarised in Shepherd, Davies & Ellis (1981 ). Nigel 
Haig, for example, has used image processing hardware and software to selectively degrade, 
embellish, and construct faces in terms of 'features' 217 (Haig, 1984, I 986a, I 986b). 
The results of these studies appear to show that the upper face is more important218 than the lower 
face, that internal features (eyes, mouth) are more important than external features (hair, head shape) 
for familiar faces, but less important for unfamiliar faces, and that hair length, hair coloration, and 
face thinness-fatness are also important cues (Shepherd et al., 1981 ). In general, the saliency studies 
that manipulate features show a fair amount of agreement in results, but studies which use subjective 
reports and verbal descriptions, and/or scaling methods, vary a great deal. The scaling studies, in 
particular, appear to produce results strongly dependent on the specific population of faces used as 
stimuli (Shepherd et al.). 
The saliency studies have usually assumed that faces are processed featurally, but have rarely made a 
formal case for the featural model. As early as 1973, an intriguing result reported by Harmon 
suggested that a simple featural model must be false. Harmon showed that judgements of facial 
identity could be accurately made from representations consisting of as few as 16 pixels.219 
217 I emphasise the word 'features', since most featural studies have adopted a common sense notion that facial features are 
self evident - eyes, noses, chins, etc. This begs the question of what the important facial features are: large parts of the 
face are excluded as candidates, e.g. foreheads, cheeks. See Rhodes (1988). 
218 In the sense that recognition accuracy and latency are improved - different studies use different measures, so this is a very 
broad generalization. See Shepherd et al. (1981) for a discussion. 
219 
Pixel = 'picture element'. Harmon showed subjects digital representations of familiar faces that were displayed as k 
blocks (or pixels) of differing light intensities. Thus, a face might be represented by 30 000 pixels of varying light 
Chapter 5 facial representations 
Bachmann (1991) found essentially similar results, using a different method. Since a face can be 
recognised from as few as 16 pixels, individual features cannot be of much importance: single 
features in a 16 pixel face will be represented by as few as one or two pixels, and the degraded nature 
of such a representation suggests the relative unimportance of single features. A similar argument 
can be made from the findings of studies in which representations of faces are spatially filtered to 
remove high frequency information.220 
In a rigorous examination of the issue, Sergent (1984) carefully manipulated identikit portraits in 
terms of three features, and showed that latency on a same-different task was differentially affected 
by combinations of manipulations over simple manipulations (i.e. changing two features produced 
greater response latency than expected from the manipulation of each feature separately). In addition, 
a multi-dimensional scaling solution of similarity judgements yielded dimensions that were not 
independent, which suggests that facial features should not be considered in separation from each 
other (but should rather be considered in configuration). 
Inversion effects 
One of the better known early findings in studies of face recognition is the great difficulty that 
vertically inverted faces create for accurate identification and recognition. Yin's (1969) widely 
reported study first showed this, and the finding has been replicated many times (see Valentine, 
1991 a, for a review). Figure 5.1 demonstrates the effect, alongside another well known form of 
inversion (photographic negative inversion), which is also known to strongly affect recognition 
performance (Phillips, 1972). 
Vertical inversion Photographic negative 
inversion 
Figure 5.1 Two inversions known to affect the accuracy and latency of face recognition. 
intensity (a high resolution display), or I 00 such pixels (a low resolution display), or even I pixel. The question Harmon 
was interested in was how the progressive reduction of picture quality would affect judgements of face identity. 
220 The methods are almost identical in their consequences: pixellation in digital images achieves much the same result that 
spatial filtering achieves in analog images (Harmon, 1973 ). 
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Yin interpreted his results to imply a special route for face processing, but other authors have 
provided persuasive arguments against this view. Thus, Diamond and Carey (1986) showed that 
vertical inversion of exemplars of other categories of percept can equally disrupt recognition and 
identification, provided that the perceivers have expert knowledge of the exemplars.221 The results 
from the inversion studies are often taken as evidence for the configurational view of face perception, 
since inverted and upright faces have identical facial features, and differ only in configuration. 
Valentine & Bruce (1988) dispute this interpretation, and provide data which is consistent with the 
idea that faces are 'mentally rotated' to an upright position from an inverted state: Increases in 
response latency are directly proportional to the required rotation, and recognition difficulties can be 
explained in terms of a multidimensional model of face encoding (see Valentine, 1991 a). 
Split half composite faces 
Perhaps the most convincing evidence in favour of the configurational view comes from studies that 
use 'split' half faces. Young, Hellawell & Hay (1987) constructed face stimuli from photographs by 
combining bottom and top halves of photographs of different faces as i) composites, or ii) non-
composites. An example of each, along with the original images, is shown below as Figure 5.2 
Top Face Bottom Face Non-composite Composite 
Figure 5.2 A split-half composite face, and its components (modelled on stimuli used by Young et al., 1987). 
Subjects in Young et al. 's study found it comparatively easy to recognise the components of non-
composite faces (i.e. who the bottom and top halves really belonged to), but made many errors when 
judging composites. This difference was not present when subjects were required to judge inverted 
faces. These findings were replicated with different composite constructions (e.g. internal features 
221 In particular, Diamond & Carey found that dog breeders made the same retarded recognition and latency responses to 
inverted representations of dogs that they showed to inverted human faces. 
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composited with external features), and with both well known and recently familiar faces. Facial 
components, or features, appear to take on different perceptual properties in different combinations. 
These results make a strong case for the importance of configural cues in the recognition of faces. 
But, as Young et al. concede, highly distinctive features may frequently assist face recognition 
processes, and much more needs to be understood about the interaction of configural and featural 
cues. 
First-order and second-order information 
Diamond & Carey (1986), and Rhodes (1988), have suggested a formal way of conceptualizing the 
difference between featural and configural cues. They distinguish 'orders' of information in terms of 
category properties. First-order information refers to the properties that a single face has, taken as a 
perceptual object (e.g. eyes, ears, a nose, a 'face-like' configuration of features). Second-order 
information refers to the relational properties of facial components: all faces share a basic 
configuration, but there are many spatial differences between particular configurations, and these 
differences provide important information about the identity of faces. Rhodes ( 1988) suggests that it 
is possible to identify still higher orders of differentiating information, such as age and gender, but is 
not clear that extending the scheme offers any conceptual advantage. 
The significant aspect of this 'ordering' of facial information for present purposes is the 
acknowledgement that configural information depends on the general nature of the category. Since 
the human face is an example of a natural category, the properties of the category derive from the 
population of category exemplars (see Rosch & Mervis, 1975).222 This, I will later argue, is a crucial 
consideration in developing a measure of facial similarity. 
Formal theories of face recognition 
There are several formal theories of face recognition in the literature, and I would like to draw 
concusions from them for discussion later in the chapter. I will deal with two of the most widely 
researched and evolved theories: both of these are the work of Vicki Bruce and her colleagues in the 
United Kingdom. 
Certain preliminary considerations are of some significance. 
222 Indeed, Wittgenstein (1950/1978) derived his notion of a 'family' resemblance from the configural variation of genetically 
related faces. · 
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Familiar vs. unfamiliar faces 
Most face recognition research prior to 1980 used unfamiliar faces as stimuli. These were usually 
presented to subjects briefly, and subjects were later tested on their ability to recognise the faces. 
Bruce (1979) noted the patent lack of ecological realism in this procedure, and suggested that it was 
analogous to Ebbinghaus' (1964/1885) use of nonsense syllables. In the interim period, much 
' 
research has shown that familiar and unfamiliar faces deserve very different theoretical treatment. 
Thus, Ellis, Shepherd & Davies (1979) demonstrated that familiar faces are usually identified more 
easily and accurately from internal facial features, but that no such advantage holds for unfamiliar 
faces. Young, Hay, Mc Weeney, Flude & Ellis ( 1985) replicated this finding, and showed that it holds 
across variations in pose and expression. 
Bruce (1994) reports work documenting the different effects of transformations on familiar and 
unfamiliar faces. Recognition accuracy for unfamiliar faces is more prone to changes in pose (e.g. 
from a 3/4 view to a full face view), than is the case for familiar faces. Indeed, familiar faces are 
fairly robust to such transformations. A similar result, obtained with very different methods, is 
reported by Read, Vokey & Hammersley ( 1990). 
These studies suggest that familiar and unfamiliar faces receive qualitatively different processing, and 
furthermore, that familiar faces are more likely to be represented at the level of structural code than 
pictorial code.223 This is an important observation for the empirical work reported in this dissertation, 
as eyewitnesses most usually identify people who are only recently, and slightly, familiar to them. 
Formal theories of face recognition are largely concerned with the processes underlying the 
recognition and identification of familiar faces, so I will not examine the theories very closely, but 
will take what I think useful forward to later chapters. 
Information processing models 
Most recent theories of face recognition have explicitly adopted an information processing approach. 
Recognition and identification is postulated to occur in a series of discrete steps, and is thus both 
stage- and time- dependent; at each step, incoming information is processed by functionally 
independent modules, and some (usually under-specified) central executive system co-ordinates the 
flow of information. Face recognition theories are often consciously modelled on exemplars of the 
information processing approach: Bruce & Young ( 1986) explicitly acknowledged that their model 
was based on the well known 'logogen' model made famous by Morton (1969). 
223 This distinction is clearer when considered in the light of the infonnation processing model of Bruce & Young ( 1986). 
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The Bruce & Young model 
The Bruce & Young (1986) model of face recognition - which developed out of earlier work by Hay 
& Young ( 1982) - is probably the most comprehensive single model of its type, and is also widely 
accepted as providing the most satisfactory account of extant research findings. Although the model 
concerns itself with recognition of faces, Bruce & Young argue that it could be considered more 
generally as a model of person recognition, since person recognition is largely dependent on face 
recognition .. · They provide evidence from various sources in favour of this proposition, and claim that 
the evidence from cases of neurological impairment is particularly compelling. 
The model postulates that seven different types of information can be obtained in the act of 
perceiving familiar faces. In the language of the model, these types of information constitute codes. 
The pictorial code 
Faces are frequently encountered and learnt through a particular medium of representation. Many 
highly familiar faces, especially those of public figures and celebrities, are never encountered 'in the 
flesh', but are frequently seen on television, in magazines, and in newspapers. There is some 
evidence to suggest that such a pictorial code (i.e. a representation that is picture dependent) is 
implicated in face processing and recognition. Studies which expose subjects to particular 
representations of faces (e.g. photographs) report greater face recognition accuracy when subjects are 
tested with exactly the same representation than when they are tested with different representations of 
the same face (Shepherd, Ellis & Davies, 1982; Read, Vokey & Hammersley, 1990). 
The structural code 
Evidence for the involvement of a 'structural code' in face recognition is also strong. This is the 
sense in which people can see a photograph of a new face, and recognise a different photograph of the 
person as depicting that person: presumably, a code has been created which is invariant under certain 
transformations. There appears to be a difference in the structural codes for familiar and unfamiliar224 
faces: Familiar faces are encoded with respect to less changeable aspects of face. The nature of the 
structural code is unspecified in the model, but Bruce & Young take bearings on Marr's (1982) work 
on vision. Accordingly, they suggest that there are probably interdependent sets of descriptions at the 
level of structural code, allowing identification from single features (e.g. eyes) or from whole faces. 
Bruce & Young argue further that structural code is probably expression independent, and that the 
224 'Unfamiliar' here denotes faces that have been seen before, but which are not well known. This is an unfortunate choice 
of word, but corresponds to usage of the term in the literature. 
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descriptions in the codes probably allow for different head angles. In short, structural code 1s 
canonical. 
Visually derived semantic code 
When we r~cognise faces, we are immediately able to make judgements about several personal 
attributes (for example, sex, age, occupation). We can think of people who resemble the person in 
question, we can make judgements of relative beauty - in short, we tend to derive a great deal of 
semantic information about the person from visual recognition. In the model, this is referred to as 
visually derived semantic code. 
Identity specific semantic code 
Recognition of particular faces also provides immediate information about the recognised person. 
Typically, when the person's face is highly familiar, we gain access to information about where she 
lives, who she is married to, what she does for a living, and so on. This information bears very little 
relationship to the physical form of the face, and is referred to in the model as identity specific 
semantic code. 
Name code 
Although one might be tempted to subsume information about a person's name under the previous 
code, Bruce & Young make a strong case for the existence of a separate name code. In particular, 
they propose that it is an output code, which allows a name to be generated, and passed on to 'output 
devices' (like a language production system). Some of the most compelling support for such a code 
includes i) the well known everyday difficulties we (humans) have in producing a name, although we 
can simultaneously remember other attributes of the person in question; and ii) evidence from 
neurological disorders, to wit apraxias, where subjects are completely unable to generate names, but 
other functions are intact. 
Other codes postulated by the model, but of less significance, are the facial expression code, and the 
facial speech code. 
A diagrammatic representation of the model is presented below, and the role of the seven codes in the 
functioning of the model is evident from the diagram. 
Two additional postulates of the model are of considerable significance. These are i) the existence of 
logogen-Iike devices, known as 'face recognition units' (FRUs), and ii) the existence of 'person 
identity nodes'. 
Chapter 5 facial representations 
Face recognition units (FR Us) and person identity node~ (P!Ns) 
Face recognition units receive input from encoders, which transform code obtained from the visual 
system into a suitable form. Each FRU contains structural code describing one of the faces known to 
the individual (there are therefore at least as many FRUs in the system as there are known faces), and 
is activated by the input it receives. The strength of this activation, and the strength of the signal that 
the FRU sen~s to the cognitive system, will depend on the similarity of the input stimulus code to the 
code stored.cin the FRU. Bruce & Young posit that FRUs don't operate in a threshold firing mode, 
since even strong degrees of resemblance will not necessarily lead to 'recognition', particularly when 
the person is a 'look alike' and context evaluation indicates a mismatch. The FRU can be 'primed' by 
PINs, e.g. in anticipation of someone we know we are about to meet. (PINs contain identity specific 
semantic information). The PINs are the site at which person recognition occurs; and as such can be 




(Reproduced, with minor modifications, from Bruce & Young, 1986, p 312). 
Figure 5.3 The Bruce & Young (1986) model of face recognition. 
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The model is sequential in nature: name codes must be generated after identity specific information, 
for example, and face recognition units can only fire after visual input is structurally encoded. This 
does not exclude the possibility that there is an interactive flow of information (indeed, double headed 
arrows in the diagram indicate where this is explicitly postulated), nor that later stages may influence 
processing at earlier stages. There is interlinkage between the 'codes' and the processing stages. 
Thus, name codes appear to be accessed through identity specific semantic codes at the level of the . 
PINs. The.: model is supported by a host of findings, some deriving from empirical studies 
specifically-' designed to test it (e.g. Ellis, 1992; Roberts & Bruce, 1988; Valentine & Bruce, l 986b ), 
some from diary studies of everyday facial memory problems (Young & Hay, 1985), and a good deal 
also from neurological knowledge of difficulties encountered in recognition and identification of 
faces (Bruce & Young, 1986). 
It is of little benefit to the present chapter to attempt an evaluation of the model. Comprehensive 
analyses can be found in Ellis (1992), Hay & Young (1991), and Bruce (1988), and the addition of a 
'back-end' name generator is proposed by Valentine, Bredart, Lawson & Ward (1991). In the most 
recent developments, the model has suffered the fate of many i11formation processing models of 
cognition, namely its virtual replacement by a PDP (parallel distributed processing) equivalent. I will 
look briefly at the replacement in the following section of the chapter, but wish to identify two 
aspects of the information processing model that will be important when I consider possible measures 
of facial similarity. 
The face recognition model suggested by Bruce & Young has a visual 'front-end' which is left largely 
unspecified. This is not an omission, indeed Bruce has at several places acknowledged the 
importance of this pre-processing stage (Bruce, 1992, 1994). What interests me is the postulate that 
the first stage of visual processing after the front-end involves the extraction of a 'structural', or 
'canonical' code. The model has nothing specific to say about such a code, except that it is likely to 
be invariant to transformations such as pose and expression, and that each face is elaborated in terms 
of structural code. I suggest that an analogue of such a canonical code is a method of representing 
sets of digitized facial images in an eigenspace, recently developed by Kohonen (1984), Sirovich & 
Kirby (1987), and O'Toole and colleagues (O'Toole, Milward, & Anderson, 1988; O'Toole & 
Thompson, 1993; O'Toole, Abdi, Deffenbacher & Valentin, 1993). This goes somewhat further than 
suggested in the Bruce & Young model, which proposes only that individual faces are represented in 
terms of a structural code. I will later make the argument that the representation of populations of 
faces in terms of common reference axes (or eigenvectors) provides us with a basis for measuring 
facial similarity. 
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Th'e second aspect of the model that I think is directly relevant to present concerns is the 
differentiation between more- and less- familiar faces. Face recognition units exist for each known 
face, but structural code in the units is 'better developed' for more familiar faces, and is elaborated in 
tenns of stable, less changeable, facial properties. I think that the representation of faces by a basis set 
of eigenvectors might give clearer meaning to these propositions. 
Instance based models 
Just as the infonnation processing models of the 1960's and 70's swept away previous theories of 
cognition and learning, so parallel distributed processing models are sweeping away those rooted in 
the infonnation processing paradigm. These models, known variously as 'PDP', 'instance based', 
'exemplar based', 'associationi<>t', or 'neural networks', prosper because of their remarkable 
simplicity, and their equally remarkable success at simulating complex behaviour (see McLelland & 
Rumelhart, 1985, 1986, for examples). In particular, they appear to explain many examples of 
cognitive behaviour which require expert knowledge of naturally occurring categories without 
recourse to the complex systems of rules that infonnation processing approaches postulate. The 
proferred explanation posits only experience of a discrete number of instances of the category, and a 
general associationist model of learning. 
In the case of face recognition, there are several PDP models in the literature. I will focus only on the 
Burton & Bruce (1990) model here,225 but will refer to the auto-associative model developed by 
Kohonen (1984) a little later in the chapter. 
The Burton & Bruce model 
The 'Burton & Bruce model', developed by Burton & Bruce (1990), and extended by Bruce, Burton 
& Craw (1992), Burton (1992), and Bruce, Burton & Walker (1994), is based closely on the 
Interactive Activation and Competition network (IAC) model first researched and published by 
McClelland & Rumelhart (1981). The model, represented below as Figure 5.4, has hypothetical units 
or 'neurons', which are connected multiply to other such units. These connections can be excitatory 
or inhibitory, and are bi-directional. Units are grouped in 'pools': There are three of these in the 
model, namely a pool of FRUs (face recognition units), a pool of PINs (personal identity units, or 
nodes), and a pool of semantic infonnation units. 
225 Other models include those suggested by Schreiber & Roussel ( 1991) and by Li & Psaltis ( 1993 ). 
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Information enters the system via a visual or perceptual 'front-end': a rudimentary version derived 
from Burton & Bruce (1990) is depicted in the diagram, consisting of 'feature units' connected in 
pools. Activation spreads from the front-end to the FRUs, and this is passed on to units in other pools 
according to the level of activation of each unit, and the weighting of the connection between the 
units. Familiarity decisions are taken at the level of the PINs, partly as a function of the activity 
passing there from the FRUs. i.e. this activity is 'combined' with information from other routes, to 
I 
achieve identification of the person rather than the face in isolation. PINs are multi-modal nodes -
they are the 'entry point to semantic system - but FRUs act as unimodal nodes, pooling information 
over a set of more primitive feature analyzers. There is excitation between pools, and inhibition 
within pools. 
. . ····.,Foetal 
feature 
units/ 
dimensions ·. . ..... Visual 
'front 
end' 
. . . . .. ~· !e.at_u:e. ..... ,. . :-. . feature, · : .... . . 
(from Burton & Bruce, 1990; modified to include a 'visual front-end'). 
Figure 5.4 Burton & Bruce's IAC face recognition model 
Many well established findings in the face recognition literature can be explained in terms of the 
functioning of this model, including priming effects, covert recognition, and naming difficulties 
(Bruce, Burton & Craw, 1992). Some of these findings were very difficult to explain in terms of 
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infonnation processing models like that developed by Bruce & Young, discu~sed earlier in the 
chapter. 
The model has two significant failings. In the first place, there is no learning mechanism - it is a 
steady-state model, but one of the most important aspects of human face recognition is the learning of 
new faces. The auto-associative models posited by Kohonen (1984) and O'Toole & Thompson 
' 
(1993) thoug~, provide a learning mechanism in the fonn of the so-called delta or Widrow-Hoff rule. 
This will be an important consideration when I evaluate representational schemas that might sustain a 
similarity metric. 
The second· significant failing is the rudimentary elaboration of the perceptual interface. This 
problem is shared by infonnation processing models, and its satisfactory resolution remains a major 
challenge for face recognition research. 
Facial representations 
In both face recognition models considered above, the lack of an adequate perceptual interface or 
'visual front-end' is a significant impediment. Similarly - or perhaps in consequence - neither of the 
models specifies a representational schema. There are several interesting ideas for such a schema in 
the literature, though, and I will review these in this section. The multidimensional schema suggested 
by Valentine (199la) is, in particular, an important foundation of the similarity metri9 to be advanced 
later. 
Surfaces in 3D 
Much face research has proceeded as if two dimensional pictorial representations of faces are 
adequate physical specification. In many of the studies that test theoretical claims, subjects are given 
photographs of faces to learn, and sometime later are tested for recognition ability. But faces grow on 
heads, and these are clearly three dimensional objects. Several researchers have demonstrated that 
infonnation about the three dimensional nature of faces is important to face recognition ability. 
Pearson and colleagues (Pearson & Robinson, 1985; Pearson, Hanna & Martinez, 1990; Pearson, 
1992) showed that the two-dimensional edge detectors favoured in Marr' s ( 1982) theory of vision fail 
to provide easily recognisable representations of faces. They have developed two- and three-
composite operators which capitalize on a three dimensional model of 'seeing' a face from a position 
nearly co-incidental with the surface nonnal to the face. These operators produce automated sketches 
of faces for use in low-bit-rate video communication for deaf people, and are strikingly similar to 
sketches produced by trained artists (Pearson, 1992). Bruce (1994) argues that this research 
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demonstrates the importance of three dimensional representations to an adequate understanding of 
face recognition processes. 
Bruce & Healey (1991) attempted to explore the role of three dimensional information directly, by 
using a laser scanning device to create facial images, thus rendering them devoid of surface 
pigmentation. Subjects were asked at the test phase of the study to identify faces that they had been 
exposed to at' the beginning of the experiment. Subjects found this a very difficult task, though, and 
showed much greater recognition accuracy for photographs of the same faces. 
In later research, Bruce, Hanna, Dench, Healey & Burton (1992) pursued this issue, using the cartoon 
generator developed by Brennan (1985). Previous research had shown that veridical line drawings of 
faces are more difficult to recognise than photographs. Bruce et al. tested the notion that 'mass' (low 
frequency information) is critical to the advantage of 3-D representations. The cartoon generator was 
used to create line drawings from photographs, and subjects were compared for their performance on 
recognition tests using either photographs or line drawings as stimuli. Recognition performance on 
the cartoons was good - indeed, comparable to recognition performance on the photographs. 
Further evidence suggesting the importance of three dimensional information comes from a study in 
which extensive sets of facial measurements were taken and used to build statistical models predictive 
of the sex of faces (Burton, Bruce & Dench, 1993). Here, three-dimensional measures were more 
highly predictive than two-dimensional measures, and appeared also to be more important.226 
Most recently, Bruce, Coombes & Richards (1993) have attempted to specify a general 
representational schema for faces, which takes surfaces in three dimensional space as its primitive 
objects. In this schema, a face is represented as a composite of up to eight surface types, namely 
peaks, ridges, saddle ridges, pits, valleys, saddle valleys, flat regions, and minimal regions. Faces can 
be compared in this scheme according to the percentage of the facial surface each surface type 
occupies, and according to the combination of surface types required to adequately represent the face. 
Preliminary empirical research using this schema shows that it is capable of describing facial 
distinctiveness and typicality. It is also a satisfying schema on a priori grounds, since its 
representations are invariant to viewing perspective or pose. However, the authors concede that it 
may not be a good model for the way humans perceive and recognise faces. This is not a critical issue 
for the present research, since the goal is to develop a measure of facial similarity: This measure 
should correspond to perceived similarity, but functional equivalence is not necessary. From a 
practical point of view, the equipment required to produce a facial representation in terms o( 3D 
226 The evidence in favour of this latter proposition, though, is that three dimensional measures entered the model equation 
first (a stepwise procedure was used). This is not a particularly good way of judging the relative importance of variables 
(Howell, 1992). 
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surface primitives is expensive, and bulky.221 In addition, the schema does not explicitly account for 
variation within populations of faces, and this is a significant omission: in the next section, we will 
see that facial distinctiveness and typicality are important variables. 
The representational schema I argue for later in the chapter does not attempt to produce three 
dimensional representations. This is clearly problematic, given the discussion immediately above. 
However, the schema takes three dimensional information into account implicitly, and I will suggest 
that this is adequate from a pragmatic point of view. 
Norm based coding models 
Research on inversion effects in face recognition clearly points to the importance of knowledge. of 
intra-category variation (see page 102 of this chapter). There are several representational schemas 
which attempt to incorporate intra-category and intra-population variation, and these are perhaps the 
most promising approaches for deriving a similarity metric. In order to discuss them adequately, I 
first briefly review research on the role that facial distinctiveness and typicality play in face 
recognition. 
Typicality and distinctiveness of faces 
The central findings are twofold. Typical faces are easier to classify as faces, but more difficult to 
identify individually; they also attract a greater number of false alarms in recognition tasks. 
Distinctive faces, on the other hand, are easier to identify than typical faces. 22e 
Valentine & Bruce (1986a), for example, showed that subjects classified typical faces more quickly 
than distinctive faces in a 'jumbled face' task,229 and identified distinctive faces more quickly than 
typical faces b a recognition task. Similar results were obtained earlier by Light, Kayra-Stuart, & 
Hollander (1979). 
Facial distinctiveness and typicality scores are usually obtained from ratings of subject-judges, and 
are therefore strongly dependent on the set of faces used,230 and on the set of faces with which the 
judges are experientially familiar. Shepherd, Gib ling & Ellis ( 1991) attempted to counteract the first 
227 The equipment consists of a laser scanner, several precisely aligned optical mirrors, and a very powerful computer. 
221 I mean '!=asier' here in the sense that they are identified more quickly, and in the sense that they are identified with greater 
accuracy. 
229 Faces are presented intact or as jumbled composites of face parts. Subjects are required to indicate as quickly as possible 
whether the face is intact or jumbled. 
230 This dependency is greatest when a ranking task is used, i.e. the set is ranked on typicality and distinctiveness. 
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of these problems by using a set of 240 faces, selected from a larger database of 1000. They 
demonstrated a strong effect of distinctiveness on recognition performance, and in addition showed 
that the effect held over the maximum investigated period of delay, namely one month. 
'Distinctiveness' and 'typicality' are conceptualized in the literature according to their ordinary 
linguistic usage, but a study by Vokey & Read (1992) suggests a more complicated state of affairs. 
These autho~s conducted a study in which subjects rated typicality, familiarity, attractiveness, 
likeability and memorability of a number of faces. The ratings were factor analysed, and two 
components identified - an overall memorability factor or component, and one on which the other 
variables loaded, named the 'general familiarity' factor. Thus, typicality can be decomposed into two 
factors: context-free familiarity, and memorability. These factors were found to be additively 
predictive of face recognition performance; memorability enhanced discrimination, whereas 
familiarity impeded it. The results of this study suggest the need for theoretical elaboration of the 
notions of distinctiveness and typicality. 
Several studies have made attempts at such elaboration in terms of facial prototype models. (A 
prototype in this sense is the 'best' exemplar of a category). Typicality and distinctiveness can be 
defined in terms of a notional 'distance' from the prototype, or in terms of the frequency with which 
the type occurs. 
Facial prototype formation 
Valentine & Bruce (1986c) outline a 'facial prototype hypothesis' in which prototype formation is 
some sort of averaging process, based on all faces experienced by the subject. The averaging process 
could be based on feature frequency information, and the prototype would then be the face composed 
of most frequently occurring features. Alternatively, there could be several prototypes, based on a 
similar sort of averaging process. 
Malpass and Hughes (1986), however, point out that there are several other potential cognitive 
mechanisms that might function to form facial prototypes. They identify three rival models. 
1 an attribute frequency model. Prototype formation occurs by taking the modal feature 
value for each of a set of faces. 
2 a value averaging model. Prototypes are formed by extracting the mean value for 
each feature dimension. 
3 an interval storage model. Types 'activate' not only the particular feature values 
corresponding to their features, but also the feature values directly adjacent to these. 
The prototype is thus stored as a set of features with associated average intervals. 
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Malpass & Hughes tested these models against each other by varying ldentikit faces, and the results 
appeared to support the attribute frequency model. However, the averaging models were investigated 
by treating the dimensions along which identikits were manipulated as 'scales', whereas more direct 
measurement of faces might constitute a better test. 
Whatever the dispute about the appropriate prototype model, several studies using very different 
methods hav~ shown that there are strong prototype effects in face recognition. Solso & McCarthy 
(1981), for example, conducted an experiment in which subjects were shown identikit faces which 
varied in terms of number of shared features. These features were taken from a prototype face, which 
was not shown in the presentation stage of the experiment. Faces shared 1, 2, or 3 features. Subjects 
then completed a recognition test composed of 'old' and 'new' faces,231 and indicated a degree of 
confidence for each choice. Subjects responded with greater confidence to the (previously 
unpresented) prototype face than to the other faces. This suggests that subjects formed a prototype 
from the presentation set. 
Laughery, Jensen & Wogalter (1988) constructed sets of photo-lineups from Identikit composites and 
Macamug images,232 and tested the ability of subjects to identify a face previously presented to them. 
Sets of faces were constructed from identikit prototypes, in a manner similar to that used by Solso & 
McCarthy ( 1981 ). Lineups were then constituted so that distractors differed in one feature from the 
prototype, and also differed in one feature from each other. Both prototypes and non-prototypes were 
used as targets and as distractors. Prototypes were recognised more frequently than non-prototypes. 
The authors suggest that this finding spells a warning to lineup constructors: attempting to maximise 
distractor - suspect similarity may have the unintended consequence of making the suspect a 
prototype, and therefore suggesting his identity to witnesses. 
Bruce, Doyle, Dench & Burton ( 1991) investigated prototype formation in a series of carefully 
devised experiments, using prototypes and exemplars created with Macamug software. They report 
several important findings: i) even tiny changes in facial configurations233 are important to recognition 
success; ii) prototypes seem to be learned by exposure to very similar faces; iii) prototype faces are 
preferred over 'extreme' exemplars, even when the prototype is not part of the trial set, and the 
extreme exemplars are. However, these results - and those reported in similar studies - do not 
necessarily imply a prototype learning model. Many PDP models are able to simulate category 
learning behaviour, and these models do not include any specific rule-learning mechanism: their 
231 That is, faces shown them during the presentation phase, and faces not shown them in that phase. 
232 'Macamug' is a specialised face-image software package, and runs on Apple Macintosh computers. 
233 Moving the upper or lower part of the face up or down three pixels is an example of a 'tiny' change. 
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power is to show that mere exposure to a sufficient number of exemplars can produce the same 
behaviour as a rule-learning model. 
These 'prototype studies' do not take us any further, in a practical sense, to the desired measure of 
facial similarity, but they do show that faces lend themselves to representation in a system with an 
inherent relational metric. More importantly, they show that human face perception and recognition 
is highly sensitive to such an underlying metric. 
Caricature models 
A different approach to the representational problem is taken by a set of studies which postulate that 
faces are encoded as 'caricatures'. Caricatures are defined as representations exaggerated metrically 
from an average, or norm, and the idea underlying this schema is that such exaggeration manages to 
capture the 'essence' of the face (the so-called 'superfidelity hypothesis'). Much of the evidence in 
favour of this representational schema derives from a demonstrated recognition advantage for 
caricatured faces over veridical portraits. 
Although early studies did not support the 'superfidelity' hypothesis (Tversky & Baratz, 1985; Hagen 
& Perkins, 1983), Rhodes, Brennan & Carey (1987) argued that this was because comparisons were 
usually made between line-caricatures and photographs, and because face stimuli were not well 
controlled in several other ways (for example, the photograph and caricature might show the same 
person in different poses). They used a 'caricature generator' developed by Susan Brennan (Brennan, 
1985) to create caricatures, veridical images, and anti-caricatures, thus exercising greater control over 
the stimuli. This caricature generator uses a representational scheme which is worth outlining at 
some length. Brennan argues that caricature proceeds by exaggerating the differences between two 
representations; usually between the object to be caricatured and some normative representation (e.g. 
an average, or normative face). Applying her theory of caricature to the example of faces, Brennan 
suggested that representations of faces could be produced by digitizing a number (say N) of discrete 
and salient points on any particular face from some two dimensional representation like a photograph 
or a computer-scanned bitmap. In this way, the Euclidean distance between two faces could be 
calculated by i) considering each of the faces as a vector in N-dimensional space, where each of the N 
co-ordinates of the point corresponds to a digitized point in two dimensional space; and by ii) 
determining the Euclidean distance between the two N-dimensional vectors, 
i.e. distance = ~(A1 • B1>2 + <A2 - B2) 2+ .... + (An - Bn)2 , where Ai (or Bi) is the ith dimension (x,y co-
ordinate) of face A (or B). 
In addition, it should be possible to estimate the distinctiveness of any particular face by finding the 
difference between the N-dimensional representation and a population-normative N-dimensional 
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,representation (which itself could be estimated by averaging a large number of appropriately sampled 
representations). Brennan suggests that co-ordinates should be collected according to sets of features, 
and that co-ordinates chosen should correspond to points of inflection. Brennan's schema is 
reproduced below as Figure 5.5 
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Co-ordinates for the normative face reported in Dewdney ( 1986) are used to generate the face. 
Figure S.S Brennan's scheme of fiducial points for representing faces in the picture plane. 
Using the caricature generator to create stimuli of faces, Rhodes et al. (1987) showed that subjects 
were quicker to identify caricatures of familiar faces than they were to identify anti-caricaturesi.14 or 
veridical portraits of the same faces. There was no difference, however, in recognition accuracy 
across these conditions. 
In further ~tudies, Rhodes and her colleagues have extended the work on caricature effects. Thus, 
Rhodes & Moody (1990) used caricatures of unfamiliar faces as stimuli and tested recognition of 
these against anti-caricatures and veridical line drawings, along with different encoding instructions. 
They did not find an advantage for caricatures, but did find that subjects were able to reject 
caricatures of faces not previously seen more quickly than veridical drawings. Rhodes & Maclean 
(1990) replicated the caricature advantage (again, only for response latency and not recognition 
performance), using birds as stimuli, and ornithologists as subjects. Interestingly, the advantage was 
only obtained for expert ornithologists (not for less expert 'avian knowers'), and only more typical 
examples of bird species facilitated such an advantage. 
234 
Anti-caricatures are defined as exaggerations towards the norm, whereas caricatures are exaggerations away from the 
norm. 
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Although the studies conducted by Rhodes and colleagues have repeatedly shown an advantage for 
caricatures over veridical pmtraits in terms of response latency, they have not shown a recognition 
advantage (i .e. caricatures of faces are not recognised with greater accuracy than veridical portraits). 
Several studies by other authors, though, have shown a recognition advantage for caricatures. Mauro 
& Kubovy ( 1992) used a caricaturing method in which distinctive features were exaggerated, and 
they showed that these were recognised more frequently than the veridical portraits on which the 
caricatures had been based. 
Benson & Perrett (1991 a) extended Brennan's caricaturing technique for use with high resolution 
bitmaps, and replicated both the caricature advantage for response latency, and the recognition 
advantage. The details of their technique are of some significance to a later discussion. 
In their scheme, faces are represented in a two dimensional photographic plane. Key points are 
identified on a digitized photograph of a face , and are used to create a point-determined caricature of 
the face , in exactly the same manner as in Brennan's technique. Two sets of triangles (or triangular 
tesselations) are then constructed for each of the representations (veridical and caricature), by joining 
certain points with straight lines. (Figure 5.6 shows a simplified example of an image tessellation). 
The triangles map onto each other in the two representations, since they are formed by connecting key 
points, and the faces share these, albeit in a different spatial configuration. In the veridical face , each 
triangle contains a set of pixel values, since the face is a digitized image. These values are mapped 
into the corresponding triangle on the caricatured face , using bilinear interpolation and an algorithm 
reported in Benson and Perrett ( 1991 b ). The result is a caricature of near-photographic quality. 
Figure 5.6 Sample triangular tessellation of a face image. 
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The caricature advantage appears to be manifested more clearly when these high resolution 
caricatures are used as stimuli . Benson and Perrett (I 991 a) showed that caricatures not only 
facilitated recognition latency over veridical stimuli, but also increased recognition accuracy. 
Approaches to caricature generation rely on the representation of faces in a multidimensional space, 
although this reliance is perhaps not crucial to the techniques. They certainly show that such an 
approach has useful and powerful implications. Several authors have suggested models of face 
representation and recognition that capitalize on the notion of multidimensional space, and I will later 
argue that this notion may provide a useful foundation for a metric of facial similarity. In the next 
section of the chapter, I review some of the approaches that have pursued this line of enquiry. 
Multi-dimensional space models 
The idea common to face recognition models that use the notion of multidimensional space is that a 
population of faces can be represented in a space subtended by a number of 'primitive ' dimensions. 
Each face is represented in this schema by a set of weighted basis vectors or dimensions. Such a 
conceptualization gives quantitative meaning to the notion of a 'normative' or 'average' face , and it 
also gives quantitative meaning to several important concepts, such as 'facial distinctiveness ', and 
'facial typicality '. 
Although several authors have discussed the possibility of an explicit multidimensional model of face 
recognition (e.g. Rhodes, 1988235), Tim Valentine (I 99 I a, 1991 b; Valentine & Ferrara, I 991 ; 
Valentine & Endo, 1992) has provided the most comprehensive discussion, and a working example of 
such a model. I will accordingly restrict my discussion to a consideration of his contributions. 
Valentine suggests that faces can be regarded as compositions of ' dimensions', which are attributes 
that exist for each face at some positive, mutually exclusive value. Each face can therefore be 
represented as an n-tuple, which is the set of values that the face has on each of the dimensions. The 
exact nature of the dimensions is not important - these may turn out to be physiognomic features, like 
noses, chins and ears, but they may well be something more abstract. Indeed, any discernible aspect 
of faces that serves to discriminate faces is a candidate. Faces are postulated to be normally 
distributed around the central tendency, or origin of the dimensions, and are therefore represented in 
the space with decreasing density as the distance from the origin increases. 
235 An impl icit multidimensional model also underlies Brennan's 'caricature generator; outlined earlier in the chapter. The 
work on facial prototype effects also appears to assume such a model. 
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This model has implications for the recognition process. Each stimulus face will be encoded in an n-
dimensional fonn, with some amount of noise. A decision process is therefore required to determine 
whether or not the stimulus matches the vector (or point) for a known face. This process is assumed 
to depend on i) the amount of noise in the encoding; ii) the distance between the location of the 
stimulus and its nearest neighbour; and iii) the distance between the location of the stimulus and the 
next nearest neighbour. 
There are two possible geometric (or mathematical) interpretations of such a model. In the first, it is 
assumed that faces are represented as vectors in the space, extending from the origin outward. In the 
second, it is assumed that faces are represented as points in the space. The differences between the 
models are not trivial, and require some discussion.236 
The vector coding model 
In the vector coding model, the existence of a 'normative' representation is required. This means that 
faces need to be explicitly averaged over instances, and that such a nonnative representation be used 
• 
in comparative judgements about typicality and distinctiveness. But there are identifiable sub-groups 
of faces, e.g. male and female, black and white, and it is not clear whether different nonnative 
representations will exist for different subgroups. 
The vector, or norm coding model can provide an explanation for some of the empirically observed 
phenomena in the face recognition literature. That distinctive faces are recognised more quickly than 
typical faces is due to the difference in the ratio [error/distance to the origin] between distinctive and 
typical faces. Typical faces encoded with a certain amount of error will be confused with many other 
faces that are of a similar distance to the origin, whereas distinctive faces will not, since there are 
fewer faces of a similar distance to the origin. A similar explanation can be offered for inversion 
effects: inversion is bound to result in a particularly ' noisy' representation of the stimulus; this 
'noisy' representation will be used to search the space, but will not be able to adequately discriminate 
faces that are similar to the stimulus, but not identical.237 Recognition of faces will consequently be 
very poor. 
236 
The differences derive directly from the two possible ways of describing an entity in n-dimensional space; i.e. as a vector 
v, extending from the origin to the point, or as then-tuple representing the point, (x 1, x2 . ... ,xn-l' xn). At the level of the 
recognition model, however, the crucial difference is that in the vector coding model an explicit norm is assumed, which 
is not the case for the instance based model. 
237 The mathematical definition of an 'open ball' could be used to give this idea clear quantitative meaning. 
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The instance based model 
In the instance based model, the existence of a 'normative' representation is not required. A 
normative representation may exist, in the sense that all instances could be averaged to produce such 
a representation. However, a normative representation plays no role in the recognition process. The 
prototype effects discussed earlier in the chapter do not pose a problem for this model, since many 
distributed processing models show that is possible to produce such effects without assuming rule- or 
, 
norm- determined processes (see Bechtel, 1991 ). 
Typicality and distinctiveness effects are explained in this model by the relative density of points in 
regions of the space, and by the degree of error involved in encoding facial images. A distinctive face 
will be easier to recognize because a 'circle of confusion' at a region of low point density will include 
fewer points than one at a region of high density. 
It is difficult to distinguish the models at the level of prediction. Valentine suggests that they offer 
indistinguishable explanations of typicality and distinctiveness phenomena, but that it may be 
possible to test them for their explanations of the 'other-race' effect.231 The exemplar model posits 
that other race faces will be encoded in terms of the same dimensions as own-race faces, but less 
accurately. This means that they will be more densely distributed in the space (since the dimensions 
are not optimal for discrim ination), and recognition will therefore be less sensitive. Importantly, it 
makes an additive prediction for the effects of distinctiveness and race in combination (one will have 
greater difficulty recognizing other race faces, but relative to this, distinctive faces in each race group 
will show the distinctiveness effect). The norm-based model makes slightly different predictions. If 
it assumes that both own and other race faces are encoded with respect to the same norm, in the same 
axis space, then although own race faces will be distributed at a full complement of different angles 
around the norm, other race faces will be distributed in one direction. It is not necessary for there to 
be a difference in exemplar density. Since other race faces share similar angle components, it is 
difficult to differentiate them in comparison to own race faces which will have wide differences in 
angle components. But this model cannot accommodate the additive effects of race and 
distinctiveness, unless it is assumed that other race faces are coded with respect to a separate norm. 
Valentine (1991a) suggests that this would be an unparsimonious assumption, but Benson & Perrett 
(199la) argue - apropos of their caricature procedure - that the existence of different norms for 
different groups of faces is sensible if cognitive processes involved in face recognition resemble the 
231 The ' other-race' effect in the face recognition literature is the well-established finding that white subjects are better at 
recognizing faces of their own 'race' or group, than faces of other ' races' or groups, and vice versa. (Malpass & Kravitz, 
1969; Brigham & Malpass, 1985). This difference is not vast, but is reliable, conferring an advantage of about I 0% on 
the recognizing group. 
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caricaturing described by their model. In later research, Valentine & Endo (1992) concluded that 
empirical evidence from the face recognition literature supports the instance model more than it does 
the nonn-coding model. 
What is important for present purposes is the power of the multi-dimensional approach: it provides a 
representational model for face recognition - even if the nature of the dimensional basis is unspecified 
- and it als~ explains several of the well-established empirical findings. Significantly, it has a 
similarity metric embedded in it, where the similarity of two faces is a monotonic function of the 
distance between them (in tenns of then-dimensional representation, and a distance measure239). This 
is one part of the measure to be suggested in the present piece of work; the other concerns the 
dimensions that constitute the basis of the face space. In order to arrive at this point, it is useful to 
dwell on facial similarity measures previously used in the face recognition literature. 
Previous attempts to measure similarity 
It is useful to divide previous measures into categories; these are identified below. 
'A priori' techniques 
In these techniques, researchers use some criterion that is presumed to distinguish faces on the basis 
of their similarity. Thus, Patterson & Baddeley ( 1977) created groups which ostensibly differed in 
the facial similarity of their members, by using photographs of people from very different social 
categories: to wit, actors (low similarity, since there is no defining attribute of this group to ensure 
similarity), and soldiers (high similarity, due to common characteristics detennined by shared age, 
haircuts, etc). Malpass & Devine (1983) created lineups of varying similarity by assigning 
individuals according to their height, weight, hair colour, hair length, and eye colour.240 Laughery, 
Fessler, Lenorovitz & Yoblick (1974) operationalised similarity in terms of a set of trials in which 
faces were paired, where subjects were required to discriminate old from new faces. The proportion 
of mistaken ('old') responses was used to define similarity. In a second part of that study, similarity 
was operationalized in tenns of physical characteristics (hair colour, age, etc.): these characteristics 
were used to construct a matrix, and similarity was defined as the number of shared characteristics. 
239 
There are several possibilities: the Euclidean distance, the Minkowski power metric, and the city-block distance metric 




Although it should be noted that Malpass & Devine also obtained independent ratings of the similarity of lineup 
members. 
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The weaknesses inherent in these types of technique include i) the untested nature of the assumptions 
used to determine similarity, and ii) their impreciseness. Although it might be reasonable to assume 
that groups of actors and soldiers will show different variability in facial similarity, this is a gross 
division, and of little use in most situations where similarity needs to be measured or manipulated. 
Rating techniques 
Most psychological studies that attempt to measure facial similarity do so by obtaining ratings of 
faces from independent subject judges. Bruce ( 1979) required subjects to rate stimulus faces in 
relation to target faces on a 4 point scale; in Milord's (1978) study, subjects rated pairs of faces on a 7 
point scale for similarity/difference. Harmon (1973) based an early computer-driven face recognition 
system on ratings of face descrip.!ors. Usually, ratings of similarity are made globally: that is, subjects 
are asked to rate faces on a single scale, ranging from (for example) 'not at all similar' to 'very 
similar' . Alternative conceptualizations and operationalizations are relatively unexplored. 
Researchers have not investigated whether 'highly similar' and 'easily mistakable' are coterminous, 
or correlated, nor have they systematically examined the dimensions governing similarity 
judgements. The psychometric properties of these similarity ratings are also very rarely reported, and 
there are some indications that this is an important failure : Lindsay (1994), for example, reports that 
facial similarity judgements show great inter-subject variability - an array of faces which appear 
highly similar to one observer may not appear at all similar to another observer. 
This type of approach has the advantage of retaining a hold on the cognitive aspect of facial 
similarity: what is important, after all, for most face recognition research is perceived similarity. 
Rating studies obtain a 'direct ' measure of this perceived similarity (notwithstanding the unexplored 
psychometric problems). The chief drawbacks of this technique are the dependence on subject 
ratings, and the statistical ramifications of this dependence.24 1 
Scaling techniques 
Although the use of subject ratings ensures the connection of similarity measures to cognitive 
process, such ratings are typically only useful for a small set of comparisons. Several authors have 
recognised the need to formulate similarity measures for larger stimulus samples, and have utilised 
forms of scaling technique to this end. Hirschberg, Jones & Haggerty ( 1978) obtained similarity 
241 The most severe of these ramifications is that a sizeable sample of subjects will be required to obtain rel iable estimates, 
given the high inter-rater variance reported by Lindsay (1 994), and from results reported in this thesis (see Chapter 7). 
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ratings of all pairs of faces in a large sample,242 and entered these into a multidimensional scaling 
analysis (MOS), incorporating individual differences into the analytic model. Since MOS generates a 
dimensional basis, spatial distance measures can be used as a measure of similarity. Other, cognate 
approaches include Rhodes ' (1988) study, which used a ' tree sorting' algorithm. Subjects chose the 
most similar pair of faces in a large set, the next most similar pair, and so on. The pairs of similarity 
ratings were ~ntered into an FxF matrix, analysed (via non-metric MOS) either as FxF (averaged over 
subjects), or as FxFx.N, where individual differences are of interest. The algorithm creates a tree with 
branches, and the similarity between faces is computed according to the rank of the branches in 
between them. Young & Yamane (1992) took extensive measurements from each of a set of faces, 
found Euclidean distances for each face on these ' axes', and then submitted the distances in matrix 
form to MDS. Davies, Shepherd & Ellis (1979) measured facial similarity as an interim step in an 
application of (hierarchical) clust~r analysis. Forty eight subjects were individually given a set of 100 
black and white photographs, and asked to sort them into piles on the basis of physical similarity. 
Sortings were entered into a 100 X 100 matrix, the main diagonal representing the frequency with 
which individual photographs were sorted into identical piles by subjects. Matrix entries were treated 
as similarity measures. 
I think that these approaches - in principle - present the most satisfactory solution in the literature to 
the problem of measuring facial similarity. The recognition that a similarity metric must be based on 
a representational scheme capable of simultaneously representing all faces in a set is particularly 
important. The further recognition that similarity must be conceptualised as inherently 
multidimensional is also significant. However, the schemes discussed here do not go far enough: the 
dimensions of the representational space are implicit, and it is not clear that they can generate faces 
that are not in the set submitted to MOS in the first place. At any rate, the issue is not broached in 
these studies. 
An alternate approach, which does not use MOS, but retains the notion of a multidimensional 
representational scheme, is the use of principal component analysis (PCA) exemplified in studies by 
Sirovich & Kirby (1987), O'Toole et al. (1994), and Craw & Cameron (1991). This approach appears 
capable of providing a set of generating dimensions that can accurately represent faces which were 
not included in the initial PCA. I will later argue that this is the most fruitful procedure to follow in 
quest of a facial similarity metric. 
242 The problem with subject ratings of large samples is that it is usually not feasible to obtain comparative ratings for each 
possible combination of faces. A sample of I 00 faces, for example, sustains more than 9900 pairwise ratings. 
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Dimensions for the space 
The multi-dimensional representational models outlined above do not adequately address the nature 
of the generating dimensions. In Valentine's several writings on the subject (1991a, 199lb, Valentine 
& Endo, 1992) he declines to suggest what these dimensions could be, except to note that they could 
be any aspect which discriminates between faces. Although Valentine may be correct in a theoretical . 
sense,20 the dimensions cannot be arbitrary if the representational model is to be taken as a model of 
perception and cognition. The nub of the problem is that the dimensions for a cognitive 
representational basis are probably tied up with primary visual processing, and it is extraordinarily 
difficult to make theoretical descriptions at this level commensurable with theoretical descriptions at 
higher cognitive levels. We encountered this problem earlier in the chapter, namely in the face 
recognition models of Bruce & Young (1986 - see page 106), and of Burton & Bruce (1990 - see page 
109). In both models, the 'visual front-end' of the models was left almost completely unspecified. 
The failure to address the nature of the dimensions significantly impairs the cognitive validity of 
multi-dimensional models. The measure of facial similarity I favour and use in this research makes 
explicit the nature of such dimensions, but I cannot claim that their nature lends the measure any 
direct cognitive validity. One of the goals of the research is to examine the correspondence between 
estimates of facial similarity derived from the measure, and estimates derived from direct perceptions 
of fac ial similarity, but this is not intended as cognitive validation of the dimensions. The intention is 
a practical one: if the measure has satisfactory measurement properties, and if it correlates reasonably 
with perceived similarity, then it may be a useful measure of facial similarity. 
Although few authors have explicitly addressed the nature of the dimensions that might generate a 
multidimensional representational model, it is possible to identify dimensions that have been used in 
an implicit manner. These dimensions are typically embedded in 'knowledge systems' designed to 
faci litate accurate retrieval of faces, or in predictive statistical models. Some discussion of these is 
provided immediately below. 
Descriptions as dimensions 
Faces are undoubtedly visual stimuli, and a satisfactory account of face recognition processes must 
surely incorporate a notion of visual search. It is notable, however, that artificial recognition 
'devices' can search a population of faces fairly accurately on the basis of verbal descriptions of 
20 
If the goal is merely to provide ~ model capable of representing a set of faces, the dimensions do not matter. However, if 
the goal is to suggest dimensions that correspond in some degree to what humans use, then the nature of the dimensions is 
very important. 
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faces. In these recognition systems, a population of faces is represented in a 'description space': that 
is, verbal descriptions constitute the dimensions of the space. 
One of the earliest demonstrations of such an approach is to be found in a seminal article by Hannon 
(1973). A large set of photographs of faces was rated on descriptive dimensions by a number of 
independent)udges. Ratings were averaged across raters, and each face was coded as an n-tuple of 
mean ratings. Hannon showed that one could search this 'description space' by obtaining a rating on 
each of the dimensions, and by finding the nearest neighbour in the space to this 'target face' .2"" In 
this way, a subject could retrieve a face from the system by simply providing a description, or a set of 
ratings. 
A similar, perhaps more substantial recognition system is reported by Ellis, Shepherd, Shepherd, Flin 
& Davies (1989). This system, known as FRAME, was developed in collaboration with the British 
Home Office. Faces are described on a number of dimensions in FRAME, some qualitative Uudges ' 
ratings), and some quantitative (anthropometric measurements). Witnesses provide a verbal 
description, which an operator codes, and a search is conducted, yielding the k most similar faces. 
Witness are free to identify a particular face, or to ask for the search to be moderated (by using the 
most similar face as the new 'key', or by redefining the search on specific features found on some of 
the k faces). The overall dimensions used in this system are: Overall shape of face; Complexion; 
Hair; Forehead; Eyebrows; Eyes; Ears; Nose; Mouth; Chin; Facial hair; Physical peculiarities; 
Accessories. Ratings on several sub-dimensions are also obtained. FRAME is shown in several 
studies to be effective: in particular, it is better than the usual 'mugshot album' searches on typical 
faces, but not on distinctive faces, where performance is roughly equivalent. The usefulness of this 
type of approach depends not so much on the use of descriptions, I suggest, as on the multi-
dimensional representational scheme. Indeed, the use of descriptions as dimensions is greatly . 
limiting, since each face needs to be rated by a sizeable number of judges, and the verbal nature of the 
descriptions must surely limit effectiveness. 
Physical measurements as dimensions 
A somewhat different approach to the problem of facial dimensions is the use of physical 
measurements. Burton, Bruce & Dench (1993), for example, investigated the ability of direct facial 
measurements to discriminate between male and female faces. Distances of various physical 
'features' were taken from photographs of faces, on straight line segments (therefore capturing only 
2
"" In fact, Harmon suggested several search strategies (e.g. binary searches, selection of probable subsets) and several 
measures (Euclidean, correlations). 
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two dimensional infonnation). A discriminant function analysis (DF A) was able to correctly classify 
about 85% of faces, in comparison to a baseline perfonnance of human subjects at about 96%. But 
misclassifications bore little resemblance to faces humans mistook, and Burton et al. concluded that 
the DF A did not constitute a good psychological model. A similar effort, with three dimensional 
measures derived from a laser scanning device, gave about the same perfonnance as the 2D DF A, but 
with fewer variables (6 instead of 12). When the 3D measures were combined with 2D measures, 
DF A results approximated that of human observers. 
Few attempts have been made to generalise this technique to the identification of individual faces , and 
where it has, the physical measurements have typically been combined with other infonnation (see the 
discussion of the FRAME system, above). 
Eigenvectors of intensity maps in the picture plane 
The most elegant solution to the ' dimensions problem', however, may lie in principal components 
analysis, or equivalently, in the auto-associative learning networks first described by Kohonen (1984). 
This approach has considerable practical advantages over those discussed above, and provides an 
appealing mathematical solution to the task of representing populations of faces, and not merely fixed 
sets. Since this is precisely the method to be explored empirically in later chapters, I will take 
considerable care to describe it accurately here. 
A face can be represented and recognised with considerable accuracy in two dimensions, as for 
example in a photograph. This is partly because photographs retain infonnation about the three 
dimensional fonn of faces (see Bruce, Hanna, Dench, Healey & Burton, 1992), and perhaps because 
the visual system is inherently adapted to the task of extracting three dimensional infonnation from 
two dimensional retinal images. All of the infonnation used by the visual system for face recognition 
purposes may be contained in projections of faces onto two dimensional surfaces like photographic 
emulsion. If we find a representational basis for these projections, it may serve as a heuristic 
cognitive model, and may also provide a metric for representing and comparing faces. The first of 
these concerns is not of immediate relevance to the thesis, but the second is. 
The starting point of the PCA approach245 is to conceptualize a digitized246 face image as a two 
dimensional A=MxN array of intensity values.247 An ensemble of images maps to a collection of 
m The account offered here is a synthesis of the approaches outlined at some length by Turk & Pentland ( 1991 ), Sirovich & 
Kirby (1987), and Kirby & Sirovich (1990). 
246 Kirby & Sirovich (1990) offer separate accounts for analogue and digital images; the differences are not especially 
significant. 
247 At the level of the analysis, this MxN array is concatenated with respect to rows, and treated as an RX! vector (where R = 
MxN). 
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points in this MxN space. Since face images will bear considerable resemblance to each other, this 
space will be relatively low-dimensional. PCA finds the vectors that generate this subspace. 
The ensemble of faces is r1, rz, r3, ... , r M· The average face of the set is 'I'=~ I:~ Each face 
differs from the average by the vector 4>i = ri-'I'. PCA requires that the face covariance matrix be 
fonned, but the dimensionality of the matrix is large,241 and the task of perfonning PCA on it is 
probably intractable (Sirovich & Kirby, 1987). However, for almost any particular set of face images, 
there will be fewer data points in the image space than the dimension of the space; there will only be 
k-1 meaningful eigenvectors rather than MxN of these (where k =number of images in the set). The 
task is therefore to first solve for eigenvectors of the MxN matrix, and then to take appropriate linear 
combinations of the images 4>i. This technique reduces to a) constructing the MxN matrix, L = Ar A, 
where Lmn= 4>m Tep"' and ii) finding the M eigenvectors, vi, of L (A = the face matrix). These 
M 
detennine the linear combinations of the M faces to fonn the 'eigenfaces' ui, ui = Iv <I>k. 
k•I (k 
Each face in the set of face images can then be represented as a set of co-ordinates on these 
eigenfaces, or axes: the face will be perfectly reconstructed as a sum of the co-ordinate-weighted 
eigenfaces, provided that all the eigenfaces are used. If only a subset of the eigenfaces is used, the 
face will be imperfectly reconstructed, although this reconstruction may still be very accurate. By 
way of example, Figures 5.7 and 5.8 present an ensemble of six faces, and the six eigenfaces derived 
from an application of this technique. 
For further details regarding the images, see Chapter 7, page 161 onwards. 
Figure 5. 7 Grey scale images offaces used in experiment I a 
241 Sirovich & Kirby ( 1987) suggest that the dimensionality will be MxN. 
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For further details regarding the principal component analysis, sec Chapter 7, page 161 onwards. 
Figure 5.8 Eigenfaces produced by PCA in experiment 1 a. 
The benefits of this approach to the task at hand are considerable. Four are worth singling out for 
discussion. 
The eigenfaces generated by the PCA allow the representation of the images in tenns of a common 
set of reference axes (the eigenfaces). Individual facial images are linear combinations of these 
eigenfaces. This is a direct implementation of the type of multidimensional model discussed earlier 
in the chapter. It also provides a solution to the problem of identifying the dimensions for such a 
model: the dimensions are just the eigenfaces identified by the PCA. Of course, there is no evidence 
that 'eigenfaces' are used in human face recognition, and it is perhaps unlikely that such a 
complicated mathematical procedure could have a cognitive analogue.249 
The multidimensional space generated by the eigenfaces has the associated advantage that well 
developed measures of spatial distance can immediately be used to detennine nearest neighbours, 
relative density around particular points, and a variety of other useful indices. I suggest that the 
similarity of two images in the space can be detennined by calculating a suitable distance measure, or 
by the dot product of the vectors representing the faces in the space. To some extent the identification 
of a suitable similarity measure is an empirical question, though, as one of the intentions is to develop 
a measure that corresponds reasonably closely to human perception of facial similarity. 
If we admit some acceptable degree of error into the representation of faces in the space, we can 
represent the set of faces with considerably fewer eigenfaces than there are faces in the set. Thus, 
249 This is arguable, though, since O'Toole & Thompson ( 1993) show that the PCA approach is mathematically equivalent in 
most respects to an auto-associative neural network model of face recognition. 
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Cameron & Craw ( 1991) argue that about 40 eigenfaces is adequate to represent 100 faces, with about 
5% error, and Kirby & Sirovich ( 1990) argue likewise. The amount of error that is acceptable here 
depends on the use to which the technique is to be put: O'Toole, Deffenbacher, Valentin & Abdi 
(1994 ), for example, argue that higher eigenfaces are important to rated distinctiveness and typicality 
of faces in the space. The relation of higher and lower dimensions to rated similarity is, again, an 
empirical matter, and will be explored in the research reported in later chapters. 
One of the most useful spin-offs of the PCA approach is the ability to represent faces which were not 
in the original set, with a measurable degree of error. A new face, F is projected into the space by the 
matrix product, uF, and the result is the vector of eigenface co-ordinates of the new face. Indeed, this 
projection is recommended by Sirovich & Kirby (1987) as the first step in measuring the 
representation 'error' inherent in a lower dimensional space: the projection is used to reconstruct the 
face, and this reconstruction is measured against the original. Initial results from Sirovich & Kirby 
(1987) and from Craw & Cameron (1991) suggest that such error is typically very low, and that a 
fairly small number of eigenfaces may be able to adequately represent an entire population of faces. 
Attractive as this approach appears, there are also several problems. In the first place, the approach 
unreasonably assumes the structural equivalence of images. Prior to analysis, images must be 
standardized, so that eyes in one image correspond in location to the eyes of other images - there 
would be no point in averaging ears and eyes, for example. 250 But faces are not structurally 
equivalent, and it is not possible to completely standardize the images prior to analysis by PCA. 
Figure 5.9 shows the 'blurring' that averaging incurs through the inevitable failure to completely 
standardize images. 
250 This objection is put more formally, and forcefully, by Craw & Cameron (1991 ), who point out that PCA assumes 
linearity, and that the axioms of linear systems demand that combinations of vectors in a linear subspace are again 
members of the subspace. In other words, the average image in a set of images must be a face, but this will not be the case 
unless images are structurally equivalent. An equally firm objection, apropos of another field of research, involving 
averages of pixel maps of faces, is lodged by Pittenger ( 1991 ), who points out that averages of three dimensional vectors 
are not equivalent to averages of the two dimensional projections of those vectors (but see a reply by Langlois & 
Roggman, 1991 ). 
The standardization of images is not only difficult to accomplish with respect to location in the raw image space, but also 
with respect to aspects such as facial expression, ambient lighting, lighting of the face, etc. However, the variation across 
faces on these latter variables would not be nearly as great as the variation between the standardized images themselves, 
and Sirovich and Kirby (1987) have shown that several of these variables do not severely affect matters. 
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The image is averaged over pixel values of six faces 
Figure 5.9 'Average' face, for face images shown in Figure 5.7. 
In practice, images are aligned so that the pupils match (i.e. the left and right pupils occupy the same 
spatial locations on each image251 ) . This ensures a cJose match of most faces. Craw & Cameron 
(1991 ) have outlined an alternate approach to the problem, which uses elements of the caricaturing 
method developed by Benson & Perrett (1991 a, 1991 b ). That is, fiducial points are defined for a 
' standard ' image, and triangular tesselations are created by joining certain of these points .252 Each 
face is then mapped onto this image, using bilinear interpolation, prior to the PCA. 
In a recent unpublished paper, Hancock, Burton & Bruce (1994) used both methods (i .e. PCA on 
'shape free ' images, and PCA on ' shaped ' images), and found a slight advantage for a combination of 
the ' shape free' and 'shaped ' methods in predicting context free familiarity . Differences were slight, 
however, and there appears to be little advantage in the modified approach formulated by Craw & 
Cameron ( 199 1 ). 
From a practical point of view, standardizing images is laborious (much more so in transforming 
images to 'shape free ' form) , albeit necessary. An algorithm to automate the standardization would 
be a useful addition: several moderately successful attempts have been reported (Bowns & Morgan, 
1993; Liu, Cheng, & Yang, 1993). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has surveyed a great deal of face recognition research, but the intention was not to 
provide a comprehensive review or evaluation. The aim was to raid this literature for a promising 
measure of fac ial similarity, and I suggest that the measure outlined in the final part of the discussion 
251 This involves scaling the images so that the inter-ocular distance is equal across all faces. An alternative technique is 
outl ined by O'Toole & Thompson (1993). 
252 
In practice, points are chosen on an a priori basis to represent the most important facial features (e.g. pupils, eyebrows, 
lips, etc), and the standard image is found by finding the mean location of these points across the set of faces . 
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is particularly promising. However, this thesis is in large part an empirical treatise, and later chapters 
will put the measure to the test. 
Despite this avowed pragmatism, several issues which were identified in the review of the face 
recognition literature are worth referring back to here. Each of these suggests that the PCA approach 
to measuring facial similarity may shed some light on more general theoretical issues. 
The dispute about whether face perception and recognition are featural or configural in nature appears 
to have resolved in favour of the configural· view (at least in large part). More important for present 
purposes, though, is the finding that configural information depends on the general nature of the 
category (see page 102): since the relevant category is the human face, we need to know something 
about populations of faces in order to understand how the information could be used. 
The formal face recognition models developed by Bruce and colleagues (see pages 104 and 108 
onwards) are a welcome advance over the atheoretical empiricism of the field in earlier decades, but 
both leave the notion of a 'visual front end' unexplored. More recently, Bruce (1994) has 
acknowledged the importance of understanding the statistical properties of images, and also that PCA 
may be helpful. In particular, the 'eigenfaces' of a PCA analysis may constitute the canonical code 
postulated in the Bruce & Young model as the basis for the operation of Face Recognition Units. 
One of the key propositions in Valentine's multidimensional model of face representation and 
recognition is that representations of out-group (or simply, less familiar) faces are 'less developed' 
than representations of in-group (or familiar) faces. The model does not detail how such a state of 
affairs could come about, but PCA (and particularly, its neural network formulation) provides an 
explanation. Components capture the statistical variation of faces, and groups of faces that are under-
represented in the face space will be represented by fewer components (hence, less accurately). 
These are incentives for further research rather than pointers to later chapters. In the rest of the thesis 
- that is, after Chapter 6 - I will concentrate on the validation of a PCA-based measure of facial 
similarity, and the application of such a measure to identification parades. 
~Statistical Inference on Measures of 
Lineup fairness ~ 
Introduction 
In Chapter 4, I reviewed research on identification parades and showed that psychologists have 
been active. In particular, legal psychologists have contributed an especially valuable corpus of 
research which concerns the development and evaluation of measures of lineup fairness. 
Measures proposed thus far are usually of a descriptive nature, and little has been written about 
their inferential use. In this chapter I investigate some commonly used measures, and suggest 
ways in which inferential statistical considerations may improve their usefulness. My approach 
will be to trace the development of measures of fairness chronologically, and to raise statistical 
considerations in relation to each measure. I argue that it is important to develop ways of 
reasoning inferentially about the measures, and I show a few consequences of not doing so. As 
I reviewed these measures in an earlier chapter, some of the descriptions here are repetitions of 
the earlier material. In particular, many of the tables in the earlier chapter re-appear here to add 
clarity to the discussion. 
Departure from expected values 
In Chapter 4 I noted that recent psychological interest in measures of lineup fairness appears to 
stem from an experiment conducted by Doob & Kirshenbaum (1973). The experiment tested a 
police lineup used in a Canadian case for fairness. In the part of the experiment which is of 
interest in this chapter, Doob & Kirshenbaum showed a photograph of the identification parade 
- to 23 'mock witnesses' (witnesses who had not been present at the original crime), along with 
the 'description' of the suspect given to police by the witness. They reasoned that subjects who 
had not been present at the crime should not be able to identify the suspect with a probability 
exceeding that expected on the basis of random selection (1/number of lineup members= 1/12 
= 0.083). 64% of the witnesses correctly identified the suspect. Doob & Kirshenbaum reported 
that the probability of this occurring is less than 0.001, and concluded that the lineup was 
biased. 
Doob & Kirshenbaum suggested that this method - which has come to be known as the method 
of the mock witness - could be used in general to assess the fairness of identification parades. 
The method posits that a lineup is fair when the proportion of witnesses choosing the suspect 
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does not exceed that expected on the basis of mere random choice. Doob & Kirshenbaum report a 
probability value to support the conclusion they make in their study, but they do not recommend a 
general method for determining when the proportion exceeds that expected on the basis of random 
choice. I suggest that the following conceptualization provides a suitable probability model of 
random witness choice, and can be used to evaluate the proportion of suspect identifications against a 
suitable null hypothesis. 
There are N mock witnesses, and there are k lineup members. The probability that a witness 
will choose the suspect, given that the choice is made randomly, will be Ilk. We assume that 
witnesses choose independently of each other. Then each individual witness choice can be 
thought of as a Bernoulli trial, with probability of success = Ilk. The number of trials, q, in 
which a successful choice is made will take the Binomial probability distribution, i.e. the 
number of correct identifications will be distributed as (1) below 
(1) 
The cumulative distribution of q will take the form of the cumulative binomial distribution, i.e. (2) 
below 
(2) 
The cumulative distribution gives the probability that 1 witness, or 2 witnesses, or 3, ..... , or t 
identified the suspect just by chance. 
For Doob & Kirshenbaum's experiment, where 11 out of 21 mock witnesses identified the suspect, the 
-7 
exact probability that this occurred is 1.96 x 10 , and the probability that 11 or more of the mock 
-7 
witnesses identified the suspect is 2.15 x 10 . This value is very small, and indicates the low 
likelihood of 11 correct random choices. 
The calculated values in (1) and (2) can, of course, always be compared to a conventionally agreed 
upon 'level of significance', but the exact probability is more informative. Both distributions are 
available as functions in many commercially available software packages. 
In Table 6.1, frequencies are reported for several hypothetical lineup configurations, and probabilities 
calculated under ( 1) clearly reflect the bias against the suspect in each. 
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Lineup Member 
1 2 3 4* 5 6 Probabili!,l: 
a 6 4 7 30 9 4 3.62xl0·9 
b 8 9 8 10 9 6 0.12 
c 3 4 10 0.0005 
•=suspect 
Table 6.1 Suspect identification probabilities in a number of hypothetical lineups.253 
There are other methods of evaluating the number of accurate identifications made by mock 
witnesses. Malpass & Devine (1983), and Buckhout, Rabinowitz, Alfonso, Kanellis & Anderson 
(1988), for example, use a one-sample z-test to compare the observed proportion of correct witness 
choices to that expected under an equiprobability model.254 It is a simple enough task, but it relies on 
the fact that the normal distribution is the limiting distribution of the binomial: the approximation is 
good for large samples, but may not be very good for small samples, especially when the parameter 
Ilk is small. In mock witness experiments one, or both, of these conditions may not be true: Doob & 
Kirshenbaum, for example, used 21 subjects, and there were 12 lineup members (i.e. 1/k = 0.083). I 
suggest that, in most cases, it is better to use ( 1) above to evaluate the rate at which mock witnesses 
identify the suspect. It yields an exact probability estimate, and the underlying probability model 
accurately represents the nature of the mock witness task. 
But there is a more general disagreement with the z-test comparison, which applies equally to the 
method suggested in (1) above. Wells, Leippe & Ostrom (1979) argue that the z-test of equivalence 
used by some researchers to compare the proportions of identifications suffers from a dependency on 
sample size. In order to conclude that a lineup is biased, researchers would simply need to obtain a 
sufficiently large sample and conduct a mock witness evaluation of the lineup. Consequently, we 
need to view claims of bias. supported by mock witness tasks with extreme caution. This argument is 
correct, but it applies to almost all instances of significance testing, and not merely to significance test 
evaluation of lineups. The appropriate use of the mock witness task is dependent on the good 
judgement of the researchers who apply it, and this is most certainly true of any inferential statistical 
procedure. 
The model outlined m ( 1) accurately represents a lineup task in which witnesses are choosing 
randomly. For this reason, I argue that it is a suitable model for the null distribution in the mock 
253 Data in this table are presented under the assumption that the 'not present' option was unavailable in the lineup tasks. This 
does not materially alter the calculation of the probability. 
254 Several other methods are possible: one equivalent would be to treat a standardized residual detennined from a Chi-square 
goodness-of-fit procedure as a nonnal deviate. 
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witness task. It is unlikely, however, that it will accurately represent choosing patterns in particular 
mock witness tasks, or in real situations, since in both cases witnesses possess specific information 
about the identity of the perpetrator, and will not choose randomly. Navon ( 1990a, I 990b ), apropos 
of a related issue, argues for a conceptualization that views identification decisions as conditional on 
the similarity of foils to information possessed by witnesses regarding the identity of the suspect. He 
argues that the correct method is to determine how likely a random match would be of the perpetrator 
and an innocent person whose features resemble those of the perpetrator. This probability can be 
expressed as p(idslrst > r0 and N=n).m Its successful calculation requires estimation of population 
parameters of physical similarity, and it reduces to the expression given by (1) once the size of the 
sub-population that meets the similarity requirement is known. This is an interesting approach, but I 
am not in complete agreement with it: in particular, I think that the task of setting a cut-off point for 
physical resemblance invites vagaries, and fails to take into account that even a small degree of 
resemblance may influence the probability of an identification. 
Functional and Nominal size 
The intention of Doob & Kirshenbaum's study was to provide a measure of lineup fairness. 
Information regarding lineup fairness is provided to some extent by the proportion of accurate mock 
witness choices, but it is certainly not complete. An important additional feature of a lineup appears 
to be the number of plausible foils that it contains. 
Wells, Leippe & Ostrom (1979) coined the term 'functional size' to deal with this type of situation: 
functional size is intended to provide an index of the number of plausible lineup members, and is 
therefore also a measure of lineup fairness. The measure relies on the mock witness task introduced 
by Doob & Kirshenbaum, but avoids certain problems encountered by Doob & Kirshenbaum's 
procedure for evaluating fairness when 'null' and 'perfect' foils are present in the lineup. These 
problems were discussed in Chapter 4 (page 66 onwards). Wells et al. suggest an alternate measure, 
which attempts to avoid some of the problems. The measure is defined as DIN (where D is the 
number of mock witnesses who choose the defendant, and N is the total number of mock witnesses), 
and represents the proportion of mock witnesses who identify the suspect. It is insensitive to the 
problem of null and perfect foils, and Wells et al. suggest that the measure has a useful interpretation 
when transformed to its reciprocal (NID), which is the number of functional members of a lineup, 
hence the term 'functional size'. It is this index that they suggest as a measure of lineup fairness. A 
2j
5 Ids = identification; r st is the resemblance between the subject and the target (perpetrator), r 0 is the lower bound of the 
similarity that can be inferred from the lineup, and n is the size of the population with members who meet the resemblance 
criterion. 
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lineup is fair when the 'functional size' and the 'nominal size' are identical. In the hypothetical lineups 
d and e of Table 6.2,256 which represent lineups with clearly divergent numbers of plausible foils, 
functional size is 2 and 6 respectively, and this difference corresponds quite well to the apparent 
difference in fairness of the lineups. 
Lineup Member 
1 2 3 4* 5 6 Not Functional 
Present Size 
d 5 3 6 30 9 3 4 2 
e 8 9 8 10 9 9 7 6 
f I 3 20 10 21 4 I 6 
•=suspect. 
Table 6.2 Functional size in a number of hypothetical lineups. 
Malpass (1981) has convincingly argued that the statistic suggested by Wells et al. does not provide 
an index of the 'size' of the lineup. The measure of 'functional size' depends only on the proportion 
of accurate mock witness identifications, and takes no account of the distribution of identifications 
across the foils. It is possible for the functional size of a lineup to be identical to its nominal size and 
for the distribution of identifications to exhibit a clearly different picture about the number of 
plausible foils. Lineup f of Table 6.2 is one example (the functional size of the lineup is 6, suggesting 
6 plausible lineup members),257 and it is easy to imagine many others. Indeed, the only type of 
situation in which DIN will give a reasonable indication of the number of plausible foils may be when 
the distribution of identifications is nearly uniform, as is the case in lineup e of Table 6.2. 
Nevertheless, Wells et al.'s measure of functional size is useful under certain circumstances, and is 
quite widely used in lineup research. It is worth considering how to reason inferentially about it. The 
measure is identical in an important respect to that suggested by Doob & Kirshenbaum. Doob & 
Kirshenbaum think that the difference between the observed and expected proportions of accurate 
mock witness identifications is the critical index, but Wells et al. think that the critical index is simply 
the observed proportion of accurate identifications (and its reciprocal). The statistical considerations 
outlined in (1) above therefore also apply to the measure advanced by Wells et al. In particular, I 
suggest that the most appropriate way to apply inferential reasoning here is to express the observed 
proportion of accurate identifications as a confidence interval, and then to take reciprocals of the 
256 Note that this tabie also appears in Chapter 4: as indicated in the introduction to the present chapter, several of the tables 
of Chapter 4 are repeated here for ease of presentation and discussion. 
257 This particular distribution of lineup identifications is not as unlikely as it may seem. There are several reported instances 
of mock witness trials where foils have drawn more identifications than the suspect (cf. Buckhout, Rabinowitz, Alfonso, 
Kanellis & Anderson, 1988). 
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endpoints in order to express the interval in tenns of so-called functional size. I will discuss two 
methods of detennining a confidence interval. The first method, (3) below, is well known, relies on 
approximation theorems, and is appropriate for large samples. 
' 
D ±Z .. iD(N-D) 
N T N3 
Z is a standard nonnal deviate chosen according to the desired level of confidence, oc, and the 
other tenns are as defined in the discussion above.m 
(3) 
The second method, (4) below,259 improves the approximation at the cost of some computational 
effort. 
D(t- D) l N N Z2 ----+--
N 4N2 
(4) 
Equation (4) gives an approximate 100(1-cx) percent confidence interval for DIN. An interval for 
functional size can be obtained in turn by taking the reciprocals of the endpoints.260 
In lineup e of Table 6.2, 0.17 of the mock witnesses identified the defendant (i.e. functional size is 6), 
and the 95% confidence intervals around this value calculated under (3) and (4) above are (0.07; 
0.26), and (0.1 O; 0.28) respectively. Taking the reciprocals of the endpoints gives intervals of (3.9; 
14.3) and (3.57; 10). A larger sample would have narrowed these interval estimates considerably: 
indeed, the upper endpoints are impossible outcomes! (This is a failure which is attributable not to 
the interval estimation, but to the measure itself. Whenever a suspect is chosen at rates lower than 
expectation, functional size will be greater than the number of lineup members). The range of the 
interval indicates the importance of reasoning inferentially about functional size. An estimate of . 
functional size which is derived from a relatively small sample of mock witnesses should not, in my 
opinion, be accorded the same weight as one derived from a much larger sample. Confidence 
intervals incorporate just such a corrective weighting. In the absence of inferential reasoning of this 
kind, a particular estimate of functional size has uncertain meaning and must be of limited value. 
m It is customary to distinguish population parameters and sample estimates of the parameters at the level of notation. I do 
not follow this convention on a systematic basis in this chapter; I do so only where it facilitates the clarity of the 
discussion. In most instances the usage I mean will be clear from the context. 
259 This correction is discussed by several authors; see Hays (1994 ), for example. 
260 Rick Gonzalez, of University of Washington, reviewed a draft of this chapter, and noted in correspondence that the 
transformation to reciprocals may result in biased intervals. He suggests an alternative technique, which is to determine 
the interval as ( + - E', + + E' ), where E! is defined with respect to the standard error of .l.P. • He has identified a p p 
potential estimator for this standard error, but this will not be detailed here. He agrees, however, that both the method he 
suggests, and that outlined in this chapter, will work increasingly well with increasing N. 
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Telling a jury that the functional size of lineup e in Table 6.2 is 6 without at the same time giving an 
indication of the error of estimate i~ not completely honest testimony. 
·Effective Size and Defendant Bias 
Malpass (1981; Malpass & Devine, 1983), has provided a thorough analysis of the contributions made 
by Doob & Kirshenbaum and Wells et al. to the measurement of lineup fairness. In his analysis he 
argues for a distinction between lineup size and lineup bias. Lineup size refers to the number of 
plausible members that the lineup contains, and it contributes directly to the fairness of the lineup by 
decreasing the probability that the defendant is identified by a witness who wilfully chooses at 
random. Lineup bias, on the other hand, is the extent to which mock witnesses choose the defendant 
at rates greater (or smaller) than chance expectation. Because both these components contribute to 
the fairness of a lineup, a measure of each is required. 
The first measure to be considered is what Malpass calls 'effective size', which is close in meaning to 
the measure of functional size. In order to evaluate a lineup, Malpass argues, the critical thing to 
know is how many plausible foils it contains. Although Wells' measure of functional size attempts to 
estimate this quantity, it has several faults. Malpass suggests an alternative measure to functional 
size, 'effective size': 
Effective size = ka - t IO; - eal 
i=I 2ea 
where oi = the (observed) number of mock witnesses who choose lineup member i; ea = the adjusted 
nominal chance expectation (N•[Ilk3]); ka = the adjusted nominal number of alternatives in the lineup 
(original number - number of null foils). 261 
The intent of the measure is to reduce the size of the lineup from a (corrected) nominal starting value 
by the degree to which members are, in sum, chosen below the level of chance expectation. As is 
clear from the formula, the absolute value of .the difference between observed and expected values is 
taken,262 and the sum is divided by 2, in order that the calculation reflect the sum of differences where 
oi - ei < 0. (Malpass reaso~s that the important departures are those below chance expectation, since 
lineup members who fail to draw identifications are poor foils). 
The idea behind the measure of effective size is interesting, and importantly, it attempts to use 
information regarding the distribution of identifications across the lineup, which is necessary if we are 
261 The notation used here differs slightly from that given by Malpass ( 1981 ), in order to remain consistent with notation used 
earlier in this chapter. 
•
262 Since the sum of signed first order differences is zero. Squaring the differences is an alternate method. 
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to say something about the overall constitution of the lineup. However, there are several features 
which seem a bit problematic. 
The first is the assumption that null foils are totally implausible - indeed, non-members of the lineup. 
This is not the case. Null foils have a positive probability of occurring, especially when the number 
of lineup members . is large, and the sample of mock witnesses relatively small. In Doob & 
Kirshenbaum's experiment, for example, there were 12 lineup members, and 21 witnesses. From (1), 
we can show that the probability that a particular lineup member will be a null foil is263 
The probability that there will be exactly one null foil (which could be any of those constituting the 
lineup) should also be considered, and can be calculated with repeated applications of the binomial 
theorem 
( )
21 ll 21 
1;2 * I1(1-(ii) ) = 0.28 
1•2 
Finally, the probability that there will be at least one null foil should be determined for sake of 
completing the argument. To do this we calculate the probability that there are 1, or 2, or ... , j, ... ,or 
12, null foils in a 12 member lineup: 
12 [ ( )21 12 21 ] 
~ j H lJ(1-(H) ) = o.31 
Clearly, the assumption that a null foil warrants discarding from a calculation of effective size must 
be viewed with some scepticism. Null foils have a good chance of appearing in distributions of 
identifications obtained with the mock witness task. The chances are smaller when larger samples of 
mock witnesses are used, but are only negligible when these are very large. For example, if we 
assume that Doob & Kirshenbaum used 50 subjects, the probability of obtaining at least one null foil 
shrinks to 0.12, but to reduce this to say, 0.01 would require a sample closer to 100 subjects. Null 
foils should not simply be dismissed from calculations of lineup size since they may occur with 
appreciable probability. I suggest revising the definition of effective size to include null foils, i.e. 
__ k _ +10;-el 
Effective size L..J 
i=I 2e 
(5) 
263 This calculation assumes for convenience that choosing a particular foil consitutes a successful trial, and that choosing 
any other member of the lineup constitutes a failure. 
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The assumption underlying the notion of effective size is an appealing one. One or more of the foils 
in a lineup may present an inadequate test of a witness who has little more than only very general 
knowledge of the appearance of the offender, and we shouldn't take the ability of a witness to reject 
such foils very seriously. The calculation of effective size acts on the assumption by reducing the 
nominal size of the lineup as a function of the departure of proportionate identification of individual 
foils from th~t expected by an equiprobability model. 
For many distributions of identifications the measure does seem to give an indication of the number of 







1 2 3 4* S 6 E3 Eb 
0 25 5 25 3 2 2.83 3.00 
10 10 9 10 l l 10 5.90 5.90 
l 0 12 12 0 11 3.17 3.17 
7 7 7 24 8 7 4.60 4.60 
12 6 9 13 14 6 5.10 5.10 
6 19 . 3 20 8 10 4.45 4.45 
E, = effective size calculated with adjustment for null foils. 
Eb= effective size calculated without adjustment for null foils. 
•=suspect 
Table 6.3 Effective size in a number of hypothetical lineups. 
However, the measure also produces estimates that seem intuitively at odds with visual inspection of 
particular lineup distributions. In lineup j of Table 6.2, for example, effective size is 4.6. It is 
difficult to see what this means: clearly, foils are drawing identifications at a rate close to the 
expected value, it is just that one lineup member is drawing far more identifications than expected 
(indeed, is chosen by 40% of the witnesses). If this foil happens to be the suspect, it is difficult to see 
that a conjectured effective size of 4.6 has the meaning that is intended: a mock witness, armed with 
only superficial knowledge of the physical identity of the perpetrator, does not have a 0.22 (i.e. 
I/effective size) chance of identifying the suspect, but indeed, is more likely to succeed closer to half 
the time. The foils are not plausible, even though they are chosen at a level fairly close to 
expectation. It is possible, of course, to argue - in defence of the measure - that lineup size and lineup 
bias are conceptually distinct and that bias can be ascertained separately. But it is then difficult to 
understand what meanin~ the notion of effective size has, because it doesn't seem to estimate the 
number of plausible foils. 
In particular, when there are several near-null foils, and there is no bias against the suspect, the 
I 
measure gives a reasonable indication of the effective number of lineup members, but when the 
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distribution is less uniform, the measure is difficult to interpret. Lineups j, k and I in Table 6.2 show 
this to be the case: it is difficult in each case to see that the calculation gives a good indication of the 
plausible number of foils. 
The problem may be that the notion of 'effective size' inherently suggests that only a discrete number 
of foils are plausible alternates to the suspect - there can hardly be exactly 3.2 plausible foils in a five 
member lineup! The question of plausibility must surely be one of degree. Particular effective size 
estimates only seem really convincing in cases where i) a nearly uniform distribution of mock witness 
choices exists, or ii) certain foils are chosen at near-zero rates. Although the structure of the lineup 
appears to invite discrete-scale reasoning, it may be fruitful to think in terms of continuous variation 
of plausibility. In this sense the proportion of mock witness choices that each lineup member attracts 
serves as the best estimate of plausibility. 
For this reason I suggest that re~earchers using the mock witness task should routinely consider the 
administration of a goodness of tit test, where the observed proportions are evaluated against the 
proportions expected under an assumption of equiprobability. This would give an indication of the 
reliability of the departure of the distribution of lineup choices from uniformity. A Pearson x2 
goodness of fit test on a hypothetical lineup is reported below in Table 6.4 for purposes of 
demonstration (a likelihood ratio x2 test could also be used). 
Lineup Member 
l 2 3 4* 5 6 
Observed freq. 3 10 17 23 9 22 
Expected freq. 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Residual -11 -4 3 9 -5 8 
Std. Residual -3.21 -1.17 0.88 2.63 -1.46 2.33 
-x.2 = 22.57: df= 5; p < .01 •=suspect 
Table 6.4 Hypothetical lineup demonstrating goodness-of-fit test 
Standardized residuals presented in the last row can be used to assess the extent to which different 
foils are chosen at levels below (or above) expectation. These take an approximately normal 
distribution (the approximation is much better for large samples). 
The goodness of fit test outlined above evaluates a complex null hypothesis. Any of a large number 
of possible departures from a uniform distribution of witness choices may lead to rejection of the 
hypothesis. Its utility is therefore limited. It may be more useful for eyewitness researchers to 
construct a confidence interval around estimates of effective size, notwithstanding the reservations 
regarding the interpretation of the measure, which I expressed earlier. 
Chapter 6 Statistical inference on lineup measures 
Unfortunately, both the measure of effective size suggested by Malpass (1981) and the modification 
to the measure suggested in (5) do not easily lend themselves to known inferential methods,264 and I 
am unable to make suggestions particular to the measures. 
There are alternate strategies. The rationale of the effective size measure is to reduce the nominal size 
of the lineup in proportion to the deviation of the observed frequencies from expectation .. A related 
measure, with a similar rationale, is the "index of diversity" (!), and its standardized form, the "index 
of qualitative variation" (Q) (Agresti & Agresti, 1978). The measures compute the variation in a one 
dimensional array of frequencies. 
k ( O; )2 !=t-I -
i=I N 
(6) 
k [ k ( O· )2"'J Q=-=- I-I_, 
k 1 i=I N 
(7) 
k, N and Oi are all as defined earlier. 
I varies between 0 and kkl , and Q is standardized to vary between 0 and 1. The measures are at a 
minimum when one array item attracts all the available responses (i.e. all mock witnesses choose one 
lineup member), and at a maximum when responses are equally distributed over array items. 
Agresti and Agresti (1978) have shown how the measures 1 and Q can be used inferentially, and I 
suggest methods whereby their results are used to find confidence intervals for estimates of the 
'effective size' of lineups, and to test for differences between independent estimates of 'effective size'. 
The variance of! can be estimated by 
(8) 
264 In particular, the use of the modulus seems to render the measures intractable. It can be shown that the size of the 
measures will depend on the number of observed frequencies below expectation, i.e. 
k jo;-el . k k 
k - I-=1+-Io; 
i=I 2e N i= J+• 
where j = the number of foils chosen at rates equal or below expectation, and other terms are as previously defined . 
• 
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A large sample265 100(1-a.) percent confidence intetval for! can be estimated by 
(9) 
Similarly, a large sample 100(1-a.) percent confidence interval for the difference between two 
independent !'s can be estimated by 
(10) 
This interval can also be used to test the hypothesis that the values of! differ (the null hypothesis is 
rejected if the interval contains 0). 
The notion of effective size rests 'Jn an interpretative strategy: deviation from a uniform distribution is 
interpreted to mean that fewer than k plausible foils constitute the lineup. Whereas Malpass' original 
formulation of effective size and the modified form set out in equation (5) attempt to estimate this 
directly from the departure of the distribution from uniformity, I suggest that a similar interpretation 
can be achieved by determining the values of !266 that correspond to the presence of m foils in a lineup 
with k members. 
Imagine that a k member lineup has 1, 2, ... , or m plausible members (m .s k}, and that only these 
members draw witness choices. Assume further that witness choices are equally distributed across the 
plausible members. Now we want to calculate values of! for each of the k lineup configurations. We 
can show that this will be the arithmetic sequence267 { : 1 }:, Table 6.5 shows the possible values of! 
for all possible numbers of plausible foils in lineups varying in nominal size between 1and12. 
Number of plausible foils 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
I 0 .SO .6667 .750 .80 .8333 .8571 .8750 .8889 .90 .9091 .9167 
Lineups share initial sequences, so it is unnecessary to present values for different lineup sizes: to find the value of ! 
corresponding to the number of plausible foils, for any size of lineup, simply read off the value. The series converges to 1 for 
large values ofk. It is important to round to several digits for accuracy, increasingly so with larger values ofk. 
Table 6.5 Possible values ofl for lineups varying in nominal size, and in number of plausible foils. 
265 Agresti et al. contend that the approximation will be good for even moderate sample sizes, provided none of the observed 
frequencies approaches N. 
266 I restrict myself here to the measure L for sake of convenience. A similar argument can be made for Q. 
m I l m-1 267 Under the restrictive assumptions, ! = l - L - = 1- - = -
i=lm2 m m 
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Thus, a calculated value for! of 0.8 would be interpreted to mean that there are 5 plausible foils in the 
lineup used for the calculation. Interpretation can be made a little easier by transforming calculated 
values of! directly to 'effective size', i.e . 
. 'E'=-1- (11 )263 
1-1 
We can make this interpretation a little more rigorous, I suggest, by calculating confidence intervals 
around point estimates of! and transfonning upper and lower bounds to reflect effective size. Table 
6.6 presents point and interval estimates of! and effective size ('E') for a hypothetical lineup. 
Lineup Member 
1 2 3 4* 5 I 'E' 







U er bound 
Table 6.6 Point and 95% confidence interval estimates ofl and 'E' in a hypothetical lineup. 
The confidence intervals provide probabilistic evidence for the proposition that there were fewer than 
5 plausible lineup members. It is interesting to note that the estimate of effective size under equation 
(5) is 3.65, which is very close to the point estimate in Table 6.6, although this needs further 
exploration if we are to take 'E' seriously as an approximation of the fonnulations of effective size set 
out earlier. The application of probabilistic reasoning to measures of effective size is important, 
though, regardless of the precision of the approximation. In line with the argument made earlier 
apropos of functional size, I suggest that it may be misleading to simply present jurors (or any other 
interested party) with a point estimate of effective size, because mock witness identifications are 
inherently prone to sampling variation, and so, therefore, are measures of effective size. A confidence 
interval presents the evidence in a more satisfactory manner. 
Defendant bias 
Malpass (1981) points out that effective size does not provide a measure of bias towards the suspect, 
but an estimate of the number of plausible foils present in a lineup. Thus, it is possible for a suspect 
to participate in an unbiased lineup of very small effective size. Imagine that only three members 
263 Values of I in Table 5 are calculated by assuming a hypothetical 'effective size' i.e. I = m,;;I . The reciprocal of this -
given above as ( 11) - therefore transforms I back to hypothetical 'effective size'. 
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(including the suspect) of a ten member parade are plausible choices. If the suspect is chosen by 
mock witnesses with a probability of 113, there is no bias toward the suspect, despite the large number 
of redundant foils. We should not reject this lineup because of the differential probability of 
successfully choosing the suspect, but rather because of the increased risk that the suspect will be 
chosen at random from the lineup with three effective members (i.e. at a rate of oj per identification). 
Bias towards (or against) the suspect is another matter. Malpass advises that, in principle, we follow 
Doob & Kirshenbaum's method, which was described earlier. Here bias is equated with the departure 
of the proportion of suspect identifications from that expected under an assumption of 
equiprobability. He suggests that the 'size' of the lineup is better estimated by the calculation of 
'effective size', which I discussed at some length immediately above. Thus, defendant bias will be 
measured by departures of the suspect identification probability from 11[ effective size of lineup]. The 
idea here is that the likelihood of being selected randomly by a witness is less a function of the mere 
size of the lineup than a function of the number of plausible foils present in the lineup. 
I expressed reservations about the definition of effective size earlier, so I won't repeat them here. I 
simply pause to suggest that the re-definitions offered in (5), and (11) be used in calculations of 
defendant bias. 
Percentage below expectation 
Malpass & Devine (1983) also suggest a method for evaluating the suitability of individual foils, 
which is closely related in principle to the measure of effective size. The critical datum for evaluating 
the suitability of an individual foil, Malpass & Devine suggest, is the extent to which the foil is 
chosen below chance expectation in a mock witness task. Thus, if foil I is chosen from a ten member 
lineup with some low probability, this would suggest that the foil does not adequately represent the 
description given to the police by the eyewitness. (The question of the extent of departure from 
chance expectation is a thorny one. Malpass & Devine suggest leaving the decision to the fact 
finders). 
An alternative approach to measuring parade fairness would then be to set a minimum size criterion, 
and to determine whether the parade meets the minimum size (the estimate of size would be 
determined by including only plausible foils - and the suspect - in the total). This approach would 
apparently be intuitively appealing to lawyers and judges. 
I suggest here that decisions about whether an individual foil meets some minimum identification 
criterion should be made in terms of the probability model underlying the nature of the mock witness 
task, outlined in (I) above. This is an important consideration, since we can reasonably anticipate 
considerable departures from expected rates of identification, especially when relatively small 
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samples are used. For example; imagine that we use a lineup with 10 members, a sample of 30 mock 
witnesses, and a minimum criterion size of 67%. Then we can apply the cumulative binomial 
distribution outlined in (2) to detennine the probability that any particular foil is chosen at a rate 
below 0.67 of chance expectation269 : 
2 (30) 
' I i 9 30- i ~ i (10) (10) =0.41 
This is a very high probability, and only a large increase in sample size will reduce it to an acceptably 
low level. A sample size of 100, for example, will reduce this probability to 0.01. But note that this 
is only the probability that a particular foil is chosen at a rate below 0.67 of expectation, and the 
p~obability that at least one foil i!. chosen at such a rate will be higher. 
I therefore suggest that it would be inappropriate to simply disregard foils chosen at rates below some 
minimum criterion. A better method may be to construct confidence intervals around the observed 
proportion of identifications that each foil receives, and to apply the 'minimum criterion' test to the 
endpoint(s) of the intervals. This would have the benefit of attaching some level of probabilistic 
confidence to any decisions taken about the plausibility of foils. Methods for constructing intervals 
for both small and large sample cases are presented earlier in this chapter i.e. see (3) and ( 4) above. 
Since intervals would need to be constructed for each foil, it is worth considering some correction for 
a potential increase in the Type I error rate. A Bonferroni type correction, setting a.' = alk, is an 
obvious but conservative ~hoice. Table 6.6 provides intervals for a hypothetical mock witness 
response to a lineup array, without correction for a potentially increased Type 1 error rate. Two 
members of the lineup have intervals that fall completely below the expected proportion of choices, 
and in the case of one of these the interval falls completely below even 50% of expectation. By the 
preceding argument we should conclude that two of the foils attract too few mock witness choices to 
be considered plausible. 
269 This calculation assumes for convenience that choosing a particular foil consitutes a successful trial, and that choosing 
any other member of the lineup constitutes a failure. 
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Lineup Member 
1 2 3 4* 5 
Observed 3 24 30 33 10 
Lower bound 0.00 0.16 0.21 0.24 0.04 
Upper bound 0.06 0.32 0.39 0.42 0.16 
• = suspect. Expected proportion is 0.20 
Table 6.7 Interval estimates of foil identification proportions in a hypothetical lineup. 
We could also have conducted a goodness of fit test, as demonstrated in Table 6.4 above, and used the 
standardized residuals to evaluate the extent to which foils were under-chosen by mock witnesses. 
Estimation of intervals seems a more satisfactory method, though, since it is closer to the original 
metric. 
Lineup Size and Lineup Bias 
Malpass & Devine (1983) argue for a conceptual distinction between 'lineup size' and 'lineup bias', 
and the measures they suggest reflect this distinction. However, they also argue that these measures 
will often be empirically dependent. If an implausible foil fails to attract identifications, the size of 
the lineup is automatically reduced. If these identifications are randomly distributed over the 
remaining lineup members bias will be unaffected, but if the identifications are disproportionately 
distributed, bias will be affected. They suggest that a similar argument can be made for the case 
where bias is increased: changes in size will depend on whether the other lineup members 'lose' 
identifications proportionately. 
The case for the dependency of lineup size and lineup bias is compelling, but primarily because the 
measures are partly confounded in their definitions. A lineup is biased to the extent that observed 
frequencies depart from expectation (usually calculated only for suspect identifications), and a line-
up's effective size departs from its nominal size to the extent that observed frequencies are lower than 
expectation. It follows that suspect identifications occurring below expected levels must lead to 
estimates of effective size that are lower than nominal size. 
I have no clear answer to this problem. I think that it stems from two deeply rooted assumptions, and 
that the assumptions may need careful examination. In the first place, as I noted earlier, foil 
plausibility is generally assumed to be an all-or-none state. Thus, a lineup with an effective size of 4 
is interpreted to mean that there were 4 plausible foils in the lineup. In the second place, mock 
witness choices are assumed to be random with respect to plausible foils. This assumption underlies 
much of the reasoning around lineup measures. 
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These assumptions are useful, and allow relatively easily executed tests of a line-up's worth. They 
also limit the way in which we evaluate lineups, and they lead, as we have seen, to interpretative 
difficulties. 
I do not have carefully thought out alternatives to offer here, and can only point to the possible 
benefits of adopting two different assumptions. If plausibility is not viewed as an all-or-none state, 
but as continuously varying, then it makes better sense to evaluate foils for their degree of plausibility. 
The degree of plausibility is the extent to which foils fit the description of the perpetrator. In the case 
of the second assumption, we could relinquish the idea that we should view mock witness choice as 
random with respect to plausible foils, and think instead of foil identification proportions as estimates 
of foil plausibility. The proportion of mock witnesses identifying a foil could be thought of as an 
estimate of the degree of resemblance between the foil and the perpetrator, conditional on the 
resemblance the other foils bear to the perpetrator. 
These revised assumptions have the benefit of unconfounding lineup size and lineup bias, but I am not 
sure how they could be implemented for practical benefit. 
'· 
Diagnosticity and Informativeness 
Despite the fact that the lineup has been used now for at least 100 years, its explicit purpose has rarely 
been carefully examined by courts. Some commentators assert that a lineup primarily provides 
protection against the suggestiveness inherent in other methods of identification such as a direct face-
to-face confrontation between the witness and suspect (Devlin, 1976).270 But what will the witness's 
positive identification show in such a situation? Will it show that the witness is reliable, and that the 
details of his/her testimony can therefore be taken seriously? Or will it provide direct evidence 
against the suspect, in the sense that it increases the (perceived) probability that the suspect is guilty? 
Both of these aims are built into the structure of the lineup. The witness is asked to i~dicate the 
perpetrator211 from a number of 'foils', who are known to be innocent of the deed in question. If the 
witness identifies one of the foils, his/her evidence regarding the identity of the perpetrator is 
considered less reliable than it would otherwise. The identification parade clearly serves on the one 
hand as a check on witness reliability. Yet, a positive identification is also taken as evidence against 
the suspect: indeed, the courts are at great pains to ensure that the identification at a parade constitutes 
270 It is worth noting here the recent research by Gonzalez, Ellsworth, and Pembroke (1993), which points out that no-one 
has ever provided empirical substantiation of this claim. Indeed, in several experiments conducted by Gonzalez et al. 
showups had a lower degree of response bias than lineups. 
271 Typically, the witness is also warned that the perpetrator may not be in the parade. In South Africa, for example, if a 
witness participating in a parade is not told this, then the parade will usually be considered irregular (Hoffman & Zefertt,' 
1989). 
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an independent piece of evidence.m This would not be the case if the identification parade served 
merely as a reliability check. Consistency of identification would serve as a measure of reliability in 
its own right. Instead, the courts prefer to consider identifications as independent evidence regarding 
the suspect's guilt. 
How is the value of an identification obtained at a parade to be detennined in tenns of the second 
purpose attributed to it above? There are two distinct approaches to this question in recent 
psychological literature. Both approaches involve couching the problem in Bayesian tenns, but they 
disagree sharply about the correct way to measure the probabilities involved. I will consider only the 
earlier of the approaches here, which derives from work by Wells and his associates (Luus & Wells, 
1990; Wells & Lindsay, 1980; Wells & Turtle, 1986).273 
The Diagnosticity Ratio 
Wells and colleagues have devised two measures of the value of an identification. The first measure, 
'diagnosticity', is defined as the amount of potential impact that an identification should have in 
revising one's opinion of guilt without regard to the prior estimate of guilt - how much more likely the 
data are to have occurred given the truth of one hypothesis (that the suspect is the criminal) relative to 
the other274 (that the suspect is innocent): 
P(idsls = c) 
P(idsls :;e c) 
where ids = identification; s = suspect; c = criminal. 
Diagnosticity is thus a ratio of likelihoods: the ratio of the probability that the suspect is identified 
given that he is guilty, to the probability that the suspect is identified given that he is innocent. Note 
also that in order to obtain the diagnosticity measure, rates of identification are required from parades 
in which the criminal is present, and from parades in which the criminal is absent. 
An example should make the meaning of the ratio clear. Table 6.8 presents the distribution of 
witness275 choices in two sets of identification parades; in one of the parades in each set the suspect is 
guilty (parades I & n), in the other the suspect is innocent (parades m & o). 
272 See, for example, the South African case of R v Kola. Here the presiding juge, Schreiner, AJ. commented "[It is] 
unsatisfactory ... to rely upon ... evidence of identification given by a witness not well acquainted with the accused, if that 
witness has not been tested by means of a parade" (At 169). 
273 I referred briefly to the second of the approaches - Navon (1990a), Navon (1990b) - earlier in the chapter. I will not 
consider his position here. 
274 The hypotheses make up a statistical partition (i.e. they are mutually exclusive and exhaustive). 
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Lineup Member 
I 2 3 4* 5 6 NIP 
5 3 6 31 8 '3 4 
8 5 6 5 2 7 27 
5 3 6 31 8 3 4 
6 5 6 25 8 3 7 
NIP = not present. • = Target. 
Set {I, m): diagnosticity = [31/60)/[S/60) = 6.20 
Set { n, o): diagnosticity = [31160)/[25/60) = 1.24 
Table 6.8 Diagnosticity in a series of hypothetical parades. 
In the first set of parades, the suspect is 6.2 times more likely to be chosen when she is the criminal 
than when she is innocent. The identification parade is said to be diagnostic of the suspect's guilt. In 
the second set of parades, the suspect is only 1.24 times more likely to be chosen when guilty than 
when innocent, and the parade is thus not very diagnostic of the suspect's guilt. 
The absolute size of the diagnosticity ratio is thus the measure of the line-up's value, taken 
' independently of all other things that have a bearing on the case. It has been used extensively in the 
psychological literature in order to compare the relative success of structural alterations to lineup 
practice (Lindsay & Wells, 1985; Melara, De Wit-Rickards & O'Brien 1989). Valuable as the 
measure may be, little has been written about its statistical properties. This is a significant failing, 
which clearly hampers research in the area. In some cases, it appears to be misinterpreted,276 and in 
others researchers have to devise ingenious research designs in order to test a difference in 
diagnosticity ratios for statistical significance. 
There are several ways of conceptualizing the diagnosticity ratio that allow testing the ratio for 
statistical significance. I suggest one such model here. 
In order to derive a diagnosticity ratio, a researcher conducts an experiment in which witnesses to a 
(staged) crime are randomly assigned an identification parade either containing the perpetrator or not 
containing the perpetrator. Diagnosticity is calculated as the ratio of the probability of identifying the 
suspect (also the perpetrator) in the perpetrator - present lineup to the probability of identifying the 
suspect in the perpetrator - absent lineup. Wells and colleagues apply a Bayesian analysis in order to 
evaluate the ratio of likelihoods, but I suggest an alternate conceptualization. The experiment can be 
represented as a cross tabulation, as in Table 6.9 below, where cell counts represent observed 
frequencies (nij): 
276 See Melara et al. ( 1989) for a case in point A diagnosticity ratio of less than one indicates that the lineup is of 
questionable value, since a positive identification is less likely than a mistaken identification, but Melara et al. appear to 
interpret a difference between two such ratios as evidence for the superiority of one of the lineups. 
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Perpetrator Perpetrator 
Present Absent Total: 
Identifies nll n12 n1+ 
Suspect 
Identifies 0 21 022 "2+ 
foil. or nip 
Total: 
"+I "+2 "++ 
Note that+ notation is used to indicate summation across rows (r+) and columns (+c). 
Table 6.9 Design used to derive empirical measures of diagnosticity. 
The diagnosticity ratio is nn 11 / nn12 , which is a ratio of (estimated) conditional probabilities. It is 
+I +2 
equivalent to an index widely used in biostatistics, called relative risk, since it expresses the 
probability that a guilty suspect is identified, relative to the risk that an innocent suspect is identified. 
When diagnosticity is 1.0, the events are equally likely; departure from 1.0, on the other hand, reflects 
the degree to which events are not equally likely. 
I suggest one way of reasoning inferentially about the diagnosticity ratio. The method is applicable in 
the case of large samples, and employs corrections to increase approximation accuracy for small 
samples. Alternative methods are available, and these generally improve the approximation, but the 
labour involved in deriving the relevant confidence intervals is much greater. I refer interested 
readers to more comprehensive discussions by Agresti (1990), and Rothman (1986). 
We assume that the columns of Table 6.9 represent independent binomial samples, with probability of 
success = Piii' This assumption allows us to detennine an expression for the sampling error of the 
diagnosticity ratio, and to construct a confidence interval. I will not show the derivation of either 
here, since both results are reported elsewhere (Agresti, 1990). 
The diagnosticity ratio is asymmetrical, and a log transfonnation to symmetry is therefore a useful 
preliminary step. Thus, where two lineups have diagnosticity = 6.24 and 0.16 respectively, the ratios 
are symmetrical under a log transfonnation (In (6.24) =-In (0.16) = 1.83). However, In (d) will be 
undefined when either of n 11/n+ 1 or n 121n+2 is zero. A correction for this is to add 0.5 to each of the 
frequencies in the calculation of the diagnosticity ratio: 
d' = n 11 + 0. 5 I n 12 + 0. 5 
n+1 +0.5 n+2 +0.5 
A maximum likelihood estimator of the asymptotic standard error for d' is given by 
(12) 
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S[ln(d')] = ( I - I + I - I ) 
n11+0.5 n+1 + 0.5 n11 + 0.5 n+2 + 0.5 
(13) 
A 100*(1-a)% confidence inte~al for In (d') is given by 
ln( d~) ± Zx ( I - I + I - 1 ) 
Yi n11 + 0.5 n1+ +0.5 n21 + 0.5 n1+ +0.5 
(14) 
The endpoints of this interval can be exponentiated in order to transfonn the interval back into the 
metric of the diagnosticity ratio. The hypothesis that the ratio differs from 1 (i.e. d' :;el, or, in log 
tenns, In (d') :;e 0), can be tested at significance level Cl by detennining whether the confidence interval 
contains i. 
Using (12), (13) and (14), the diagnosticity ratios presented in Table 6.3 have 95% confidence 
intervals of (3.98; 8.16) and (0.86; 1. 77). Since the interval for the second ratio includes 1, we should 
perhaps treat the suspect-present lineup on which it is based as providing us with no more evidence 
about the suspect's guilt than the suspect-absent lineup. 
Differences between independent diagnosticity ratios 
Diagnosticity ratios are frequently used to compare the effect of independent manipulation of lineup 
characteristics. Thus, Lindsay, Lea & Fulford (1991) compared diagnosticity ratios of lineups in 
which the presentation of lineup members was sequential or simultaneous, or a combination of both. 
The difference between diagnosticity ratios will of course be subject to random sampling variation, 
just as individual diagnosticity ratios are. Comparisons would be aided by placing some probabilistic 
confidence in the size of the difference. 
In this section I suggest a test for the difference of two diagnosticity ratios, or the homogeneity of 
more than two diagnosticity ratios. The approach I take is based on that outlined by Rothman ( 1986, 
pp 220-233) apropos of assessing the homogeneity of relative risk effects. 
Imagine that there are k independent diagnosticity ratios. Each diagnosticity ratio (d) is transfonned 
to In ( d).277 Then the approximate variance of In ( d) is given as 
(15) 
217 Note that the addition of0.5, used as a correction in (Ii), is not used here. The method is therefore only applicable to sets 
containing non-zero diagnosticity ratios. A simple correction should be feasible, but is not investigated in this chapter. 
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where the notation is the same as that used in Table 6.10, and i is the ith diagnosticity ratio. 
In order to obtain a pooled estimate of the diagnosticity ratios, we use a weight for teach ratio that is 
equal to the inverse of its variance: 







The homogeneity of the set of diagnosticity ratios can be tested by computing the summed squared 
distance of each ratio around the pooled estimate, where individual ratios are weighted by their 
variances. The result is a r.2 deviate, with k-1 degrees of freedom, i.e. 
k 2 
Y 2 = J. (ln(d;)-ln(d)] 
''lk-1) ~ var[In(d;)] 
1=! 
(18) 
Better approximations are available, but at the cost of considerable computational effort. Rothman 
(1986) outlines several alternatives, based largely on maximum likelihood methods. 
By way of example, Table 6.10 reports three diagnosticity ratios obtained by Lindsay et al. (1991), 
and the results of a test for homogeneity of the ratios. (The test for homogeneity is provided as an 














d = 3.19; x.2 = 7.55, p < 0.025 
Data from Lindsay et al. (1991). 
Table 6.10 A test of the homogeneity of three diagnosticity ratios 
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The analysis suggests that the differences between the three diagnosticity ratios are not simply a 
function of random sampling variation. Standardized residuals could be examined in order to identify 
particularly salient deviations from the pooled estimate: in Table 6.10 it is clear from the individual 
diagnosticity ratios that the sequential parade has the largest associated ratio. 
In the absence of an inferential basis the comparison of diagnosticity ratios is a questionable business. 
Differences in absolute magnitude may arise from sources other than real differences in lineup 
technique: framing the comparison in probability terms goes some way toward bolstering 
comparisons. 
Information Gain 
A second measure rooted in Bayesian thinking, devised by Wells and colleagues, and closely related 
to diagnosticity, is known as 'information gain'. A positive (or negative) identification presumably 
leads to some alteration of the probability that the suspect is the criminal from the point of view of the 
investigating officer, and the amount of this change is the nett informational value of the 
identification. Information gain is the difference between the prior probability that the suspect is the 
criminal, and the posterior probability of the same (dependent only on the intervening identification or 
non-identification of the suspect). It is stated formally as 
Information gain= lp(s=c) - p(s=clids)I 
or, Information gain= lp(s.cc) - p{5*clnids)I 
where s = suspect, c = criminal, I = sign for conditional occurrence of an event, ids is the event that an 
identification is made, and nids is the event that an identification is not made; 
p(idsls = c)p(s = c) . 
p(s =cl ids)=--------------
p(idsls = c)p(s = c) + p(idsls '*' c)p(s -:F- c) 
and s, c, ids are defined as before. 
The absolute value of the difference between the probabilities is taken, since it is the size of the gain 
that is important, and not the direction. The value of the identification depends on the size of the 
prior probability (although this is only clear from a close examination of the Bayesian ratio):· a 
positive identification might lead to a big increase in the likelihood of the suspect's guilt if it is low to 
begin with, but will generally have a smaller impact the higher the 'prior likelihood of guilt. 
The measure of information gain has proved most useful as a research tool: thus Wells & Lindsay 
(1980) used it to show that non-identifications must be diagnostic of innocence, just as identifications 
are diagnostic of guilt, and Wells & Turtle ( 1986) used it to show that multiple suspect lineups will, in 
general, be inferior to single suspect lineups. 
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Although the measure of information gain is rooted in a Bayesian analysis, I suggest that it is possible 
to apply non-Bayesian inferential reasoning to it with an appropriate re-conceptualization. One re-
conceptualization is to set the prior probability to expectation under the assumption of 
equiprobability, and then to regard any difference of the observed probability of identification from 
expectation as information gain. This is equivalent to assuming that the suspect is innocent before the 
lineup, and that the extent to which he is chosen at a rate exceeding chance expectation indicates 
probability of guilt. This conceptualization has the advantage of permitting probabilistic statements 
regarding the size of information gain. 
In practical terms, a useful way of implementing this conceptualization may be to calculate a 
confidence interval (for some choice of ex) around the rate at which the suspect is chosen, using (3) or 
(4) above. The interval can then be corrected by subtracting the expected rate of identification from 
each of the extrema. The corrected interval expresses informatiOn gain as a 100*(1-cx) percent 
confidence interval. Intervals that include 0 could be considered to support a hypothesis of zero 
information gain. It is possible that the interval will be entirely negative: the meaning of this will 
depend on the nature of the lineup task. If the lineup is constructed to resemble a description of the 
perpetrator, then it conveys information suggesting a lack of resemblance between the suspect and the 
perpetrator. If the lineup is constructed to resemble the suspect, then an entirely negative interval will 
be more difficult to interpret. 
As an example of this kind of calculation, consider the sequential lineup condition from the study by 
Lindsay et al. ( 1991 ). In the perpetrator - present lineup, 28 of 60 mock witnesses identified the 
suspect (perpetrator), from a lineup with 8 members. A 95% confidence interval around this 
proportion is (0.35; 0.61 ). If we subtract the expected proportion from the endpoints, the new interval 
is (0.22; 0.49), which we can think of as the 95% confidence interval estimate of information gain. 
This interval suggests that the lineup yields positive identifying information regarding the guilt of the 
suspect, ceteris paribus. 
Discussion and conclusion 
I have made several suggestions in this chapter aimed at sharpening the usage of existing measures of 
lineup fairness and informativeness. There is little formal consideration in the psychological 
literature of the application of inferential reasoning to lineup tasks, and yet most measures of fairness 
derive their meaning from a probabilistic assumption. This failure is significant. 
Measures of lineup fairness are generally based on the mock witness task, devised by Doob and 
Kirshenbaum ( 1973 ). This task requires that subjects blind to the identity of the suspect attempt to 
guess the suspect from an array of lineup members. Inferences are made regarding the fairness of the 
Chapter 6 Statistical inference on lineup measures 
lineup depending on the departure of the suspect identification probability from expectation, which is 
detennined under an assumption of equiprobablity: that is, mock witness identifications are assumed 
to be random across foils. Since mock witness identifications are assumed to be random, the number 
- of identifications of the suspect will show the effects of random sampling variation. This is as true of 
the mock witness task as it is of a coin tossing experiment. Just as we would be loathe to interpret the 
outcome of a.coin tossing experiment without some explicit probability theory, so we should hesitate 
before interpreting the outcome of mock witness tasks. We should also hesitate before interpreting 
measures of fairness derived from the task, which include the widely used 'functional' and 'effective' 
sizes. 
I have suggested ways here of thinking inferentially about these lineup measures. In the first place the 
mock witness task is conceptualized in tenns of a simple binomial probability model, which allows 
the calculation of exact probabilities associated with identifications of the suspect. This 
conceptualization allows us to postulate inferential methods for the interpretation of measures of 
functional and effective size. Without these methods, there are problems for both research and 
application. Estimates of functional and effective size have been used to evaluate the fairness of 
lineups used in basic research, but it is not clear that fairness can be evaluated in this way without an 
appropriate theory of its statistical variation. This problem is emphasized in applied legal settings, 
where the measures in question have been used by expert witnesses to support fairness evaluations of 
police lineups (see Buckhout et al., 1988, for an example). If an expert witness claims, on the basis of 
a mock witness evaluation of a police lineup, that the effective size of the lineup is 6, this rray be 
misleading, particularly if the sample of mock witnesses is relatively small, and the lineup size is 
relatively large. I have suggested ways in this chapter in which estimates of functional and effective 
size are re-phrased as confidence intervals. This would not, in my opinion, confuse jury members or 
legal personnel, since quantification and reporting of measurement error are commonplace in the 
press, particularly in relation to opinion polls. It would have the benefit, though, of making 
evaluations of lineup fairness more rigorous, especially since these evaluations would be tied more 
directly to the probability models implicitly underpinning them. 
There may be better ways of achieving what I have attempted here. In particular, it may be possible to 
develop a unified approach to the several measures of fairness and infonnativeness; my goals in this 
chapter were simply to suggest useful inferential methods, which are neither computationally 
intensive nor dependent on advanced statistical knowledge. 
What would certainly be of considerable benefit, though, is a close scrutiny of some of the 
assumptions underlying the notions of effective and functional size. There seem to be certain 
conceptual problems attached to the claim that a lineup consists of k plausible foils, and I argued 
earlier that these lead to the confounding of lineup size and lineup bias. Plausibility is treated in most 
" 
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research as an all-or-none state - this is what gives meaning to claims like 'this lineup has 4 plausible 
foils' - but it is more likely that plausibility is a matter of degree than a discrete state. Navon's 
remarks on the 'proper treatment of diagnosticity' (l 990a, l 990b) may prove a fruitful line of 
reasoning in this regard, since his suggested conditional probability model explicitly regards the value 
of a suspect identification as conditional on the degree of resemblance between suspect and 
perpetrator. . 
Most of the measures of lineup fairness and informativeness were developed under the assumption of 
a simultaneous lineup structure: that is, witnesses view an array of people, presented simultaneously, 
and attempt to choose the perpetrator, if they feel he/she is present. Lindsay, Wells and colleagues 
have shown very convincingly that if the structure of the task is changed so that the array is presented 
sequentially, then witness performance is dramatically better (Lindsay & Wells, 1985; Lindsay et al., 
1990).271 There is some evidence that U.S. police are starting to use the sequential structure more 
regularly: perhaps even as many as 15% of lineups in some areas are now sequential (Malpass, 
personal communication). 
It is not clear that the measures developed under the assumption of simultaneous lineup structure will 
be useful for the evaluation of fairness in sequential lineups, and it is therefore also not clear that the 
inferential considerations developed in this chapter will be applicable to sequential parades without 
substantial modifications. 
The mock witness task could still be used to gauge fairness of sequential lineups if the procedure used 
to implement the test meets certain conditions. Consider the case of a lineup sequence in which all 
the foils are perfectly fair. We would expect mock witnesses to choose early in the sequence if they 
are using the criterion of resemblance fairly (they are required to identify a lineup member if that 
person matches the description). It follows that if the sequence is unaltered for other mock witnesses 
- i.e. if the same foils are always presented first, second, and so on - then the distribution of mock 
witness choices will be highly skewed, in favour of the early foils. To ensure a fair distribution of 
identifications across the lineup, one would need to cmppletely counterbalance the presentation of 
foils. Unfortunately this would be impracticable for lineup sequences of any significant length (a 10 
member lineup would require 3.63 x 106 sequences). One would instead need to use a subset of 
possible sequences. Such a subset could consist of a random selection of possible sequences, but 
there would need to be a fair number of these in order to ensure that particular foils do not appear 
early in the sequence more frequently than other foils. By the same reasoning, a substantial number 
of mock witnesses would be required, since each sequence would need to be well tested. 
271 There arc several other structural aspects to the sequential lineup, some of which appear to have become standard in 
reports on their use. One of these is that t~c witness docs not know the number of lineup members. 
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The point behind these procedures is to ensure that a completely fair sequential lineup results in a 
uniform distribution of identifications, since departures from uniformity could then be used as a gauge 
of the fairness of the lineup, and in particular, as reflections of the plausibility of individual foils. The 
measures of functional and effective size depend on the assumption that uniformity of identifications 
is the theoretically 'fair' state against which departures should be judged, and if a sequential mock 
witness task can satisfy this assumption, then the measures should be equally useful for this kind of 
lineup. As we have seen, however, there are clearly several practical difficulties in constructing a 
version of the mock witness task for sequential lineups. But, more importantly, such a mock witness 
task would lack the clear interpretability of the task used for the simultaneous lineup. In the 
simultaneous lineup, expected performance is easy to determine, since witness choice is assumed to 
be random across the k members. It is not clear what expected performance is in the sequential 
lineup, since witnesses do not know the number of lineup members, and choice is unlikely to be 
random across k members. This is a significant failure, since the elegance and power of the mock 
witness task depends on the simple probability model underlying it. It is a simple matter in 
simultaneous lineups to determine whether a suspect is chosen more frequently than chance, but in 
sequential lineups the quantitative nature of random choice will be very difficult to estimate. 
A possible way of approaching the problem is to use simultaneous lineups to ~test the fairness of 
sequential lineups (the lineups would, of course, have the same members!) It is perhaps reasonable to 
assume that fair simultaneous lineups are also fair sequential lineups,279 and that foils who are 
plausible in a simultaneous lineup will also be plausible in a sequential lineup. This implication is 
probably only true in one direction, since there is some evidence tha~ sequential lineups are relatively 
robust with respect to problems of low functional and effective size (Lindsay et al., 1991 ). Fair 
sequential lineups are therefore not necessarily fair simultaneous lineups. 
·~ 
279 I refer only to the structure of the lineup, of course. Procedural problems in a sequential lineup could well render a 
simultaneous lineup unfair. 
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In this chapter I commence the empirical exploration of a measure of facial similarity derived from 
the principal ~omponent analysis (PCA) of a set of facial images. The measure was discussed at some 
length in Chapter 4, so there is no need to re-trace the theoretical and mathematical justification, 
except where the empirical results suggest that this is necessary. The chief goal of the empirical 
exploration here is to gather evidence on the correspondence between the PCA similarity measure and 
human judgements of facial similarity. Two studies are reported in this chapter: in the first, a small 
set of faces is analysed, and performance on a similarity ranking task is compared to performance 
predicted by the PCA measure. In the second study, a larger set of stimulus faces is used, and four 
validity measures are compared against performance predicted on the basis of the PCA measure. The 
PCA measure shows considerable promise, but there are some mathematical and theoretical questions 
that need addressing. In addition, the similarity judgement tasks are problematic in several respects, 
and need re-thinking. 
Study 1 
Study I served as a pilot investigation. Two small sets of faces were selected from a larger collection, 
and were composed as an array, or 'simultaneous photospread lineup'. The analogy of a photospread 
was explicit in the composition. One of the chief potential applications of the measure of facial 
similarity is lineup evaluation: judgements of facial similarity made by witnesses in this situation are 
inherently comparative,280 and a similarity measure derived from the principal component 
representation of the photospread is intuitively satisfying. 
Method 
Stimuli 
Two sets of six facial images from the set collected in Study 2 were used in this study. Details . 
regarding the method of image collection and standardization are provided in the description of Study 
2. Six white male faces constituted set I a, and six black female faces constituted set I b. The faces 
were not chosen on the basis of particular criteria, but simply to make up arrays that were relatively 
homogeneous with respect to gross external attributes. Each set was printed on plain paper at 360 dpi 
280 This is the case for simultaneous lineups, but may not be the case for sequential lineups - see Chapters 4 and 6 for a 
discussion of the differences between these lineups. 
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(dots per inch), using an inkjet printer, for presentation to subjects. ·Appendix B shows the sets of 
faces. Three sequences were created for each set, for purposes of counterbalancing. 
Analysis of stimuli 
The six images in each stimulus set were standardized in the manner described for the stimulus set of 
' 
Study 2, except that photographs were scanned at size = 550 x 600 pixels. These image sets were then_ 
analysed in the same manner described for Study 2, except that face images were 330 000 element 
vectors. Image set la (white male faces) and the corresponding eigenfaces generated by PCA are 
represented in Chapter 5 as Figures 5.7 and 5.8. Both image sets are shown as Appendix B. Table 7.1 
presents a summary report of the principal component analysis. 
Image set la (white male) Image set lb (black female) 
PC rio. - Eigenvalue % Variance - Cum.% PC no. Eigenvalue % Variance -- cum.·:: 
% 
I 4.36 72.6 72.6 I 3.78 62.9 62.9 
2 0.55 9.2 81.8 2 0.87 14.4 77.4 
3 0.36 6.1 87.8 3 0.82 13.6 91.0 
4 0.33 5.5 93.3 4 0.26 4.3 95.3 
5 0.22 3.7 97.0 5 0.17 2.8 98.I 
6 0.18 3.0 100.0 6 0.12 1.9 100.0 
PC= principal component. % Variance= percentage variance explained by component. Cum.%= cumulative percentage of 
variance explained by all preceding components, in addition to the present component. 
Table 7.1 Principal component analysis of images in sets la and lb 
It is clear from Table 7.1 that both image sets produce first principal components which resolve a 
considerable amount of variance. Several popular statistical 'rules of thumb' would suggest that the 
first component is sufficient: all other components have eigenvalues smaller than 1 (Kaiser, 1958), 
and a scree test (Cattell, 1966) in both cases shows an 'elbow' after the first component. However, 
the image sets are small, and the components may be quite unstable. It is also possible that 
dimensional reduction of the component solution will lose important information about the physical 
similarity of images. In the analyses reported below, the full solution is used to generate similarity 
scores. (The issue of dimensional reduction is explored at greater length in Study 2). 
Subjects 
Subjects were 35 school pupils attending an evening discussion on career possibilities at a local high 
school. Their ages ranged from 16 to 18. 
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Procedure 
Subjects were asked at the end of a career evening to participate 'in a study on face perception and 
recognition'. Each subject was given two sets of faces, corresponding to those described above under 
Stimuli. These sets were combined in an experimental booklet, in alternating order across subjects 
(i.e. some subject received booklets which presented the male array first, and others received booklets 
which presented the female array first). Facial images were arranged in varying sequences within 
arrays, as described above, to effect counterbalancing. Subjects were (verbally) asked to rank the 
faces in order of similarity to a 'target face' by placing the number '1' beneath the most similar face, 
'2' beneath the next most similar face, and so on. The target was indicated by enclosure in a 
rectangle, and by the absence of prior numbering. Subjects were given fifteen minutes to complete 
the task, after which booklets were collected. 
Results 
Rankings provided by subjects were analysed chiefly for correspondence to the similarity metric 
derived from the PCA, but several other issues were also explored. 
Orders and sequences 
Image sets la and 1 b were combined in several different orders (i.e. the male and female arrays varied 
with respect to whether they were presented first or second), and in different sequences (i.e. faces 
within the array varied with respect to the position in the array), for counterbalancing purposes. In 
order to test the effect of the different orders and sequences on similarity rankings, a multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOV A) was conducted, taking orders and sequences as between subjects 
effects, and rankings of the separate faces as a within subjects effect. Table 7.2 shows that the 
between subjects effects and all interactions involving these effects, were not statistically significant. 
All further results in Study 1 will therefore be reported without respect to order or sequence of 
presentation. The within subjects effect ('RANKING' in the table) is significant, though, which indicates 
that faces were ranked differentially in tenns of similarity to the target face. 
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Set la 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects. 
Source of Variation 









ORDER BY SEQ. 





Source of Variation SS DF 
WITHiN + RESIDUAL 179.67 120 
RANKING 120.21 4 
ORDER BY RANKING 9.49 4 
SEQ. BY RANKING 18.42 8 
ORDER BY SEQ. BY RANKING 12.25 8 
Set lb 
Tests of Between-Subjects 
Source of Variation 
WITHIN + RESIDUAL 
ORDER 
SEQ. 













Source of Variation SS DF 
WITHIN +RESIDUAL 256.65 112 
RANKING 46.24 4 
ORDER BY RANKING 8.08 4 
SEQ. BY RANKING 19.38 8 
ORDER BY SEQ. BY RANKING 17.81 8 
Preliminary empirical work 
MS F p < 
.01 
.01 .77 .387 
.01 .86 : 434 
.01 . 86 .434 
MS F p < 
1. 50 
30.05 20.07 .000 
2.37 1. 58 .183 
2.30 1. 54 .151 
1. 53 1. 02 .423 
MS F p < 
.10 
.06 .62 .438 
.06 . 63 .538 
.06 .63 .538 
MS F p < 
2.29 
11.56 5.05 .001 
·2. 02 .88 .478 
2.42 1. 06 .398 
2.23 .97 . 462 
ORDER = order of presentation of sets I a and I b; SEQ. = arrangement of faces within the sets 
Table 7.2 Analysis of variance table for effects of orders, sequences, and similarity rankings offaces 
Consistency of rankings 
Although the analysis immediately above shows that subjects, on average, reliably differentiated faces 
in terms of similarity to the target, the rankings showed considerable inter-subject variation. The 
degree of correspondence was investigated by calculating Kendall coefficients of concordance, and 
testing these for statistical significance. The size of these coefficients indicates the degree of 
· concordance, and the test of statistical significance estimates the probability that this degree of 
concordance is a product of mere random sampling variation. Coefficients were calculated on 
rankings for each of the image sets, and these were statistically significant, but low (w = 0.40, x2= 57, 
df=4, p < 0.0001, for set la; w = 0.13, x2= 17.58, df=4, p < 0.001, for set lb). Table 7.3 attempts to 
demonstrate the degree of overall concordance, by cross-tabulating faces and ordinal positions in the 
ranking sequence. 
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Set Ia Set lb 
Al A4 A2 A5 A3 Bl 85 83 84 82 
I 25 2 3 5 2 12 12 5 2 3 
Ordinal 2 7 9 12 5 7 8 7 8 6 5 
position 3 2 12 3 I I 13 10 3 10 8 3 
4 I 8 8 5 13 3 5 5 10 IO 
5 0 4 9 9 0 I 7 6 8 12 
Mean Rank 1.4 3. 1 3.2 3.3 4.2 2.2 2.7 2.9 3.5 3.6 
Std. dev. 0.7 I.I 1.4 1.4 0.9 I. I 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.5 
Note: cell entries represent frequenc ies of rankings of faces in the image sets. A 1 denotes the 1st face in set 
1 a, Al the second face, and so on . 
Table 7.3 Similarity rankings of faces in image sets la and lb 
This method of presenting subject rankings has the following implications: perfect concordance 
would result in diagonal matrices (i .e. entries only in the main diagonal ), and states of lesser 
concordance would be shown by the departure of matrices from this condition. Although frequencies 
in diagonal and off-diagonal cells are discernibly larger than in other cells, this is more clearly the 
case for image set 1 a, and the pattern in both cases is far from near-diagonal. However, the mean 
rankings show that subjects do not clearly differentiate several faces in terms of their similarity to the 
target (e.g. faces A4, A2 and AS), and it may be that these faces are not sufficiently dissimilar (from 
each other) to elicit concordant rankings from subjects. 
Similarity correspondences 
Similarity ratings obtained from subjects were correlated against similarity scores derived from the 
PCA described in Stimuli, above. The correspondence is difficult to interpret, either from the 
scatterplots, or the correlation coefficients, which are shown in Figure 7.1. 
Set la r = -0.65 Set 1 b : r = 0 .4 7 
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Similarity rankings for sets 1 a and 1 b were provided by 35 and 34 subjects, respectively. Error bars are extended one standard 
error above and below the mean. 
Figure 7.1 Relations between ranked similarity of faces in sets la and lb, and distances derived from PCA. 
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Although it appears from the scatterplots that there is only a small number of data points across which 
the correlation is calculated, and that this might make the magnitude of the relation difficult to 
interpret, it should be remembered that each of the data points represents a mean ranking, calculated 
over more than 30 subjects. However, these means are based on scores which exhibit considerable 
variability, and the estimates they give may be quite inaccurate. The difference in the direction of the 
relation across the image sets is surprising, and may be a consequence of the instability. In addition, 
it is apparent that the faces in the image sets do not show much between-face variation: subjects, on 
average, rate the five faces as bearing much the same similarity to the target face, and the Euclidean 
distances derived from the PCA also show a restriction in range of variation. This is a flaw in the 
des ign of the rating task: faces were not chosen to represent different degrees of similarity to the 
target, and it would probably have been wiser to select the faces on the basis of Euclidean distance 
from the target. 
Similarity measures derived from partial faces 
In some earlier work which used PCA to generate face subspaces, hair was excluded from the analysis 
by digitally masking faces (Sirovich & Kirby, 1987; Kirby & Sirovich, 1990). This is often the case 
in research on face perception processes, presumably on the ground that hair is an adaptable property 
of faces, and j udgements which use hair properties do not reflect judgements about the faces per se 
(see Bruce & Healey, 199 I for example). In order to test the effect masking has on similarity scores 
derived from PCA, the six faces of set la were digitally 'masked ' by cropping them just above the 
eyebrows, and next to the eyes (see Figure 7.2), and these ' masked ' images were subjected to PCA. 
Figure 7.2, which reports the correspondence between similarity scores determined from full faces 
and those determined from masked faces, shows that masking had litt le effect on the similarity scores . 
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Score from muked face 
Sample masked face 
Figure 7.2 Correspondence between similarity scores derived from PCA of full faces , and 
similarity scores derived from PCA of masked faces . 
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Similarity measures derived from larger image subspaces 
Similarity measures reported thus far were derived from analyses of arrays of six faces. Although this 
is a restriction based on practical considerations - a prospective application of the measure is to 
lineups, which usually have small numbers of members - it is not preferable from a theoretical point 
of view. The similarity measure is calculated on the basis of dimensions identified by the PC 
analysis; these dimensions will differ when PCA is conducted on larger sets of faces, and lower 
dimensions will be much more stable. In order to empirically examine the effect of using similarity 
scores derived from larger subspaces of faces, the faces in set la were included in a larger set of 62 
(the set reported in Study 2 below), and similarity scores derived from the PC solution for this set. 
Figure 7.3 shows that the similarity scores calculated from the PCA of six faces did not differ 
markedly from those calculated from the PCA of the larger set. 
r= 0.95 
o.e5 0 .75 0.85 0 .95 
Score from Mt of I f1ce1 
Figure 7.3 Correspondence between similarity scores derived from PCA of set la= six 
faces, and similarity scores for the same six faces derived from PCA of a set of 62 faces . 
Discussion 
Study 1 does not provide any clear evidence to support the notion that the proposed measure of 
similarity corresponds to judgements of similarity made by human subjects. It also does not provide 
any clear evidence against this notion, though. Several weaknesses inherent in the judgement task 
used in Study 1 render it incapable of providing convincing evidence of either kind. Only five faces 
were used in the task, and although this is not a problem in itself (since more than 30 responses are 
pooled to provide a similarity estimate for each face), when coupled with high inter-subject 
variability, the task may provide seriously inaccurate estimates of perceived similarity. Three 
amendments to the design may alleviate the problem: (I) constructing the arrays so that faces vary 
systematically and substantially on the PCA measure of similarity; (2) using more subjects, so that 
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obtained mean rankings are more rel iable; and (3) finding alternate similarity rating tasks. These 
amendments are implemented in Study 2, below. 
The substantial variation in perceived similarity is an interesting finding in its own right. The 
phenomenon is unreported in previous research, apart from a casual observation made by Lindsay 
(1994), which is surprising. It raises a considerable problem: if perceived similarity shows little 
correspondence across subjects, then the task of constructing a lineup of people who meet a criterion 
level of facial similarity may be impossible. Possible explanations should be considered, though. 
Firstly, it may be that people will agree only when faces show substantial similarity or dissimilarity, 
but not when they show levels of similarity between the extremes. This is explicable if judgements of 
similarity are made on multiple bases - that is, if they are multi-dimensional - and if these differ across 
subjects. Highly similar faces will resemble each other on many dimensions, and judgements based 
on a subset of these dimensions are more likely to be congruent. Highly dissimilar faces will 
resemble each other on very few dimensions, and will be likely to attract ratings of dissimilarity. 
Other faces are problematic: since they will resemble each other on some dimensions, but not on 
others, there is considerable room for disagreement when subjects use only a subset of available 
dimensions. This hypothesis can be tested by examining the variation shown in subject ratings of 
similarity: variability should be lowest for faces rated most- and least- similar, and higher for other 
faces. Table 7.3 bears this contention out (more clearly in the case of set la), but the differences in 
variation are not compelling. Another possibility is that subjects are themselves simply inconsistent 
in rating similarity. A useful test of this might be the investigation of the consistency of subject 
ratings on different occasions. 
Study 2 
In Study 2, further investigations were conducted on the validity of the PCA measure of facial 
similarity. The correspondence between rated similarity and the PCA measure was again 
investigated: modifications were effected to the task reported in Study 1, and a new rating task was 
constructed. The modifications to the rating task included i) the careful selection of faces , aimed at 
ensuring adequate variation of PCA-based similarity scores between faces, and ii) the inclusion of a 
greater number of target faces in arrays. The new rating task required subjects to match pairs of faces 
in terms of similarity, rather than ranking an array of faces in relation to a target. 
Three additional tests of the validity of the PCA similarity measure were explored in Study 2. In the 
first place, the ability of the PCA similarity measure to predict the race, sex, and age of faces was 
tested. If the measure conveys information about the similarity of faces , it should be able to 
discriminate clearly dissimilar groups. This predictive ability was investigated with discriminant 
function analysis. 
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In the second place, the relation between a PC-based distance measure and rated facial distinctiveness 
and typicality was explored. In the theoretical justification of the measure in Chapter 5, I proposed 
that the measure should capture distinctiveness infonnation, and this proposition was accordingly 
investigated in Study 2. 
In the third P.lace, the face validity of PCA similarity scores was investigated. This was achieved by 
subjecting similarity scores to a cluster analysis: faces constituting the ensuing clusters were 
examined for physical similarities. The rationale behind this procedure was that similarity scores will 
possess some 'face validity' if clusters identified by a cluster analysis appear to be differentiated on 
the basis of facial 'features'. 
Method 
Stimuli 
Seventy two students and staff at the University of Cape Town (UCT) were photographed against a 
unifonn, dark background. These photographic subjects were recruited by placing advertisements on 
noticeboards on the UCT campus, by advertisement in lectures, and by direct recruitment as they 
passed the venue in which photographs were taken. Subject characteristics are reported in Table 7.4 
.·. Age Sex Race 211 
Category N Category N Category N 
18 - 29 45 Male 21 Black 8 
30 - 39 6 Female 41 Coloured 13 
40- 49 7 White 41 
> 50 4 
Table 7.4 Subject characteristics of the 62 faces submitted to PCA analysis in Study 2. 
Ambient lighting was standardized,212 a stroboscopic flash unit was used to provide a direct source of 
light, and was coupled to an automatic 35mm Leica SLR camera, which was used to capture 
photographs. Subjects were asked to adopt a neutral expression, and to look straight ahead at the 
camera. Photographs were developed by a commercial photographic service, and then digitally 
scanned at 300 dpi on a Hewlett Packard IIx flatbed grey-image scanner. The images were edited 
211 Race groups reported here are based on those defined in the (now defunct) South African Population Registration Act. 
They should not be taken to indicate distinct genetic or physiognomic populations, although the groups do differ 
considerably in physical appearance. 
212 All electric lights in the venue, which was a seminar room, were turned on. These consisted of two neon lights, and six 
incandescent lights. The effect of variations in background and lighting on component based facial representations was 
investigated by Sirovich & Kirby ( 1990), who concluded that the effect is small. 
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digitally to remove jewellery and other extraneous costume. Of an original set of seventy two 
photographs, ten were rejected: five were rejected due to poor quality,213 and five were rejected 
because subjects had facial hair, or spectacles which were not removed at the time of taking 
photographs. 
Analysis of stimuli 
The sixty two images in the stimulus set were standardized with respect to position of the left and 
right pupils (i .e. images were cropped, enlarged, or reduced so that the pupils occupied the same co-
ordinate positions in a common pixel space). Image size was equated by cropping to a unifonn size of 
154 x 205 pixels. Each face was therefore standardized to a vector of size = 31570 pixels. (The set of 
images is reproduced as Appendix C). The image set was then submitted to PCA, using SPSSTM 
proprietary software under an MS Windows™ platfonn. Face images were submitted as variables, 
each constituted by 31570 ' observations' . Principal components and their coefficients were derived 
from this analysis, and these were used to generate a matrix of Euclidean distances between faces in 
the image set (61 of the principal components were used in one set of analyses, and 5 in another set). 
In addition, the Euclidean distance of each face from the ' centre' 214 of the component space was 
calculated, in order to investigate the relation between rated distinctiveness, typicality, and distance of 
faces from the centre of the component space. The principal component analysis is reported m 
summary form in Table 7.5 
I 32.08 51.7 51.7 22 0.29 0.5 90.3 43 0.13 0.2 97 
2 8.85 14.3 66 23 0.27 0.4 90.8 44 0.13 0.2 97.2 
3 2.99 4.8 70.8 24 0.26 0.4 91.2 45 0.13 0.2 97.4 
4 2.25 3.6 74.5 25 0.26 0.4 91.6 46 0.12 0.2 97.6 
5 1.10 1.8 76.2 26 0.26 0.4 92 47 0.12 0.2 97.8 
6 1.06 1.7 77.9 27 0.25 0.4 92.4 48 0.12 0.2 98 
7 0.86 1.4 79.3 28 0.24 0.4 92.8 49 0.12 0.2 98.2 
8 0.82 1.3 80.6 29 0.22 0.4 93 .2 50 0.11 0.2 98.4 
9 0.68 I.I 81.7 30 0.21 0.3 93 .5 51 0. 10 0.2 98.5 
10 0.58 0.9 82.7 31 0.20 0.3 93.8 52 0.10 0.2 98.7 
11 0.53 0.9 83 .5 32 0.20 0.3 94.2 53 0. 10 0.2 98.8 
12 0.50 0.8 84.3 33 0.19 0.3 94.5 54 0.09 0.2 99 
13 0.47 0.8 85. l 34 0.18 0.3 94.8 55 0.09 0.1 99.1 
14 0.45 0.7 85.8 35 0.18 0.3 95 56 0.09 0.1 99.3 
213 The photographic negatives for these images were (erroneously) exposed to contaminating light by the photographic 
processing service. 
214 The 'distance from the origin ' is an intuitive way of thinking about facial distinctiveness, but in practice this measure 
cannot be used. Principal component analysis ' normalizes ' vectors, with the consequence that the Euclidean distance of 
each face from the origin is I. Another way of conceptualising distinctiveness is as the distance of each face from the 
multivariate mean of component coefficients: typical faces will be close to the 'average tendency', and distinctive faces far 
away. 
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15 0.41 0.7 86.5 36 0.17 0.3 95.3 57 0.09 0.1 99.4 
16 0.39 0.6 87.1 37 0.17 0.3 95.6 58 0.08 0.1 99.5 
17 0.38 0.6 87.7 38 0. 16 0.3 95.8 59 0.08 0.1 99.7 
18 0.36 0.6 88.3 39 0.16 0.3 96.1 60 0.07 0.1 99.8 
19 0.33 0.5 88.8 40 0. 15 0.2 96.3 61 0.07 0.1 99.9 
20 0.32 0.5 89.4 41 0.14 0.2 96.6 
21 0.30 0.5 89.9 42 0.14 0. 2 96.8 
See Table 7.1 for key. 
Table 7.5 Principal component analysis of images in Study 2. 
The sizes of the principal components (five > 1.0) suggest that a five dimensional solution would be 
adequate here (Kaiser, 1958), but a stricter criterion (Joliffe, 1972) suggests an eight dimensional 
solution. A scree plot, reproduced below as Figure 7.4 appears to provide support for a five 
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Figure 7.4 'Scree' plot for principal components of images in Study 2. 
In similar, previous research using principal components analysis on face images, O ' Toole et al. 
( 1994) have claimed that early components ' capture ' information about the race and sex of images. 
Figure 7.5 reproduces the first ten ' eigenfaces ' derived from the present analysis, and subjective 
scrutiny of the images appears to bear this contention out. 
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Subscripts index the ordinal sequence of the eigenfaces; thus 'E l.GIF' is the first eigenface, and 'EI O.GIF ' the tenth eigenface. 
Eigenfaces 2 to I 0 have been brightened for presentation purposes. The black 'patches' on the faces (particularly EI) may be an 
artefact of stroboscopic illumination. 
Figure 7.5 The first ten 'eigenfaces' derived from the PCA of face images in Study 2. 
The first eigenface appears to represent the 'central tendency' (or, perhaps 'faceness') of the images, 
whereas eigenfaces 2 and 3 appear to represent the race and sex of images. It should be remembered, 
though, that summed weightings of these eigenfaces re-create the images in the original set of faces, 
and it is probable that combinations of eigenfaces are maximally discriminative of subject groupings 
(this issue is explored statistically in the discriminant function analysis reported below). Thus, 
O' Toole et al. (I 994) argue that negatively and positively weighted additions of a second eigenface to 
a first eigenface - produced in their analysis of approximately I 00 faces - appears to capture male and 
female facial information, respectively. Figure 7.6 presents face images constructed as combinations 
of the first three eigenfaces of Figure 7.5. The combinations appear from visual inspection to 
resemble prototypic black male and white female faces. 
Eigenfaces I + 2 
(black male?) 
Eigenfaces I + 3 
(white female?) 
Composites are equally weighted combinations. The black 'patches' 
on the faces may be an artefact of stroboscopic illumination. 
Figure 7.6 Composite images formed from low dimensional eigenfaces. 
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Procedure 
Rating distinctiveness and typicality 
Four arrays of 10 face images were constructed, in several distinct sequences, m and printed on a 
Hewlett Packard laser printer at 600 dpi . Each of 41 subjects rated two arrays of images (20 images 
in total) for distinctiveness, on a 15 point scale. Subjects were instructed as follows: "Imagine that 
you were to encounter the face in a crowd of people in supermarket mall: how easily would this face 
'stick out' in such a crowd? A very distinctive face would 'stick out' to a considerable degree, but a 
less distinctive face would not 'stick out' as much ." (These instructions are similar to those used in 
several studies by Bruce & Valentine - see Valentine & Bruce, 1986c, for example). Ratings were 
obtained for a total of 40 faces. Subjects for this rating task, and for all other tasks reported here, 
were second year university students . They were asked to complete the task during a lecture period. 
In addition, each of another 38 subjects rated two arrays of images (20 images in total) for typicality, 
on a 15 point scale. Subjects were instructed as follows : "Imagine that you were to encounter the face 
in a crowd of people in a supermarket mall: how likely is it that you will meet someone like this, or 
someone closely resembling this person? If this is a likely event, then the face is typical". This 
instruction is similar to one used .by Valentine & Bruce ( 1986c ). 
Ranking similarity: target arrays 
Three arrays of 10 face images were constructed, on the basis of decreasing PCA similarity to a target 
face in the original set of 62. The Euclidean distances separating the faces are represented on the 
horizontal axes in Figure 7 .10. Target faces were arbitrarily chosen to represent white female, white 
male, and black male groups. The three arrays were combined in various sequences, and orders, for 
purposes of counterbalancing, and each of 28 subjects was asked to rank each member of the three 
arrays in respect of similarity to the target face in each array. 
Ranking similarity: pairings of images 
Nine arrays of twenty facial images were constructed by selecting images from the original set at 
random. Each of 111 subjects was asked to create similarity pairings of the images in one of these 
arrays by i) choosing the most similar pair of faces; ii) the next most similar pair of faces, and so on, 
until all ten possible (exclusive) pairings had been effected. In all of these tasks, subjects were given 
a booklet containing the arrays, with instructions, and were asked to complete the tasks during a 20 
minute period at the beginning of a lecture. 
285 The di stinct sequences were created for counterbalancing purposes - that is, to avoid order effects. As in study I, 
sequences did not systematically affect ratings. and results will be presented without reference to the sequences. 
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Results 
Results generally showed some support for the prospect of using PC-derived spatial distances as 
measures of facial similarity. In addition, individual principal components derived from a PC analysis 
of a set of facial images appear capable of discriminating gross physical differences manifested across 
race, sex and age groups, and may also be predictive of rated distinctiveness and typicality. 
Cluster Analysis 
Similarity scores were derived for each possible face pairing from the principal component analysis, 
and entered into a simi larity matrix. Matrix entries, M;j, thus corresponded to the similarity score 
between the i1h and l faces . This matrix was submitted to hierarchical cluster analysis, with average 
linkage, using SPSS™ software. The analysis appears to have clustered faces on meaningful physical 
dimensions. Figure 7.7 attempts to summarize the cluster analysis graphically, depicting 10 clusters 
identified in the analysis , constituting 41 of the 62 faces. In particular, male and female faces appear 
to have been efficiently separated (c lusters 1, 2, 5, 7 and 8), as have black and white faces (clusters 1, 
2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9 and I 0). 
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Cluster 1. Faces framed by long hair; predominantly female. 
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Cluster 2. Female faces, long Cluster 3. Medium length hair; Cluster 4. Medium-short length hair; 
hair; forehead obscured forehead unobscured, 'sharp' chins forehead unobscured, square chins 
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Cluster 5. Thin, angular female 
faces, forehad unobscured, small 
chins 
Cluster 8. Black .female faces, 
forehead unobscured, thick hair 
Cluster 6. Male faces, forehead Cluster 7. White female faces, 
semi-obscured, large chins forehead semi-obscured, short hair 
Cluster 9. Coloured male faces, 
forehead unobscured, closely 
cropped hair 
Cluster 10. Small faces 
Figure 7.7 Clusters of face images identified in the cluster analysis 
The classification presented as Figure 7.7 is, of course, on ly exploratory: the algorithm driving the 
classification starts by identifying one cluster (all the faces) , and proceeds to the point where there are 
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as many cluster as there are faces (Everitt & Dunn, 1991) - stopping points in between depend on the 
interpretability of the solution. The stopping point in the present analysis was chosen because it 
accommodates most of the faces in the image set ( 41 of 62). 
Discrimination of race, sex and age 
Principal components derived from the PCA of the set of 62 faces were entered into a stepwise 
discriminant function analysis as independent variables, with race, sex and age as dependent, or 
classificatory variables. (Age, and race were categorised for these purposes, as shown in Table 7.4). 
Discriminant functions, in each of these cases, provided accurate classifications of the images. 
In the case of sex, a discriminant function using 10 of the principal components correctly classified 
95% of the cases (X2 = 63 . 7; df= 10; p<0.0001 ). In the case of race, a discriminant function using 5 of 
the principal components correctly classified 90% of the cases (X2 = 95.1; df=lO; p<0.0001). In the 
case of age, a discriminant function using 3 of the principal components correctly classified 82% of 
the cases (X2 = 40.9; df=9; p<0.0001 ). Summary results of the discriminant analyses are reported in 
Table 7.6 
a) Summary of discriminant function analyses 
Classification Eigenvalue %variance Canonical Wilks A xz df p< 
function . explained correlation 
Race 3.83 97.5 0.89 0. 19 95.1 IO 0.0001 
Sex 2. 18 100 0.82 0.31 63.7 IO 0.0001 
Age 1 .51 60.7 0.58 0.49 40.9 9 0.001 
Age2 .21 25.0 0.42 0.74 17.33 4 0.001 
Agei . 12 14.2 0.33 0.90 6.44 0.01 
In the case of Race, there were three categories, and two discriminant functions . The second function was dropped, since it 
exhibited little class ificatory power (X2 = S.3; df=4 ; p>0.2S). In the case of Sex, there were two categories, and only one 
discriminant function. In the case of Age, there were four categories, and three discriminant functions . All three functions 
contributed significantly to the classificatory power of the analysis, and classificatory results are based on the combination. 
b) Discriminant/unctions 
Classification ·.piscriminant functions (C's are principal 
function components) 
Race Cl , Cl3, Cl8, C2, CS 
Sex Cl,CIO,CI4, C22, C3, C33. C42,CS,C7,C9 
Age , CJ! , CS, C8 
Age2 C31, CS, C8 
Agei CJ!, CS, C8 
Weights of components in the discriminant 
functions 
-.62, .SJ, .43, .82, -.69 
.60, .41 , -.42, -.47, . 73, .36, -.48, -.36, -. 77, .50 
.27, .76, .72 
.76, .12, -.65 
.72, -.44, .55 
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c) Classification tables 
Race 
w 8 c Tot 
w 39 0 2 41 
8 0 7 8 
c 2 10 13 
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Age 
30 40 50 Tot 
0 0 1 45 
3 0 0 6 
0 3 0 7 
0 0 4 
83 
w = white; b=black; c=coloured; f=female ; m=male; Tot=Total number of cases. Entries in tables are frequencies , and 
represent the cross tabulation of actual and predicted group membership - diagonal entries are correct classifications. 
Table 7.6 Summary results of the discriminant analysis 
Distinctiveness and typicality 
Subjects reliably rated faces as differentially distinctive and typical, when ratings were examined in 
average across the faces, but there was a considerable degree of inter-subject variation in these 
ratings. Figure 7 .8 shows the ratings of distinctiveness and typicality for 41 and 39 faces respectively: 





10 .. 9 
u 8 Q. 
l':' 7 .., 6 
" 5 ;; a:: 4 
3 . 
2 
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 
Face Face 
31 subjects rated distinctiveness, and 37 subjects rated typicality. Both attributes were rated on a 15 point scale. 'Error bars' 
are constituted by extending a line I standard error above the mean, and I standard error below the mean. Faces are arranged 
in order, from least- to most- distinctive, and least- to most- typical . 
Figure 7.8 Ratings of distinctiveness and typicality. 
Correlations of mean ratings of distinctiveness and typicality with spatial distances of faces from the 
multivariate mean of the principal component space were negligible (r = 0.13 and r = 0.04, 
respectively). It is doubtful that higher-order components in such a space are statistically stable, but I 
nevertheless investigated the relation between distinctiveness and typicality ratings and principal 
components, using multiple linear regression. Multiple regression models regressing individual 
Chapter 7 Preliminary empirica l work 
principal components on these ratings were fairly successful. In the case of distinctiveness, a 
stepwise regression algorithm identified a model consisting of 10 principal components, with R
2
=0.88 
(F = 2 1.8; df = 10, 30; p < 0.0001). In the case of typicality, a stepwise regression algorithm 
identified a model consisting of 3 principal components, with R2=0.33 (F = 5.6; df = 3, 34; p < 0.003). 
The results of the regression analysis are presented in simplified form as Table 7.7 
, Distinctiveness Typicality 
Variables in the Equation Variables in the Equation 
Variable B St err ~ T p< Variable B St Err ~ T p < 
Cl3 -4.67 1.26 -0.24 -3 .71 0.01 Cl5 -8.21 3.03 -0.38 -2.71 0.01 
C22 7.53 1.39 0.35 5.42 0.01 C20 -8.32 3.64 -0.32 -2.28 0.03 
C23 4.12 1.55 0.17 2.66 0.01 C24 7.04 3.32 0.30 2.12 0.04 
C25 -4.52 1.79 -0.18 -2.53 0.02 Constant 7.57 0.25 30.28 0.00 
C33 -4.74 1.96 -0.16 -2 .42 0.02 
R2 = 0.33 ; R2adj . = 0.27 C4 1 12.75 2.07 0.40 6.15 0.01 
C46 9.50 2.55 0.25 3.73 0.01 
C5 4.09 0.75 0.37 5.47 0.01 Analysis of Variance 
R2 = 0.88 ; R2adj . = 0.84 DF SS MS F p < 
Regression 3 39.37 13.12 5.58 0.001 
Analysis of Variance Residual 34 79.97 2.35 
DF SS MS F p < 
Regression 10 93 .39 9.34 21.8 0.001 
Residual 30 12.81 0.43 
Note: C's are principal components. The stepwise procedure was controlled by setting the probability for inclusion to p = 
0.06, and for exclus ion top= 0.1 
Table 7.7 Summary ofregression of principal components on rated distinctiveness and typicality. 
Relation between rated distinctiveness and rated typicality 
Although common language usage suggests that (facial) distinctiveness and typicality are antonyms, 
this is not reflected in their empirical relation. In recent research, Vokey and Read (1988; 1992) 
report evidence which suggests that rated distinctiveness and typicality are partially independent, and 
they invoke the notion of 'context-free familiarity ' as explanation. In the present research, the 
relation between rated distinctiveness and typicality was of moderate strength. Ratings of the 
distinctiveness and typicality of 33 and 3 7 faces respectively, were provided by independent subjects, 
as detailed in Procedure above, and 29 of these faces were common across stimulus sets. For these 
27 faces, mean rated distinctiveness and mean rated typicality were calculated, and the correlation 
determined across faces, which was statistically significant, albeit of moderate strength (r = -0.52; df 
= 27; p < 0.006). 
Rating similarity: arrays 
Subjects reliably ranked faces as differentially similar from target faces, when rankings were 
examined in average across the faces, but there was a considerable degree of inter-subject variation in 
these rankings (see Figure 7.9). The differentiation between faces shown here is in marked contrast to 
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the lack of differentiation shown in Study 1, which is probably consequent on the careful selection of 
faces for the present arrays . 
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Error bars extend I standard error abov e and below mean rankings. 28 subjects provided rankings for each array. Faces are 
arranged in order of mean ranked similarity to targets. 
Figure 7.9 Ratings of similarity to target faces in three arrays often faces . 
In one of the three arrays in which subjects ranked faces in a similarity relation to a target face, the 
correlation between mean similarity ranking and the ranking derived from the PCA was high, but in 
the other two the correlation was low. In the case of the array containing the white female target, the 
correlation was 0.85 (df = 7; p<0.01); in the case of the array containing the black male target, the 
correlation was 0.04; and in the case of the array containing the white male target, the correlation was 
0.08. Figure 7.10 depicts scatterplots of relations for each of the arrays. 
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Error bars are lines extended one standard error above and below the mean. 28 subjects provided similarity rankings for each 
array. 
Figure 7.10 Relations between similarity rankings and PCA similarity measures, in three arrays. 
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Ranking similarity: pairings 
Subjects were required in this task to choose pairs of faces that were most similar to each other, until 
all possible pairings were exhausted. For each pairing made by subjects a corresponding Euclidean 
distance was calculated: this was the distance in the principal component space, between the pair of 
faces selected by the subject. These distances were averaged over subjects so that mean distances 
were obtained for the I 0 exhaustive pairings possible in the task - i.e. each subject produced ten 
, 
pairings; for each of these pairings a PC-based distance was calculated, and then mean distances were 
found for each pairing, averaging over subjects. Since the task required subjects to pair the most 
similar faces in the array, sequentially, and since each array had a determined sequence of closest 
pairings in terms of the principal component coefficients, it was possible to calculate expected 
Euclidean distances. Table 7.8 and Figure 7.11 report average observed distances, and expected 
distances. 
Pair no. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Expected 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.73 0.76 0.78 0.83 0.92 1.08 
Obtained 0.84 0.85 0.83 0.86 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.96 0.93 1.0 I 
St. dev. 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.21 0.21 0.22 
Standard deviations are reported for observed scores. 
Table 7.8 Average obtained and expected Euclidean distances for the pairings task. 
There was a very strong correlation between the expected and obtained distances (r = 0.94, df = 8; 
p<0.0001 ). The size of this correlation is slightly misleading, since the obtained distances were 
averaged over 111 subjects, and there was considerable variability between subjects . A better 
indication of the strength of the relation may be the effect size calculated from an appropriate 
Analysis of Variance 
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Figure 7.11 Relation between observed and predicted Euclidean distance in the face pairing task 
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Accordingly, a repeated measures single factor Analysis of Variance was conducted across pairings, 
taking observed Euclidean distance of each face pairing made by subjects as the dependent variable, 
and ordinal sequence (which had ten levels) as the independent variable. The omnibus test in this 
analysis was not of much interest, since the PCA measure of facial similarity provided fairly precise 
predictions of differences between levels of the independent variable. Figure 7.1 I shows the 
predictions, and it is clear from visual inspection that the relation between ordinal sequence and 
predicted distance is nearly Iinear.286 The analysis of variance was therefore conducted by partitioning 
sums of squares with a set of orthogonal polynomials, which allows one to estimate effects due to 
linear, quadratic, cubic and other higher order terms. The analysis was implemented under the 
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It is clear from the trend analysis that the linear effect provides a good fit to the observed pairings 
data: the effect size was substantial (T)2 = 0.44), and also statistically significant (F = 74.13 ; df= 1,94; 
p<0.0001 ). Since the performance expected in terms of the PCA similarity measure was very close to 
constituting a linear relation, the observed pairings data corresponds very well to that predicted by the 
PCA measure. 
Similarity measures derived from low dimensional component spaces 
One of the chief benefits of principal component analysis is its ability to reduce a large set of 
correlated variables to a small set of orthogonal components, which reproduce the variables with 
relatively little error. The theoretical development of the PCA_based measure of similarity outlined in 
an earlier chapter did not address this issue: the goal of the measure is to capture similarity 
information, and not necessarily to develop a data-efficient representational scheme. Indeed, all 
similarity measures used thus far are determined by the full set of principal components, since the full 
set reproduces the set of face images without any error. There are problems with this approach, 
though, which led me to explore similarity scores derived from low dimensional component spaces. 
216 It is important to note that the predicted distances are averages, since multiple arrays were used in the pairing task, and 
each array has a unique pairing sequence. Although the relation depicted in Figure 7.11 appears to deviate slightly from 
linearity, it is unlikely that fitting non-linear models will be of much use, given the instability of the distance estimates. 
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In the first place, although the full set of components (say k) perfectly reproduces the original 
variables, th is will be true of any k linearly independent vectors of appropriate length.211 The 
components could possess little fac ial information themselves and yet reproduce a set of face images. 
In the second place, higher order components will be high ly unstable, and will depend almost 
exclusively on the particular image set they are derived from. Lower order components will be much 
more stable, ~nd more likely to possess the ability to reproduce images not in the original image set.211 
Ultimately, if the measure is to be of some use, similarity scores for particular faces will need to be 
generated from a base set of eigenfaces, and not from endless, repeated principal component analyses. 
In order to explore the use of a lower dimensional imilarity score, the principal component analysis 
reported above, under Analysis of stimuli, was repeated for the images in Study 2, except that the 
statistical software forced an analysis with just five components.219 The component solution generated 
in this fash ion accounted for approximately 75% of the variance across face images. Similarity scores 
derived from the solution were compared to those generated by the full set of principal components, 
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Figure 7.12 Relation between similarity scores derived from the full set of eigenfaces, and scores 
derived from the set containing the first five eigenfaces. 
It is clear that there is a very strong relation between the similarity scores, although the strength of the 
relation varies quite substantially across the three array types (it is weakest for the array containing 
white males). This may be due to the under-representation of the white male group in the image set. 
217 This is a well known mathematical result. See Lang ( 1987). 
211 The approximate standard error of eigenvalues (for large n) is given by Flury & Riedwyl ( 1988) as s(ln) = tnJL~J , 
where lh =the h1h eigenvalue. 
219 The decision to use five components was based on the size of the eigenvalues, and on an examination of the scree plot (as 
discussed earlier, on page 169 of th is chapter). 
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Discussion of Study 2, and General Discussion 
The results of Study 2 provide support for the claim that PCA-based measures of facial similarity and 
distinctiveness capture important facial information, and that this information corresponds in 
reasonable degree to human perceptions and judgements of facial similarity and distinctiveness. 
Several aspects of the study and the evidence it produced are of some concern, though: in particular, 
there are issues about i) the practical implementation of the PCA measure, and ii) the enduring 
problem of inter-subject variability. These will be addressed under several headings, below, 
alongside a consideration of changes to effect in the research strategy followed in Studies 1 and 2. 
Discrimination of' gross' differences in physical characteristics 
The PCA measure of similarity is able, at relatively high levels of accuracy, to discriminate groups of 
markedly dissimilar faces. Thus, relatively simple component-based discriminant functions 
distinguished faces of different sex and race with considerable, but imperfect accuracy. Similarly, a 
simple function was able to discriminate age categories, but with less success. 
The degree of inaccuracy associated with the discriminant functions, and its implications, are difficult 
to evaluate. In the first place, classification tables - such as those presented earlier in Table 7.6 - are 
known to overestimate the accuracy of the classification (Everitt & Dunn, 1991 ), and it is useful to 
examine the degree of accuracy with some form of sample subdivision. This is not attempted in the 
present chapter, but the issue is taken up in a study to be reported in Chapter 8. In the second place, 
there is an argument to be made for upper limits on the accuracy of the present discriminant functions : 
since human judges are rarely able to achieve more than about 95% accurate classification of sex 
(Bruce et al., 1993 ), this is perhaps the maximum precision we should expect from discriminant 
functions that attempt the same. 
At any rate, the classificatory ability of the PC analysis is an indication that it is capturing facial 
information relevant to human perception of facial similarity. 
Typicality and distinctiveness 
Facial distinctiveness and typicality are key variables in face recognition research and theory: in 
Chapter 5 I reviewed much of this work, and suggested that distance of a facial image from the origin 
of a component space may capture facial distinctiveness. However, the empirical investigation 
reported in this chapter showed that such a measure is a poor indicator of rated distinctiveness and 
typicality. Nevertheless, principal component analysis does seem to capture important distinctiveness 
information: component-based regression equations proved highly successful at modelling rated 
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distinctiveness, but proved less successful in the case of rated typicality. In both cases, few of the 
early components were selected by the stepwise algorithm for inclusion in the final equation. Thus, 
even as the success of the modelling suggests that the PCA approach may be a fruitful avenue to 
pursue in the measurement of facial distinctiveness, it also raises problems. It appears desirable to 
base PCA similarity (and distinctiveness) scores on a low dimensional component space (I make this 
argument on page 178, and later in the discussion below), but it seems that distinctiveness and 
typicality information is captured by higher order components. Measures based on low dimensional 
subspaces are therefore likely to lose information about distinctiveness and typicality of faces. 
Nevertheless, it may be too early to give up on the potential of a PCA based distance measure as an 
index of facial distinctiveness: the overwhelming problem with results from studies I and 2 is that the 
principal component analysis was based on a comparatively small image set (k=62), and this set itself 
was disproportionately constituted by young, white females . In Study 3, a much larger and better 
stratified image set is subjected to PC analysis, and indices of facial distinctiveness are again 
investigated. 
Similarity measures based on lower-dimensional spaces 
The measure of facial similarity developed at the end of Chapter 5 assumed that the similarity 
measure should be calculated with respect to the full component solution i.e. by determining 
Euclidean distances over all k of the component coefficients in a k-component solution. The full 
solution perfectly reconstructs all faces in the image set, and a similarity measure based on the full 
solution would lose no facial information. However, this approach makes the measure highly 
dependent on the specific solution obtained in the PC analysis, and analyses based on different image 
sets may produce quite different similarity measures. Furthermore, high order coefficients have very 
small eigenvalues associated with them, are consequently highly unstable, and it is questionable that 
they have any statistical meaning (in the sense of constituting variation not attributable to mere 
sampling fluctuation). If the measure is to have practical utility, it should be possible to find a 
similarity score for two faces by projecting them into a reasonably stable component space. 
Lower-dimensional spaces are more likely to be stable and relatively generalizable, and are a 
promising solution to this problem: in both studies, results showed that similarity measures based on 
greatly reduced component spaces corresponded very well to measures derived from the full solution. 
The similarity measure and perceived facial similarity 
The strength of the relation between mean rated similarity and Euclidean distances derived from the 
PCA approach is promising, particularly for the pairings task. However, there are several troubling 
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features. In the first place, two of the arrays in the array ranking task produced results which 
exhibited virtually no relation between perceived similarity and Euclidean distances. This may be due 
to the particular constitution of the image set: 66% of the set was drawn from a white female 
university population, and comparatively few from other groupings in the same population. This is 
telling in the present case: there was a strong correspondence between rated similarity and the PCA 
measure in the case of the white female array, and absent relations in the case of the other two arrays, 
which were constituted by faces drawn from poorly represented segments of the image set. The 
arrays which failed to show a relation were constituted by faces underrepresented in the sampling 
plan, and the components that emerged in the analysis may have been inadequate to the task of 
representing general properties of these groups of faces. 
Also troubling is the great degree of inter-subject variation in facial similarity ratings: indeed, there is 
little to model if subjects themselves cannot agree on similarity judgements! Earlier, I mentioned the 
near-complete absence of discussion in the literature on this issue: although many face recognition 
researchers have investigated facial similarity, the fact that human similarity judgements vary so 
greatly has not been addressed. This phenomenon requires careful examination, since most practical 
applications of the similarity metric assume reasonable degrees of subject equivalence - and I daresay, 
South African courts assume such equivalence, otherwise the key notion that identification parades 
should consist of physically similar persons is impracticable. 
Reconstructing the similarity task 
It appears possible to shed light on the problem of inter-subject variation by constructing alternate 
similarity rating tasks. Thus, in Study 2, the 'pairings task' revealed a strong relation between the 
PCA based similarity measure and rated similarity, whereas the array rating task produced results that 
were equivocal. Since one of the primary objectives in the development of the similarity measure is 
to provide an independent means of evaluating the fairness of identification parade, it may be useful 
to explore the relation between the PCA based measure and indices of 'parade fairness' (which were 
discussed at some length in Chapters 4 and 6). This is done in a later chapter. 
It is important, though, to consider possible explanations for the inter-subject variation, rather than 
merely generating ad hoc operationalizations of perceived similarity. This will allow us to think of 
corrective strategies. 
The most bothersome explanation from the point of view of both legal and psychological work on 
identification parades is that people are inherently inconsistent in perceptions of similarity: that is, 
perceptions of similarity at time 1 differ substantially from those at time 2. Common sense suggests 
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that this explanation is false, 290 and it can be investigated with comparative ease, using test-retest 
techniques. 
Another bothersome explanation - fortunately, with a more tractable outcome - is that similarity 
judgements are made on multiple dimensions, and different subjects tend to base their judgement on 
different dimensions (or, equivalently, weight the same dimensions differentially). This explanation 
was considered in the discussion of Study 1, and it appears that there is some evidence for it. It may 
be useful to explore the basis of similarity judgements in order to obtain further and clearer 
confirmation. Ways of doing this are explored later in the thesis. 
The third, and final explanation I wish to consider here is that the range of perceived similarity is 
extremely limited (for all subjects). Gross subject differences are perceived (between sex and race 
groups, for example), but lesser differences are not. Consequently, similarity judgements of targets 
who are not clearly distinct will be unstable and will show large inter-subject variation. This does not 
necessarily spell trouble for identification parade practice: in Chapter 4 I reviewed research conducted 
by Luus & Wells (1991), in which they argue that parades should exhibit 'propitious heterogeneity'. 
If this explanation turns out to be valid, we will need to investigate the relation of such heterogeneity 
to measures of parade fairness . 
The implication for the PCA measure of similarity is that it might need 'calibration' in terms of this 
relation: that is, we will need to know what degree of similarity on the PCA measure is predictive of 
lineups that have poor functional and effective sizes. 
Limitations of the image set 
The greatest limitation of studies I and 2 is the size and constitution of the image sets used there . The 
set was small, and highly disproportionate in respect of sex, race and age. This constraint is likely to 
have influenced the similarity (and distinctiveness) measures in several ways. In the first place, the 
principal component analysis (which sustains the measure) is likely to have produced components that 
are quite unstable. This means that the components (and therefore, the similarity scores) will have 
limited generalizability, and that it is probably unwise to apply the similarity metric to faces that were 
not in the original set. In the second place, since the image set was disproportionately composed of 
white, female faces, it is probable that the components provide a poor representation of other groups 
of faces. Similarity scores based on these components will be inaccurate, since they assume that 
components capture population information. Accordingly, in the further empirical work discussed in 
290 Facial similarity is part of the everyday perceptual world: it is common to remark on the facial similarity of twins, siblings, 
and families . Stable perceptions surely underlie this talk. 
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later chapters, a much larger set of face images was collected and submitted to principal component 
analysis. 
Chapter 8 ~ further empirical tests of the similarity measure ~ 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I reported two empirical studies. The first of these was a preliminary 
empirical investigation of the facial similarity measure, and the second showed that the measure has 
promise. The investigations reported there, however, were hampered by several methodological 
weaknesses, which are addressed in the studies reported in this chapter. In the first place, whereas the 
earlier investigations used a relatively small image set, which was homogenous with respect to gross 
subject characteristics (e.g. race and sex), the similarity measure in the present work was derived from 
a relatively large, heterogeneous image set (278 faces). Other methodological issues addressed in this 
second set of studies include i) the nature of instructions given to subjects in face rating tasks, and ii) 
the test-retest reliability of ratings of facial similarity. 
A central intention of the research reported in this chapter was to repeat the similarity rating tasks 
used in the research of Chapter 7. The results there were mixed, and it was not clear whether this was 
due to the limited image set, the high inter-subject variation, the nature of the rating task, or the 
measure itself. The results from the re-administration (and modification) of the task are reported here, 
and they point again to the usefulness of the similarity measure. 
The similarity measure is also examined in other substantive ways. In a previous chapter, the 
similarity of two faces was defined as the distance between them in a principal component space, 
which is formed by subjecting digitized images of faces to principal component analysis. In 
component analyses reported earlier in the thesis, frontal photographs of faces constituted the images. 
However, it is clear that there are many possible viewing angles, and in this chapter I report work 
which investigates the generality of the similarity measure across two different views of faces , and 
also explores the possibility of 'combining' views to give a better measure. Finally, I turn to two 
questions sustaining much of this thesis: can the measure be used as a gauge of the fairness of 
identification parades?, and what is the relationship between facial similarity and identification 
accuracy in identification parades? I attempt to answer these questions in two experiments. In the 
first experiment, similarity of targets in an array was manipulated, and the effect of this manipulation 
on standard indices of parade fairness was assessed. In the second experiment, subjects were given 
photographs of people allegedly observed in a particular location, and later tested for their ability to 
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identify them in a photo-parade. Manipulations in this experiment included varying the similarity of 
parade members. 
Collection and analysis of facial images 
The research reported in the previous chapter used a set of images which proved limited in several 
respects. In particular, the set was relatively small (62 images), and was disproportionately 
constituted by photographs of young white women. I argued in that chapter that a much larger - and 
more representative - corpus of images is needed to study perceptions and ratings of fac ial similarity. 
The first task for the present research was therefore to collect such a corpus. 
Several possibilities were explored regarding possible sources of facial images; I opted finally for a 
strategy which involved setting up a photographic stall in supermarket malls, and offering passers-by 
a free photograph in exchange for permission to use this photograph for research purposes. This 
approach seemed likely to attract a diverse collection of people, and to ensure heterogeneity with 
respect to gross physical characteristics. (It would be preferab le, of course, to construct a sampling 
frame which ensures representativeness, but it is difficult even to imagine how such a scheme could 
be constructed in the case of facial characteristics!) 
Letters were sent to the management committees of twenty supermarket malls in the Cape Peninsula, 
requesting permission to operate a photographic stall in the manner described above. Four 
committees responded positively, and photographs were accordingly collected over a two week 
period. Photographic subjects were recruited by i) placing posters in conspicuous places, and ii) 
directly propositioning passers-by. A total of 278 people agreed to pose for photographs. Their 
characteristics are summarised in Table 8.1, and the (frontal) images are printed as Appendix D. 
Age •- Sex Race 
29 1 
Category N Category N Category N 
16 - 19 22 Male 148 Black 14 
20- 29 122 Female 130 Coloured 139 
30- 39 74 White 121 
40-49 40 
> 50 20 
Table 8.1 Subject characteristics of the 278 facial images collected in supermarket malls. 
291 Race groups reported here are based on those defined in the (now defunct) South African Population Registration Act. 
They should not be taken to indicate distinct genetic or physiognomic populations, although the groups do differ 
considerably in physical appearance. 
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It was not possible to standardize ambient lighting in the different locations. Instead, subjects were 
positioned in front of a grey matte screen, and a stroboscopic flash unit provided a direct source of 
light. Two 35mm format cameras were used to take photographs (a Canon EOS 500, and Canon EOS 
100), at a focal length of approximately 80mm. Exposure was controlled by the automatic TTL 
metering system of each camera. Subjects were asked to adopt a neutral expression (as in a 'passport' 
photograph), and to look straight ahead at the camera. A second photograph was then taken, with 
subjects adopting a :Y.. profile position. 
Photographic film was later developed by the author, contact printed on Ilford 'Pearl' photographic 
paper, and digitally scanned at 300 dpi on a Hewlett Packard llx flatbed grey-image scanner. 
In research reported in the previous chapter, digital images were edited to remove jewellery and other 
extraneous costume. This process is laborious, and will surely be unattractive to people who wish to 
use the similarity measure at a practical level. Accordingly, I explored the effect of leaving jewellery 
and costume intact on derived similarity scores. 
Similarity scores and extraneous costume 
Twenty facial images were randomly selected from the larger set of 278 frontal images. Images were 
standardized according to the scheme outlined in Chapter 7, to a size of 120 x 150 = 18 000 pixels: 
that is, all images were scaled to equalise inter-ocular distance, and positioning of the left and right 
pupils.292 These images were submitted along with the remaining 258 images to principal component 
analysis, and complete component coefficients were computed for each image. An inter-correlation 
matrix was determined by correlating the co-ordinates of each of the 20 images with the co-ordinates 
of every other image in the set of 20 (each image is defined by the PCA as a set of component co-
ordinates). The twenty images were then digitally edited to remove jewellery and other extraneous 
adornments, and the process was repeated as for the unmodified images. Two correlation matrices 
were thus formed, one containing inter-correlations of unmodified images, and the other containing 
inter-correlations of modified images. These matrices were differenced, and the resulting absolute 
differences appear to be small, albeit non-zero (see Table 8.2, where the average absolute difference is 
reported for each image). 
292 In the case of profile views, faces were equalised on chin-nose distance, and positioning of the left pupil. The principal 
component analysis of profile views was in other respects identical to that pursued for frontal views. 
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F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 FB F9 F10 
0.1 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.1 0.03 
F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 F16 F17 F18 F19 F20 
0.04 0.08 0.1 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11 
Median difference= 0.065. Fl =face image 1, F2 =face image 2, and so on. 
Entries were calculated as follows: each face was correlated with every other face, in both modified and unmodified 
forms. Absolute differences were computed for each of these correlations, and averaged columnwise (i .e. for each 
face). Thus, the entry 0.1 under Fl indicates that the average absolute difference in inter-correlations between Fl 
and all other faces, across modified and unmodified forms, is 0.1 
Table 8.2 Absolute differences in inter-correlations across modified and unmodified images. 
The effect of using unmodified images on similarity scores is thus probably quite small, and further 
analyses were computed using only these images. (Further investigations may of course show that the 
small median difference reported above is non-trivial). 
Principal component analysis and the similarity metric 
In Chapter 7 I noted· that it is probably inefficient to derive the similarity measure from the full set of 
component coefficients generated by principal component analysis. High order components typically 
resolve negligible amounts of variance, and including them may hardly alter similarity scores (see 
Chapter 7, page 178 onward). The problem is to identify an adequate number of components for the 
component space. This problem is typically dealt with in multivariate statistical practice by using a 
number of ' rules of thumb ', viz. Kaiser' s 'eigenvalues > l ' rule, and Catell ' s ' scree plot ' . In the 
present case, both the scree plot and Kaiser's rule proved of little help. Figure 8. 1 presents two scree 
plots - in the first of these, the scale the eigenvalues take makes the plot impossible to interpret, and in 
the second, there is no discernible ' elbow'. 
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Figure 8.1 Scree plots of eigenvalues from the PCA of278 frontal facial images 
Table 8.3 , on the other hand, shows that excluding all eigenvalues< 1 would lead to a 24 component 
solution which leaves 15% of the solution unresolved, and is surely unsatisfactory. An alternative 
rule suggested by Joliffe (1972), which leads to excluding eigenvalues< 0.7, does little better. 
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No. Value Cum% No. Value Cum% No. Value Cum% No. Value Cum% No. Value Cum% No. Value Cum% No. Value Cum% No. Value 
var. var. var. var. var. var. var. 
1 123.94 44.60 36 0.64 89.00 71 0.26 94 .0 106 0.14 96.40 141 0.09 97 .80 176 0.06 98.70 211 0.04 99.30 248 0.03 
2 40.40 59.10 37 0.61 89.20 72 0.25 94.10 107 0.14 96.50 142 0.09 97 .90 1n 0.06 98.80 212 0.04 99.40 249 0.03 
3 13.48 64.00 38 0.61 89.40 73 0.25 94.20 108 0.14 96.50 143 0.09 97.90 178 0.06 98.80 213 0.04 99.40 250 0.03 
4 9.66 67.40 39 0.60 89.60 74 0.24 94.30 109 0.14 96.60 144 0.08 97.90 179 0.06 98.80 214 0.04 99.40 251 0.03 
5 7.77 70.20 40 0.55 89.80 75 0.24 94.40 110 0.13 96.60 145 0.08 98.00 180 0.06 98.80 215 0.04 99.40 252 0.02 
6 6.77 72.70 41 0.55 90.00 76 0.24 94.50 111 0.13 96.70 146 0.08 98.00 181 0.05 98.80 218 0.04 99.40 253 0.02 
7 4.39 74.30 42 0.54 90.20 77 0.23 94.60 112 0.13 96.70 147 0.08 98.00 182 0.05 98.90 217 0.04 99.40 254 0.02 
8 3.20 75.40 43 0.52 90.40 78 0.22 94.60 113 0.13 96.80 148 0.08 98.00 183 0.05 98.90 218 0.04 99.40 255 0.02 
9 2.92 76.50 44 0.50 90.60 79 0.22 94.70 114 0.13 96.80 149 0.08 98.10 184 0.05 98.90 219 0.04 99.50 256 0.02 
10 2.71 77.40 45 0.50 90.80 80 0.22 94.80 115 0.12 96.90 150 0.08 98.10 185 0.05 98.90 220 0.04 99.50 257 0.02 
11 2.68 78.40 46 0.47 90.90 81 0.21 94.90 116 0.12 96.90 151 0.08 98.10 186 0.05 98.90 221 0.04 99.50 258 0.02 
12 2.44 79.30 47 0.47 91.10 82 0.21 94.90 117 0.12 97.00 152 0.08 98.20 187 0.05 98.90 222 0.04 99.50 259 0.02 
13 1.99 80.00 48 0.45 91 .30 83 0.21 95.00 118 0.12 97.00 153 0.08 98.20 188 0.05 99.00 223 0.04 99.50 260 0.02 
14 1.82 80.60 49 0.43 91.40 84 0.20 95.10 119 0.12 97 .00 154 0.08 98.20 189 0.05 99.00 224 0.03 99.50 261 0.02 
15 1.79 81.30 50 0.42 91.60 85 0.20 95.20 120 0.12 97.10 155 0.07 98.20 190 0.05 99.00 225 0.03 99.50 262 0.02 
16 1.72 81 .90 51 0.41 91.70 86 0.20 95.20 121 0.11 97.10 156 0.07 98.30 191 0.05 99.00 226 0.03 99.50 263 0.02 
17 1.54 82.50 52 0.40 91.90 87 0.19 95.30 122 0.11 97.20 157 0.07 98.30 192 0.05 99.00 227 0.03 99.60 264 0.02 
18 1.52 83.00 53 0.39 92.00 88 0.19 95.40 123 0.11 97.20 158 0.07 98.30 193 0.05 99.10 228 0.03 99.60 265 0.02 
19 1.32 83.50 54 0.38 92.10 89 0.19 95.40 124 0.11 97.20 159 0.07 98.30 1M 0.05 99.10 229 0.03 99.60 266 0.02 
20 1.27 83.90 55 0.37 92.30 90 0.18 95.50 125 0.11 97.30 160 0.07 98.40 195 0.05 99.10 230 0.03 99.60 267 0.02 
21 1.22 84.40 56 0.37 92.40 91 0.18 95.60 126 0.11 97.30 161 0.07 98.40 198 0.05 99.10 231 0.03 99.60 268 0.02 
22 11 6 84.80 57 0.34 92.50 92 0.18 95.60 127 0.10 97.40 162 0.07 98.40 197 0.05 99.10 232 0.03 99.60 269 0.02 
23 1.12 85.20 58 0.34 92.60 93 0.17 95.70 128 0.10 97.40 163 0.07 98.40 198 0.05 99.10 233 0.03 99.60 270 0.02 
24 1.07 85.60 59 0.33 92.80 M 0.17 95.80 129 0.10 97.40 164 0.07 98.50 1H 0.05 99.20 234 0.03 99.60 271 0.02 
25 0.99 85.90 60 0.33 92.90 95 0.17 95.80 130 0.10 97.50 165 0.07 98.50 200 0.05 99.20 235 0.03 99.60 272 0.02 
26 0.93 86.30 81 0.33 93.00 98 0.16 95.90 131 0.10 97 .50 166 0.07 98.50 201 0.05 99.20 236 0.03 99.70 273 0.02 
27 0.91 86.60 62 0.32 93.10 97 0.16 95.90 132 0.10 97.50 187 0.07 98.50 202 0.04 99.20 237 O.D3 99.70 274 0.02 
28 0.87 86.90 63 0.31 93.20 98 0.16 96.00 133 0.10 97.60 168 0.06 98.60 203 0.04 99.20 238 0.03 99.70 275 0.02 
29 0.83 87 .20 64 0.30 93.30 99 0.16 96.10 134 0.10 97 .60 169 0.06 98.60 204 0.04 99.20 239 0.03 99.70 276 0.02 
30 0.76 87 .50 65 0.30 93.40 100 0.16 96.10 135 0.09 97.60 170 0.06 98.60 205 0.04 99.30 240 0.03 99.70 2n 0.01 
31 0.74 87.80 86 0.29 93.50 101 0.15 96.20 136 0.09 97.70 171 0.06 98.60 206 0.04 99.30 241 0.03 99.70 278 0.01 
32 0.71 88.00 67 0.29 93.70 102 0.15 96.20 137 0.09 97.70 172 0.06 98.60 207 0.04 99.30 242 0.03 99.70 
33 0.70 88.30 68 0.28 93.80 103 0.15 96.30 138 0.09 97.70 173 0.06 98.70 208 0.04 99.30 243 0.03 99.70 
34 0.67 88.50 69 0.28 93.90 104 0.15 96.30 139 0.09 97.80 174 0.06 98.70 209 0.04 99.30 244 0.03 99.70 
35 0.65 88.70 70 0.26 93.90 105 0.15 96.40 140 0.09 97 .80 175 0.06 98.70 210 0.04 99.30 245 0.03 99.70 
No. =Number of eigenvector; Value= eigenvalue of corresponding eigenvector; Cum. var. % =cumulative percentage variance resolved by 
current and all preceding eigenvectors. Eigenvalues are rounded to two places. 
Table 8.3 Eigenvalues and cumulative resolved variance from the PCA of 278 frontal views 
Accordingly, I pursued a different way of th inking about the number of eigenvectors on which to base 
the component space. Since the goal of PCA in the present case is to constitute a space in which faces 
are accurately represented by common, orthogonal components, I exam ined reconstructions of faces 
based on increasing numbers of eigenvectors. Reconstructions of ten randomly chosen faces based on 







































Reconstructions are weighted linear combinations of eigenvectors (or principal components). The weights are the 
coefficients of principal components produced by PCA 
Figure 8.2 Reconstructions of I 0 face images with increasingly large sets of eigenvectors 
Figure 8.2 clearly shows that the set of eigenvectors with associated eigenvalues > 1 (i .e. the first 24 
eigenvectors) do not satisfactorily reconstruct facial images. Indeed, from visual inspection of the 
reconstructions, it appears that at least 100 eigenvectors are required to produce facial images which 
approximate their original form . This supports a claim O'Toole et al. (1994) make, namely that 
higher order components carry important information of identity. Perhaps the measure of facial 
similarity does not need to be sustained by a representational basis that is precise with respect to 
identity, but the reconstructions based on 24 and 50 images are quite imprecise, and this does not 
invite confidence in highly reduced component solutions. All similarity scores computed in the 
present research are thus based on solutions with 100 eigenvectors. 
The assumption of linearity 
In Chapter 5, I briefly discussed alternate ways of standardizing face images prior to PCA. One 
alternative was devised by Craw & Cameron ( 1991 ), with the intention of maintaining several of the 
axioms of linear systems. I disregarded this approach earlier, since a study by Hancock et al. (1994) 
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appeared to show that there is little difference between the standard and modified approaches. In the 
analysis of the large set of images collected for the present research, I decided to return to this issue. 
The problem Craw & Cameron identified with the standard approach to PCA of face images, is that it 
breaks the axioms for vector addition and scalar multiplication. The linear space that has its basis in 
the eigenvectors produced by the PCA of face images must meet the following axioms (at Ieast): 293 
Scalar multiplication Vector addition 
If v is in V, then av is in V for all a in JR If u and v are in V, then u + v is in V 
where Vis a vector space, u, v are vectors, a is a scalar, Ris the set of real numbers. 
PCA produces a basis for representing faces in terms of common components, and this basis works on 
the assumption that the axioms above are satisfied: each face in the image set is represented as the 
weighted combination of eigenvectors i.e. the scalar multiplication and addition of eigenvectors . The 
problem is that certain combinations of faces in the image set are not incontrovertibly members of 
' face space'. The standardization scheme suggested by Craw & Cameron corrects the 'blurring' 
problem (see Chapter 5), but it is not clear to me that it satisfies the axioms outlined above. This is 
because combinations of the basis vectors of 'face space' produce faces that are quite unlike faces , 
even when a corrective scheme is used like that suggested by Cameron and Craw. Figure 8.3 shows i) 
the first ten eigenfaces produced by the PCA of the frontal views of the image set of 278 faces; and ii) 
combinations of eigenfaces weighted according to the covariance structure of the component 
coefficients. 
El= eigenface I, E2 = eigenface 2, and so on. Fie!= fictitious face I, Fic2 =fictitious face2 , and so on . 
Figure 8.3 The first 10 eigenfaces from the PCA, and 10 'random'294 combinations of the eigenfaces. 
293 See Lang, ( 1987), or any first level linear algebra text. 
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None of the combinations depicted above are anything like real faces, although all have shape and 
form closer to faces than to any other objects. There appear to be two important implications for 
present purposes. The first is that the kinds of differences the combinations above have in relation to 
real faces are not restricted to shape, and this means that the scheme suggested by Craw & Cameron 
will not ensure that PC-based representational schemes meet the axioms of linear systems. An 
important qualification in this respect is that it is difficult to know what degree of correspondence 
between combinations and real faces is acceptable - the images in the figure above resemble real 
faces, even if they are clearly not faces. The second implication of breaking the axioms is that the 
measure of facial similarity proposed in this thesis may rest on tenuous ground. The similarity 
between two faces is defined as the Euclidean distance between the image vectors representing the 
faces in component space, but this distance is meaningful only if the space is linear. Again, this 
depends on how strictly we evaluate the resemblance between combinations of basis vectors and real 
faces. If we are prepared to accept a component space which is 'facelike', rather than a space 
constituted only by real faces, the consequences will be less serious. 
Study 3: Ratings of similarity and distinctiveness 
Similarity 
In the first of the empirical studies reported in this chapter, I returned to the rating tasks which 
provided mixed support for the measure of facial similarity in Study 2. In these tasks, subjects are 
asked to rate the similarity of a number of people to a designated ' target ', and ratings are correlated 
with distances of the faces in component space. One of the tasks in Study 2 yielded results which 
showed a strong relation between rated similarity and spatial distances, but the remaining two did not. 
However, there were methodological uncertainties in Study 2, which I discussed in Chapter 7. I 
attempted to address these uncertainties in Study 3. 
In the first place, the image set in Study 2 was severely limited by both size and homogeneity. The 
corrections in this respect have been outlined at some length above. In the second place, the rating 
task in the earlier study required subjects to rank stimuli in terms of similarity to a target. This may 
have narrowed the range of differences in perceived similarity available as responses to subjects, and 
the task was altered in Study 3 to allow subjects to rate similarity on a continuous scale. In the third 
place, the task of explicitly rating fac ial similarity is an unusual one. Although it is likely that most 
humans frequently make implicit judgements of similarity, to be asked to do so in a formal task is 
294 A weight was selected at random for the first component (within the range produced by the PCA for the set of 278 faces 
on the first component), and weights for a further 99 components were generated from the covariances between the first 
component and the next 99 components in the PCA of278 frontal faces. 
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unusual, and invites unusual behaviour. This may make subjects adopt a mechanistic and simplified 
approach (e.g. using one facial feature as the basis for the judgement). Accordingly, subjects were 
given instructions in Study 3 which attempted to structure their judgement. 
Other issues were addressed in Study 3, which were not specifically identified as methodological 
weaknesses in Study 2. Whereas Study 2 did not examine the effect of facial distinctiveness on 
similarity ratings, Study 3 varied the distinctiveness of targets in order to assess separate and 
interactive effects of distinctiveness. In the face pairings task reported in Chapter 7, it appeared that 
subjects were able to distinguish gross differences in similarity, but were not able to make fine 
distinctions. Accordingly, tasks were structured in Study 3 so that arrays were constituted by 
members who differed ' continuously' or ' discontinuously ' on the similarity distance measure. That 
is, arrays were either constituted by several groups of members who differed in substantial ' steps ' of 
similarity from the target (i.e. 'discontinuously'), or by members who differed in small, evenly spaced 
' steps' of similarity from the target (i .e. ' continuously' ). If subjects are able only to make gross 
distinctions, their judgements should match the spatial distance measure better in ' discontinuous ' 
arrays than in ' continuous' arrays. 
Subjects 
Subjects were 76 Psychology I students at the University of Cape Town. They participated in the 
study during a lecture. 
Materials 
Twelve array tasks were constructed in a similar manner to those used in Study 2. Ten face images 
were printed on paper in array form, and one of these was designated as the target. Three arrays were 
joined with a covering page of instructions into an experimental booklet. The arrays varied according 
to the design of the study, presented below. A sample booklet is reproduced as Appendix E. 
Instructions issued to subjects were altered from those used in Study 2, in line with the rationale 
outlined earlier: 
Over the page you will find three collections of faces. The collections are marked "A", ·e·. and ·c·. 
respectively. In each collection you will notice that each face has a number below it, except one, which is 
called the 'target' face. I would like you to compare the numbered faces to the target face - how similar in facial 
appearance are they to the target? 
In order to arrive at the rating of similarity, use any facial quality you think relevant. You may also wish to take 
the following into consideration: 
Hair: are the length, colour, and texture similer? 
Hair1ine: is the hair1 ine equally high or low on the forehead? 
Face shape: do the faces have the same shape (e.g. round, thin, angular)? 
Noses: are the noses similar in size and shape? 
Mouths: are the mouths equal in size? are the lips equally full? 
Skin texture and colour: is thia similar? 
ChiN: are these the same shape and size? 
Please use a scale with the extreme values shown below. You can assign any number between 0 and 10. 
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Not at all similar Highly similar 
Please indicate for each face, how similar it is to the target face. Do this by writing the value you have chosen 
next to the number of the face. Repeat this process for each of the three collections, "A', "B" and "C". 
Design 
The principal data of interest in Study 3 were the similarity ratings subjects made in array tasks. 
However, these arrays were constructed to vary in terms of the distinctiveness of the target (low, 
moderate, high), and in terms of the graded similarity of the members of the parade (discontinuous, 
continuous). The similarity and distinctiveness of parade members was determined from the PC-
based distance measure. In addition, each of the six arrays created in this way was formed in two 






34 37 I 35 37 
38 35 
Cell entries are numbers of subject responses, and not numbers of subject per se, since 
subjects completed three tasks. (The ' distinctiveness ' factor was a repeated measure). 
Figure 8.4 Design for Study 3 - similarity rating tasks. 
Procedure 
Subjects were asked at the beginning of a lecture to participate ' in a study on face perception and 
recognition', after which experimental booklets were distributed. These booklets had been arranged 
in a randomized order prior to distribution, and the cover page gave subjects all further necessary 
instruct ions. The booklets themselves variously contained arrays which were instances of conditions 
and sequences described in 'Materials ' and 'Design ' above. 
Results 
Results of the similarity rating task provided strong positive support for the notion that the PC-based 
similarity metric corresponds in reasonable degree to ratings of similarity made by human subjects. 
The facial distinctiveness of targets and the graded similarity of arrays affected ratings of similarity, 
but not so greatly as to negate the correspondence between the spatial distance measure and subject 
ratings. 
The dependent variable for analyses of distinctiveness and graded similarity effects was the 
correlation between individual subject ratings of similarity and the spatial distance measure. Each 
correlation was transformed to approximate standard normal deviate form for purposes of analysis, 
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using the Fisher transforrnation.295 Three separate between-subjects one way analyses of variance were 
conducted in order to assess the effect of the graded similarity manipulation: one for each level of the 
distinctiveness factor. 296 These analyses showed that the graded similarity manipulation depressed 
rating correspondence for arrays with targets of low facial distinctiveness only. A one way repeated 
measures analysis of variance was then conducted to assess the distinctiveness manipulation, and this 
showed that ~rrays with targets of low distinctiveness depressed rating correspondence - but Figure 
8.5 appears to show that this is due to the graded similarity manipulation. Table 8.4 and Figure 8.5 

























df Effect MS Effect df Error MS Error F p < 
2 0.53 146 0.09 6.11 0.002 
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Figure 8.5 The effect of the distinctiveness and similarity gradation manipulations on 
correspondence between subject ratings and the spatial distance measure of similarity. 
In order to assess the correspondence between subject ratings of similarity and the spatial distance 
measure in an analogous manner to that used in Chapter 7, average similarity ratings were computed 
across subjects, and correlated with spatial distances, for each of the twelve arrays. Scatterplots are 
shown in Figure 8.6, and annotated to show correlation coefficients and Kendall concordance 
coefficients. 297 
295 This is a recommended practice when treating correlations as data See Howell ( 1992). 
296 The full study design consisted of one repeated measures factor (facial distinctiveness) and one between subjects factor 
(graded similarity). However, subjects were not assigned consistently to conditions in the graded similarity factor - i.e. a 
subject could have been assigned a high distinctiveness array with discontinuous graded similarity, and then a moderate 
distinctiveness array with continuous graded similarity, and so on. This made the model specification for a two way 
analysis of variance rather cumbersome, and so I opted for the simpler approach to the analysis, as outlined here. 
297 Ratings were transformed to ranks in order to compute Kendall cc.efficients. 
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High Distinctiveness; Continuous similarity 
Sequence 1 
r • -0.68; W • 0.27; p < 0.01 
4 
Subject rating 
Moderate distinctiveness: Oisc.ontinuous similarity 
Sequence 2 























Low Distinctiveness; Discontinuous similarity 
(Only one sequence was presented) 
r = -0.42: w • 0.20; p < 0.01 
Subject rating 
Points arc mean ratings. All p values arc calculated for Kendall' s coefficient (W). W is calculated for subject ratings only, and reflects the 
degree of agreement among subjects. Negative relationships are expected, since the rating and spatial distance scales take reverse directions. 
Figure 8.6 Relations between subject ratings of similarity, and the PC measure of facial similarity. 
Figure 8.6 shows that there is a strong correspondence between subject ratings of facial similarity and 
the spatial distance measure of facial similarity. In each of the eleven array tasks, the relationship is 
in the expected direction, and the (absolute) correlation is always greater than 0.40 in size. The 
median absolute correlation is 0.70, which is strong. The consistency of both size and direction are 
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convincing demonstrations that the spatial distance measure corresponds in reasonable degree to 
human judgements of similarity.298 Nevertheless, it should be remembered that average ratings tend to 
inflate correlations, and that subjects were far from consistent in their ratings, even with the 
modifications to the task instructions used in this study. (The inconsistency is shown in the size of the 
Kendall coefficients: these show that agreement was better than chance expectation, but not 
complete). 
Distinctiveness 
I argued in an earlier chapter that the PC-based representational basis offers two facial measures - a 
measure of facial similarity, and a measure of facial distinctiveness. The similarity of two faces is the 
distance between the faces in component space, whereas facial distinctiveness of a face is the distance 
of that face from the origin299 of the component space. In Chapter 7, I explored the relationship 
between subject ratings of facial distinctiveness and the PC distinctiveness measure, but found that 
there was little relation. It proved possible, however, to successfully model ratings of facial 
distinctiveness by regressing component coefficients on distinctiveness ratings . I returned to this 
question in Study 3.300 
A possible explanation for the failure of the distinctiveness measure in Study 2, is that the basis 
vectors of the space were determined from analysis of a small, homogenous image set. The basis 
determined in Study 3 may yield different results, since it was determined from a much larger image 
set. Accordingly, the distinctiveness rating task deployed in Study 2 was administered, with arrays of 
faces taken from the frontal image set, and ratings were correlated against distinctiveness scores 
derived from a PCA of this set. 
Subjects 
Subjects were 26 first year Medical students at the University of Cape Town, attending a year-end 
course evaluation meeting. They were asked to participate in a face recognition study, and completed 
rating forms at the beginning of the evaluation meeting. 
291 The results of Study 4, which are reported later in the chapter, show a similar, strong correspondence and further bolster 
this conclusion. 
299 Distance from the multivariate mean is a more practical solution; see footnote 284 in Chapter 7. 
300 The distinctiveness research that is reported here was conducted separately i.e. at a different time, and with different 
subjects, and is reported under Study 3 merely for convenience. 
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Materials and Procedure 
Three arrays were constructed, consisting of 28, 28 and 26 face images, respectively.30 1 These arrays 
were printed on a Hewlett Packard laser printer at 600 dpi. Ten subjects completed the first array, 
seven completed the second, and nine completed the third. Subjects rated arrays for distinctiveness, 
on a 15 point scale. Subjects were instructed in the same way as subjects in Study 2: "Imagine that 
you were to encounter the face in a crowd of people in supermarket mall : how easily would this face 
' stick out' in such a crowd? A very distinctive face would ' stick out ' to a considerable degree, but a 
less distinctive face would not 'stick out' as much." These instructions were printed on the cover page 
of an experimental booklet, which was distributed to subjects. Ratings were obtained for a total of 82 
faces. 
A mean distinctiveness rating was determined for each face image, and the resulting 82 mean ratings 
were correlated with the PC based facial distinctiveness measure. A scatterplot of the relation 1s 
reported as Figure 8.7 
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Figure 8.7 Relation between rated distinctiveness and the spatial distance measure of 
distinctiveness. 
It is clear from Figure 8. 7 that there is little relation between rated distinctiveness and the PC-based 
measure. This is in keeping with the finding made in Study 2: basing distinctiveness scores on a 
larger image set appears to have little effect on this relation. Despite the absence of a relation 
between PC-based distinctiveness, defined as distance from the multivariate mean, and rated 
distinctiveness, regression analyses in Study 2 showed that it is possible to use weighted combinations 
of individual components to model rated distinctiveness. Similar analyses were conducted on data 
collected in the present study - coefficients and statistics of a model identified by a stepwise 
regression procedure are reported as Table 8.5. 
301 The distinct sequences were created for counterbalancing purposes - that is, to avoid order effects. As in study I, 
sequences did not systematically affect ratings, and results will be presented without reference to the sequences. 
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Var. 8 St. err ~ T p< Var. 8 St.err ~ T p < 
C2 -1.10 .37 -0 .20 -2.95 0.01 C63 10.57 4.83 0.015 2.18 0.03 
C26 5.45 2.42 0.15 2.25 0.02 C64 -11.18 4.47 -0.17 -2.49 0.02 
C31 11 .73 2 .82 0.30 4.14 0.00 C74 -25 .84 4.55 -0.42 -5 .66 0.01 
C32 5.97 2 .36 0.17 2.53 0.01 C75 -15.26 4.39 -0.24 -3.47 0.01 
C36 10.62 2.76 0.27 3.83 0.01 C78 12.52 4.50 0.19 2.78 0.01 
C44 -10.84 2.78 -0.26 -3.89 0.01 C79 -16.54 4.87 -0.23 -3 .39 0.01 
C57 -13.47 3.61 -0.25 -3 .72 0.01 C87 -14 .07 5.74 -0.17 -2.45 0.02 
C58 18.33 4 .30 0.32 4 .25 0.01 C98 -22.58 5.41 -0.28 -4.17 0.01 
Const. 6.02 0.13 44.44 0.01 Analysis of Variance 
IP=0.71 ; R2adj. =0.64 DF SS MS F p< 
Standard error of estimate= 1.13 Regress. 16 206.09 12.88 10.16 0.001 
Residual 65 82.39 1.27 
Note: C's are principal components. The stepwise procedure was controlled by setting the probability for 
inclusion top= 0.06, and for exclusion top= 0.1 
Table 8.5 Summary ofregression of principal components on rated distinctiveness; data from Study 3. 
Although the model resolves a reasonably high amount of variance, it should be remembered that 
stepwise regression procedures capitalize on chance, and frequently produce models that are unstable. 
Cross-validations of the model were therefore attempted, on randomly selected subsamples of the 
distinctiveness data set. In the first set of cross-validations, I evaluated the regression equation 
formed from the variables identified in Table 8.5, on two sub-samples.302 The resulting equations 
resolved a satisfactory, and statistically significant, amount of variance (Equation 1: R~dj . = 0.74; F = 
9.12; df= 16, 30; p < 0.001; Equation 2: R~dj. = 0.65; F = 4.88; df= 16, 18; p < 0.001). In the second 
set of cross-validations, I conducted a stepwise regression on a further two randomly selected 
subsamples (each subsample had 43 subjects). The point of this exercise was to see whether 
components identified in the two analyses would match i) those identified by the original stepwise 
procedure, and ii) match across the two subsamples. Variables identified in the three stepwise 
procedures are reported in Table 8.6 
C2. C26, C31 C2. C31 , C36 C13, C19, C51 
C32, C36, C44 C44, C46, C47 C54, csa. css 
C57, C58, C63 C59, C6, C69 C66, C68, C70 
C64, C74, C75 C94, C98 C78, C81, CBS 
C78, C79, C87 
C98 
R~i. =0.66 R!.i; = 0.80 R!.i;=0.81 
F = 10.16 F = 13.4 F = 15.5 
p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001 
Note: C's are principal components. All three procedures were 
controlled by setting probability of inclusion in the model to 0.06, 
and probability of exclusion to 0.1 
Table 8.6 Components selected by stepwise regression procedures. 
302 Regression coefficients were re-determined for each of the sub-samples, using statistical software. 
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The table shows that the three procedures identified sets of components with comparatively little 
overlap. It is not entirely clear what this means: stepwise regression is notoriously fickle, and one 
expects variable selection to be a little inconsistent, but it leaves the question of measuring 
distinctiveness no closer to a solution.303 This is the last empirical investigation of the spatial distance 
measure of distinctiveness to be reported in this thesis, so I leave it as an issue for later research, or 
other researchers. 
Study 4: Viewing perspective and facial similarity 
In Chapter 5, I pointed to an important problem in much face recognition research, which is the use of 
single viewing perspectives - typically photographs taken from a frontal perspective. Studies which 
use single viewing perspective'i cannot distinguish face perception and memory from picture 
perception and memory, and probably yield inflated estimates of recognition ability, in particular. 
Viewing perspective is also an important consideration for the type of measure of facial similarity 
proposed in this thesis, viz. a measure based on analysis of a set of images, standardized for viewing 
perspective. I explored the role of viewing perspective in several ways in Study 4. In the first place, I 
examined the relation between similarity scores derived from analysis of a set of frontal images, and 
scores derived from analysis of a set of Y4 profi le views. These scores should be strongly correlated, 
and the absence of a strong correlation would be evidence against the robustness of the PC-based 
similarity measure. However, what would constitute a 'strong correlation ' here is not clear, so I 
attempted to establish some baseline value by correlating similarity ratings of frontal and profile 
views made by human subjects. In addition, I explored the relation between the PC-based measure of 
similarity and subject ratings of similarity, for both frontal and profile views, and combinations of 
these. Finally, I briefly examined the utility of combining principal component analyses of frontal 
and profile views. 
Relation between PC-based similarity scores across viewing perspectives 
As described in an earlier section of this chapter, photographs were taken of 278 people from frontal 
and Y4 profile viewing perspectives, converted to digital images, and submitted to principal component 
analyses. In the case of the profile views, several of the images were discarded, leaving a total of 257 
images.304 The set of Y. profile images is reproduced as Appendix F. The principal component 
analysis of profile images was conducted in the same manner as that for frontal images, as were 
303 It is interesting, however, that almost none of the early components get selected for inclusion in any of the three models. 
304 It proved difficult to take successful photographs from a '!. profile perspective. Subjects were urged to adopt an 
appropriate stance, and much effort was made to manoeuvre subject and camera into a suitable relation, but this was not 
always possible. About 30 profile photographs were discarded. In contrast, only five frontal photographs were discarded. 
There were 252 images for which both frontal and profile images were available fo r analysis. 
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similarity scores, and neither will therefore be described here. Profile and frontal similarity scores 
were obtained for each face image for which both profile and frontal views were available: that is, the 
(PC-based) similarity of each face to every other face in the image set was determined, for both 
frontal and profile image sets. Since the aim was to determine whether the image sets generated 
equivalent similarity relations, a correlation was calculated between the set of frontal and profile 
similarity scores, for each face image. The distribution of this correlation is shown in Figure 8.8 
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Mean frontal-profile correlation 
Note: in order to calculate the overall mean correlation, individual correlations were 
Fisher-transformed before computation, and the mean of these transformed correlations 
was inverse-transformed. Individual correlations represent the relation between frontal 
and profile similarity scores, calculated for each face image. 
Figure 8.8 Distribution of correlations between frontal and profile similarity scores. 
The similarity relations are clearly not equivalent across frontal and profile views, but are certainly 
not insubstantial. The important question here is how strong a relation is acceptable: a perfect 
relation is improbable, as faces will show differences when viewed from different angles, and this can 
be expected to attenuate the strength of the relation. On the other hand, it is unlikely that similarity 
relations will change dramatically with a change of viewing perspective. In order to assess the 
strength of the relation shown in Figure 8.8, I investigated the relation between similarity ratings 
made by subjects when shown frontal views, and ratings made when the same faces were shown in % 
profile view. At the same time, I (again) investigated the relation between rated similarity and the 
PC-based measure of similarity, and the effect of facial distinctiveness on similarity ratings. 
Subjects 
Subjects were 90 Psychology 1 students at the University of Cape Town. They participated in the 
study during a lecture. 
Materials 
Twelve array tasks were constructed in a similar format to that used in Study 3. Ten face images were 
printed on paper in array form, and one of these was designated as the target. Two arrays were joined 
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with a covering page of instructions into an experimental booklet. The arrays varied according to the 
des ign of the study, presented below. A sample booklet is reproduced as Appendix G. Instructions 
issued to subjects were the same as those used in Study 3, as outlined on page 193 above. 
Design 
The principal data of interest in Study 4 were the similarity ratings subjects made in array tasks, 
which varied in terms of whether frontal, profile, or both frontal and profile views were presented to 
subjects. Face images selected for inclusion in arrays varied substantially on the PC-based similarity 
measure, to strengthen the manipulation. 305 Arrays were also constructed to vary in terms of the (PC-
based) distinctiveness of the target (low, and high). In addition, each of the six arrays created in this 
way was formed in two distinct sequences, for counterbalancing purposes. The design is schematised 
in Figure 8.9 
Distinctiveness 
H' h L IQ ow 
Frontal (F) 





Cell entries are numbers of subject responses, and not numbers of subject per 
se, since subjects completed two tasks. (The 'distinctiveness ' factor was a 
repeated measure). 
Figure 8.9 Design for Study 4. 
Procedure 
Subjects were asked at the beginning of a lecture to participate 'in a study on face perception and 
recognition', after which experimental booklets were distributed. These booklets had been arranged 
in a randomized order prior to distribution, and the cover page gave subjects all further necessary 
instructions. The booklets themselves variously contained arrays which were instances of conditions 
and sequences described in 'Materials' and 'Design' above. 
Results 
Similarity ratings of frontal, profi le, and frontal + profile views were strongly related, and the 
correspondence between these ratings and spatial distances was again fairly high. These results again 
305 
Similarity scores for the combined frontal and profile view were calculated by computing the Euclidean distance of each 
face from the target face, across coefficients from each of the component solutions (i.e. the component solutions were 
treated as one solution). 
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point to the usefulness of the PC-based similarity measure. Also, distinctiveness, and viewing 
perspective appear to affect the degree of correspondence between subject ratings of similarity, and 
the PC-based measure of similarity, but it is not clear what this means. 
Table 8. 7 shows relations between frontal, profile, and frontal + profile ratings, and relations between 
spatial distances calculated for each viewing perspective from the principal component analysis. In 
each case where the result for subject ratings are reported, reported correlations involve mean subject 
ratings, and not individual subject ratings. 
a) Inter-correlations of subject ratings of similarity 
i) Low distinctive target ii) High distinctive target 
Frontal I Profile I Frontal + Profile 
Se 1 Seq2 Seq1 Seq2 Seq1 Seq2 
Frontal I Profile I Frontal + Profile 
S 1 Seq2 Seq1 Seq2 Seq1 Seq2 
Frontal 1.00 Frontal 1.00 
1.00 0.57 1.00 
Profile 0.83 1.00 Profile 0.38 0.57 1.00 
0.58 0.78 0.85 1.00 0.34 0.81 0.83 1.00 
F+P Seq1 0.85 0.94 0.94 0.90 1.00 F+P Seq1 
Seq2 0.56 0.58 0.84 0.78 0.74 1.00 Seq2 0.53 0.71 0.45 0.41 
Note: The wrong member in sequence I of the F + P condition, high distinctiveness array, was inadvertently labelled as the 
' target', and inter-correlations are therefore not reported for this condition. 
b) Inter-correlations of spatial distance similarity scores 
i) Low distinctive target ii) High distinctive target 
Frontal I Profile I Frontal + Profile 
S 1 Seq2Seq1 Seq2Seq1 Seq2 
Frontal I Profile I Frontal+ Profile 






Profile 0.86 1.00 Profile 1.00 1.00 
0.86 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
F + p Seq1 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.97 1.00 F+P Seq1 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 1.00 
Seq2 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 Seq2 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 1.00 1.00 
c) Correlations of similarity ratings and spatial distance similarity scores 
i) Low distinctive target ii) High distinctive target 
Frontal Frontal 
Profile Seq1 ·0.91 Profile ·0.88 
Seq2 ·0.78 ·0.63 
F+P Seq1 ..().91 F+P Seq1 
Seq2 .o.n Seq2 ·0.09 
Table 8. 7 Inter-correlations of similarity ratings and spatial distances. 
Several things are clear from the table. In the first place, it is clear that inter-correlations of spatial 
distances across frontal, profile, and combined views are at least as strong as those between subject 
ratings across the same views. This seems to resolve the question of how strong the relation between 
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frontal and profile spatial distances should be (i.e. it is strong enough), and is further evidence in 
support of the utility of the spatial distance measure. In the second place, correlations between 
subject ratings of similarity and spatial distance estimates of similarity are again high (albeit not 
uniformly), and in the expected direction. 
Results reported immediately above were based on mean subject ratings. In order to assess effects 
due to distin~tiveness and viewing perspective, I examined individual subject ratings of similarity. 
The dependent variable for purposes of analysis was the correlation between individual ratings of 
similarity and the spatial distance measure. Each correlation was transformed to approximate 
standard normal deviate form (reported mean correlations are inverse transformed from th is form). A 
one way repeated measures analysis of variance was conducted to assess the distinctiveness 
manipulation, and this showed that arrays with targets of low distinctiveness increased rating 
correspondence over arrays witi~ targets of high distinctiveness (F = 29.57; df=l ,86; p < 0.001). 
However, this was not uniformly the case: Figure 8.10 shows that there was little difference between 
profile views of arrays with highly distinctive targets. One way between subjects analyses of variance 
were conducted to assess differences over viewing perspective, for arrays with high-distinctive and 
low-distinctive targets. In the former case, there were significant differences between viewing 
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Figure 8.10 Effects of viewing perspective and target distinctiveness on correspondence 
between subject ratings and the spatial distance measure of similarity. 
These results appear to show that particular v1ewmg perspectives decrease the correspondence 
between subject ratings and the spatial distance measure, but only when targets are of high facial 
distinctiveness. Several factors make me reluctant to accept these results as they stand: in the first 
place, they conflict with findings made in Study 3, where high distinctiveness improved the 
correspondence and low distinctiveness worsened it. In the second place, results from the 
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distinctiveness rating tasks in Study 3 were that subject ratings of distinctiveness bear little relation to 
the PC-based measure of distinctiveness: it is thus unclear what the distinctiveness manipulation in 
this study represents, in terms of perceptions held by subjects. 
Study 5: Test-retest reliability of subject ratings of similarity 
In Studies 1 : and 2, I noted that ratings of similarity show considerable inter-subject variance, and 
considered a few explanations for this lack of concordance. I will not review that discussion here, 
except to note that the most bothersome explanation is that people are inherently inconsistent in 
perceptions of similarity: if that is the case, perceptions of similarity at time 1 will differ substantially 
from those at time 2. In the present study, I investigated the reliability of similarity ratings over time, 
using a standard test-retest procedure. 
Subjects 
Subjects were 21 Psychology 3 students. They participated in a face rating task during the final 
tutorial of term, and a follow-up rating task some three weeks later. 
Materials 
Three face rating tasks were prepared for use in the study. Each rating task followed the format used 
in Study 2: i.e. an array of 10 faces was printed on a sheet of paper, one of which was designated as 
the ' target' face. Subjects were then asked to rate each face in terms of similarity to the target face . 
A 100 point scale was used in the present case (as opposed to 10 point scales in the earl ier studies). 
The first of the three arrays was used in the initial rating completed by subjects, and two further 
arrays were created for administration at the follow-up stage. Each of the additional arrays was 
created by removing a number of the faces presented in the initial array, replacing them with different 
faces, and changing the order of presentation of the five original faces. Five faces were removed in 
one of the arrays, and the other four faces (constituting the original array of nine non-target faces) in 
the second of the arrays. The initial and follow-up arrays are reproduced as Appendix H. 
Procedure 
Subjects were approached during the last tutorial session of term, and asked to participate in a face 
perception and recognition study. Two groups of subjects, attending different tutorial sessions, 
participated in the study. Each subject was given a rating task, which had the necessary instructions 
appended as a cover page. Subjects were asked to provide names and student numbers, but were not 
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told to what purpose they would be put. After a period of two weeks, each subject (bar two )306 was 
contacted by post, and asked to complete a second rating task. Rating tasks were attached to letters 
requesting subjects to participate: there were two versions of the follow up rating task, and these were 
randomly distributed amongst subjects. Twelve of the nineteen subjects who were asked to 
participate in the follow-up stage of Study 5 submitted completed rating tasks. 
Results 
Test-retest reliability of similarity ratings proved to be fairly good, although this varied substantially 
across subjects. 
Correlations for ratings of the five (or four) faces which appeared in both initial and follow-up tasks 
were computed for each subject Table 8.8 shows the correlation coefficient for each subject, and 
also reports the median correlation, and correlation over mean ratings. 
Subject 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Correlation o.oo 0.13 0.23 o.51 0.58 0.68 0.73 0.86 0.92 0.94 0.99 1.00 
Median correlation= 0. 7 Correlation between mean ratings (i.e. over subjects) of in itial and follow-up arrays = 0.94 
Table 8.8 Correlations between initial and follow-up ratings, per subject. 
The correlations are acceptably high, especially when computed over subjects. However, it is prudent 
to bear in mind the methodological problems usually associated with test-retest designs : in particular, 
subjects may show demand effects, and attempt to recreate ratings from memory, rather than from a 
fresh scrutiny of the task. The three week period between test and re-test is some security against this 
threat, as is the insertion of five (or four) new faces, and the re-arrangement ofremaining faces within 
arrays. On the other hand, the use of only five (or four) faces across tasks, renders the estimate of the 
test-retest correlation coefficient a little unreliable: the median estimate of 0. 7 may be too high, or too 
low. 
Discussion of Studies 3, 4 and 5 
There were central and peripheral aims in Studies 3, 4 and 5. The central aim was to rigorously test 
the facial similarity measure derived from principal component analysis of facial images, on face 
306 
Postal details for two subjects were missing from university records, and these subjects were not asked to complete the 
fo llow-up task. 
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rating tasks. This was effected with i) a larger image set, ii) arrays which exhibited greater variation 
of facial similarity, and iii) tasks which structured subject judgements. I also investigated the 
generality of the PC-based similarity measure across viewing perspectives. Peripheral aims included 
testing the facial distinctiveness measure, derived from principal component analysis of face images, 
and assessing the effect of manipulated distinctiveness on similarity rating tasks. 
The tests of ~he facial similarity measure were largely positive - in both Studies 3 and 4, correlations 
between mean subject ratings and the PC-based measure were high. There were 24 rating tasks in 
total across the two studies, of which 17 produced correlations greater than 0.65 in size, and 11 
produced correlations greater than 0. 75 . If one bears in mind that subject ratings of similarity show 
considerable variation - which means that mean ratings will not be very reliable - this correspondence 
is good. There were several tasks, however, in which the correlation between subject ratings and the 
PC based similarity measure was much lower, albeit always in the expected (negative) direction . It is 
not clear why the results in Studies 3 and 4 show a clear correspondence, where the results of Study 2 
were mixed. This could be due to the fact that similarity scores were derived from analysis of a much 
larger image set: the image set used in Study 3 consisted largely of young, white females , and the 
representational basis on which the similarity scores rely was probably inaccurate for faces from other 
populations. Alternatively, it could be due to the fact that arrays were composed of face images that 
varied more greatly on the similarity measure than in the previous study. Alternatively, again, it could 
be due to the revised instructions, which attempted to structure subject ratings. There is no easy way 
to evaluate these explanations on the basis of the data from Studies 3 and 4, and I will not attempt an 
evaluation here. It is enough for present purposes that the data shows convincingly that the PC based 
measure corresponds reasonably well to subject ratings of similarity. 
The investigation of viewing perspective in Study 4 produced further evidence m favour of the 
similarity measure. Just as face recognition studies which test subject for their memory of face 
images run the risk of mistaking picture memory for face memory, so a similarity measure based on 
just one view of a face runs the risk of mistaking view-similarity for face similarity. Similarity 
measures taken from analyses of separate views of faces (frontal and :Y. profile) proved to be fairly 
strongly related. The strength of this relation furthermore appeared quite adequate when compared to 
the relation of subject similarity ratings across different viewing perspectives. 
Clear as the results of the similarity rating tasks were, so results involving the PC-based 
distinctiveness measure were equivocal. This measure was defined in an earlier chapter as the 
Euclidean .distance from the multivariate mean of component coefficients, but proved unrelated to 
subject ratings of facial distinctiveness in both Studies 2 and 3. Although stepwise regression 
procedures showed that it is possible to model subject ratings by weighted composites of component 
coefficients, models of this sort proved unstable. Different components were identified by the 
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stepwise procedure for cross-validation subsamples, and this makes a general measure an unlikely 
solution. (A measure based, for example, on a weighted combination of coefficients of components 
could be quite useful, but not if the identity of the components is uncertain). 
Certain manipulations involving the PC-based distinctiveness measure produced statistically 
significant effects. In Study 3, correlations between subject ratings and the PC-based similarity 
measure were smaller for arrays with targets of low distinctiveness, but only when array similarity 
was structured discontinuously. In contrast, correlations were smaller in Study 4 for arrays with 
targets of high distinctiveness, but only when images were viewed in frontal or combined frontal-
profile orientation. It is difficult to interpret this set of results: they are (partially) contradictory, and 
since the PC-based distinctiveness measure is not related to subject perceptions of distinctiveness, the 
meaning of the effects is unclear. This is a pity, since perceived distinctiveness has proved to be an 
important variable in recent face recognition research (see Chapter 5). 
At this stage of the empirical research, it is probably fair to conclude that measures of facial similarity 
derived from principal component representational bases are sufficiently closely related to subject 
ratings of similarity to use them as approximations of perceived similarity. However, it is apposite to 
recognise that perceived similarity can have many operationalizations, and that the rating tasks used in 
Studies 1 to 5 are merely several instances. In particular, the rationale behind much of the empirical 
research reported in this thesis was to develop a measure of lineup fairness, on the assumption that 
perceived similarity of lineup members is an important factor. It is time, therefore, to report research 
which looks directly at the relation between lineup similarity and lineup fairness, and at the usefulness 
of the measure of facial similarity in this respect. 
Study 6: Facial similarity and mock witness parades. 
In Chapters 4 and 6 I discussed a method of evaluating parade fairness , which is commonly used in 
psycho-legal research. This is the method of the mock witness: mock witnesses are given a 
description of a suspect, and asked to identify the suspect from an identification parade. Several 
measures of parade fairness are associated with this method; I evaluated these in Chapter 6 and made 
certain recommendations regarding their usage and interpretation. In Study 6, I examined the 
relationship between the measure of facial similarity and measures of parade fairness, using the mock 
witness method. 
Subjects 
Subjects were 169 first year medical students at the University of Cape Town. They completed mock 
witness tasks at the beginning of a year-end course evaluation. 
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Materials 
Three face images were selected from the frontal set of 278 to serve as suspects m mock witness 
tasks. The images were selected so as to vary on the PC-based facial distinctiveness measure; to wit, 
as highly distinctive, moderately distinctive and of low distinctiveness. This was achieved by 
selecting images at random from the top 5%, middle 5%, and bottom 5% of the distribution of 
distinctiveness scores. The images are shown as Figure 8.11 
High distinctiveness Moderate distinctiveness Low distinctiveness 
Figure 8.11 Suspects selected for the mock witness tasks. 
These images were then given to three raters, in different orders, to get verbal descriptions for the 
mock witness tasks. Raters were shown each image for twenty seconds, and after presentation of the 
image were instructed as follows: 
Now, please describe the person you have j ust seen, without turning back to the previous page. This description 
should be highly accurate - other people should be able to identi fy the person on the basis of the description 
alone - but write what you can remember, even if you think that the description is not accurate enough. 
Written descriptions were then carefully examined by the author, and combined to form a description 
of each suspect. The final descriptions are shown in Table 8.9 
High distinctiveness 
A coloured or black male, probably in his 
late 20's or early 30's. He has dark, short, 
curly hair, and dark eyes; a round face , 
slightly fiattened head, and round chin. He 
has a close, scanty beard and moustache; 
a large, fiat nose, and full eyebrows. His 
ears are small. 
Moderate distinctiveness 
A young white female with dark, thick, 
slightly curly hair hanging down her back. 
She has straight, full eyebrows, and large, 
dark eyes. She has a round face , with 
wide, well defined jawbones, a small , 
pointed chin, and a closed, smallish 
mouth. She has striking looks. 
Low distinctiveness 
A sl im, white male, probably in his 
early twenties. He has an angular, 
thin face, with high cheekbones, a 
square chin, and fullish lips. He 
has straight, short hair; and teeth 
which are slightly bucked . 
Table 8.9 Descriptions of suspects used in the mock witness tasks . 
Six photo-parades were then created, for each of the suspects. These parades were constructed so as 
to structure the similarity of parade members in relation to the target. This was achieved by selecting 
images which were in the first 6th, second 6tl1 ... sixth 6th of the distribution of similarity scores, 
calculated in relation to the suspect. In this way, three sets of six parades, of differing target-member 
similarity, were constructed, making 18 parades in total. These parades are shown in Appendix I. 
Three parades - one selected from each of the three sets, at random - were combined, along with a 
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covering page of instructions, into an experimental booklet. Six of these booklets were created in 
total. Instructions required subjects to identify suspects on the basis of the descriptions provided 
them: 
Over the page, you will find three collections of pictures. Each collection is of a number of people. The 
collections are labeled "A", "B", and "C" respectively. 
One of the people in each collection was recently seen in a shopping mall in Cape Town. A description of 
each of these 'target' people is provided below. Your task is to guess who the person is, on the basis of the 
description. 
Please indicate your guess by circling the number below the person in each collection who you think matches 
the corresponding description . Since there is a correct answer to the problem, you must choose one person in 
each of the three collections. 
Design 
The chief aim of Study 6 was to determine the relation between measures of lineup fairness and the 
spatial distance measure of facial similarity. Accordingly, subjects were presented with photo-lineups 
which varied systematically on measured facial similarity: there were six 'degrees' of similarity, 
defined in terms of the sextiles of the distribution of similarity scores.307 However, parades were also 
structured according to the facial distinctiveness of the suspect (see the discussion in Materials, 
above), resulting in a total of three distinctiveness conditions. Similarity and distinctiveness 























Cell entries are numbers of subject responses, and not numbers of subjects per 
se, since subjects completed three tasks. (The 'distinctiveness ' factor was a 
repeated measure). Similarity conditions are numbered I - 6, from most to 
least similar. 
Figure 8.12 Design for Study 6. 
Subjects were addressed at the beginning of a year-end course evaluation meeting, and asked to 
participate in a study of face recognition and perception. Experimental booklets, which were pre-
arranged in random order with respect to manipulations constituting the design of the study, were then 
307 
' Similarity ' here refers to the similarity between parade members treated as suspects, and other members of the parade. 
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distributed to subjects. Subjects completed the tasks independently, at their own pace, after which 
booklets were collected. 
Results 
There was a strong relation between measures of lineup fairness and the spatial distance measure of 
similarity: hi'gher degrees of similarity between suspects and parade members led to greater lineup 
fairness. 
Several dependent measures were fonned, since several measures of lineup fairness are currently used 
in psycho-legal research, and one of the aims of work reported in this thesis is to compare the 
measures. At the simplest level, a binary dependent variable was created, according to whether 
subjects had chosen correctly or incorrectly on mock witness tasks. A log-linear analysis on a three 
way table embodying the design of the study (Similarity X Distinctiveness X Correctness308) showed 
that a model incorporating all main effects, and the following interaction effects - i) similarity x 
correctness, and ii) distinctiveness x correctness - produced a satisfactory fit to observed frequencies . 
(L.R. X
2 
= 25.4; df = 20; p > 0.19).309 In other words, it was not necessary to include the three way 
interaction in the model, nor was it necessary to include the remaining two way interaction 
(distinctiveness x similarity): the effects of similarity and distinctiveness were independent of each 
other. Figure 8.13 shows the proportion of accurate identifications per experimental condition, as 
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Figure 8.13 Similarity and distinctiveness effects on mock witness accuracy. 








309 This analysis assumes independence of observations, which is not the case, since the 'distinctiveness' factor was a 
repeated measure. I use much the same kind of analysis in Study 7, where I more fully discuss the implications of 
breaking the assumption. 
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The similarity effect is evident in Figure 8.13, but the distinctiveness effect is difficult to interpret. 
The fluctuation of responses to parades with the low distinctiveness target hinders the interpretation, 
particularly in the similarity = 3 condition: without it, low and moderate distinctiveness appear to 
decrease identification accuracy, more or less uniformly, in relation to high distinctiveness. What is 
clear, though, is that increasing similarity of parade members to the suspect reduces the likelihood 
that the identity of the suspect can be guessed by witnesses armed with only a brief verbal description. 
Alternate measures of lineup fairness were then computed. These included the measures known as 
'Effective size' 310, and 'E'. Since these measures were discussed at considerable length in Chapters 4 
and 6, I will not discuss their formulation or rationale here. Correlations between measures of lineup 
fairness and a pseudo variable, representing facial similarity,311 were computed over the 18 conditions 
of Study 6, and are reported in Table 8.10 
Similarity 
Effective size (1) 
Effective size (2) 
E 
Functional size 




-0.77 0.96 0.94 - I 
-0.73 0.89 0.86 o.97 I 
Table 8.10 Correlations between measures of lineup fairness, and facial similarity. 
Correlations between alternate measures of lineup fairness are very strong: in particular, 'E', which is 
recommended over measures of effective size in Chapter 6, since it accommodates inferential 
quantitative methods, is almost perfectly correlated with both formulations of effective size. 
Correlations of all measures with lineup similarity are strong, and in the expected direction. 
Three of the measures of lineup fairness tabulated above are intended to produce an estimate of the 
number of 'feasible', or 'good' foils present in a lineup.312 Their absolute sizes therefore have 
meaning, and are reported in Table 8.11, for each of the 18 lineups used in Study 6. Estimates of 
functional size are included for comparison. 
310 
Two measures were computed here; i) using the formula originally proposed by Malpass, and ii) using the revised 
formula, as set out in Chapter 6. 
311 
The pseudo variable was constituted by the numbers I • 6: i.e. the ordinal sequence of similarity conditions in the study. 
312 That is, 'effective size(!)', 'effective size (2)' and 'E' . Functional size gives an estimate of the bias against the suspect in 
a lineup, although Wells et al. ( 1978) originally claimed that it serves to estimate number of good foils 
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1 2.55 3.09 2.60 2.20 1 2.35 3.00 2.47 1.82 1 2.27 2.53 2.11 1.67 
2 2.97 3.55 2.74 1.94 2 1.07 1.30 1.08 1.04 2 1.26 1.70 1.19 1.10 
3 : 2.85 3.23 1.97 1.44 3 2.10 2.27 2.13 2.00 3 1.58 2.54 1.49 1.24 
4 i 1.13 1.52 1.14 1.07 4 1.08 1.31 1.08 1.04 4 . 1.06 1.26 1.07 1.03 
5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
6 ; 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Since all of the lineups had 8 members, nominal size = 8, which should serve as an upper bound on estimated effective sizes (but 
not on estimated functional sizes, see Chapter 6). 
Table 8.11 Estimates of lineup size in lineups of varying target-foil similarity and target distinctiveness. 
It is clear from Table 8.11 that none of the lineups approaches an effective size anywhere near the 
notional maximum of 8. This may be a result of the fairly elaborate verbal descriptions given to 
witnesses - descriptions given in real cases where witness identity is in question are unlikely to be as 
detailed as this - and the effective sizes given above may consequently be underestimates. A 
replication, using less detailed descriptions, would test this explanation. Alternatively, it may be that 
the image set used to generate the lineups is too small to provide foils sufficiently similar in 
appearance to construct lineups of a reasonable effective sizr.: . However, examination of the 
distribution of witness choices across lineup foils does not support this interpretation: Table 8.12 
reports the distribution of choices for the 18 lineups,313 and shows that some foils attract a 
disproportionate number of choices. Since foils are 'equally similar' to the target (i.e. have almost 
identical similarity scores), it cannot be the case that there are too few ' sufficiently similar ' foils . 
. iJii;up'lnitriiber~ 
;~stf-.~~~~5.il~iT~4,~':'ll'OWi~'.:0.lf ... '. 
. . "~  ec- . . • . . - -.,. )lioi$< ""'"'~" ' .t-...... . ~ .... $- .,. ~.,,. ~ 
1 High 1 0 9 0 2 0 1 0 22 45.64 2.60 3.57 2.05 
2 High 2 0 1 Q9 3 0 0 2 31 59.58 2.74 4.10 2.05 
3 High 3 1 1 1 mg 4 1 0 0 26 79.85 1.97 3.38 1.39 
4 High 4 00000~2 0 31 187.06 1.14 1.37 0.97 
5 High 5 000006:0 0 26 182.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
6 High 6 o!Jlo o o 0 0 0 30 210.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Mode rat" 1 go o o 8 6 0 0 31 69.39 2.47 3.42 1.93 
8 Moderate 2 0 1 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 27 173.59 1.08 1.26 0.94 
9 Moderate 3 0 ml 0 0 14 1 0 0 30 82.53 2.13 2.44 1.89 
10 Moderate 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ~ 26 166.62 1.08 1.27 0.94 
11 Moderate 5 0 0 o Mo 0 0 0 30 210.00 1.00 1-00 1.00 
12 Moderat9 6 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 23 161 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
13 LDw 1 1 0 10 1 0 0 0 :'l1B 30 83.60 2.11 2.85 1.68 
14 Low 2 0 0 ta 0 1 0 1 0 23 131 .09 1.19 1.57 0.96 
15 Low 3 o o o 121 3 0 0 2 26 113.69 1.49 2.19 1.13 
16 Low 4 om 1 o o 0 0 0 31 201 .52 1.07 1.22 0.95 
17 Low 5 0 0 0 ta 0 0 0 0 31 217.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
18 Low 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 o r~ 26 182.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Shaded cells indicate lineup positions taken by suspects. Distinct. = distinctiveness; Simi!. = similarity. Lower = 
lower limit of95% confidence interval around estimate of 'E' , Upper= upper limit of same. 'X.2 values, and confidence 
intervals, arc calculated on the basis of the theoretical development in Chapter 6. All 'X.2 values arc significant at p = 
0.001 
Table 8.12 Frequencies of mock identifications, for each of the 18 lineups in Study 6. 
313 This is a large table, and might appear better suited to an appendix for reproduction. I include it in the text of the chapter, 
since the aim here is to evaluate measures of lineup fairness, and the method I pursued in Chapter 6 relied on visual 
examination. 
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Statistics assessing lineup fairness are also shown in Table 8.12: they suggest that all of the lineups 
suffer from poor effective size, and this is borne out by visual inspection. The identification 
frequencies, in turn, suggest that foils do not equally resemble the verbal description: distributions are 
not uniform, despite the fact that foils were chosen to have equal similarity scores. 
The central intention in Study 6 was to investigate the relation between the PC-based similarity 
measure and :measures of lineup fairness. The results clearly establish that there is a strong relation, 
but it is not clear that similarity scores can be used to construct lineups with high effective sizes. This 
requires investigation elsewhere. 
To complete the report of empirical work undertaken for this thesis, I turn to an examination of the 
effects of facial similarity in a simulated identification scenario. 
Study 7: Facial similarity and identification accuracy 
I argued in Chapters 4 and 5 that facial similarity has received very little attention in either the face 
recognition or witness identification literatures. On occasions where it has been investigated, it has 
proved to be a variable of substantial import (see Chapter 4, page 90 onwards). We know that it is 
strongly associated with indices of lineup fairness (Malpass & Devine, 1984; Study 6 in the present 
chapter), and it appears to affect identification accuracy in simulated identification scenarios. Studies 
that have investigated the impact of similarity in identification scenarios have typically used indirect 
measures of similarity (for example, ratings made by independent judges), or a priori similarity 
classifications. In the present study, I investigate the effects of similarity on identification ability with 
a direct measure of facial similarity, namely PC-based spatial distance. 
Although foil-target similarity has rarely been investigated in the identification literature, it is a 
pivotal topic in theoretical discussion of identification parades . Navon (1990a, 1990b) and Wells and 
his colleagues (Lindsay & Wells, 1980; Wells, 1993; Wells, Seelau, Rydell, & Luus, 1994), among 
others, take physical similarity to be a key component in the construction and evaluation of lineups. 
Researchers in the field differ in their understanding of the way that target-foil similarity is likely to 
affect identification ability. On the one hand, target-foil s'imilarity is seen as an optimal-function 
problem: If similarity is too high, suspects will be protected when they are innocent, but guilty 
suspects will go free. If similarity is too low, guilty suspects will be identified with ease, but so will 
innocent suspects. The problem is therefore to find a similarity function that maximises identification 
of guilty suspects, and protection of innocent suspects. According to Wells and colleagues, however, 
this strategy is bound to fail. There are several reasons that this is the case, but central is the mistaken 
reliance on the ' match-to-suspect' nature of the strategy. What is required instead is a ' match-to-
description' strategy, aimed at ensuring that 'propitious heterogeneity' of parade members is 
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achieved. Opinion in the psycho-legal literature is divided on this set of claims, and since I discussed 
the dispute at length in Chapter 4, I will not consider the matter any further here. I simply wish to 
point out that the ' match to description ' approach is not uncontested . This is important in the present 
study, and indeed to the entire empirical project reported in this thesis, since the measure of facial 
similarity advocated here assumes the ' match to suspect' strategy. 
A few important methodological considerations are worth outlining prior to the report of Study 7. 
Work reported in the identification literature has shown that simulated identification scenarios which 
use lineups as recognition tests need to bear in mind the distinction between ' target present' and 
' target absent ' lineups . Both are necessary if one wishes to correctly evaluate identification accuracy, 
and especially if one wishes to obtain ' diagnosticity' estimates (see Chapter 4). Secondly, one of the 
most significant contributions of witness identification research has been the development of 
' sequential lineups '. In Chapter 2 I argued that this development has had a major impact on police 
practice in parts of the U.S.A.. Any assessment of the effect of facial similarity on identification 
ability needs to use both forms of lineup (i .e. simultaneous and sequential). Study 7 incorporates both 
of the considerations outlined in this paragraph, i.e. it uses target-present and target-absent lineups, 
and it uses simultaneous and sequential lineups. 
Subjects 
Subjects were 22 Psychology 3 students, and 46 Psychology 2 students, at the University of Cape 
Town. Psychology 3 students participated in the experiment during a tutorial , and Psychology 2 
students participated during a lecture . 
Materials 
Two sets of three face images were chosen from the frontal set of 278 images, along with 
corresponding profile views of these images. A set of face images was presented to each subject at 
the first stage of the experiment, in document form. The frontal images were also embedded in lineup 
arrays, which were presented to subjects at the final stage of the experiment. The lineup arrays varied 
in terms of target-foil similarity, so as to constitute three levels of similarity. This was achieved by 
selecting foils who fell within 0 - I 0, 45 -55 or 90 - I 00 percentile points of the target, on the 
similarity measure. Frontal and profile views for each of the faces are shown as Figure 8.14 
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High similarity Moderate sim!larity Low similarity 
Sets are shown in rows. 
Figure 8.14 Sets of images used as targets in Study 7 
Two documents were prepared to present to subjects at the first stage of the experiment. Each 
document contained one of the sets of images, along with fictitious descriptions of each of the people 
represented by the images. Subjects were required to read these descriptions, and having read them, 
to write three further facts they believed to be probably true of each of the three people. The 
documents are reproduced in Appendix J. These documents presented information which was later 
tested with lineup arrays. The point of requiring subjects to read descriptions, and to write three 
further facts, was to disguise the nature of the experiment: that is, to make it appear like a ' first 
impressions ' study, rather than a simulated identification study. 
Simultaneous and sequential lineup arrays were then created for each of the three images: each of 
these arrays either contained or omitted the relevant face image, thus constituting the ' target-present ', 
' target-absent ' manipulation. Arrays were combined into booklets, three at a time: each target was 
'represented' in one of these arrays (either in target-present or target-absent form). In the case of 
simultaneous parades, these were simply stapled together, along with an instruction page. In the case 
of sequential parades, a mini-booklet was created for each of the three arrays. One image was printed 
on each page of the mini-booklet. Three mini-booklets and a page of instructions were inserted into 
an envelope. Instructions attempted to ensure that sequential lineup arrays were completed as 
sequential tasks, and those issued for the second set of images are set out below. 314 
Earlier, you were provided with pictures and descriptions of three students. What I would like you to do now is to point them out -
if they appear - in the collections of pictures that follow. Please read the instructions carefully. 
Over the page you will find the first co llect ion of numbered pictures, arranged in sequence (I have marked it as 'A'). Please start 
with the first picture and decide whether it is Cassiem. If it is, indicate which number is below his picture. If it is not Cassiem, tum 
the page. Decide whether th is second picture is Cassiem. Continue in this way until you have either found Cassiem, or until there 
are no more pictures. Do not turn back at any stage to look at pictures you have already rejected. If you have not found Cassiem at 
314 Note that points 2 and 3 are shortened for presentation here, since they repeat instructions given in point I. 
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the end of the sequence (he may or may not be in the sequence), you must indicate that he is not present. If you do find him in the 
sequence, write the number which appears below his picture in the space below, and immediately stop the task (i.e. do NOT look at 
any pictures which appear later in the sequence). 
Cassiem does not appear 0 Cassiem is number 
2 Tum the page to the next collection of numbered pictures (I have marked it as 'B'). Please start with ... later in the sequence). 
Susan does not appear 0 Susan is number 
3 Tum the page to the next collection of numbered pictures (I have marked it as 'C'). Please start with ... later in the sequence). 
Astrid does not appear 0 Astrid is number 
Instructions for simultaneous lineup conditions can be found in Appendix K, along with reproductions 
of the arrays used in simultaneous and sequential conditions. 
Design 
Study 7 was a 2x2x2x3 factorial experiment, with one dependent variable. Factors were 1) Lineup 
structure (simultaneous, sequential); 2) Target presence (present, absent); 3) Image set (a, b); 4) 
Target-foil similarity (high, moderate, low). Lineup structure, Target presence and Image set were 
between-subjects factors , while Target-foil similarity was a repeated measures factor . Assignment of 
Image set, Target presence and Lineup structure conditions was random. The design of the study is 
shown in Figure 8.15, excluding the image set manipulation .315 
Present Absent Target presence 
Simultaneous Sequential Simultaneous Sequential Lineup structure 
High 12 20 17 14 
Moderate 19 20 15 14 
Low 15 14 19 20 
Similarit 
Cell entries are numbers of subject responses, and not numbers of subject per se, since subjects completed three 
tasks . (The 'similarity' factor was a repeated measure) . 
Figure 8.15 Design of Study 7. 
Procedure 
The experimental procedure differed slightly across the groups of subjects, and this is worth detailing. 
Psychology 3 students were recruited from groups attending voluntary additional statistics tutorials at 
the end of the academic year. These groups varied in size, ranging from 2 to 7. At the beginning of 
the tutorial they were given a document containing frontal and profile views of targets, and were 
allowed five minutes to complete the task contained in the document. There were two documents 
315 Two image sets were used in order to check variation ofresults across images. Effects were not specific to image sets, and 
this manipulation will not be discussed further. 
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designed for this stage of the experiment (as detailed in Materials), and subjects were randomly 
ass igned one of the documents. A statistics lesson then ensued, and lasted 30 minutes. At the end of 
the lesson, subjects were asked to complete the second part of the experiment (they did not know that 
there was a second part), and were randomly assigned an array booklet, which contained either 
simultaneous or sequential lineup array tasks, corresponding to the image set they had received at the 
beginning of the experiment. Some of the arrays in these tasks contained the target, and others didn ' t. 
The assignment of target present and target absent arrays had been effected randomly, in the 
development of the experimental materials. 
Psychology 2 students were addressed at the beginning of a year-end course lecture, and asked to 
participate in a study of face recognition and perception. Each subject was then handed two 
envelopes. One envelope was marked 
Open this envelope when you receive it. Complete the task inside it, place the completed task back in the 
envelope, and seal it. 
This envelope contained the first stage of the experiment, namely the document discussed in 
Materials. The second envelope was marked 'Do not open this envelope until instructed to do so ', 
and was sealed. Subjects completed the first task, after which the lecture commenced. The lecture 
lasted 30 minutes, after which subjects were instructed to open the second envelope. They then 
completed the lineup array tasks, which were contained in the envelope. Lineup structure, Target 
presence and Image set conditions had been randomly distributed across envelopes, so assignment of 
subj ects to conditions was also random . 
Results 
Similarity, lineup structure, and target presence all proved to have significant effects on subject 
performance in lineup tasks. Subjects made better decisions with sequential lineups, but only when 
targets were absent; and low-similarity lineups improved accuracy of identifications in sequential and 
simultaneous lineups, in both target-absent and target-present conditions. Image set had no effect on 
subject performance, and since this manipulation was intended to check the generalization of findings 
across images, it will not be discussed any further in this chapter. 
Results from lineup tasks may be assessed in terms of correct identification decisions (i.e. to treat 
identifications of the perpetrator when he is present as equivalent to witness indications that the 
perpetrator is not present when he is indeed not present), but it is generally more useful to classify 
results in relation to target presence/absence. Results are typically reported in the terms set out in 
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Note : in some instances, researchers classify ' identifies suspect' under Target absent as 
an incorrect identification, or ' false alarm '. This happens when one of the foils is pre-
designated as the 'suspect' - see the discuss ion below. 
Table 8.13 Identification decisions and their outcomes in simulated identification scenarios. 
Results are thus better considered separately, at least initially, for target present and target absent 
lineups. Table 8.14 reports results for Study 7, according to lineup structure, and target-foil 
similarity. x2 tests of association between lineup structure and identification performance are also 
reported . 
Target present 
High similarity Moderate similarity Low similarity 
Seq Sim Seq Sim Seq Sim 
hit ;5 
incorrect id 1 4 
incorrect 11 9 
rej 
hit trno 5 
incorrect id 6 3 
incorrect 4 4 
rej 
hit trno 13 
incorrect id 2 0 
incorrect 2 2 
rej 
x' = 2.52; df = 2; p > .2s x' = 2.40: df = 2; p > .30 
Seq =sequential ; Sim = simultaneous; id = identification; rej = rejection. 
High similarity 
Seq Sim 
incorrect id ~ 
correct rej LU 




incorrect id ~ 
correct rej u_:__J 
x' = o.3: df = 1; p > .so 
Table 8.14 Identification decisions in the 12 lineups used in Study 7 
Low similarity 
Seq Sim 
incorrect id ~ 
correctrej ~ 
x' = 3.54; df= 1: p < .06 
Table 8. I 4 shows that there is little difference in identification accuracy between simultaneous and 
sequential lineup structures when targets are present, but there is a difference when targets are absent. 
In particular, subjects completing simultaneous lineup tasks are apt to make more incorrect 
identifications (false alarms) when targets are absent, than when targets are present. This trend 
appears to be the case for lineups of high and low target-foil similarity, but not for lineups of 
moderate target-foil similarity. In addition, there appears to be an effect for facial similarity across 
lineup conditions - from visual scrutiny, low similarity appears to be associated with a great many 
hits, and few mistakes, in both sequential and simultaneous conditions. This impression is 
investigated more rigorously below. 
One of the most useful ways of thinking about lineup identifications is in terms of Wells and 
colleagues' ' diagnosticity ratio' (see Chapter 6). This ratio reflects the likelihood that a guilty suspect 
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will be chosen, when present in a lineup, over an innocent suspect being chosen, when the perpetrator 
is not present. Although this ratio makes perfect sense when one has police lineups in mind (the 
pol ice always have a suspect, and this suspect is either innocent or guilty), it does not apply as easily 
to lineups used in simulated identifications. This is because simulated identification scenarios always 
have a 'real ' perpetrator, but never have a ' real ' suspect, in the sense that police have a ' real ' suspect. 
In order to calculate the diagnosticity ratio in a simulated identification scenario, researchers usually 
designate one of the lineup members in target-absent arrays as the ' suspect'. This method 5eems a 
little opportunistic to me,3 16 and I decided to approach matters a different way. Instead of treating one 
of the members of the target-absent lineup as the suspect, I treated all identifications of foils as 
informative, and totalled the number of identifications in these lineups (totals are shown in Table 
8.14). In a real lineup, the identifications accruing to only one of the lineup members would be 
considered (since there is only one suspect3 11) , so I divided the total number of identifications in 
target-absent lineups by the number of lineup members . This estimate is used in the calculation of 
diagnosticity, in place of the number of identifications attracted by the 'designated suspect '. 
Diagnosticity ratios are presented in Table 8.15, for sequential and simultaneous lineups, across the 
three similarity conditions. 
·--
Similarity 
; Lineup structure High Moderate Low 
Simultaneous 4.2 I 5.5 I 16.5 I 
Sequential 10.7 I 6.4 I 3a.1 I 
Total 6.3 6.0 22.1 
Values in the row marked ' total' are calculated over both conditions. 
Table 8.15 Diagnosticity ratios for lineups constructed to have varying target-foil similarity. 
It is clear from the table that diagnosticity varies across similarity conditions, and across lineup 
structure. It also appears that lineup structure and similarity factors interact, so that differences 
between simultaneous and sequential lineups are greatest when similarity is low, and smallest when 
similarity is moderate. These observations should be subjected to examination by inferential 
statistics. It is possible to compare simultaneous and sequential lineups across similarity conditions, 
us ing methods I developed in Chapter 6, since these comparisons are of independent diagnosticity 
ratios. However, the methods developed there are suitable for large samples, as they rely (in part) on 
3 16 
See the discussion ofNavon ' s arguments, starting on page 75 of Chapter 4. 
3 17 
I assume that there is one suspect, although police do hold multiple-suspect lineups. See Chapter 3. 
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approximation to the normal probability distribution. Table 8.16 reports tests of significance, as well 







d d x2 df prob. 
4.2 10.7 0.45 1 p > 0.5 
5.6 6.4 0.007 1 p > 0.5 
16.5 38.1 0.19 1 p > 0.5 
All statistics reported in this table are as described in Chapter 6 
95% Confidence intervals 
Sim. Upper Lower Seq. Upper Lower 
d' limit limit d' limit limit 
3.6 8.37 1.56 6.8 11 .8 3.9 
3.7 7.62 2.51 4.4 7.6 2.5 
11.3 36.6 3.5 17.0 40.7 7.1 
Table 8.16 Tests of significance, and confidence intervals, for diagnosticity ratios calculated on 
simultaneous and sequential lineups. 
Values reported in the table suggest that differences between diagnosticity ratios are not statistically 
significant. This can be seen from the x2 tests of differences between d, and from the overlapping 
confidence intervals for d' . These ;·esults may serve merely to underscore that the methods developed 
in Chapter 6 are appropriate for large samples: for small samples, statistical power will be very low.318 
Certainly, x2 tests of association reported in Table 8.15 show that simultaneous and sequential lineups 
exhibit different proportions of identification error. 
The design of Study 7 demands an investigation of similarity effects across target presence and lineup 
structure manipulations. There are two problems in implementing such an analysis, though . The 
categories that the dependent variable takes differ across target-present and target-absent lineups, 
making comparison difficult. This can be overcome by reclassifying identification decisions as 
' correct ' or 'incorrect ' (which loses information, but achieves comparability), and in the analys is 
reported below, this variable is called ' identification accuracy' . In the second place, the design of 
Study 7 incorporates a repeated-measures factor (similarity), which, like all other variables in the 
design, is categorical. Log-linear analysis is the analytic method of choice for exploring main and 
interaction effects of categorical independent variables on categorical dependent variables, but there 
is no general method for designs which use repeated measures.319 I proceeded to analyse the data for 
311 This can be seen from the formula for the standard error of ln(d '), below: As cell sizes increase, so the standard error 
decreases, and, by implication, power increases. 
S[ln(d')] =~ --t- - --+-- + --t- - --+--
( n11 +0.5 n·• +0.5 n21 +0.5 n·' +0.5 '\ 
319 There are ' table folding ' methods, which fit symmetry, quasi-symmetry, and quasi-independence models (see Agresti . 
1990; and Kennedy, 1992), but these appear to be appropriate for one-factor repeated designs only. In the present design, 
there are two independent factors in addition to the repeated factor, and there does not appear to be a widely recognised 
technique for dealing with such a design. 
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Study 7 with standard Jog-linear techniques (i .e. assuming all factors to be independent): this appeared 
to be the only option which would provide a full evaluation of the study,320 even though it does not 
take the dependency in the data into account. 
Tests of all k-factor interactions suggested that 2 and 4 factor interactions should be included in the 
model (2 factor interactions: X2 = 23 . 7; df = 9; p < 0.006;32 1 4 factor interaction: X2 = 4.65; df = 2; p < 
0.1 ), but tests of partial association suggested only a two way interaction between similarity and 
identification accuracy (X2 = 17 .54; df = 9; p < 0.001 ). Specific models tested against each other 
revealed that the model {Similarity X Identification accuracy} 322 provided an adequate fit, and was 
simpler than any rival models . Table 8.17 summarises the model identification and evaluation. 
No. Model spec. ·/ df prob. 
1 I, St, P, Si 37 .20 18 p > 0.005 
2 Ix Si 19.92 18 p > 0.33 
3 St x P, St x Si , Ix St, Ix P, P x Si 31.05 11 p > 0.001 
4 Ix Si, St x P, St x Si , Ix St, Ix P, P x Si 13.51 9 p > 0.14 
5 St x Ix Si 14.04 12 p > 0.29 
6 St x Six I, St x P x I, St x Ix Si , Ix P x Si 4.66 2 p > 0.09 
I= Iden ti fication accuracy; Si = Similarity; St.= Lineup structure; P =Presence of target. 
Table 8.17 Key log-linear models tested in the log-linear analysis of Study 7 
Model 4 is clearly preferable over model 1, since it fits the data better, and the incremental change in 
X2 is significant. This implies that .at least one 2-factor interaction will be required to fit the data . 
Model 2 is preferable over model 3, by the same criterion of incremental change in X2. A comparison 
of models 2, 3 and 4 shows that it is necessary to include the interaction between Similarity and 
Identification accuracy, but no other 2-factor interactions. (This is corroborated by the test of partial 
associations, reported above) . It is not easy to choose between Models 2, 5 and 6 on statistical 
criteria, but the parsimony of Model 2 makes it the most attractive. 
The conclusion from the log-linear analysis is that the interaction between Similarity and 
Identification accuracy is a sufficient basis on which to understand the results of Study 7. This 
interaction is shown in terms of cell frequencies, in Table 8.18 below: 
320 The analysis m\ist therefore be viewed with some skepticism. The central assumption broken here is that of statistical 
independence. One of the most likely consequences of breaking this assumption is that statistical tests of significance 
used in identification and testing of the log-linear model will be conservative, i.e. the model will be over-simplified. 
321 All x.2 values reported in this section are estimates produced by maximum likelihood estimators. 








38 (57%) 29 (43%) 
40 (56%) 32 (44%) 
19 (26%) 53 (74%) 
Percentages are calculated row-wise. 
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Table 8.18 Frequencies for the interaction between facial similarity and identification accuracy. 
The interaction is explicable almost entirely in the deviation of the low similarity condition from other 
conditions: in this condition, correct identifications were much more frequent than in high and 
moderate similarity conditions. A re-examination of Table 8.14 shows that correct identifications in 
low similarity lineups are more frequent in both target-present and target-absent conditions. 
Discussion of Studies 6 and 7 
The major aim of empirical work reported in this thesis has been to develop a direct measure of facial 
similarity. I showed in Studies 2 - 5 that a measure based on a principal component analysis of face 
images succeeds in an important respect, namely that it corresponds reasonably well to human 
judgements of facial similarity. Since the justification for developing a measure of similarity was 
derived from analysis of a legal problem - how to assess the fairness of identification parades - this 
was not sufficient evidence in favour of the measure. I needed, in particular, to show that the measure 
of facial similarity would also correspond to measures of lineup fairness developed in the psycho-
legal literature. Study 6 investigated the measure in this respect, using the well-tried 'mock witness ' 
technique, and several measures of lineup fairness derived from this technique. Results showed that 
the measure of facial similarity is strongly related to measures of lineup fairness. The results were 
complicated to some degree by slightly anomalous results from a 'facial distinctiveness ' 
manipulation . The complication is not too serious: there was a near-monotonically decreasing 
relation in all distinctiveness conditions between similarity and lineup fairness. In addition, the PC-
based measure of 'facial distinctiveness' has proved very difficult to understand in several of the 
studies reported in this chapter, particularly since it appears unrelated to subject judgements of 
distinctiveness. 
At any rate, the measure of facial similarity is strongly related to measures of lineup fairness , and may 
prove to be a useful proxy for these more expensive and less direct measures. Ideally, one should also 
be able to use the measure in foil selection, particularly for photo-lineups. The measure would 
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(theoretically) allow one to structure the similarity of a lineup in an ' objective' manner. Results from 
Study 6 do not support such a use for the measure (but later investigations may, of course, find 
differently). The distribution of witness identifications across foils was decidedly non-uniform, even 
in high similarity conditions, and even though foils in these conditions had near-identical similarity 
scores in relation to the target. This may have been due to the highly individuating descriptions 
subj ects were given of targets, but it may also show the failure of the 'match-to-suspect' strategy that 
the similarity measure adopts. It would be interesting to compare a ' match-to-description ' foil 
selection strategy directly with a method based on the facial similarity measure. In general , lineups in 
Study 6 exhibited low levels of fairness, and later work will need to investigate the similarity measure 
with a wider range of fairness scores. 
Study 7 did not directly examine the utility or validity of the similarity measure. Instead, the measure 
was used there to investigate the effect of similarity on witness identifications, using a simulated 
identification scenario. Results from the study showed that similarity is strongly related to witness 
accuracy, but in an unanticipated.direction. 323 Low similarity lineups led to greater accuracy, in terms 
of hits and correct rejections, than moderate or high similarity lineups. This finding bears out Wells ' 
recent contention (Wells et al., 1994) that high similarity lineups may not provide witnesses with 
' propitious heterogeneity'. The finding also lies quite uneasily next to the finding from Study 6 that 
high similarity lineups are associated with greater lineup fairness. It may be that the conventional 
way in which 'lineup fairness ' is understood and investigated in the psycho-legal literature is 
mistaken. Fairness is usually assessed with mock witness tasks, and is measured as bias towards (or 
against) the suspect, or in terms of the number of 'plausible ' foils in the lineup. The mock witness 
task assumes that a lineup is unfair if a witness is able to identify the suspect with only a brief 
description of the suspect to hand. What constitutes ' brier has not been investigated, and this may be 
overdue: one expects a witness who has a detailed description to succeed, so we need to know more 
about the relation of the description to mock identification accuracy. 
Study 7 also corroborated findings from previous studies in the field regarding the utility of sequential 
lineups. Sequential lineups were associated in this study with fewer false alarms than simultaneous 
lineups, while securing the same number of ' hits '. 
In sum, the key findings from Studies 6 and 7 are that the PC-based measure of facial similarity may 
be able to ' stand-in' as a proxy for standard measures of lineup fa irness, but that these standard 
323 It is not correct to claim that this result was totally unanticipated. Wagenaar & Veefkind (1992) reported results which 
showed that greater similarity led to more false alarms, and decreased recognition accuracy. Much legal discussion, 
however, has assumed that greater similarity will lead to greater fairness. 
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measures may themselves need re-examination in the light of the relation between lineup similarity 
and identification accuracy uncovered in Study 7. 
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In this, the final chapter of the thesis, I have several aims. In the first place, I wish to review the 
cardinal arguments of earlier chapters, and to trace their evolution in the thesis. It is clear from the a 
priori and empirical investigations reported in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 that certain arguments and claims 
need to be reshaped, or moderated . Secondly, this chapter is traditionally set aside for summary and 
evaluation of findings, and I will not disappoint in this respect: In particular, I will attempt to provide 
a summative account of research on the proposed measure of facial similarity, including its potential 
use in the assessment of parade fairness . Finally, I will return to one of the key meta-theoretical 
engagements of the earliest part of the thesis, which is the notion of an ' applied psychology' : my brief 
will be to speculate about the practical use of the similarity measure in several aspects of police and 
legal work. 
I argued at the beginning of the thesis that research on identification evidence and identification 
parades is a kind of 'applied psychology' . We must be careful , though to understand the nature of 
'applied research ' : It is all too often interpreted as the ' application of basic science to real world 
matters ', or as some other near-tautological pursuit. I argued earlier that this is frequently mere 
justificatory rhetoric on the part of researchers. Most of what passes as 'applied psychology ' is never 
applied, and would be better labelled as ' applicable psychology' . The label is adopted on the basis of 
the distal origin of the research problem, and because recent cognitive psychology has greatly 
favoured research which attempts to shed itself of the laboratory. A psychology which is applied, on 
the other hand, will take seriously the notion that 'application' is not inherent to research ; it needs to 
be actively pursued. 
A useful point of departure, in the case of applied witness research, is to take bearings on the 
distinction made by Wells (1978) between ' system' and 'estimator ' variables. System variables are 
those under the control of the criminal justice system, and research on these works close to the form 
(eventual) application will take: the trick is to find something about which something can be done. 
Choosing a system variable as the focus of the research does not guarantee application, though : in 
Chapter 2 I reviewed a discussion by Wells (1986), which outlines potential strategies for promoting 
the application of witness research, and I think I made clear in that review that there are many 
obstacles in the way even of research which carefully targets ' system variables'. Nevertheless, the 
choice of system variables as objects for research investigation appears to be a useful beginning 
strategy. The research reported in this thesis utilised this strategy. 
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The present work sets . itself up as applied research, and its amibitions in this respect should 
consequently be subjected to inspection. 324 Certain questions can be posed in respect of the ' applied ' 
orientation of empirical research reported in this thesis. The present research stopped well short of 
'application': limitations are imposed in the first place by the inherent academic nature of the thesis, 
and the ideas pursued here are, in the second place, at an early stage of development. Nevertheless, I 
believe that results from the empirical investigation of the similarity measure show it to be of 
potential use in several aspects of police and legal practice. I will outline a few of these potential uses 
at the end of the chapter. 
The cardinal argument regarding the understanding of 'applied psychology', at least for purposes of 
continuity of the thesis, was that researchers need to proceed carefully at the stage of problem 
definition. The justification for applied research is typically a practical problem which originates 
outside of the discipline in question, and an important part of an applied project must be to understand 
the problem in terms of the discipline or context being entered. There is no point in answering a 
problem which is phrased incorrectly. This conclusion led me to a review of South African law on 
identification parades, as well as a brief look at police practice. 
The review of South African law was approached in the spirit of a kind of legal positivism. That is , 
the review was an attempt to construct a coherent, rule-based interpretation of the law. This was 
achieved through the inspection of manifest law, i.e. statutes, case law and police documents. There 
was no attempt to assess legal practice in a more grounded manner. Legal practice with respect to 
identification parades may tum out to differ greatly from this picture: we may find that overt 
characteristics of judges and defendants partly or largely determine the conduct and evaluation of 
parades (as they certainly have in other aspects of legal practice in South Africa - see Murray, Sloth-
Nielsen & Tredoux, 1989). As far as the review is concerned, it cannot be claimed that a completely 
coherent picture was obtained. There are many contradictions, and points of disagreement. It is 
unclear where many regulations originated, and it is clear that different interpretations are possible. 
This, of course, is not unusual in a complex knowledge system like case law. 
The review of South African law on identification parades showed that the chief concern of the courts 
has been to regulate procedure. Courts have gone to great lengths to ensure that accused persons are 
protected against suggestive parade arrangements, and to rule out the possibility that witnesses make 
identifications by virtue of having the suspect 'pointed out', however inadvertently this might occur. 
Do example, the officer charged with conducting the parade should not even know the identity of the 
suspect, in case he accidentally communicates this to the witness. Many other strictures are in place, 
and were discussed at some length in Chapter 3. 
324 Lest Byron' s adage ring true : ' In every trade a man must do his apprenticeship, save censure '. 
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There has been little concern, by contrast, with the structure of the parade. The question of how the 
parade should be assembled is not even addressed, even though the review of comparative legal and 
psychological literatures in this thesis showed that there are many alternatives to the traditional 
'lineup' (e.g. the sequential lineup pioneered by Lindsay & Wells (1 985), and the casual ' parade ' of 
people in a room, as used in some Scandinavian countries). In add ition, few legal authorities have 
thought carefully about the nature of the task embodied in the identification parade: the central 
unanswered question in this respect appears to be whether it should be treated as a test of reliability or 
as an evidentiary procedure in its own right, i.e. one that gathers independent information that points 
to the innocence or guilt of the suspect. This question has been addressed in the psychological 
literature, and there are some interesting arguments, but there is a clear lack of consensus . 
The most important aspect of parade structure, however, concerns the physical constitution of the 
parade. The courts have specified that the members forming the parade should be of same height, 
build and physical appearance as the suspect, but no advice is given concerning the evaluation of this 
requirement. In police practice, the officer charged with conducting the parade is simply required to 
certify that this is the case: he is not required to provide evidence that will point to this conclusion. 
He may arrange for a photograph to be taken, but is not required to do so. 
I identified this lacuna in the legal treatment of identification parades as a major problem, but wish to 
add at this stage that the problem runs deeper than simply assessing the similarity of parade members. 
The results of Studies 6 and 7 showed that the relation between similarity, lineup fairness and 
identification performance is certainly not self-evident, and may well be highly complex. Even if 
courts were able to assess similarity, they would be faced with the further question of deciding what 
degree of similarity is required. This kind of question is not amenable to investigation by the courts -
or at least not under its present epistemological disposition. It is a question more amenable to 
investigation by a discipline like research psychology. 
The overriding aim of providing the review of South African law was to better understand the 
problems that identification evidence pose, in context. I argued that one of the key difficulti es 
appears to be the inability to assess the physical similarity of parade members, and I took this 
observation as partial motivation for the empirical work of the thesis. 
Other motivations derived from the review of the psychological literature on identification parades. 
Psychological work on identification parades has been very productive, if one considers the small 
number of researchers actively involved in the field, and the relatively small corpus of publications. I 
argued earlier that measures of lineup fairness and lineup size represent some of the most useful work 
in this regard, but that the work is flawed by a neglect of the probability assumptions underlying the 
measures. Chapter 6 constituted an attempt to bolster the measures by tying them to their basis in 
probabi lity theory. Specific recommendations were made regarding ways to use statistical inferential 
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reasoning in the interpretation of the measures. This included developing a new measure of lineup 
size, ' E': earlier definitions of lineup size proved intractable to treatment by inferential statistical 
techniques, and ' E ' was developed in order to be tractable to inferential techniques. I also 
investigated the interpretation of Bayesian measures known as ' diagnosticity ' and ' information gain ', 
and made recommendations regarding the application of inferential statistical thinking to these 
measures. 
Many of the recommendations made in respect of the application of techniques of statistical inference 
to lineup measures were tempered by the stricture that they be used with fairly large samples. 
Empirical work in Studies 6 and 7, which used fairly small samples, showed the dependence of the 
measures on large sample sizes. This stricture, and its confirmation, may make inferential techniques 
a Jess attractive option to identification research, since much of the research is based on (relatively) 
small samples.325 
Studies 6 and 7 raised additional questions about the measures of lineup fairness and size. Study 6 
showed that similarity covaries with both fairness and size: lineups of greater target-foil similarity had 
greater functional and effective sizes, and led to fewer correct mock identifications of suspects. Study 
7, on the other hand, showed that greater target-foil similarity led to lower accurate identification 
rates, in both suspect-present and suspect-absent lineups . This constitutes something of a conundrum 
for research on identification parades: fair(er) lineups lead to lower identification accuracy! The 
conundrum may derive from what is an unexplored aspect of the mock witness task (this task 
underlies all of the measures of lineup fairness and lineup size). 
The mock witness task determines the likelihood that a witness, anned only with a brief written 
description, is able to guess the identity of the suspect from visual inspection of the parade. The role 
that the written description plays in the performance of mock witnesses is almost completely 
unexplored in the literature. Clearly, a more detailed description will lead to a greater likelihood of 
accurate identification than a less detailed description, and by implication also to lower estimates of 
lineup size and lineup fairness. This makes the measures of lineup fairness and lineup size arbitrarily 
dependent on the description . An implication of this is that the more information a witness has, the 
less likely it is that a ' fair ' lineup can be constructed, in the sense that a lineup is adjudged fair by 
existing empirical measures of fairness . There is no natural limit on the detail of the description - one 
cannot talk reasonably of an ' average' witness description, since descriptions may vary in as many 
ways as there are different opportunities for observation. The situation where the fairness of a lineup 
is investigated in a post hoc fashion - for example, where a lineup has been conducted by police, and 
325 It is, of course, always difficult to know what size of sample qualifies as ' large ', or 'small '. In the case of identification 
research, though, many of the measures are proportions (e.g. proportion of correct identifications), and where these 
approach 0 or I, very large sample sizes will be needed to provide accurate estimates of population parameters. 
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the description originally given to the police is available - could perhaps be said to produce conditions 
that naturally limit the description, but even this type of situation is subject to complications . For one, 
descriptions provided by witnesses are rarely likely to be complete records of what is available to 
them in recall. Certainly, some searching questions need to be asked about the measures of lineup 
fairness and size, and about the mock witness technique in particular. 
The principal empirical project undertaken and reported in the thesis developed and tested a measure 
of fac ial similarity. The need for such a measure was argued in the first place on the basis of the 
review of identification Jaw, but to that could be added the virtual absence of a measure in the face 
recognition literature. When facial similarity is measured, it is typically through an indirect route, and 
an ad hoc solution to a research exigency. 
The theory behind the measure proposed in this thesis is Valentine's multidimensional model for the 
perceptual representation of faces. The multidimensional nature of the model means that faces are 
represented in terms of the same underlying dimensions, which in turn sustains well known 
mathematical measures. These allow - among other things - the calculation of distances between 
faces in the space, and distances of faces from the origin . Unfortunately, Valentine's model is offered 
at a conceptual level only, and the dimensions constituting the space are left completely unspecified . 
I searched for a suitable solution to the problem of dimensions for the multidimensional model , and 
evaluated possible candidates in Chapter 5. The search for suitable 'facial ' dimensions led to the 
image processing work of Sirovich & Kirby (1987), and O' Toole and colleagues (e.g. O ' Toole & 
Thompson, 1993 ). This work pioneered the use of principal component analysis (PCA) with digital 
images of faces , and appears to solve not only the problem of suitable facial dimensions, but al so 
provides an implementation of Valentine ' s multidimensional model , in the form of the principal 
component analysis itself. The derivation of spatial distances from principal component solutions is 
seamless, and a natural consequence of the mathematical basis of the analytic technique . 
The major theoretical proposition of the thesis, then, was that a measure of the facial similarity of any 
two faces in a particular image set can be defined as the Euclidean distance between these faces in a 
principal component space. A similar proposition was made in the case of facial distinctiveness. The 
empirical work set out, by and large, to investigate these propositions. Before I turn to a review of 
this empirical work, it is useful to note certain limitations pertinent to the underlying theoretical basis 
of the measures, and some uncertainties about the practical implementation of the methodology. 
Of the many distance and other potential similarity metrics avai lable in multidimensional space 
models (e.g. the Minkowski metric, city-distance spatial measures, dot products), I chose only to 
investigate Euclidean distance. I leave the utility and theoretical adequacy of other measures as an 
open question to later research, or other researchers. The technique used in implementing the PCA of 
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face images appears to break some fundamental mathematical axioms. Faces are standardized with 
respect only to pupil location, and will differ in many other ways after standardization : combinations 
of faces treated in this way will not again be ' faces ', and this breaks one of the axioms of linear 
systems. I discussed a particular solution to this problem in Chapters 5 and 8, but argued there that 
this solution cannot meet the axioms in question, if they are applied strictly. In the end, it is not clear 
how the axioms should be interpreted. I have settled for an interpretation which requires 
combinations of face images to be ' facelike ', rather than faces themselves. 
There are technological limitations, presently, in the practical implementation of the methodology 
required to derive facial similarity scores from a principal component analysis. All images in the 
studies reported in this thesis were standardized individually, using image processing software, and 
this was a lengthy business. After standardization, images were subjected to PCA, and component 
coefficients captured for each face . Finally, Euclidean distances were calculated between faces . This 
process is cumbersome, at least in its present form , and solutions to some practical limitations are 
needed . The standardization procedure is the most time consuming stage in the process, and software 
capable of automating this process would be very useful. This could be achieved simply enough if 
pupils could, in turn, be automatically determined for each face . Recent publications in the 
engineering literature suggest that this will soon be possible (Cheng, Liu & Yang, 1993). The 
solutions to other implementation problems appear to be uncomplicated, and probably depend only on 
the availability of resources. 
I have repeatedly claimed that the present research - and, indeed, most identification research - is a 
kind of applied psychology, but this does not mean that theory is unimportant. I have determined the 
value of the PCA similarity measure according to its correspondence with human perceptions of 
similarity, and its relation to lineup indices, but it could be said that such an approach is mere 
pragmatism. What is the relation between the technique used to derive the similarity scores, and the 
human visual-cognitive system? Surely it cannot be the case that human perceptions of similarity are 
determined in a manner which is anything like a principal component analysis, or again, like the 
determination of a Euclidean distance in a multidimensional space? A better approach in the long 
run, it may be argued, is to develop a theory at the level of cognitive process, and to develop measures 
from this theoretical groundwork. 
There are several possible rejoinders to this position. Although it may seem a bit far-fetched to assert 
that the PCA technique underlying the similarity measure is a good model of visual-cognitive 
processes, some support for this proposition can be adduced from the demonstration that the 
technique can be translated into a (mathematically equivalent) auto-associative neural network (see 
footnote 249 in Chapter 5). Neural networks are now widely used to model cognitive processes, and 
their ability to produce 'learning behaviour' of the type that human face recognition behaviour shows, 
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suggests that there is more to the PCA approach than sheer expedience.326 There are some, though, 
who feel that neural network models are in themselves highly dubious accounts of human cognition 
(see Bechtel, 1991 ). Perhaps the truth of the matter is that most cognitive modelling is difficult to 
justify by reference to ' real psychological processes ' : we rarely have evidence that makes us capable 
of arguing th is point with any degree of competence. 
I concede then, that the cognitive-theoretical basis of the PCA approach is a little inchoate, and that I 
have done little to render it differently. This can be the task for a later, more extensive project. 
The empirical tests undertaken in respect of the facial similarity and distinctiveness measures can be 
separated into two categories. In the first, I investigated the measures directly - that is to say, I 
examined the relation of the measures to human judgements of facial similarity and distinctiveness, on 
the same sets of stimulus materials. Several distinct task operationalizations were utilised . Direct 
investigations of the measures also included an assessment of concurrent validity, in respect of the 
abil ity of the measures to accurately discriminate a priori similarity classifications of sets of face 
images. In the second category of test, I examined the relation of the measure of facial similarity to 
indices of lineup fairness and lineup size. This category of test does not directly examine the validity 
of the measure: it assumes instead that target-foil similarity determines lineup fairness , ceteris 
paribus, and hence treats the facial similarity measure as a proxy index of lineup fairness. The first 
five empirical studies fall into the first category, and the final two into the second. 
The first two studies produced anomalous results when face ranking tasks were used (i .e. there was 
correspondence between subject rankings and rankings based on the PC similarity measure, in some, 
but certainly not all tasks). I argued that the anomalous nature of these results is explicable, on 
several grounds . I will not detail these again here, except to note that these studies used images (and 
similarity measures) derived from a relatively small , homogenous base set. Although results from the 
ranking tasks were unclear, a face pairing task used in Study 2 showed a strong and consistent 
correspondence between subject judgements of similarity and the PC measure. In addition, a cluster 
analysis produced a classification which grouped similar faces, and distinguished dissimilar faces , and 
a discriminant analysis appeared capable of producing highly accurate classifications of race, sex and 
age groupmgs . 
Study 3 set out to correct significant methodological uncertainties which may have hampered Studies 
1 and 2. The most important of these included the collection of a new, larger, and more 
heterogeneous base set of facial images, and the re-structuring of the similarity judgement task used in 
Study 2. Similarity ratings were gathered in 11 conditions, using the restructured similarity rating 
326 O 'Toole et al. (1994), for example, have shown that the neural network implementation is capable of modell ing the 
' other-race' effect in face recognition behaviour. 
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task, and the correspondence between these ratings and the PC similarity measure was generally 
strong, and always in the expected direction. 
Study 4 repeated the investigation of the correspondence between subject ratings and the PC measure, 
but extended the scope of the inquiry to include different viewing perspectives. Results again 
generally showed a strong relation between subject judgements and the PC measure. This was true 
for ratings of frontal faces and for ratings of profile faces. In addition, PC similarity scores based on 
frontal views were strongly related to PC scores based on profile views of the same subjects (indeed, 
perhaps more strongly than subject ratings of similarity across viewing perspectives). This is an 
important test of the measure: frontal views of faces should not be mistaken for the faces themselves, 
and a similarity measure based only on frontal views runs the risk of making such a mistake - a 
measure based on frontal views may simply be a measure of picture or image similarity, and not a 
measure of the similarity of the faces . 
In Studies 1-4, judgements of facial similarity exhibited a great deal of inter-subject variation. This is 
a significant finding in its own right: although several published studies have elicited similarity 
ratings, only one of these refers at all to this phenomenon, and then only as an aside (Lindsay, 1994 ). 
I considered several possible explanations for the high degree of inter-subject variation in Chapter 7, 
and devised Study 5 as a test of the most troubling explanation. This explanation posits that similarity 
ratings are inherently unstable, and will vary greatly over rating occasions, even when these are made 
by the same subject. Study 5 examined the fluctuation of ratings over a three week period, using a 
simple test-retest design. Findings indicated satisfactory reliability over time, but there were several 
weaknesses in this design that could be corrected in further investigations of the ' variation 
phenomenon'. In addition, Study 5 tested only one explanation of the phenomenon; a series of studies 
aimed at explicating inter-subject variation would be a welcome addition to the literature. 
In sum, Studies 1-5 show that the PC similarity measure has considerable promise. The measure is 
strongly predictive (in general) of human judgements of facial similarity, and this is true over a 
variety of conditions, sequences, task operationalizations, and viewing perspectives. The measure is 
also capable of discriminating groupings which, on a priori grounds, reflects similarity differences 
between subjects. 
Investigations of the PC distinctiveness measure, on the other hand, produced less promising results . 
Studies 1 and 2 showed little evidence that this measure corresponds to human perceptions and 
judgements of facial distinctiveness. Stepwise regression procedures using vectors of component 
coefficients as predictors, however, appeared able to model human data with some success. Further 
investigations of distinctiveness, to wit in Study 3, showed a similar lack of correspondence between 
subject judgements and the PC measure, but stepwise regression analyses appeared to show again that 
human data can be successfully modelled. I am skeptical of the regression results, though, for reasons 
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set out at greater length in Chapter 8, and prefer to conclude that facial distinctiveness infonnation is 
not captured by the PC distinctiveness measure, at least as defined in this work. Alternate definitions 
of distinctiveness may be the first step in rethinking the PC measure. The distinctiveness of a face is 
defined in Valentine ' s multidimensional model as the distance of the face from the origin of the 
space. PCA effectively rules out an operationalization of this definition, since it detennines a solution 
subject to the constraint that members of the component space are orthonormal (i .e. they are 
orthogonal, and of unit distance from the origin). Faces are represented equidistantly from the origin, 
and this means that it is impossible to implement the theoretical definition of distinctivness. There 
may be ways of transfonning component solutions to achieve an operationalization of Valentine's 
conceptualization of distinctiveness; I leave this possibil ity to later research, or other researchers. 
The two final empirical studies undertaken for the thesis investigated the application of the similarity 
measure to identification parades. They thus fall into the second of the categories delineated above. 
Study 6 explored the relation between the PC similarity measure and the indices of lineup fairness and 
size discussed at some length in Chapters 4 and 6. A mock witness task was designed, and eighteen 
photo lineups were constructed in order to examine the relation between similarity and distinctiveness 
manipulations, and parade indices. Results revealed a definite and strong relation between similarity 
and lineup indices; this relation was present for each of the measures of lineup fairness and size, and 
appeared to be monotonic, but the presence of ceiling effects must make conclusions about the nature 
of the relationship somewhat tentative. Greater similarity led to greater fairness , and to higher 
estimates of lineup size. It should be mentioned, though, that none of the lineups used in the study 
produced size estimates anywhere near the nominal number of lineup members, and few, if any, of the 
lineups produced suspect identification rates that would lead one to believe that they were fair. This 
was probably due to the detailed nature of the written descriptions mock witnesses used to detennine 
the identity of the suspect. As I argued earlier in this chapter, we need to investigate the significance 
of these descriptions to measures of lineup fairness and size at much greater length. 
One or two remarks about the application of the similarity measure to identification parades are in 
order here. In the first place, it should be recognised that the 'fairness' of a parade will depend on 
many things. Procedural irregularities may produce an identification which is palpably unfair (see the 
newspaper report reproduced on page 58, Chapter 3) even though the structure of the parade is 
satisfactory in every respect. Parade structure may lead to unfair identifications; the case of interest 
here is the kind of parade which consists of people who are highly dissimilar. The measure of facial 
similarity is consequently only a measure of ' structural fairness', and it should further be noted that 
facial similarity is only one component of physical similarity. There is a case to be made for the 
overriding importance of facial similarity, but it may simply be sufficient to note that it is now 
common police practice in the USA to use photospread lineups, composed only of head-and shoulder 
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photographs. Facial similarity is just about the only component of physical similarity in this kind of 
lineup, and the measure developed in this thesis may be justified, if necessary, in application only to 
photospread lineups. 
The legal requirement of physical similarity, at least in South Africa and English Jaw, is that parade 
members bear a sufficient likeness to the suspect. As I have noted at several places in the thesis , 
recent publications in the psychological literature reject this requirement, arguing instead that foils 
should be chosen on the basis of the description given to police at the first stage of the criminal 
investigation. This contention is not uncontroversial, even in the psychological literature. It must 
come into conflict with the PC measure of similarity, since the measure assesses 'structural fairness' 
under the assumption that target-foil similarity is a determinant of this fairness . The task of 
reconciling the approaches - or, conversely, disposing of one - is not feasible at this stage of the 
thesis, but it is worth pointing out that the 'match to suspect' strategy must sufficiently meet a 'match 
to description' strategy, if it is assumed that the suspect matches the description : if the foils resemble 
the suspect, and the suspect resembles the description, then it follows that the foils must resemble the 
description .327 
The final empirical study of the thesis, Study 7, broadened the scope of the empirical enquiry to 
include questions additional to those concerning the validity and utility of the PC similarity measure. 
In particular, Study 7 explored the relationship between target-foil similarity and identification 
accuracy in a simulated identification scenario. The motivation for this study derived from the 
observation in Chapter 4 that comparatively little is known about this relationship, and that facial 
similarity may consequently operate as a type of confounding variable. The study was therefore 
intended as a serious and substantive investigation, but it also served as a demonstration of the 
potential of the similarity measure as a research tool. 
The identification scenario used in Study 7 exposed subjects, in a disguised fashion , to photographs of 
targets, and later tested their recognition ability with photospread parades . There was no attempt to 
dress the scenario up as a ' real event' (as, for example, in Malpass & Devine, 1981 b, or Murray & 
Wells, 1982), since my concern was only with recognition accuracy. 
There were several important findings in the study. In the first place, identification performance was 
superior in sequential lineups, but only in target absent lineups, and not in all similarity conditions. 
The finding of an advantage for sequential parades, though, adds to what is now a solid corpus of 
findings indicating the superiority of this mode of parade over the traditional mode used by police, at 
least in South Africa (see Table 4. 7). But the study also revealed a negative relation between facial 
327 Of course, it may be 'over-sufficient ', in the sense that the match between suspect and foils is too close, making accurate 
identification too difficult. 
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similarity and identification performance: lower degrees of similarity led to better identification 
performance. This was the case in target present lineups, in target absent lineups, and in both 
simultaneous and sequential lineups. 
This latter find ing is explicable in some respects, but in other respects it is quite unanticipated . Wells 
and colleagues (Wells, Rydell & Seelau, 1993 ; Wells, Seelau, Rydell & Luus, 1994) have recently 
argued that lineups should have adequate feature heterogeneity - that is suspects and foils should be 
somewhat dissimilar - since feature homogeneity will impede correct identifications of guilty 
suspects. In this sense, the finding in question is not surprising: identification decisions were indeed 
more accurate in low similarity, target-present conditions of Study 7. However, identification 
decisions were also more accurate in low similarity, target-absent conditions. This is not anticipated : 
indeed it is directly contrary to an expectation declared by Wells (1984, p 92). 
A possible explanation for this find ing may lie in the construction of the lineups used in Study 7 
(these lineups are shown as Appendix K). The low similarity lineup was constructed by selecting 
foi ls whose similarity scores were in the 90 - I 00 percentile range, determined in relation to the target 
(i.e. their spatial distance from the target was great). In the target-present lineups, the target and foils 
were therefore highly dissimilar. However, in the target-absent lineups, the target was replaced by 
another foil , drawn again from the pool of foils who fell in the 90 - I 00 percentile range. This has the 
consequence that none of the foils in the target absent lineup resembled the target, and subjects would 
probably not be drawn easily into making a positive identification decision in such a lineup. If a 
different selection strategy had been used, say selecting a stand-in fo il who was facially similar to the 
target, the lineup would have had only one foil who resembled the target, and subjects would probably 
have been enticed with greater frequency into making an identification. 
If this explanation holds true, then the finding of an overall recognition advantage for low similarity 
lineups will only exist for lineups where the suspect bears little resemblance to the perpetrator. At 
present, there is little information about the resemblance, in real cases, that innocent suspects bear to 
the perpetrator, and it may be worth treating suspect-perpetrator resemblance as a substantive issue in 
later research . 
The empirical work, in sum, shows that a similarity measure derived from a principal component 
analysis of face images has considerable potential, and may in addition be a useful research tool. 
There is much to do, though, in terms of further investigation of the measure, and I wish to draw 
attention to a few possibilities here. 
In the first place - as I pointed out earlier in the Chapter - the technology behind the measure is a bit 
cumbersome, and would do with some streamlining. The measure needs to be integrated into a 
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system which has facilities for on-line capture of face images, automation of the required 
standardization, and relatively effortless derivation of similarity scores. 
Although several researchers consider image sets of size I 00 adequate for a representational basis of 
facial images, this is a somewhat dubious claim. We need to investigate the differences between 
representational bases generated by different populations of faces, before we can have any confidence 
in the adequacy of a generating set of any particular size. For example, is it better to construct 
different representational bases for different populations of faces , or to construct one, overarching 
basis? This is an argument Valentine considers in his theory of the perceptual representation of faces 
(see Chapter 5), and he shows that there are different implications. 
Only one study reported in this thesis investigated the relation of the similarity measure to parade 
fairness , and it is clear that we need many more before we can claim to understand this relationship. 
In particular, it will be useful to systematically examine the dependence of indices of lineup fairness 
on the nature of the written description given to mock witnesses, and the relation of this dependency, 
in tum, with the measure of facial similarity. 
Although Wells and colleagues reject the notion that an ' optimal function ' can be determined in 
respect of target-foil similarity, in part on the basis that it would be difficult to find a suitable ' cut off 
point ' (see the earlier discussion in Chapter 4), I think that the similarity measure may well lend itself 
to such an investigation. The relation between target-foil similarity and identification accuracy (or 
perhaps, ' diagnosticity ' ) could be examined empirically, and standard techniques in the differential 
calculus could be used to find local and global ' maxima ' . These will be points at which levels of 
target-foil similarity produce maximum identification accuracy. There are many complications, of 
course: we have just seen that suspect-perpetrator similarity is an important additional variable, and 
there will doubtless be many more. 
I started this thesis by asserting that identification research is a type of applied psychology, and that it 
exists by virtue of a concern with the world of practice. It can only deserve this name, in addition, if 
it pursues its natural goal, which is application. In this sense, most of what has preceded this chapter 
in the thesis is only a prelude to real work. I would like, nevertheless, to sketch possible beginnings 
for such work, and in the last few paragraphs of this thesis I suggest ways in which the facial 
similarity measure developed here might be put to use. This discussion is necessarily speculative. 
Police officials frequently complain about the problems involved in constructing identification 
parades. Willing foils are difficult to find, and willing foils who bear a reasonable resemblance to the 
suspect are as scarce as hens ' teeth. These problems are less severe when police are allowed to use 
photospread lineups instead of corporeal parades, but even then the search for a reasonable set of foils 
can be troublesome. The facial similarity metric could be incorporated into a computerised system for 
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producing photospreads, and this would make the task of lineup construction much simpler. An 
image of the suspect could be scanned, and a database of faces could be searched for a number of foils 
who are within a certain distance from the suspect, which is to be determined from spatial position in 
the principal component space. Foils selected in this manner could be entered into a ' simultaneous 
photospread ' or 'sequential photospread '. 
Particular photospread lineups constructed in the way outlined immediately above - or constructed in 
other way, actually - could be ' calibrated ' on indices of lineup fairness developed in the psychological 
literature, since Study 6 showed that there is a strong relation between these and the facial similarity 
measure. However, much more research is required in this respect before the relation is sufficiently 
well understood for this to be justified. 
Just as the similarity metric could underlie a system for constructing photospreads, so it could serve as 
the heuristic ' engine ' of a mugshot retrieval system. Mugshots are presently filed , at best, according 
to gross physical characteristics such as race, sex and age, and searching through a mugshot album 
can be a lengthy procedure. Mugshots could be digitally scanned, and then organised - and searched -
according to the similarity metric. In particular, a binary search procedure could be implemented : the 
witness is shown the two most dissimilar images in the database, asked which image is most similar to 
the perpetrator, and the database is halved according to this choice. The procedure is repeated until 
the remaining set of images is small enough for the witness to examine entirely. (See Lenorovitz & 
Laughery, 1984, for a similar suggestion). 
Finally, I think that the most powerful potential of the similarity metric and the representational bas is 
underlying it, is to produce synthetic face images. Faces that are members of the space can be 
reconstructed as images by compositing weighted basis vectors, and this implies that synthetic faces 
can be constructed in a similar way. An attempt at constructing synthetic (or fictitious) faces was 
reported in Chapter 8, and although the synthetic faces produced there were not very convincing, they 
were clearly ' facelike ' in appearance. The capability of creating synthetic faces is an interesting one; 
it may allow Identikit operators and other police artists the opportunity to create much more realist ic 
images. 
This potential application of the facial similarity metric may be the most powerful, but it is also the 
most speculative. Speculation is a significant tool, though, in the prefiguring of psychology in the 
world. 
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Appendix A: Form SAP 329. 
Artikel 37 (1) (bl Wet Nr 51 van 19n Section 37 (1) (b) Act No 51 of 19n 
1. Lid in bell- van parade 
Member in Charge ol parade ......... ................. ........ ...... ........... .. ....... ......... .. .... .. ... ................ ...... . 
2. ~:~ .. ... . .. ....... ............. .. ................... .... .. ... ............ .. . .. ......................... .. ......... ............ .. ...... .............. ~~ ............. .. .. /. ....... .. ... .. .... /. ........ .... . 
3. Klag1e(s) • Charge{s) ... ................ ... ......... ............... .......... .... .... ..... .......................... ......... ....... ... .......... .. ........ ... ......... .... ..... .................... .. .... ... ...... . 
4. Opdrag w die hou van die parade ontvang op 
Instruction for the instiMion of the parade r_,.,,ed on ..... .............. ..... ... ... ............ .. ..... .......... ........ .... .......... ...... ...... ... ....................... .... ....... .... . 
om vanaf die oode<soel<beampe Nr 
at.... .. .................................. .. ... ........... .. ........ ... from the irNestigating officer No .. ........................................................ ... ................ ............. .. .................... ...... .. . 
Rang Naam 
Rani<.. ....... ........ ....... ... ........... ...... .......................... Name . .. ........................... ........ .... .... ...... .. .. ...... .. .......... ... .......... ... ...... ... .. ..................... ... .. ........... . 
5. Volle naam(e) van verdagte(s): 
Full name(s) of suspeci(s): 
Taal 
(1) ........... ......................... ................. .. .... ..... ... ...................... ....... .. ....... ....... ... ... ... ...... .......... ..... ....... .. .... ...... Language .... ... ...... .. .... .. ............ ...... .. . 
Taal 
(2) ................ ... ......... ............................. ... .... ..... .. .... ........... ................... ... ... ..... ............................... .. ............. Languag. .. ......................................... . 
Taal 
(3) ....... ...... ....... ..... ........ ...... .... ..................... .... .. ... ... ....... .. .... ...... ........................... ........................................ Langu.qe ....... .. .. .. .. .... ... .. ..... ...... .. .... . . 
Taal 
(4) .... .... .... ... .. ........... .... ... .......... .. .......... .................... .... ...... .......... .... ... .. ........ .. .. .... ..... .. ...... .... ... .. .... ........ ..... Language ... ... ...... ..... .... ...... ..... .... ... .. . 
(In geval van meer verdagtes. vervolg op lolio.) • (If there are mo<e suspects. continue on folio .) 
6. Verdagte(s) is op 
S uspeci(•) wa!/Wf're informed on ............. .. ... ........... .. ...... ... .. ...... .. .. .. ..... ...... .. .... .... ...... .. .. .. 
van die voorgenome 
.. .. .. ................ ....... .. of the intended 
parade op 
parade on .................................................. ..... .. ....... .. 
om 
at ..... 
te ingelig . 
.. ...................... .. .............. at... .. 
7. Verdaq1e(s) is op verwittig dat hy/symulle 
Suspeclls l was/Were informed on .... ......... .... .. ....... ...... .... .... ....... ..... .. ... ....... ... ..... ... .... ... .... .. .. ..... .... ........ ............... ..... .... .. ........... .... .. that he/she/they 
pereotig is op regsverteenwoordiging . 
is/are enti tled to legal representallon. 
8. Verdagte(s) vertang/v91\ang nie regsverteenwoordiging/nie. 
Suspect(s) desire/do not desire l99al representation. 
9. R119SVertMnwoordiger(s) 
LeoaJrepr~live(s) (1 ) .. ............. .. ...... .. .. .. .... . .......................................................... (2) ................................................................... ..... . 
is 
(3) ..... ...... ... ...... ...... ....... ...... .... ....... ....... .......... ................. .... ......... (4) .... .. ....... .... .. ..... ... .. ... .... ........ ... .... .... .... .. .. ... .... .... ....... ................ ... was/Were informed 
op 
on (1) .. ... ... ... .. ..... ....... ..... ............................ ... ..... ... .. ....... ... ........ ............ ... .. ... ..... (2) .... .... .......... .. . .... .................................. .. ..... ...... .. . 
(3) ........... ......... ................... ............. .. .. .. .... ........... ................... ......................... (4) .. .... ...... ........................... ..... .... .... .. .. .... ... ......... .... ........ ..... ... ... ..... ...... .... ... . 
lfl991ig van die datum, tyd en plek van die parade. 
of the date. time and pl- ol the parade. 
10. Naam van lotoQraal 
Name of phoeographer ..................... ............ ......... .. ........... .. .... .... ...... .. .... ... ... ... .... ............................... ... ............... .. ........... .... ........ ... .... .... .. .. ................ .... .. ... .. . 
11. Naam van tolk 
Name of int9fl)feter .. ... ........ ....... .... ....... ........ .... ..... ... ........ ................. .. ... ..... , .... ........................ .. ..... ................ .. ....... .......... ... ....... .... ............ ..... .. . 
12. Ole parade ia buite siQ en gel'loof van ender per-sone gehoo. 
The parade was.held out ol sight and hearing ol olt>e< penona. 
~ ~~ ~ 
Place .............. ...................................... .......... ....... .. .......... date .. ...... ... .... ... ......................... ..... ... ..... ... ...... .............. .. .. time .. .. ........... ............ ... . . 
13. =~,,,:.;:==~~.~;·:,:~~~~ :n:~ = ~· .. ........................................ ... .. ........ ....... ....................................  
Kantoor Nr 
............................ _ ................................... -..................... _ ..... - ................... -·····-··-·············-····Olfice No ................................................................................ . 
14. Naam Vin lid Wit getuie(I) na parade beQMi 
Name ol membet wno ncof1I witnesa{n) to the l*ade ....... .. .............................. ................................................................................................... .. .............. .. 
15. Naam van lid ,.., getuie(a) van par1I<» beQMi 
Name ol membet who e9COrts witnesa(ea) from the per9de .......... ... ... ... .... .......... .... .................. ............... ... ...... .. .. ... .. ...... .. .. .... ... ..... ......... ..... .. .... ...... ..... .. ... .. ... . 
16. Naam van lid wat toesig oor getuie(s) gehou het nadat hytsyitiulle parade~ hel 
Name ol member who guarded the wilnesa(n ) an.< hellhellhey had anended the pa-ade ........... ............. .... ... ...... ............ .......................... ............. .... .. 
Kantoor Nr 
..................................... -............................................... _ ................................... -... '. ................... Olfice No .................................................... ...................... ..... .. 
17. Oaar wu allHaam pe<sone op par9de (lnlluitende die verdagte{a)J. Hulle ia min ol ,,_ van dieM!fde lengte. ligQaamsbou, 
The<e -• ........................... ...................... peraona on par9de (including the ~a)J. They•• ol aboul the ume height. build. aQe Wld awearance and 
oude<Oom en voc:>ntoma en ia alrMI nautenby aooa die verdegte(a) geldM. 
_. dreued men Ot lele ........ to the auaoeci(I). 
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18. Verdagte(s) is van die beweerde klagte(s) en die doel van die parade verwittig en meegedeel dat hytsylhulle-
Suspec1(s) has/have been inlormed ol 1he all99atoon(s) and !he purpose ol the parade and that he/shellhey-
19. 
(1) enige posisie van sylhaar/hulle keusa op die parade mag inneem en van pcsisie mag verander v00<da1 ·n ander getuie geroep w0<d : en 
may take up any position of hi&lheriitieir ch01Ce on the parade and may Ctiange hi&lher/lheir pos~ion bele><e another witness is called : and 
(2) enige radeijke versoek(e) !en opsigte van die parade mag rig . 
may make any reasonable reques!(S) in respec1 ol the par...i.. 
( 1) Sylhaar/hulle versoek(e) is soos volg: 
H1s/herllheir request(s) istart the loflowing: 
Verdagtt • Suspec11 
Verdagte • Suspect 2 
Verdagta • Suspect 3 ... 
Verdagte • Suspect 4 
(2) Stappe gedoen as gevoiQ van die versoek(e) : 
S1eps 1aken as a resun ol the reques!(s) : 
Verdagte • Suspect 1 
Verdagte • Suspect 2 
Verdagte • Suspect 3 
Verdagle • Suspect 4 .. 
20. VMdagte(s) is gevra al hy/sylhulle 1evr@de is met die opstel van die parade. inslu1tende die persona op parade. 
Suspect(s) waSJWere asJ<ed whether hetshel!hey iSiare satislied with the parade. including the persons on parade. 
Sylhaarlhulle antwoord(e) is soos votg· 
H1s/tler/lh8tf answer(s) iSiare as lotlows: 
Verdagte • Suspect 1 
Verdaqte • Suspect 2 . . 
Verdagte • Suspect 3 
Verdagle • Suspect 4 ... ... . 
21. Naam van regsveneenw00<diger1s1 . indien teenw00<dig: 
Name ol legal rep<esenta~ve ( sl . 11 present: 
Naam •Name Namens • On behatt ol 
22. Persona op parade. verdagte(s) ingesluit: 
Persons on parade. suspect( sl included: 
Naam • Name Ouderdom • Age Adres • Address 
(1) ........ .... .............................................................. ... ... ... ...... ... ...... ................... ........ .. ..... .... . . 
(2) .......... .... ... ............. ... ... .... .. ......... .... ...... ............ ..... ........ ............. .. .. ........ ... ... .......... ............ .... . ... ..................... ............ .. ....... ...... .... .. ..... ...... ...................... . 
(3) .......... .. ..... ...... .. .. ... ............ ................. .. .... ... .. .... .... ..... .............. ........... ... .. .. ... ... .... ...... ....... .. ............. ..... ..... ..... ..... ............................ .. ...... ... ........ .... ..... . . 
(4) ................. ............ ........ .. ... ... ... ................. .... ........................... .. .. .. .... ... ...... ...................... .... ........... .............................. .... ...... .. ....... ............................ .... . 
(5) ..... .. .... ... .. .... .... ... ............................................. ............. ... .... ... ........................... ................. ......... .. ... .. ..... ......... ...................... .. ........ .... ... .. ... .......... .. ... .. . 
(6) .......... .. .. ...... .... .... ...................................................... ... .... ........... ......... .. .............. .. ....... ............. ........ ............... ............. ... ....... ...... .......................... ........ . 
(7) .......... ............... .............. .. .... ................. ......... ........................ ....... .... .. ........................... ... .. ... . ,,, .. , .. ... ... ... ..... ................... .... .... .... .......... ..... ... ..... . 
(8 ) .... .. ............... ....... .. ....... .. ...... ....... .... ..... .... .......... ... ........ .. ....... ... ......... .. ...... ... ........... .... .......... . ......... .. ........ .. .. ............. ...... ........... ......... ... .... .......... ... . 
(9) .................. ............ ........ .. ..... ...... .................................... ... ..... ..... ..... ..... .... ......... ........ ........ ... .... ...... ........ .. .......... .. .. ....... ... ............. ... ...... .. ...... ..... ..... ..... ... . 
(10) ....... .. .............. ......... .. ......... .. .......... ...... . . 
(11) ... .. ........ ..... .... ... .... ... ........................... .. 
A ppendices 
Naam •Name Ouderdom • Age Adres • Address 
(12) ...... ... ... .. ..................... ......... ...... ..... .. ............. ..... . 
(13) ....... ....... .. ... .. ................. .. ... ... ......... ......... ........ ... .. .... ... .. ..... .. .... ... .. ............... .............. .. ....... . 
(14) .. ... ... ...... ........ ... ........ .... ..... .. ... ...... ...... .... .... ....... . . 
(15) ... ........ .... ... .................... ... .... .. ... ...... ...... ............. . 
(18) ..... ... ... ........ ............... ... .... ......... ... .. .... ... .. ....... ............. ............ ....... ...... .. ....... ...................... . 
(17) .......... .. .... ... ............... ... ..... .. .. .............. .. ............. ... .... .... ......... ...... ..... .... ... ............ ... .... ......... . 
(18) .... ... ..... .............. ..... ...... ... ... ................................................ ....... .... ................ ..... .............................. .......... .. 
(19) ....... ..... ...... ............. .... ...... ............. ..... ..... ... ..... ................. ........... ........... ..... ......... .. .. ........ .... . 
(20) ... .... ..... ...... .... ....... ... ... .. .... ....... ....... ..... ... .... ..... ....... .... . 
23. 'n Foto Is geneem nadat die patade opgestel is: Ja • Nee 
A photog<aplt was taken ane< the parade had been set up: Yn • No 
VERLOOP VAN PARADE • PROCEDURE OF PARADE 
24. Ole penone. lnsluitende die verdegte(s). wet un die perade deelneem. neem die volgende posisies van link! na regs voor my in: 
The person! , including the suspect(s). taking pan in the perade. take up lhe lollowing positions from lento right in front of me: 
(1 ) .. ..... .. .. .... .... ... .... .. ..... .. .................... ................ ... ,. .... ........ ................... ....... .. (2) ....................... .... ....... ... .... ..... ...... .. .... ... ... .... .. .............. .. . 
(3) .... .. ....... ........ ... ........ .. .......................... .. .. ... .. ......... ...... ............. ............ .. ..... (4) ...... .. ... .. ..... .... ..... . 
(5) ... .. ....... ... ............... ...... ........ ... ............. ..... .................... .. ..... .... ........... .. ...... (8) ... ...... ... ...... ...... . 
(7) ..... ...... .. .. ... ...... .. (8) .. .. .......... .. 
(9) ........... ......... ... .. (10) ..... .. .. ... .. 
(11) .... . (12) .. 
(13) .... . (14) 
(15) ........... .. ... .............. ... ..... .. .. (18) .. 
11n ...... .. .. ...... .............................. .. .... .... ..... ... .... .. ...... .................... .. .. ...... .. ...... (18J ..... .. ..... ... .... ... . 
(19) .. ...... .. ............................ ....... .. ..... .. ...... ................ .. ..... .... ..... ... ............... .. (20) .............................. .. . 
25. E111ste 9e1uie • Fint witness 
Naam • Name........ ............. .. .. .. ....... ..... ...... ........................ .. .. .. ................. .. ... Taal • Language 
is gevra om die verdagte(s). indien op parade. uit le wys deur syil1aarlhul skouer(s) aan ta raai<, wat (datum. tyd, plek en kfagte): 
was asked to point out the suspeet(s). 1f on perade, by touehing hisil1erllheir shoulder(s), who (dale . time. place and charge ): 
(1 ) Tyd deur getuie 9eneem om persoon(e) op parade ui1 1e wys 
Tune taken by wrtness to point out person(s) on parade ............................. .................... ............... ..... .. ............... ... .. .. .... .. .. 
Uit91eg • Resutt .................................. ... ..... ........ .. .... ... ..... .. ..... .. ... .... ....... ...... ........... ... ... ....... .. .. ... ..... ....... .... ................... . 
(2) Reak!ie van ge!uie tydens uitwysing van persoon(e ): 
Reaction of wrtneas durinQ pomting out of person(s) : 
28. Verdagle(s) wOfd geleentheid gebied om van posisie(s) ta verander en Qevra of hy1Syil1ulte tevrede is met syil1aaril1ulle posisie. Syil1aatil1ulle 
Suspect( s) is/are given the apportunrty of changing hisil1erllheir pesition(s) and asked whether helshellhey is/are satisfi ed . Hisil1er/lheu 
antwoo<d(e) was : 
answer(s) was/Were :· (1) ...... .. ................ .... ... ... .... ... ... .... .. ... ... .... ... .. ....... ......... .................................... .......... .. .. ..... ....... ....... . 
(2) ........ ...... ... ............. .... ....... .. ...... ...... .. .. ........ .. ... ..... .... .... .......... ... ................................ ... ............ ...... . 
(3) ... ......... ....... ............ ..................... .......... ......... ........ .. ... .... .... ... ........ ... ....... ............. ..... ... .............. .. . . 
(4) .. .... ........................... ...... .... ..... .. ... ... .... .. ... .. .................. .. .. ..... ... ......... ... ......... . ......... . .. ....... ... . .. 
27. Posisies deur persona op patade ingeneem voordat tweed• getuie op perade verskyn: 
Posi1ions taken by persons on pftrade bef0f4 the second witness appears on parade: 
(1) ................ ............ ....... ............................ ............ ........ .......... .... ... .. .. ... ...... .. . (2) ...... .. .. .. ......... ... ... ... ... ... ... ..... ... ........ .. ............................ .......... .. ........... ..... . 
(3) .... .... ............................................................................................ ............. . .. (4) ...................................... ..... .... ........................ ............ ... .......... ............. .. ... .. 
(5) ......... .. .. .. .. .... ... .... ............ .... .. ....... ... ...................... .. ...... ........... .. ... .. ..... ...... . (6) ... .. ... .................. .......... ... ..... ...... .... .. ...... ............ .... ... ....... ........................ ... . 
(7) .......... .. ......... .... .. .......... .... ... ......... ..................... .. .. ......... ...... ... ...... .. ........... . (b) ... ...... ... ...... ..... ... . .. ...... ... ..... ...................... ....... .... ..................... . .. .......... .... .. 
(9) ....... ............ ............................... ........... .................................. ... ................ .. (10) ...... ............ ......... ... ...... ... ... .. ......................... .. ........................................ . 
(11) ....... ...................................................................... .. ... ............. ....... ... ...... ... (12) .... .. ............................. .. ..... .. .......... ...... .. ......... ..................................... . 
(13) ... .... ... ... ... ... ....... ... ...... ....... ........... .... ...... .... .......... ............. ............ ....... .. ... (14) ............. ............... .......... ... ... ....... ...................... ........................................ . 
(15) ........... .............. .. ...... ...... .. ..... .............................................. ... ... ....... ....... .. (16) ........... ... .. .............. ...... .. .... ...................... ... ... ......... .... ... ............. ..... . 
(17) .. ......... .. .......... .. ....... ...... ......................... ........ ............ ... ...... ... ....... .... ..... ... (1 8) .. ............................... .. ...... .......... ..... ........................................................ .. 
(19) ...... ..... ................. .. ..................................................... ........ .... ........ .. ....... .. (20) ............. .... ........................... .. ..................................................... . .. 
Appendices 
28. Tw&ede getuie • Second witness : 
Naam • Name.. ....... .... .... .. . .... . .. ........ .. ..... ....... ... Taal • Language ... ..... ...................... .......... . 
is gevra om die verdagte(s). indien op parade , u1t le wys deur sylllaarlllul skouer(s) aan le raak, wat (datum. tyd. plek en klagte) : 
was ask&d lo point out tho suspect(s). if on parade. by touching hislller,,he+r shoulder(s). who (date. time. place and charge ): 
( 1) Tyd dour getuie genHm om persoon(o) op parade urt to wys 
Time taken by witness to poonf out person(s) on parade ..... ... ......................... ... .... .................. ............ ........... ...... ..... ......... ..... ... ..... ..... ..... . 
U~sleg • Resun ....... ........... ..... ... .... .... .................... ........... .. .. ....... ................. .. ..... ... .. .......... ....................... ... ... .............. ...... .. .... .. ...... ....... ... .... ... .. . 
(2) Reaksie van Q•luie tydens uitwysing van persoon(e) : 
Reaction of wrtness during pointing out ol person(s): 
29. Verdegte(s) word ~leenlheid gebied om poeisie(s) le verander en gevra al hy/Syll'lu .. t9\lfede la met sylhaarmu .. posisie. Sylllaar"1ulle 
Suspec1(s) is/are given the opporlunily al changing hlshlef'1heir position(s) and asked whether helshelll'ley is/are satisfied. Hlshler/lheir 
entwoord(e) was: 
ans-(s) wUIWere: 
(1) .................... ......... ......... .. ............................................................................ ................ ........... ... ... .. ........ ........... .. 
(2) ..................................................................... ............................... ........ ... .. ....... ... ..... .... .......... .... ... .. ... ............ .. ... . 
(3) ................................................................. ....... ...... ... ... ..... .... .. ................. ................................................. ... ..... .. . 
(4) ................................ .............. ................................... ....... .... ... .. ..... .. ... .. .. ............................................. ..... .... ... ... . 
30. Posisies deur person. op parade ~eem voordat derda gel\Jie op parade verskyn: 
Positions taken by persons on parade before the third wilness appears on parade : 
(1) ....... ... ......... ........................... ............ ......... .. ... .... .... .. .. .. ..... ... ...... .. .............. (2) ... .. .. .. ............ ............................................................................ ................ .. . 
(3) ..... ......... ......... ......... .... ........... .. .... ... ... ..... .... ..................... ..... ... ... ...... ........ . (4) .. ..... .. ........... ... .. ..... .... ............................ ........ ...... ... ... ... ..... .................. .. . 
(5) .. .. ..... ........ ................................ .. ......... ....... ... .. .... ....... .... .. ...... ... ..... ..... .... . . (6) .. .... .. ... .......................... .... ....... .... .. ...... .. ..... .............. .. .... ... ···· ······ ···· ······ 
(7) ..... ... .. .. ......... ... ... ................ .. .. ..... ... ............ ................... ...... ................ .. .. .. . (8) .. .... ... ...... ...... ....... ........................ ... ..... ............ ................. ·· ···· ·· ·············· 
(9) .... ... ................ ......... ............ ......... .. ......... .......................................... .. .. .... . (10) ......... .... ... ..... ............... ........ . .. ....... .. ... .... ... ......... ..... ..... ....... ........... . 
(11 ) ............. ..... ........ ... ... .. ....... ... ... ..... ......... ................. .................................. . (12) .... ... .. ... .... ... ..... ........ ... ..................................................................... . 
(13) .... ............................... .... ....... ......... ... .. ... ..... ... ......... .............. .... ... .. ... ... ..... (14) ..... .. ..... ........ .... ................... ...................... .. ............. .. .... ................ . 
(1 5) ...... ..... .. ........ .... .... .. ... .... ... ........................... .. ....... ..... .... .... ..... ... ..... .......... . (16) .... .. .. ...... ..... ...... ..................... ............... .......... .. .......... ................... . 
(17) ........... ..... .. ........... .... .......... ... ..... ........ ........ ... .. ... ...... ... ... ... .. ..... .. ........ .. ..... (18) ....................... ............. ...................... ...... ...... ... ................ .... .. ...... ..... . 
(19) ..... .... .... ..... ....... .... ...... ... ..... ... .. ..... ....... ................................................... ... (20) .. .... ... ............ ..... .... ........... .... ... .... .. .... .. .......... ... ... ... .... ... .. .... .. ......... .......... . 
31 . Deroegetuie •Third~: 
Naam • Name ..................... ...... ... ........ .......... ............. .. ......... ... .... ....... ... ................. .. ........ ...... Taal • unguage ........ ............. ...... ...... .................. ............ . 
is gevra om die verdagto(s), indien op P.8fade. u~ le wys deur sy/haarlllul sl<ouer(s) aan le raaK, wa1 (datum, !yd, plek en klagte): 
wu asked to poinl ou1 the suspecl(s) . Hon parede, by touching hisiher1't>eir shoukM<(s). whO (date, time. pl..::e and charge ): 
(1, ~~au~.on·~~=~ ~::~or,r:,ag:,~~~.~ ................................................................ ............................. ... .. .... ................................ ...... . 
Uitsleg • Re sun ....... ................ ..... ..... .... ........ ... .. ... ...... .. .. ........ ... .......... .... ........ ... _ ... ... .. ...... .. ....... .. .... ........... .. .. ................................... ...... ...... ....... .. .. .... . 
(2) Reaksie van Q8tuie lydtn$ uitwysing van persoon(e): 
Reaction al wrtnesa during pointing out of person(s): 
32. Opmefltings. indien enige 
Rern811<.s , ~ any .. ................................................. ................. ..................... .............................. ........ ... ....................................... ............. ....... ............................. . 
33. Num van poliaiestaaie 
Name al poiice station ... ........ .. ...................................... ................................................. .... .. ...................... ............................................................ .................... . 
VB Nr 
06No. ................ J ....... ......... J ............... _ 
34. Ek. Nr Rana Num 
I, No. ·-···········- ··................................. Rank ................................................... Neme·-········- ·- ····················· ..................... --...................... ....................... .. 
~ dal hierdie pwade door my ~ is, dal die besondamede wat op die vorm deur my I~. korrek en 'n presiese 
oerttty that 1hil ~ was conduded by me, that the particulan which haw been oompleWd on the form by me are correct and that n la a just r9flOl1 
We«QllM van die gebeure la. 
al the prooedurea wtlicll tooic place. 
L---------------- -----
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Appendix B: Arrays of faces used in experiments 1 a and 1 b 
Faces used in experiment la 
'"":,~ ,, 
reee7. JPG 'sse x • 608 
FacQs U&Qd i n QXpQriment lb 
F0009 .JPG 160 x 600 
F0013 .JPG 160 x 600 "r0011.JPG 160 x 600 
Appendices 
Appendix C: The collection of images used in Study 2 
A ppendices 
Appendix D : Frontal views collected for Studies 3-7 
Note: Faces shown here are not in final standardized fonn . 
Appendices 
Appendices 
Appendix E : Sample experimental booklet used in Study 3 
Face Recognition Study 
Colin Tredoux 
Department of Psychology 
University of Cape Town 
Rondebosch 7700 
Over the page you will find three collections of faces. The collections are marked "A", "B'', 
and "C" , respectively. 
In each collection you will notice that each face has a number below it, except one, which is 
called the 'target' face. I would like you to compare the numbered faces to the target face -
how similar in facial appearance are they to the target? 
In order to arrive at the rating of similarity, use any facial quality you think relevant. You may 
also wish to take the following into consideration : 
Hair: are the length, colour, and texture similar? 
Hairl ine: is the hairline equally high or low on the fo rehead? 
Face shape: do the faces have the same shape (e.g. round , th in, angular)? 
Noses: are the noses similar in size and shape? 
Mouths: are the mouths equal in size? are the lips equally full? 
Skin texture and colour: is this similar? 
Chins: are these the same shape and size? 
Please use a scale with the extreme values shown below. You can assign any number 
between 0 and 10. 
o _________ s _________ 10 
Not at all similar Highly similar 
Please indicate for each face, how similar it is to the target face. Do this by writing the value 
you have chosen next to the number of the face. Repeat this process for each of the three 
collections, "A", "B" and "C". 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
Appendices 






TARGET 2 3 1 5 
c 
A ppend ices 
Appendix F : Profile views (of face images) used in Study 4 
Note: images are not in final standardized form . 
Appendices 
Append ices 
Appendix G : Sample experimental booklet used in Study 4 
Face Recognition Study 
Colin Tredoux 
Department of Psychology 
University of Cape Town 
Rondebosch 7700 
Over the page you will find two collections of faces. The collections are marked "A", and 
"B", respectively. 
In each collection you will notice that each face (or pair of faces) has a number below it , 
except one, which is called the 'target' face. I would like you to compare the numbered faces 
to the target face - how similar in facial appearance are they to the target? 
In order to arrive at the rating of similarity, use any facial quality you think relevant. You may 
also wish to take the followin£ into consideration : 
Hair: are the length, colour, and texture similar? 
Hairline: is the hairline equally high or low on the forehead? 
Face shape: do the faces have the same shape (e.g. round , thin , angular)? 
Noses: are the noses similar in size and shape? 
Mouths: are the mouths equal in size? are the lips equally full? 
Skin texture and colour: is this similar? 
Chins: are these the same shape and size? 
Please use a scale with the extreme values shown below. You can assign any number 
between 0 and 10. 
o _________ s _________ 10 
Not at all similar Highly similar 
Please indicate for each face , how similar it is to the target face. Do this by writing the value 
you have chosen next to the number of the face. Repeat this process for each of the 
collections , "A" and "B". 















Appendix I : Parades used in the mock witness task of Study 6 
Hi h distinctiveness; Similari = I 
•••• [I , 
I. 12 · 1~ .• ·~r·· ~ - -, 9,· fl-·' . ii . ; ' i '!l!!'!!T . • . ·~ . 1 • . .. . . -- · •1 • • ·s b 
5 ' ? 8 
Hi h distinctiveness; Similari = 2 
Appendices 
Moderate distinctiveness; Similari =6 
A ppendices 
Appendix J: Documents given to subjects at the initial stage 
of the experiment in Study 7 
Document A 
Below, you will find pictures and descriptions of three students. The details were taken from 
a self-report questionnaire completed by the students. Please read the descriptions, and 
look at the pictures. 
Cassiem 
Age 26. Majors are English and 
History. Would like to become a 
teacher after completing first 
degree. Is interested in movies, 
dancing and music. 
Susan 
Age 37. Busy completing an 
honours degree in Archaelogy. 
Married, with three children . Is 
interested in walking, bird-
watching , and heraldry. 
Astrid 
Age 20. First-year B.Sc. student. 
Not sure of a career track. Is 
interested in volleyball , walking on 
the beach, movies, and likes 
working with children . 
Please turn the page. 
Appendices 
Now, try to think of one further thing which you think is probably true of each of the 





Comparative Perception Study 
Colin Tredoux 
Department of Psychology 
Univers ity of Cape Town 
Rondebosch 7700 
A ppendices 
Below, you will find pictures and descriptions of three students. The detai ls were taken from 
a self-report questionnaire completed by the students. Please read the descriptions, and 
look at the pictures. 
David 
Age 24. Majors are English and 
History. Would like to become a 
teacher after completing first 
degree. Is interested in movies, 
dancing and music. 
Flip 
Age 25. Busy completing an 
honours degree in Archaelogy. 
Married, with three ch ildren . Is 
interested in walking , bird-
watching, and heraldry. 
Bongani 
Age 30. First-year Soc.Sci . 
student. Not sure of a career 
track. Is interested in politics, 
ball-room dancing , and black-and-
white film technology. 
Please turn the page. 
Appendices 
Now, try to think of one further thing which you think is probably true of each of the 








Appendix K : Test instructions, and lineups, used in the test 
phase of the experiment in Study 7 
1 Test instructions for subjects who completed document ' A' in the initial phase 
Comparative Perception Study 
Colin Tredoux 
Department of Psychology 
Universi ty of Cape Town 
Rondebosch 7700 
Earlier, you were provided with pictures and descriptions of three students. What I would 
like you to do now is to point them out - if they appear - in the collections of pictures that 
follow. 
1 Over the page you will find the first collection of numbered pictures (I 
have marked it as 'A') . If the student Cassiem appears in this collection , 
indicate which number is below his picture (if he is not present, mark the 
checkbox): 
Cassiem does not appear D Cassiem is number 
2 Turn the page to the next collection of numbered pictures (I have marked 
it as 'B'). If the student Susan appears in this collection , indicate which 
number is below her picture (if she is not present, mark the checkbox): 
Susan does not appear D Susan is number 
3 Turn the page to the next collection of numbered pictures (I have marked 
it as 'C') . If the student Astrid appears in this collection , indicate which 
number is below her picture (if she is not present, mark the checkbox) : 
Astrid does not appear D Astrid is number ---
Thank you for participating in this study 
A ppendices 
2 Test instructions for subjects who completed document ' B ' in the initial phase 
Comparative Perception Study 
Col in Tredoux 
Department of Psychology 
University of Cape Town 
Rondebosch 7700 
Earlier, you were provided with pictures and descriptions of three students. What I would 
like you to do now is to point them out - if they appear - in the collections of pictures that 
follow. 
1 Over the page you will find the first collection of numbered pictures (I 
have marked it as 'A'). If the student David appears in this collection, 
indicate which number is below his picture (if he is not present, mark the 
checkbox) : 
David does not appear D David is number ---
2 Turn the page to the next collection of numbered pictures (I have marked 
it as 'B') . If the student Flip appears in this collection , indicate which 
number is below her picture (if he is not present, mark the checkbox) : 
Flip does not appear D Flip is number 
3 Turn the page to the next collection of numbered pictures (I have marked 
it as 'C'). If the student Bongani appears in this collection , indicate which 
number is below her picture (if he is not present, mark the checkbox): 
Bongani does not appear D Bongani is number __ 
Thank you for participating in this study 
Appendices 
3 Lineups used in tests of subjects who completed document ' A' in the initial phase 
(The same set of images was used for sequential lineups). 
SIMILARITY Target absent Target present 
High 
(Target is no 3) 
Moderate 
(Target is no 4) 
Low 
(Target is no 5) 
Appendices 
4 Lineups used in tests of subjects who completed document 'B' in the initial phase 
(The same set of images was used for sequential lineups). 
SIMILARITY Target absent Target present 
High 
(Target is no 6) ii··: I' . . .,.· Cl.l ·~ : 
3 3 
I I , . 
1 7 
Moderate 
(Target is no 7) 
........ . ....... 
Low 
(Target is no 6) Rililll 11 
1 z 3 1 1 z 3 1 iul ri -.., 111 .. ·' 1·11· 1· tJil !I . . ~ .. ;' . I ' .· ' . t ' • l l ' 
5 b 7 5 b 7 8 
A ppendices 
Appendix L · Raw data for Studies 1 - 7 
Note that in cases where different sequences and orders were used, data are reported according to the 
original sequence/order, and are not comparable across sequence/order. 
Study lb Study la 
Array member Array member 
Subiect Order Sequence A B c D E Subiect Order Sequence A B c D E 
1 1 1 12 11 8 10 9 1 2 1 4 5 3 2 1 
2 1 1 9 8 10 11 12 2 2 1 1 5 4 2 3 
3 2 1 12 11 10 8 9 3 2 1 1 5 3 2 4 
4 1 1 8 10 11 12 9 4 2 1 1 5 4 3 2 
5 2 1 8 12 10 11 9 5 2 1 I 2 5 4 3 
6 1 1 12 10 8 4 11 6 1 I 1 4 3 2 5 
7 2 1 9 8 10 11 12 7 2 I 1 2 4 3 5 
8 2 1 8 11 10 9 12 8 2 1 1 5 2 3 4 
9 1 1 12 10 8 11 9 9 2 1 1 2 5 4 3 
10 2 I 11 12 8 9 10 10 2 1 1 5 4 3 2 
11 1 1 12 11 8 10 9 11 1 1 2 3 4 1 5 
12 I I 12 9 8 10 II 12 2 I I 4 2 3 5 
13 2 2 8 9 10 12 11 13 l I l 4 3 2 5 
14 I 2 8 9 11 12 10 14 I I I 4 5 3 2 
15 2 2 8 10 12 11 9 15 2 l l 2 5 3 4 
16 2 2 10 8 11 9 12 16 I l l 2 4 5 3 
17 I 2 12 11 9 10 8 17 2 2 3 5 4 2 l 
18 I 2 8 9 11 12 10 18 I 2 2 l 5 4 3 
19 I 2 10 12 8 11 9 19 I 2 2 4 5 3 l 
20 2 2 8 10 11 9 12 20 I 2 l 2 5 3 5 
21 2 2 10 8 12 9 11 21 l 2 3 4 5 2 l 
22 I 2 10 8 11 9 12 22 I 2 l 5 4 2 3 
23 I 2 8 12 11 9 10 23 I 2 l 2 5 4 3 
24 l 3 10 12 8 9 11 24 2 2 l 2 3 5 4 
25 I 3 11 12 10 8 9 25 I 2 2 4 5 3 I 
26 2 3 12 11 9 8 10 26 2 2 2 l 4 3 5 
27 I 3 8 9 12 10 11 27 I 2 l 5 4 2 3 
28 2 3 12 10 8 9 II 28 2 2 l 3 4 5 2 
29 2 3 8 10 9 12 II 29 I 3 I 3 5 4 2 
30 2 3 8 12 10 11 9 30 2 3 l 2 4 3 5 
31 l 3 12 8 10 11 9 31 2 3 l 2 3 5 4 
32 1 3 12 8 10 11 9 32 I 3 l 2 5 4 3 
33 2 3 12 8 11 9 10 33 2 3 2 l 5 4 3 
34 2 3 9 10 8 11 12 34 l 3 2 4 5 I 3 
35 2 3 I 2 4 3 5 
36 I 2 l 2 6 3 4 
Data are ranks. In Study I a, the ranks progress from 1-5, and in Study I b, from 8-1 2. Thus, an '8' for 
member A in Study I b means that the corresponding face image is ranked most similar to the target. 
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Study 2 : Rated distinctiveness data 
Face images were rated on a 15 point scale. The numbers in the first row (below ' Array a ' ) follow the 
sequence of images in arrays presented to subjects. Arrays 4-6 were different sequences of images 
used in 1-3. 
Array 1 Array~ Array ;:s 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 1 1 7 15 1 1 10 1 1· 1 1 1 ' 10 1 1,10 15 1 1 1 1 1 15 7 7 1 15 1 1 
3 3 3 7 4 3 7 7 4 3 3 3 3 · 14 7 3 7 5 3 4 3 3 3 7 3 3 3 7 3 3 
1 1 7 7 ' 7 7 1' 15 1 1 7 7 7115 1 7 , 15 7 1 1 1 1 1 15 1 1 1 7 1 1 
15 1 7 7 15 1 1 7 1 7 ' 1 1 1 15 15 7 1 1 7 1 7 1 1 15 15 1 1 1 15 15 
8 4 9 2 3 2 2 : 3 4 7 6 7 3 8 3 9 3 3 7 4 3 7 4 8 5 3 3 4 8 8 
15 7 1 15 15 15 7 1 1 7 15 7 7 1 15 1 15 7 7 7 1 7 15 1 7 15 7 1 1 15 
7 7 7 15 1 15 7 7 7 15 · 7 7 7 15 7 1 7 7 15 7 7 15 7 7 1 1 1 7 7 7 
1 1 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 1 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 1 1 1 , 7 
14 13 10 ' 13 ' 14 12 13 ' 14 9 4 8 ' 5 6 8 11 10 14 13 4 7 9 8 8 10 11 9 10 13 12 ' 12 
1 1 15 7 15 1 7 15 1 1 7 15 7 7 7151515 1 1 7 1 1 ' 15 7 1 15 1 15 , 7 
15 15 7 15 7 15 7 1 15 15 15 15 15 7 7 15 7 7 15 15 15 15 7 7 15 15 15 15 15 15 
15 8141413 4 4 5 5 2 13 10 2 8 15 14 4 7 2 2 4 10 8 14 14 8 5 10 7 9 
4 4 8 3 1 7 6 14 3 5 1 13 2 9 12 7 14 7 6 6 15 5 14 13 9 15 7 1 1 6 
1 1 6 1 8 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 6 2 8 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
11 10 8 7 1 8 12 2 8 7 7 8 8 9 4 8 4 11 7 6 7 7 13 13 7 9 3 9 4 10 
Array' Array 5 Array 6 
13 7 7 6 6 6 5 13 7 6 14 13 7 5 6 4 6 7 7 7 7 6 10 5 5 5 7 7 7 6 
1 15 7 1 15 7 1 15 15 7 15 15 1 1 1 1 15 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 1 7 15 7 1 
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 7 15 15 1 1 7 1 7 7 1 1 
4 14 3 5 6 7 5 9 10 11 2 6 6 3 5 3 2 7 3 2 2 3 5 4 2 5 3 6 3 7 
7 13 5 10 7 5 3 15 10 4 15 10 3 5 2 2 3 3 10 5 3 6 5 5 6 4 3 11 14 11 
7 13 7 10 13 10 3 10 3 10 15 10 6 3 7 7 3 13 10 7 13 15 7 7 4 4 7 14 13 13 
7 15 7 7 7 7 7 15 15 7 15 15 7 7 7 4 7 4 6 7 3 3 5 3 3 5 5 7 7 7 
7 9 6 7 7 7 6 15 6 5 15 10 8 7 10 6 6 5 8 6 4 5 15 6 6 6 6 8 8 7 
7 1 15 15 15 7 7 7 7 15 7 7 15 7 15 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 15 7 1 15 7 
7 15 1 7 7 1 7 15 1 1 15 15 7 1 1 7 1 1 7 1 1 15 15 11 7 1 15 15 1 7 
' 
7 2 7 15 15 7 2 1 7 7 1 1 7 1 15 7 15 7 7 15 7 1 1 7 15 7 7 1 15 7 
7 15 8 1 12 9 1 15 15 7 14 12 7 9 2 1 3 7 6 1 5 13 14 7 3 6 3 1 1 1 
7 12 7 6 8 6 6 8 13 12 12 13 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 10 12 4 6 4 4 10 11 6 
7 12 4 4 6 6 2 7 4 9 13 10 5 3 3 5 6 3 3 5 7 11 3 3 7 3 12 8 4 
10 13 10 7 7 7 7 9 7 9 13 12 6 7 5 6 10 6 6 6 5 6 5 5 5 5 6 10 7 7 
7 15
1 
7 7 1 1 1 15 1 1 15 15 1 15 7 1 15 7 7 7 7 7 15 1 1 1 7 15 7 7 
15 151 7 1 15 15 1 1 7 1 1 15 15 7 15 15 1 7 7 1 15 1 1 7 7 15 15 15 7 7 
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Study 2: Rated typicality data 
Face images were rated on a 15 point scale. The numbers in the first row (below 'Array a') follow the 
sequence of images in arrays presented to subjects. 
Array 1 Array 2 Array 3 
Sequence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
a 2 7 13 1 1 3 3 7 14 3 15 5 1 7 7 12 6 3 1 9 2 15 9 6 1 10 7 4 7 15 
a 7 7 1 15 7 1 1 1 15 15 7 7 1 1 7 1 15 1 1 7 1 1 1 15 1 7 7 1 7 15 
a 15 10 12 11 13 12 15 4 8 10 14 10 3 9 10 12 8 12 12 15 4 8 8 5 1 2 7 12 8 10 
a 14 7 12 10 9 10 6 7 15 10 15 7 3 7 15 10 9 7 12 14 3 5 10 6 1 14 12 6 10 15 
a 15 7 7 1 7 1 7 1 15 15 7 7 1 1 7 1 15 7 1 15 1 7 1 7 7 15 15 7 15 15 
a 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 7 7 15 15 1 7 1 15 1 1 15 1 15 15 1 15 15 1 15 1 15 15 
a 15 15 7 7 7 7 1 1 7 15 15 7 15 1 7 15 15 7 1 7 15 7 7 1 1 1 7 1 1 15 
a 10 10 10 1 8 5 6 2 6 12 8 10 8 2 2 7 4 4 8 10 2 15 5 6 6 10 10 6 8 6 
a 7 7 15 7 7 15 1 1 15 1 7 15 1 1 7 15 15 1 15 7 1 15 15 7 7 7 15 7 1 7 
a 7 15 7 7 13 15 7 15 13 7 15 1 7 1 7 7 1 7 7 7 1 15 15 1 1 15 7 7 15 7 
a 9 7 7 5 2 6 9 5 12 13 12 10 5 5 14 14 4 5 8 14 9 9 6 2 1 13 12 9 10 12 
a 7 15 1 7 1 12 7 15 15 7 7 3 1 2 7 12 7 12 2 15 1 5 12 7 7 12 1 7 1 15 
a 1 1 7 15 7 1 7 7 15 7 7 15 15 7 1 15 15 1 7 15 15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 15 
a 8 6 13 9 7 6 3 1 10 7 5 7 4 4 7 7 8 5 5 10 4 5 6 7 5 6 5 3 3 10 
a 12 9 11 6 5 4 1 3 11 3 9 7 3 7 15 7 7 6 11 15 1 12 4 7 2 4 2 1 7 12 
a 2 10 11 7 3 10 4 1 9 6 3 5 4 8 2 4 7 6 9 7 4 10 10 3 4 8 8 5 7 11 
a 12 13 8 13 8 13 6 13 13 12 14 13 12 11 12 13 13 13 13 13 8 12 13 3 3 10 12 3 11 10 
a 7 7 15 7 15 7 15 7 7 7 7 15 15 7 7 7 7 1 7 7 1 15 7 7 7 7 7 15 7 7 
a 7 1 7 7 7 15 7 1 15 7 1 1 15 7 15 1 15 7 7 7 1 7 15 1 7 7 15 7 7 15 
b 10 5 11 4 12 12 13 7 5 6 7 7 7 8 8 14 14 7 10 3 6 9 12 9 3 7 10 3 10 13 
b 7 15 1 15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 15 1 1 7 1 1 1 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 
b 10 10 7 1 7 10 15 1 1 7 15 7 10 7 10 7 13 15 7 7 7 7 5 10 7 7 13 5 5 10 
b 7 15 7 1 7 1 1 7 1 7 15 7 7 15 7 15 7 15 7 15 15 15 15 7 1 15 15 15 15 7 
b 5 5 4 10 1 1 1 7 2 2 6 5 8 11 6 3 5 2 6 5 5 9 11 5 2 7 1 3 6 6 
b 12 1 7 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 6 1 1 1 6 12 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 12 7 1 1 1 1 1 
b 10 12 7 5 9 7 12 9 5 4 4 9 4 8 7 7 6 3 4 4 5 7 12 10 8 5 7 5 6 8 
b 12 12 7 12 7 7 5 8 10 10 10 6 6 8 12 13 6 8 6 9 10 12 12 7 7 7 5 9 12 
b 7 8 10 9 13 13 6 13 13 13 13 13 12 13 13 13 13 6 13 11 9 13 13 8 5 13 13 13 13 13 
b 8 6 8 12 10 8 6 5 12 10 8 10 4 6 9 12 12 4 10 6 4 10 12 8 15 10 10 5 10 10 
b 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 7 7 15 15 15 1 7 15 7 13 7 15 7 7 15 15 7 1 15 15 7 15 15 
b 7 10 3 8 8 5 4 3 8 9 5 3 8 8 5 15 3 8 15 2 5 4 7 1 7 4 3 9 15 
b 7 15 15 1 1 1 1 9 1 15 10 13 3 7 10 7 15 2 9 15 2 8 13 7 1 15 9 1 4 15 
b 7 7 10 3 7 10 10 3 5 5 5 10 3 7 12 10 3 7 10 3 5 7 10 7 5 8 8 3 5 8 
b 15 15 15 15 15 7 15 1 1 7 15 15 10 15 15 15 15 4 15 12 3 10 15 7 3 14 14 2 13 13 
b 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 1 1 15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
b 7 5 4 4 6 8 4 4 7 4 7 7 2 5 7 4 8 1 6 6 3 7 7 6 1 4 5 5 10 12 
b 7 7 1 15 1 7 7 7 7 1 7 7 15 1 15 1 15 1 15 7 7 15 7 7 1 1 1 7 1 7 
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Study 2: Ranked similarity task 
Numbers in the first row follow the sequence of the original arrays: missing numbers indicate the 
presence of the target in the corresponding position. 
Array white male Array white female Array black male 
Sequence 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 
a 9 5 6 10 3 4 7 2 8 1 4 9 6 7 8 5 3 2 2 4 7 1 8 9 3 5 6 
a 9 3 4 6 2 8 5 1 7 1 4 7 3 8 9 5 6 2 1 4 2 3 5 8 9 7 6 
a 8 3 7 6 4 9 1 5 2 2 5 6 9 8 7 1 4 3 10 2 6 3 7 9 8 5 4 
a 8 3 5 6 2 4 7 4 1 1 4 5 2 7 8 9 3 6 4 1 2 3 8 9 7 5 6 
a 8 4 1 3 6 5 2 7 9 1 4 5 7 9 8 3 2 6 1 7 4 2 8 6 5 3 9 
a 8 7 5 9 6 4 1 2 3 1 2 6 5 9 7 8 3 4 6 2 5 1 8 3 7 4 9 
a 10 6 3 9 5 8 4 2 7 2 7 10 6 9 8 5 3 4 2 6 9 8 3 5 7 10 4 
a 6 4 8 9 7 2 5 3 1 1 3 8 9 7 4 2 6 5 5 7 1 3 9 8 6 2 4 
a 6 3 8 9 5 7 1 2 4 1 7 9 5 4 8 3 2 6 1 6 5 2 9 5 7 8 4 
a 7 6 5 9 8 3 1 4 2 2 1 9 7 8 6 3 5 4 10 2 6 5 9 3 8 7 4 
a 7 2 8 9 1 3 5 4 6 1 2 4 6 8 7 9 5 3 2 7 4 8 1 5 9 6 3 
a 7 5 3 8 9 2 1 6 4 2 5 7 6 9 8 4 1 3 1 4 2 3 6 5 9 7 8 
a 9 7 6 8 3 4 5 2 1 1 5 3 8 9 6 7 2 4 8 3 2 1 9 4 5 6 7 
a 8 2 7 9 3 1 4 5 6 1 7 6 4 8 9 5 3 2 4 3 6 1 5 8 9 2 7 
a 5 2 7 8 6 3 9 4 1 1 7 9 2 8 6 5 3 4 2 5 4 1 7 9 8 3 6 
a 9 7 2 8 4 6 5 3 1 1 5 6 4 8 9 7 3 2 9 6 2 4 10 7 8 3 5 
b 3 7 5 8 2 9 3 4 1 2 3 10 4 7 9 8 6 5 1 4 5 3 8 9 10 7 6 
b 4 8 6 9 1 3 2 5 7 2 1 7 8 6 9 3 4 5 2 1 6 3 7 8 9 5 4 
b 9 6 3 10 5 1 2 4 8 3 2 5 6 4 9 7 8 1 1 4 2 3 5 6 9 8 7 
b 9 2 1 4 5 3 6 8 7 2 8 5 6 1 9 7 3 4 1 4 6 3 7 9 8 2 5 
b 3 6 5 10 8 7 4 2 9 1 5 7 4 8 9 2 3 6 1 6 7 3 5 4 8 9 2 
b 7 8 6 9 3 4 1 2 5 1 4 6 7 8 5 9 2 3 7 2 4 1 8 9 5 3 6 
b 8 6 2 7 5 4 3 1 9 1 5 8 7 9 6 3 2 4 1 5 4 2 6 8 9 7 3 
b 7 5 2 4 3 8 1 6 9 2 6 7 5 8 9 3 1 4 1 2 6 5 3 4 8 7 9 
b 9 4 1 8 3 6 5 2 7 4 5 1 8 9 6 7 2 3 2 3 4 6 8 9 7 5 1 
b 7 1 2 3 5 6 8 4 9 1 4 9 5 7 8 6 2 3 4 2 3 1 7 5 8 6 9 
b 9 7 1 8 6 5 3 4 2 1 3 8 7 2 9 5 6 4 2 8 5 1 3 9 7 4 6 
b 9 6 3 10 5 1 2 4 8 3 2 5 6 4 9 7 8 1 1 4 2 3 5 6 9 8 7 
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Study 2: Similarity pairing task 
Numbers in the first row indicate pairings. Numbers in the second row indicate the identity of the 
images making up the pairs (i .e. ' 6 ' and '20' means that subject 1 rated the 6th and 20th images in the 
array as most similar). 
I""'>'"° 
-~, ' Pf 
-, ,,.,., .. =- !>t ""-"- "' - "' ' "' . 6 20 8, 15 1 18 9 19 .,. 5 ,, 7 12 2 16 ,. 5 6 1 7 • 9 2 10 3 8 
"' 
.I 9 7 3 ' 6 2 5 1 • 8 10 ,. 19 ,, 12 16 17 18 20 20 15 13 8 jtl 10 3 ,. 15 20 13 1 6 7 5 9 18 • 16 
"' 
16 17 15 20 ,. 19 12 15 11 20 1 8 6 9 10 3 2 • 6 3 7 10 fe 2 '2 3 ,. 6 15 10 13 ,, 20 1 19 • 16 • 7 17 18 8 9 
~,, ' 16 17 1 5 3 ' 6 15 20 14 15 
,, 12 10 • 8 9 7 2 13 18 .. 1 2 3 6 • 12 5 8 7 8 9 12 10 13 ,, 20 16 18 ,. 19 13 20 
0 8 9 3 6 7 10 16 1 17 11 1 13 • 19 ,. 15 18 . 20 2 5 • 14 6 9 :a 10 13 7 5 1 ' 6 3 ,. 2 12 15 19 9 18 • 17 8 16 ,, 20 
"' 
6 3 4 , 10 1 8 5 9 7 2 18 20 1oi 19 13 17 ,, 12 16 17 18 15 te ' 3 ,. 13 10 8 " 20 6 
,, 18 2 12 7 5 16 17 13 19 8 ,. 9 • 
"' • 2 
3 71 10 8 9 • 5 1, 8 14 15 18 20 11 13 12 19 16 17 " 12 19 2 10 5 , 6 15 8 1 7 
,, 9 • 17 13 18 ,. 20 3 18 
"' • 
,. 18 20 3 10 16 17 6 · 2 7 15 8 13 5 ,, 9 19 1 12 .. 6 13 13 12 10 ,, ,. 3 20 g 2 • • 7 ,, 17 18 1 • 15 
"' 
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3 6 2 5 • 9 7 8 1 , 10 ,, 15 19 20 13 17 12 ,. 16 13 1 ,, 10 13 2 12 • 5 ,. 3 17 20 6 19 15 7 16 8 18 
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Appendices 
Study 3: Similarity rating task 
The first 9 columns (in each of the three sets across the page) represent faces in the array, in the order 
in which they appear (excluding the target). 
s 7 3 2 8 7 2 6 6 high .discont 1 1 1 8 1 1 7 1 2 , 1 low discont 2 2 3 1 1 3 2 1 2 3 high contin 2 
0 4 2 2 3 6 0 0 0 high discont 1 3 1 4 s 7 2 4 1· S mod contin 2 8 2 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 low discont 2 
4 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 .mod ,discont 1 2 s. 4 8 , 9 7 4 s 3 high contin 1 3 1 2 3 2 4 6 1 1 mod con tin 1 
6 0 0 2 0 , 1 0 1 5 high 'contin 2 3 4 7, 3 9 . 8 7 , S, 4 low discont 2 6 7 1 3 0 8 1 2 • high .discont 2 
0 4 s 0 s 1 0 0 Slow :discont 2 4 9 6 4 0 s 3 2 S mod contin 2 7 2 7 8 3 s 3 , 4 4 low con tin .2 
s 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 O mod lcontin 1 3 4 4 ' s 4 4, s 3 ; 4 high con tin 1 4 2 0 3 2 8. 1 7 1 1mod .dis cont 2 
3 0 0 . 0 s 0 4 4 high 1contln 2 3 4 s• 4 4 4 s, 3 • 2 ,1ow discont 2 2 3 1 0 3 2 o. 1 3 high 1contin .2 
0 0 7 0 4 0 2 1 4 .low 1discont '2 4 ' 3 3 3 6 s 4 2 6 mod con tin 2 3 2 4 1 s 2 2 1 2 low dis cont ,2 
3 0 2 2 1 1 4 . O mod 1contin 1 7 · 4 0 3 0 6 3 3 , 9 high discont 2 2 1 0 . 1 1 2 6 , 1 0 mod 1contin 1 
7 3 0 3 0 4 0 0 3 high ldiscont 2 4 s 7 , 7 ' 3 2 5 , 7 3 low contin 2 7 0 3 1 1 7 o: s 4 1high 'contin 2 
2 o• 11 1 1 0 0 o, 0 low ,contin ,2 ' 7 3 0 .. 4 6 0 4 4 mod discont '2 0 1 s 0 s 2 4 4 Slow dis cont 2 
1 1 0 0 0 6 , 0 1 • 0 mod discont 2 2 s 4 s 4 3 2 4 1 high contin 1 s 0 4 7 0 0 3 0 0 mod ·contin 1 
2 4 2 s 2 s1 s: 2 6 'high lconlin 1 1 . 3 3 1 2 6 1 1 ' 0 low disconl 2 6 7 0 s 0 s 0 1 7 high discont 2 
2 4 6 ' 2 2 7 : 6 2 . 2 low 1discont 2 2 0 s 1 4 3 s 2 ' 7 mod con tin 2 3 0 0 2 s 0 0 4 1 low ,contin 2 
7 2 2 4 4 7 , 6 2 7 ·mod jcontin 2 3 4 3 3 1 2 3 3 3 high contin 1 0 4 0 0 6 7 0 0 0 mod discont 2 
2 0 . 6 0 8 , 0 Si 8 'high 1contin ,2 3 3 2 2 4 s 4 2 2 low discont 2 1 3 2 1 1 4 0 0 0 high .contin 1 
2 0 3 0 s 0 8 s 10 low ldiscont 2 2 0 2 2 2 1 4 3 3 mod contin 2 1 0 1 0 2 0 3 2 3 mod con tin 2 
s 7 ' 8 0 0 , 6 2 1 0 mod Jcontin 1 4 6 0 7 1 3 2 2 3 high discont 2 1 2 2 4 3 3 2 4 2 high contin 1 
4 7 3 6 . 2 s 6 4 7 high contin 1 4 0 0 3 4 . 4 s 2 low contin 2 1 1 4 2 2 s 3 1 O low discont 2 
4 7 6 ' 4 8 7 6 4 ' 3 ,low Jdiscont 2 4 2 4 2 3 2 2 0 0 mod discont 2 2 1 3 1 4 3 2 0 S mod cont in ,2 
s 2 ' 4 1 s 6 s 4 3 8 1mod contin 2 4 1 0 2 0 4 2 0 0 high contln 2 3 10 2 6 4 8 s 7 9 high •discont 1 
0 s; 1 1 0 3 7 , s 8 4 high ldiscont 1 0 2 0 , 0 0 0 0 0 4 low discont 2 6 s 10 4 7 8 9 3 2 low cont in '1 
0 2 3 s 2 3 0 1 4 low cont in •1 2 O· 0 1 2 2 2 0 0 mod con tin 1 8 7 4 10 6 s 2 3 9 mod discont 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 mod discont 1 4 2 1 ' 0 2 6 2 3 7 high cont in 2 3 s 2 1 7 8 4 6 7 high disconl 1 
2 2 0 4 , 0 " 0 0 0 high ldisconl 2 3 , 3 2 0 7 s 8 3 9 low discont 2 4 3 7 s 4 5 6 3 4 low contin 1 4 0 3 2 1 4 0 0 2 low contin 2 3 3 3 2 3 0 s 1 1 mod con tin 1 8 s 4 3 s 1 2 6 2 mod discont 1 
1 4 0 1 3 4 1 2 2 mod 1discont 2 7 2 1 O• 2 6 0 4 " high cont in 2 2 4 2 3 4 7 4 4 7 high discont 1 
4 6 1 4 1 6 3 2 5 high discont 2 1 2 0 . 9 s s 2 3 low disconl 2 4 3 7 s 4 3 3 3 4 low cont in 1 
2 1 6 7 1 s 3 2 3 '1ow contin 2 6 3 1 0 s 6 7 0 0 mod contin 1 7 2 2 3 4 2 2 4 2 mod discont 1 
2 3 2 2 2 7 2 4 4 mod .discont 2 6 6 1 4 10 6 9 10 7 high discont 2 0 s 2 1 7 7 1 2 2 high discont 1 
7 4 3 1 s 4 2 s 2 high discont 2 7 4 8 6 7 9 9 9 8 low cont in 2 2 1 6 4 4 2 6 1 1 low cont in 1 
7 4 7 6 4 7 4 4 5 low contin 2 6 7 10 10 8 9 s 8 8 mod discont 2 s 6 1 1 1 0 0 2 O mod dis cont 1 
8 6 2 6 6 4 4 4 S mod disc.on! 2 0 4 2 4 4 , s 7 0 0 low cont in 1 s 3 s 4 6 8 4 6 6 high discont 1 
7 7 1 s 0 8 2 1 5 high discont ,2 0 3 4 10 10 0 0 0 0 mod discont 1 1 0 4 6 1 0 1 0 O low .contin 1 
3 3 7 6 s 3 3 4 7 low cont in 2 7 ' 1 6 0 9 4 3 7 .high discont 2 s 7 1 6 1 0 0 2 4 mod discont 1 3 4 0 3 s 6 2 s 3 mod discont 2 4 1 4 7 , 6 1 2 6 S 0 low cont in 2 3 3 2 2 0 3 2 2 2 high con tin 1 
s s s s 2 4 4 4 s high discont 1 2 7 0 1 4 9 0 1 O mod dis cont 2 2 4 8 2 3 6 s 3 4 low discont 2 
0 0 3 7 1 2 0 0 2 low cont in 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 high discont 1 7 2 0 1 4 6 6 6 8 mod contin 2 
2 2 0 3 2 0 4 3 4 mod dis cont 1 4 4 4 2 4 4 3 3 3 low cont in 1 s 4 1 2 1 6 6 4 7 high 1discont 2 
3 7 4 6 s 6 4 3 1 high cont in 1 3 s 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 mod discont 1 8 7 9 8 7 6 8 8 3 low 1contin 2 
0 1 2 1 3 6 3 2 1 low discont 2 2 3 0 2 1 4 2 2 s high discont 2 9 8 2 s 6 7 1 1 1 mod discont~ 
3 0 6 1 8 4 1 0 8 mod con tin 2 4 0 2 2 0 s 2 3 O low contin 2 6 s 1 4 s 9 4 6 8 high discont 2 --
0 0 0 3 4 3 0 4 0 high contin 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 mod discont 2 s 3 6 7 4 8 1 7 9 low cont in 2 
0 1 2 0 3 6 2 0 o low discont 2 1 2 1 . 3 s 2 2 3 high discont 1 7 6 3 4 s 3 2 7 1 mod discont 2 
3 0 s 1 7 1 6 0 9 mod contin 2 2 1 4 3 2 3 4 0 O low contin 1 1 4 0 6 1 3 2 1 5 high contin 1 --
6 10 8 7 7 8 3 2 1 high contin 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 mod discont 1 2 1 4 2 0 8 7 4 1 low discont 2 
s 8 9 4 8 9 2 2 1 low discont 2 6 4 2 s 0 4 3 1 8 high discont 2 1 0 3 0 s 0 6 2 7 mod contin 2 
7 1 2 7 s s 6 4 s mod contin 2 7 3 4 6 3 6 4 7 3 low contin 2 2 6 2 s 3 6 4 0 4 high con tin 1 
8 7 2 3 4 s 2 2 6 high discont 2 2 s 0 2 4 7 0 7 4 mod discont 2 3 3 7 2 2 . 1 6 '4 low discont 2 
s 3 4 7 s 2 2 3 2 low cont in 2 6 2 2 2 s 6 2 s 2 high contin 2 2 1 7 4 3 2 1 2 8 mod contin 2 
2 3 1 1 3 8 1 4 2 mod discont 2 2 6 7 2 6 s 1 1 3 low discont 2 2 1 0 4 0 0 1 1 1 high contin 1 
1 4 4 4 0 0 0 1 2 high contin 1 6 4 2 6 6 2 7 2 4 mod contin 1 0 0 1 1 0 4 2 3 O low discont 2 
2 0 1 1 2 s s 0 2 low discont 2 0 1 1 0 0 4 0 2 6 high contin 2 s 2 1 0 2 1 2 0 1 mod cont in 2 
2 1 0 1 0 2 4 1 3 mod cont in 2 0 3 1 0 2 0 6 s 4 low discont 2 0 2 4 3 7 6 0 0 3 high discont 1 
4 6 0 6 0 8 3 7 high discont 2 3 0 1 1 1 0 4 0 O mod conlin 1 0 3 2 s 4 2 1 0 0 low cent in 1 
6 0 3 1 s 1 2 7 1 low cont in 2 4 2 1 0 1 3 2 4 "high conlin 2 3 0 0 6 3 0 8 s . mod discont 1 
1 1 0 1 1 3 0 1 O mod discont 2 3 2 1 2 s 4 2 3 -~ d1scont 2 0 6 0 3 s 7 3 1 4 high co~~-
3 2 0 3 0 8 1 0 7 high discont 2 0 1 1 2 2 1 s 0 1 mod ccntin 1 0 2 1 1 1 6 3 1 O low discont -~ 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 O low contin 2 1 3 1 1 7 8 4 s 3 high disccnt 1 2 0 3 2 . 7 6 1 0 4 mod cent in 2 
0 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 mod discont 2 2 1 4 0 1 0 0 1 0 low contin 1 3 4 1 2 7 9 8 s 6 high discont 1 
6 7 2 9 4 10 3 s 8 high disc.on! 2 7 1 2 4 2 0 0 1 O mod discont 1 1 4 6 s 7 8 9 2 3 low cont in 1 
8 7 2 4 10 6 s 9 3 ,1ow cont in 2 1 4 3 2 1 3 2 0 0 high contin 1 9 6 3 s 8 2 1 7 4 mod discont 1 
9 4 7 3 s 10 2 8 6 mod dis cont 2 0 1 2 3 0 s 2 0 O low discont 2 8 1 1 0 0 3 2 3 6 high cont in 2 
1 2 0 3 3 2 1 0 0 high disc.on! 2 2 0 1 1 1 0 6 2 7 mod conlin 2 3 3 s s 6 2 6 4 8 low disc.on! 2 
1 0 s 4 2 0 1 6 3 low conlin 2 4 3 0 2 2 4 3 3 2 high contin 2 9 2 8 4 3 s 9 2 2 mod contin 1 
0 1 0 0 1 3 0 1 o mod discont 2 0 1 2 0 3 0 0 0 2 low discont 2 7 0 4 i 3 0 3 Shigh~~ 
1 6 3 s 3 6 2 3 2 high contin 1 s 0 0 0 2 s 3 0 o mod contin 1 0 6 0 2 1 3 0 1 1 .mod discont 2 
1 2 7 3 6 6 2 4 3 low discont 2 s 2 0 0 2 8 2 2 4 high contin 2 9 1 0 0 1 7 0 0 2 high cont in 2 
1 0 7 1 6 6 1 0 7 mod contin 2 0 0 s 2 2 0 3 4 7 low discont 2 0 0 6 0 0 0 8 1 7 low discont 2 
1 6 1 6 1 1 0 1 3 high lcontin 1 s 6 4 7 s s s 0 0 mod con tin 1 8 0 . 6 7 0 2 8 0 0 mod cont in 1 
0 2 ' 0 0 o· 4 1 ' 1 O low 'discont 2 3 2 1 2 1 s 1 2 4 high 
Appendices 
Study 3: Distinctiveness rating task 
Notation of the form fl , f2 .. f28 , heading columns, represent face images in the rated array. The 
subscripts indicate the order in which they appear in the array. 
Array no f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8 f9 f10 f11 f12 f13 f14 f15 f16 f17 f18 f19 f20 f21 f22 f23 f24 f25 f26 f27 f28 
" 
6 7 1 1 1 15 7 1 1 7 7 15 7 1 1 15 7 15 7 1 1 1 1 15 1 7 1 1 1 
6 10 10 6 12 6 10 8 6 7 7 12 7 11 12 11 6 12 7 10 6 7 6 12 6 4 5 7 5 
6 2 13 2 7 3 1 2 2 4 1 14 10 2 2 2 3 8 3 2 2 1 4 12 4 12 3 10 5 
6 7 7 7 1 1 1 15 15 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 7 7 7 7 7 1 1 7 7 1 1 1 
IF 6 7 15 7 7 7 1 15 7 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 7 7 1 1 7 1 
6 7 15 7 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 7 7 7 1 15 1 7 1 7 7 1 15 15 1 7 7 1 1 
.,. - 6 7 15 1 1 7 15 7 7 7 1 15 7 7 1 7 1 7 1 1 1 1 7 7 1 15 7 7 7 
6 4 4 7 5 12 10 7 5 7 6 10 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 5 6 7 8 4 3 4 
6 6 4 4 10 15 12 4 12 2 4 15 7 3 2 10 9 13 2 2 4 2 5 10 2 10 1 6 10 
•, 6 1 7 1 1 7 7 1 1 7 1 15 7 1 7 15 1 15 7 7 1 1 1 7 7 7 1 1 1 
· 7 5 9 7 5 15 12 1 10 15 8 8 9 4 12 9 10 11 7 15 8 8 9 15 9 10 14 12 8 
7 7 1 1 7 7 1 7 7 1 1 7 1 7 7 1 7 1 1 1 7 1 1 1 7 15 1 1 15 
7 6 7 6 15 6 6 8 2 7 4 4 3 15 5 5 7 5 8 3 3 8 5 3 4 9 7 5 7 
7 1 1 7 7 7 1 1 7 7 1 7 1 7 7 1 1 1 7 7 1 1 1 1 7 7 1 7 7 
7 2 5 5 7 12 8 6 10 14 10 11 12 10 12 10 6 7 7 10 7 5 8 8 4 6 8 12 10 
7 1 1 1 15 7 1 7 15 15 15 7 7 15 7 1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 7 15 1 7 7 
.~: 7 1 7 1 1 7 1 1 7 1 1 7 1 15 1 1 15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 15 1 1 7 
10 8 1 9 1 5 1 1 7 5 3 2 2 1 5 2 2 15 1 6 7 15 2 1 2 5 7 
10 5 5 2 4 8 8 8 10 9 5 4 3 3 2 6 8 9 4 3 5 8 9 8 9 9 7 
10 3 3 5 4 6 3 3 6 4 2 4 4 2 6 7 7 7 2 2 7 8 2 2 2 7 5 
10 7 7 1 1 15 5 7 1 7 1 7 7 15 15 7 15 7 15 7 1 7 7 15 15 1 
i' 10 3 7 7 3 9 8 8 5 7 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 8 3 7 7 9 4 4 4 4 5 
10 5 7 15 7 7 6 7 6 7 6 6 10 6 10 4 4 15 12 3 3 13 15 12 6 13 6 
10 2 5 7 1 3 3 9 1 1 2 7 2 2 5 5 5 4 6 7 4 12 5 6 7 5 4 
10 13 7 5 11 7 6 9 6 7 7 7 15 7 11 10 15 15 13 6 13 15 7 7 7 10 9 
10 8 3 5 10 5 8 8 5 3 10 7 5 12 12 15 9 7 5 15 4 2 4 7 6 
Appendices 
Study 4: Similarity rating task, across frontal and profile views 
Notation of the form fl , f2 .. f28, heading columns, represent face images in the rated array. The 
subscripts indicate the order in which they appear in the array. Hi = high distinctiveness; lo = low 
distinctiveness; fr= frontal view; pr= profile view; fp =frontal +profile view. 
5 0 2 3 2 0 1 2 2 hi fp 2 6 9 2 3 0 0 4 7 10 lo fr 2 2 2 2 0 7 9 4 1 lo fp 1 
5 6 4 5 5 3 3 3 5 hi fp 1 0 0 0 4 4 5 6 7 0 hi fr 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 3 0 hi fp 2 
55565444810 fp 2 300035140 10 1 002020000 10 fp 1 
3 2 5 2 3 5 2 1 3 hi pr 3 3 3 8 5 5 4 8 3 hi fp 2 0 0 5 0 3 0 3 0 6 hi fr ,2 
2 3 2 • 5 4 2 2 2 7 lo •fr 2 1 4 1 7· 7 5 2 4 lo fp 1 O 3 2 O 1 2 O 4 O lo r 2 
6 . 7 • 0 3 4 0 1 1 hi pr 0 0 0 3 2 2 3 0 0 hi fr 2 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 2 hi fr 2 
O. 5 0, 4 2 1 O 5 lo fr 0 2 O O 2 2 O 4 2 lo pr 2 O 1 2 O 1 O O 2 O lo pr 2 
5 6 9 1 3 8 1 0 1 hi pr 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 hi fp 2 3 1 2 0 4 4 3 0 1 hi pr 1 
0 4 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 lo fr 0 O 2 O 3 O O O O lo fp 1 O 4 O 4 2 O 1 1 3 lo fr 1 
o 5 10 o 9 7 8 o 5.hi pr 3 5 4 2 6 2 2 7 5 hi fr 2 3 5 5 6 1 2 6 o 5 hi fr 2 
58011087910 fr 78646679710 pr2 156348372 10 pr 2 
1 3. 3 0 4 2 6 2 2 hi pr 3 5 1 1 6 8 7 6 4 hi pr 2 5 0 10 0 10 5 0 0 5 hi pr 2 
0 3, 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 lo fr 2 8 0 2 4 3 0 6 7 lo fr 2 O O O 0 0 0 10 10 0 lo 'fr 2 
1 0 5 0 4 2 2 2 5 hi pr 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 hi fr 1 1 3 0 1 3 1 6 6 0 hi 
1 1 01 0 1 O 1 0 O lo fr 3 2 1 O 1 1 O 3 O lo pr 1 2 O 4 O 8 2 7 O· 2 lo 
5 5 4 3 5 8 4 3 7 hi pr 2 3 6 2 7· 5 7 9 8 hi pr 2 1 1 2 3 1 1, 4 2 2 hi fr 
2 7 2 5 6 3 6 4 5 lo fr 3 5 1 2 1 2 4 8 9 lo fr 2 O 2 4 2 2 3 2 5 2 lo pr 
1 1 1 0 1 2 5 1 2 hi pr 0 5 2 3 0 1 1 0 4 hi fp 1 4 0 0 1 0 1 6 0 6 hi fr 
0 3 0 2 2 0 3 0 0 lo fr 0 2 3 4 5 ' 0 1 0 5 lo fp 2 0 6 2 0 3 3 4 8 0 lo pr 
4 0 6 0 6 5 0 1 6 hi pr O O O 5 1 3 6 O O hi fr 1 3 4 3 6 2 4 4 3 4 hi fr 
0 0 1 6 0 2 2 1 3 lo fr 6 1 O O O 4 2 7 O lo pr 1 2 2 4 2 1 3 3 5 3 lo 
10 5 4 8 5 3 3 3 5 hi fr 2 4 7 4 2 8 5 2 5 hi fr 2 3 2 5 3 3 3 5 2 3 hi 
7 8 3 2 3 2 2 5 2 lo pr 1 5 2 6 0 4 8 7 7 6 lo pr 2 1 1 6 5 5 4 5 10 5 lo 
3 0 0 4 5 0 1 0 3 hi fr 1 1 0 10 0 4 9 8 1 7 hi pr 1 3 2 7 6 4 7 7 6 5 hi 
1 4 0 0 1 2 2 0 lo pr 1 8 1 0 1 9 3 1 2 0 lo fr 1 4 5 9 8 8 7 7 8 6 lo 
9 6 4 7 6 2 3 4 hi fr 1 7 4 6 4 6 7 7 6 3 hi f 1 3 5 8 0 6 9 2 4 1 hi 
6 6 4 4 5 6 7 8 9 lo r 1 7 8 4 7 7 9 9 8 7 lo fp 2 3 6 O 1 3 O 7 2 4 lo 
6 2 5 6 3 4 3 4 hi fr 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 O O 3 hi pr 2 4 3 I 2 3 4 6 5 6 hi 
5 2 3 3 4 3 6 2 lo pr 1 5 6 1 1 O O 4 1 O lo fr 2 5 7 3 4 3 2 4 7 6 lo 
l--.--~0~4~0~~2~0~=1--c2o--757h_i __ f~r-~2o-- ~2 -=3~7~4~4~8~2~3~6~hi_----'p~r--;2 -~0~0~2~0~0~~0~0~0~8~h~i--
4532270811o pr 2 35221378710 fr 2 00000040010 
2 3 3 0 3 2 3 0 3 hi pr 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 5 0 0 hi fr 2 10 4 3 2 8 7 5.--6~"97h~i -----=-- I 
0 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 lo fr 1 0 0 8 0 0 0 O 5 0 lo pr 2 5 8 2 4 3 5 10 7 6 lo 
2 7 9 8 10 3 5 6 4 hi fp 2 7 8 8 9 7 5 10 7 6 hi fr 2 O 3 6 6 5 1 8 O 4 hi fr 
0 0 9 0 10 7 8 6 lo fp 1 7 7 7 8 4 4 8 9 lo pr 2 1 6 8 1 4 7 2 7 O lo pr 
1 5 3 6 5 3 6 1 7 hi Ip 1 7 4 6 5 3 8 9 4 10 hi fr 2 10 10 9 2 4 0 8 10 10 hi fp 1 
6 6 2 5 2 0 0 2 4 lo f 2 2 4 9 7 8 5 3 10 6 lo pr 2 5 10 10 4 8 10 7 10 8 lo fp 2 
0 0 1 0 3 2 0 0 0 hi pr 2 5 5 0 2 6 3 4 0 0 hi r 2 1 8 6 1 1 3 7 5 5 hi pr 2 
4 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 lo fr 2 0 6 0 0 2 0 3 6 6 lo fr 2 6 7 O 5 1 1 4 7 5 lo fr 2 
6 4 2 7 7 4 4 5 4 hi fr 0 2 8 8 1 4 7 0 2 hi fr 2 2 5 3 1 6 5 2 2 3 h1 pr 2 
8 3 2 3 4 6 6 6 2 lo pr 1 5 6 1 3 5 2 4 2 lo pr 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 6 5 2 lo fr 2 
2 2 6 4 5 2 1 2 1 hi fp 1 3 1 4 3 0 0 0 0 hi fp 2 0 6 4 3 6 5 6 4 3 hi pr 2 
1 2 3 2 4 2 2 1 1 lo Ip 2 O 3 O 5 3 5 O 2 lo fp 1 1 4 5 4 5 6 8 ~7.--4~10--f;-.r-=2-1 
5 4 4 4 1 1 3 3 5 hi fr 1 0 1 4 4 0 0 0 1 hi fr 2 5 3 4 2 6 7 6 3 5 hi pr 1 
45112455310 pr 1 0351 106110 pr2 33255233410 fr 1 
4 5 2 6 6 5 2 2 5 hi fp 2 2 1 2 0 1 3 1 0 3 hi pr 2 0 0 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 hi fp 2 
4 2 5 3 6 2 3 5 4 lo fp 1 2 2 0 2 1 0 1 4 4 lo fr 2 7 2 3 2 2 1 O 0 lo fp 1 
~1.--.0~1~5~~5_2c--_4~4.--=1 7h_i __ t~p-~2,___~3 -=8-;2~7~5~2~5,--'6~3~hi __ 1!'--=-2 __ 9~-7~7-=9-=9--=8~6~6o--7~hi _ _ tp 2 
3 3 5 3 8 4 . 2 6 lo fp 5 2 7 4 8 7 6 4 7 lo 1 8 6 6 6 5 8 6 5 lo fp 1 
8 5 4 5 4 4 6 7 4 hi fr 1 3 1 3 4 5 2 1 1 3 hi fr 1 1 3 1 O 6 2 2 1 2 hi pr 2 
56263648310 pr 1 25123345110 pr 1 841203254 10 fr 2 
7 2 1 5 6 5 2 3 3 hi fr 1 3 1 0 2 5 3 1 0 hi f 2 6 4 7 4 7 5 9 6 2 hi fr 2 
7 6 5 5 5 6 5 5 4 lo pr 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 3 5 lo fp 1 4 3 5 2 3 4 5 4 2 lo pr 2 
7 7 5 2 1 7 8 0 4 hi fr 2 4 4 8 4 5 4 2 1 4 hi pr 1 2 4 4 7 3 1 7 O 8 hi fr 2 
4 1 8 6 8 2 3 8 5 lo pr 2 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 2 4 lo fr 1 3 5 6 4 5 4 3 9 3 lo pr 2 
5 1 6 2 7 4 6 2 7 hi pr 1 3 4 3 6 2 2 5 3 4 hi fp 2 4 4 2 2 6 7 5 4 '"'3,.--,.,h i~-~pr--o-1--1 
2 6 2 5 1 2 5 3 5 lo fr 1 2 1 3 1 5 2 3 1 7 lo fp 1 
5 2 4 3 3 5 2 2 1 hi .fp 2 5 3 0 6 2 1 0 0 0 hi fp 2 
1 1 3 2 2 2 4 3 3 lo fp 1 2 o 6 o 6 5 5 o 6 lo fp 1 
0 0 2 0 9 9 3 3 10 hi 2 2 2 2 7 5 3 3 3 5 hi f 2 
A ppendices 
Study 5: Test-retest reliability of subject ratings of similarity 
Init ial = array presented at initial stage of experiment; Follow = array presented at fi nal stage of 
experiment. ' ti fl ' =first face in array presented at initial stage, ' t2fl ' = first face in array presented 
at final stage, and so on. 
ltiUD!e..m lijjtial~ Ut1E t1t'2 t1fJ m~ tt~ ms t1'f1;: t118: tlf9. fOJ!PW,: t2fj~ ~~; ~ WI', t2f~; ~s t2f7~ t2fl!' t2t9 
1 !301 10 30 10 50 10 10 20 15 30 
2 !301 10 50 20 60 40 30 50 30 0 !302 60 40 40 0 70 0 70 60 60 
3 !301 30 40 20 50 50 60 20 70 60 !302 90 50 40 0 60 5 35 50 80 
4 !301 30 50 20 40 40 60 70 30 50 
5 !301 40 70 30 50 30 30 50 30 70 !302 70 30 30 50 50 30 80 70 
6 !301 0 20 0 30 0 20 30 10 20 !303 10 5 0 15 0 70 10 5 
7 !301 0 0 30 40 60 50 0 50 0 
8 !301 45 65 25 80 30 35 50 30 55 !302 90 55 50 30 75 60 80 65 70 
9 !301 0 30 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 !302 60 0 20 0 40 0 30 10 0 
10 !301 0 50 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 !302 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 !301 20 60 10 75 30 40 60 10 20 !303 80 20 20 10 50 20 60 60 50 
12 !301 20 60 0 45 10 10 0 5 5 
13 !301 40 80 50 80 45 70 45 40 50 
14 !301 0 80 0 30 40 20 10 20 0 !303 25 0 15 5 60 15 50 10 30 
15 !301 20 40 30 40 30 40 45 30 40 !303 60 50 45 45 65 50 50 55 
16 !301 60 90 70 70 80 70 60 80 60 !303 75 50 60 70 70 55 60 75 60 
17 !301 0 70 20 30 10 75 25 25 30 
18 !301 10 75 10 5 5 50 75 10 50 
19 t301 5 10 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 !303 0 0 0 5 5 5 0 0 5 
Appendices 
Study 6: Mock witness task 
Dist = distinctiveness; Sim. = similarity; Mem. 
correctness (I =correct) . . 
3 5 4 1 1 3 6 8 35 1 3 
2 5 4 1 1 2 2 • 35 1 • 2 
1 2 3 1 1 1 3 5 35 0 1 
3 5 4 2 1 3 1 8 36 1 3 
2 5 4 2 1 2 3 5 36 0 2 
1 2 3 2 1 1 6 2 36 1 1 
3 2 3 3 1 3 6 8 37 1 3 
2 6 3 3 1 2 2 4 37 1 2 
1 1 3 3 0 1 3 1 37 0 1 
3 5 4 4 1 3 4 2 38 1 3 , 
2 5 4 4 1 · 2 1 5 38 0 I 2 1 
1 2 . 3 4 11 I 1 4 6 38 ' 1 ! ' 1 , 
3 5 .. 5 , 1 3 1 8 , 39 , 1 , 3 
2 5 4 5 1 2 3 2 39 1 2 
1 2 3 5 1 1 6 2 39 1 : 1 
3 1 3 6 0 3 6 8 40 ' 11 3 
2 3 5 6 , 0 2 2 2 40 , 0 2 
1 6 2 6 1 1 3 4 40 1 1 . 
3 3 5 7 0 3 5 • " 1 3 2 4 8 7 1 2 5 4 41 1 2 
1 5 6 7 ' 1: 1 2 5 " 0 1 3 3 4 8 1 3• 6 8 42 1 3 , 
2 • 8 8 1 I 2 2 4 42 1 2 
1 5 6 8 1 1 3 4 42 1 1 , 
3 3 4 9 1 3 6 8 43 : 1 3 
2 4 8 9 1 2 2 4 43 1 2 
1 5 6 9 1 1 3 • 43 1 1 
3 1 8 10 1 3 5 4 .. 1 3 
2 3 5 10 0 2 5 • .. 1 2 
1 6 2 · 10 1 1 2 4 .. 0 1 
3 1 8 11 1 3 5 4 45 1 3 
2 3 2 11 1 2 5 4 45 1 2 
1 6 2 11 1 1 2 3 45 1 1 
3 3 4 12 1 3 5 4 46 1 3 
2 4 8 12 1 2 5 4 46 1 2 
1 5 6 12 1 1 2 3 46 1 1 
3 3 4 13 1 3 6 8 47 1 3 
2 4 8 13 1 2 2 4 47 1 2 
1 5 6 13 1 1 3 4 47 1 1 
3 5 4 14 1 3 4 2 48 1 3 
2 5 4 14 1 2 1 1 48 , 2 
1 2 4 14 0 1 4 6 48 1 1 
3 6 8 15 1 3 4 2 49 1 3 
2 2 4 15 1 2 1 6 49 0 2 
1 3 4 15 1 1 4 6 49 1 1 
3 5 4 16 1 3 4 2 so 1 3 
2 5 4 16 1 2 1 6 50 0 2 
1 2 4 16 0 1 4 6 50 1 1 
3 6 8 17 1 3 • 3 51 0 3 
2 2 4 17 1 2 1 5 51 0 2 
1 3 4 17 1 1 4 6 51 1 1 
3 6 8 18 1 3 4 2 52 1 3 
2 2 4 18 1 2 1 5 52 0 2 
1 3 4 18 1 1 4 6 52 1 1 
3 1 8 19 1 3 2 3 53 1 3 
2 3 5 19 0 2 6 3 53 1 2 
1 6 2 19 1 1 1 3 53 0 1 
3 4 2 20 1 3 4 2 54 1 3 
2 1 1 20 1 2 1 1 54 1 2 
1 4 6 20 1 1 4 6 54 1 1 
3 4 2 21 1 3 4 2 55 1 3 
2 1 1 21 1 2 1 1 55 1 2 , 4 6 21 1 1 4 6 55 1 1 
3 8 8 22 1 3 4 2 56 1 3 
2 2 4 22 1 2 1 5 56 0 2 
1 3 5 22 0 1 4 6 56 1 1 
3 4 2 23 1 3 6 8 57 1 3 
2 1 1 23 1 2 2 4 57 1 2 
1 4 6 23 1 1 3 4 57 1 1 
3 1 3 24 0 3 4 2 58 1 3 
2 3 2 24 1 2 1 1 58 1 2 
1 6 2 24 1 1 4 6 58 1 1 
3 1 3 25 0 3 5 4 59 1 3 
2 3 2 25 1 2 59 2 
1 6 2 25 1 1 2 5 59 0 1 
3 4 2 26 1 3 4 2 60 1 3 
2 1 1 26 1 2 1 5 60 0 2 , 4 6 26 1 1 4 6 60 1 1 
3 3 8 27 0 3 4 2 61 1 3 
2 4 8 27 · 1 2 1 6 61 0 2 
1 5 6 27 . 1 1 4 6 61 1 1 
3 1 8 28 1 3 4 2 61 1 3 
2 3 2 28 1 2 1 1 62 1 2 
1 6 • 2 28 1 1 4 6 62 1 1 
3 4 2 29 1 3 4 2 63 1 3 
2 1 5 29 0 2 1 5 63 · 0 2 
1 4 6 29 1 1 4 6 , 63 1 1 
3 • 2 30 1 3 5 4 64 1 3 
2 1 1 30 1 . 2 2 • 64 1 2 
1 4 6 30 1 1 2 " 64 0 1 3 5 4 31 , 1 3 2 3 65 ,, 3 
2 5 4 31 1 2 6 3 65 1 2 
1 2 5 31 0 1 1 5 65 0 1 
3 2 3 32 1 3 2 3 66 1 3 
2 6 3 32 1 2 6 3 66 1 2 
1 1 1 32 1 1 1 3 66 0 1 
3 2 3 33 1 3 2 3 67 1 3 . 
2 6 3 33 1 2 6 3 67 1 2 
array member chosen; S 
2 3 69 1 3 6 8 
6 3 69 1 2 2 4 
1 1 69 1 1 3 6 
2 3 70 1 3 5 4 
6 3 70 1 2 5 • 
1 5 70 0 1 2 2 
6 8 71 1 3 1 3 
2 4 71 1 2 3 2 
3 4 71 1 1 6 2 
6 8 72 1 3 1 3 
2 4 72 1 2 3 2 
3 4 72 1 1 • 6 2 
5 4 73 1 3 , 1 • 
5 • 73 1 2 3 5 
2 • 73 0 1 6 2 
5 4 74 1 3 3 4 
5 4 74 1 2 4 8 
2 , 8 " 0 1 5 6 5 • 75 1 3 1 8 
5 4 75 1 2 3 2 
2 4 75 0 1 6 2 
5 4 76 1 3 5 
5 ' 4 76 1 2 5 , 4 
2 3 76 1 1 2 3 
5 4 77 1 3 5 • 
5 4 77 1 2 5 4 
2 . 3 77 1 1 2 3 
5 4 78 1 3 5 4 
5 4 78 1 2 5 4 
2 3 78 1 1 2 3 
5 4 79 1 3 5 4 
5 4 79 1 2 5 4 
2 8 79 0 1 2 4 
6 8 80 1 3 2 5 
2 4 80 1 2 6 3 
3 4 80 1 1 1 
6 8 81 1 3 3 4 
2 4 81 1 2 4 8 
3 4 81 1 1 5 6 
4 2 82 1 3 3 4 
1 1 82 1 2 4 8 
4 6 82 1 , 5 6 
4 2 83 1 3 3 4 
1 5 83 0 2 4 8 
4 6 83 1 1 5 6 
6 8 84 1 3 1 1 
2 4 84 1 2 3 2 
3 4 84 1 1 6 2 
3 5 85 0 3 3 4 
4 8 85 1 2 4 8 
5 6 85 1 1 5 6 
3 • 86 1 3 3 4 
4 8 86 1 2 4 8 
5 6 86 1 1 5 6 
4 2 87 1 3 1 8 
1 6 87 0 2 3 2 
4 6 87 1 1 6 2 
1 8 88 1 3 3 4 
3 2 88 1 2 4 8 
6 2 88 1 1 5 6 
3 5 89 0 3 3 4 
4 8 89 1 2 4 8 
5 6 89 1 1 5 6 
4 2 90 1 3 3 4 
1 1 90 1 2 4 8 
4 6 90 1 1 5 6 
• 2 91 1 3 3 4 
1 1 91 1 2 4 7 
4 7 91 0 1 5 6 
6 8 92 1 3 4 2 
2 4 92 1 2 1 1 
3 4 92 1 1 4 6 
1 3 93 0 3 3 • 
3 5 93 0 2 4 8 
6 2 93 1 1 5 6 
4 2 94 , 3 5 4 
1 1 94 1 2 5 4 
4 6 94 1 1 2 3 
1 3 95 0 3 6 8 
3 5 95 0 2 2 • 
6 2 95 1 1 3 4 
4 2 96 1 3 1 6 
1 1 96 1 2 3 2 
4 7 96 0 1 6 2 
6 6 97 1 3 1 6 
2 4 97 1 2 3 2 
3 2 97 0 1 6 2 
3 4 98 1 3 1 8 
4 8 98 1 2 3 5 
5 6 98 1 1 6 2 
3 4 99 1 3 2 7 
4 8 99 1 2 6 3 
5 6 99 1 1 1 1 
1 3 100 0 3 2 3 
3 5 100 0 2 6 3 
6 2 100 1 1 1 7 
3 4 101 1 3 6 8 
4 8 101 1 2 2 4 
subject; Crt. identification 
102 1 3 4 2 136 1 
102 1 2 1 6 136 0 
102 0 1 4 6 136 1 
103 1 3 4 2 137 1 
103 1 2 1 1 137 1 
103 0 1 4 6 137 1 
104 0 3 3 • 138 1 
104 1 2 4 8 138 1 
104 1 1 5 6 138 1 
105 0 3 4 2 139 1 
105 1 2 1 6 139 0 
105 · 1 , 1 • 6 ' 139 1 
106 o· 3 6 8 140 1 
106 0 2 2 4 140 1 
106 1 1 3 5 140 0 
107 1 3 6 8 141 1 
107 1 2 2 4 141 1 
107 1 1 3 5 141 0 
108 1 3 5 4 142 1 
108 1 2 5 4 142 1 
108 1 1 2 • 142 0 
109 3 5 .. 143 1 
109 1 2 5 4 143 1 
109 1 1 2 143 
110 1 3 ' 5 , 4 144 1 
110 1 2 5 4 144 1 
110 1 1 2 4 144 0 
111 1 3 5 • 145 1 
111 1 2 5 4 145 1 
111 1 1 2 3 145 1 
112 1 3 1 8 146 1 
112 1 2 3 2 146 1 
112 0 1 6 2 146 1 
113 0 3 1 8 147 1 
113 1 2 3 2 147 1 
113 1 6 2 147 1 
114 1 3 2 3 148 1 
114 1 2 6 3 148 1 
114 1 1 1 3 148 0 
115 1 3 2 3 149--;-
11 5 , 2 6 3 149 1 
115 1 1 1 1 149 , 
116 1 3 2 3 150 1 
116 1 2 6 3 150 1 
116 1 1 1 3 150 0 
117 0 3 2 3 151 1 
117 1 2 6 3 151 1 
117 1 1 1 3 151 0 
118 1 3 2 3 152 1 
118 1 2 6 3 152 1 
118 1 1 1 1 152 1 
119 1 3 2 3 153 1 
119 1 2 6 3 153 1 
119 1 1 1 1 153 1 
120 1 3 2 3 154 1 
120 1 2 6 3 154 1 
120 1 1 1 1 154 1 
121 1 3 2 3 155 1 
121 1 2 6 3 155 1 --121 1 1 1 1 155 1 
122 1 3 2 3 156 1 
122 1 2 6 3 156 1 
122 1 1 1 3 156 0 
123 1 3 2 3 157 1 
123 1 2 6 3 157 1 
123 1 1 
_ 1 _ ___ 1 - 15T'1 
124 1 3 1 3 158 0 
124 0 2 3 5 158 0 
124 1 1 6 2 158 1 
125 1 3 6 8 159 1 
125 1 2 2 • 159 1 
125 1 1 3 3 159 0 
126 1 3 6 8 160 1 
126 1 2 2 4 160 1 
126 1 1 3 4 160 1 
127 1 3 3 8 16 1 0 
127 1 2 4 8 161 1 
127 1 1 5 6 161 1 
128 1 3 3 4 162 1 
128 1 2 4 8 162 1 
128 1 1 5 6 162 1 
129 1 3 1 8 163 1 
129 1 2 3 5 163 0 
129 1 1 6 2 163 1 
130 1 3 1 8 164 1 
130 1 2 3 5 164 0 
130 1 1 6 2 164 1 
131 1 3 1 ' 165 1 131 0 2 3 5 165 0 
131 1 1 6 2 165 1 
132 0 3 1 3 166 0 
132 1 2 3 5 166 0 
132 1 1 6 2 166 1 
133 1 3 1 ' 167 1 133 1 2 3 6 167 0 
133 0 1 6 2 167 1 
13' 1 3 5 4 168 ,-
134 1 --2 - 5 - - 4 -158- , 
A ppend ices 
Study 7: Simulated identification experiment 
Simult. = simultaneous; Linel _x (and likewise, Line2_x,Line3_x) = accuracy of identification outcome of 
lineup I. fa = false alarm, ir = incorrect rejection; er= correct rejection; h = hit; do = fo il identifi cation. 
Subj Array Structure Uneup1 Uneup2 Lineup3 Line1_x Line2_x Li,ne3_X Subj Array Structure Lineup1 Uneup2 Lineup3 Line1_x Line2_x Une3_X 
1 c sequential , 4 , 4 ' o fa ih icr 35 d isequential ' 0 0 o·cr lir ·er 
2 d simult 3 1 7 0 1f1 'h lir 36 d tsequontial 3 0 6 rfa Ct •h 
3 c simult 0 o : 5 ir Q' !h I 37 d jsequontial 2 0 6 to Q' ,h 
4 c sequential 0 . 2 o ir Ila 1ir 38 ,d l1imult 3 0 o fo Q' ,Cf 
S d simult ' 6 ' o ' e ,h 10' ih ! ' 39 d joequential 8 3 : 6 ' ta :1a .h 
6 d 1simull 11 0 e ;ta la ih 40 ,c I sequential 3 0 , 5 'h IQ' h 
7 .c 1 ~mul t : o • 4 ' Ola lh JO' ' I 41!d lsequontili 2 o . o '. ta !tr Q' 
8 c 1sequential 1 0 s ,ta la lh I 42 c I sequential 3 1 4 · 0 h !h la 
9 c llimult I 0 0 0 .if ,;,. ja I 43 d joequential ' 0 7 , 0 Q' lh IQ' 
10 d isequential I 2 0 0 ta ~ ir :a ' 44 d 1oequential 0 0 1 e ·a 'Q' h 
11 1C iSequential 0 1 4 ' 0 Q' lh fa I I 45 d l• imult 2 · 3 1 2 1fa ·ta ·ta 
12 d laequential 0 3 6 Ct ,ta Ito ' 46 ·c l1imult 5 0 1 6
1ta lir ·ta 
13 d 1simult 0 o . 4 ,Q' jir lta 47 .c l1imult 11 o , 5 ,h 10' lh 
14 .c 11imult I 8 . 0 2 ta 1ir lta ' 48,d 1limult 6 1 2 , 6 h 1ta h ' 
15 c raequontili ; 1; 1 0 to Ito la I 49 d lsequonti li 0 1, o·a rh ' a 
16 d 'Simult I 3 1 o : 6 .to ja lh I I 50 c laequontial ' 3 i 0 O'h lfr ct 
17 c simult 3 , 5 0 fa Ito !!" : 51.c iseq.-ntial 0 1 5 tr !ta h 
18 d 1a.equential 2 . e 8 to It• ;to 52 d !Sequential 6 0 O'h •tr 'ct 
19 c simult 1 O· 0 h ,a 10' ' 53 d l• imult 3 3 . 6 ta Ito h 
20 d simult 7 0 6 .fa ir 'h 54 c loequontial 0 0 0 ct ·ir ct 
21 c •sequential 3 0 4 h ir ta 55 d .sequential 0 7 0 Ct h ct 
22 c sequential 3 4 3 h h rfa 56 d simult 0 2 O ir fa Cf 
23 d simult 3 1 6 fa fa fa 57 c 1equential e 2 5 fa ta h 
24 c sequential 0 0 0 ct dr Q' 58 c •simult 0 6 0 ir ta ct 
25 d sequential 0 0 O ir ir Q' 59 c simult 3 4 7 fa h fa 
26 d sequential 2 0 6 to Cf h 60 d sequential e 0 6h Q' ,h 
27 d sequential 6 7 Sh h ta 61 c ·sequential 0 0 0 ir ir ct 
28 c simult 6 0 O fa ir ct 62 c ·simult 0 1 5 ta h 
29 d sequential 6 3 0 h ·ta ir 63 c simult 0 0 0 ir ir 
30 d s1mult 3 0 O fo ct ct 64 c simult 0 5 5 to h 
31 d sequential 6 0 0 h ir Cf 65 c simult 0 0 5 ct h 
32 c simutt 6 0 O fa ir ct 66 d simult 0 7 0 ct .h ct 
33 c simutt 3 5 5 fa ta h 67 d simult 6 0 6 h a h 
34 c simult 4 4. h fa 68 d simult 7 0 eta ir fa 
• 
